Search results for 'levelling down objection' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Thomas Porter (2011). Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):197-206.score: 720.0
    I discuss Ingmar Persson’s recent argument that the Levelling Down Objection could be worse for prioritarians than for egalitarians. Persson’s argument depends upon the claim that indifference to changes in the average prioritarian value of benefits implies indifference to changes in the overall prioritarian value of a state of affairs. As I show, however, sensible conceptions of prioritarianism have no such implication. Therefore prioritarians have nothing to fear from the Levelling Down Objection.
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  2. Brett Doran (2001). Reconsidering the Levelling-Down Objection Against Egalitarianism. Utilitas 13 (01):65-.score: 540.0
    The levelling-down objection rejects the egalitarian view that it is intrinsically good to eliminate the inequality of an outcome by lowering the relevant good of those better off to the level of those worse off. Larry Temkin suggests that the position underlying this objection is an exclusionary version of the person-affecting view, in which an outcome can be better or worse only if persons are affected for better or worse. Temkin then defends egalitarianism by rejecting this (...)
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  3. Ingmar Persson (2008). Why Levelling Down Could Be Worse for Prioritarianism Than for Egalitarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):295 - 303.score: 480.0
    Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an (...)
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  4. Ingmar Persson (2011). Prioritarianism, Levelling Down and Welfare Diffusion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):307-311.score: 480.0
    I have earlier argued that, like egalitarianism, prioritarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection—which I do not find serious—but also that it faces related, more serious objections that egalitarianism avoids. In this paper I reply to Thomas Porter’s attempt to rebut this argument. I also trace the more serious objections to prioritarianism to the fact that it implies the desirability of welfare diffusion, i.e. that it is better all things considered if a quantity of welfare is (...)
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  5. Nils Holtug (1998). Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Analysis 58 (2):166–174.score: 450.0
  6. Andrew Mason (2001). Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Analysis 61 (3):246–254.score: 450.0
    In an important piece of work Derek Parfit distinguishes two different forms of egalitarianism, ‘Deontic’ and ‘Telic’ (Parfit 1995; see also Parfit 1997). He contrasts these with what he calls the Priority View, which is not strictly a form of egalitarianism at all, since it is not essentially concerned with how well off people are relative to each other. His main aim is to generate an adequate taxonomy of the positions available, but in the process he draws attention to some (...)
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  7. Larry Temkin (2000). Equality, Priority, and the Levelling-Down Objection. In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. Macmillan. 126-61.score: 450.0
  8. Thomas Christiano (2005). An Argument for Egalitarian Justice and Against the Levelling-Down Objection. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Law and Social Justice. Mit Press. 3--41.score: 450.0
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  9. Thomas Christiano & Will Braynen (2008). Inequality, Injustice and Levelling Down. Ratio 21 (4):392-420.score: 300.0
    The levelling down objection is the most serious objection to the principle of equality, but we think it can be conclusively defeated. It is serious because it pits the principle of equality squarely against the welfares of the persons whose welfares or resources are equalized. It suggests that there is something perverse about the principle of equality. In this paper, we argue that levelling down is not an implication of the principle of equality. To (...)
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  10. Re'em Segev (2009). Second-Order Equality and Levelling Down. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):425 – 443.score: 300.0
    Many think that equality is an intrinsic value. However, this view, especially when based on a consequential foundation, faces familiar objections related to the claim that equality is sometimes good for none and bad for some: most notably the levelling down objection. This article explores a unique (consequential) conception of equality, as part of a more general conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, which is not exposed to these objections.
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  11. Joseph Raz (2009). On the Value of Distributional Equality. In Stephen De Wijze, Matthew H. Kramer & Ian Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges. Routledge.score: 270.0
    The paper returns to the question whether equality in distribution is valuable in itself, or, if you like, whether it is intrinsically valuable. Its bulk is an examination of two familiar arguments against the intrinsic value of distributional equality: the levelling down objection and the objection that equality violates some person-affecting condition, in that its realisation does not improve the lot of people.
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  12. Oscar Horta (2010). Igualitarismo, igualación a la baja, antropocentrismo y valor de la vida. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 35 (1):133-152.score: 174.0
    Axiological egalitarianism claims that an outcome improves at least in some respect if the value it contains is more evenly distributed. In this paper I defend this form of egalitarianism and identify some of its corollaries. First, I consider and reject the levelling down objection. I then point out that egalitarianism casts doubt on the traditional view of the value of life in terms of maximization. Further, I argue that this theory also questions anthropocentric conceptions of value.
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  13. David McCarthy (forthcoming). Distributive Equality. Mind.score: 174.0
    Egalitarians think that equality in the distribution of goods somehow matters. But what exactly is egalitarianism? This article argues for a characterization based on novel principles essentially involving risk. The characterization is used to resolve disputed questions about egalitarianism, such as its compatibility with strong separability and its relation to other distributive theories. But egalitarianism is subject to a particularly severe form of the levelling down objection, and is claimed to be false.
     
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  14. Priority Equality & Levelling Down (2004). International Journal of Ethics ISSN 1535-4776 Volume 4 Number 1, Pp. 77-88© 2004 Nova Science Publishers, Inc. International Journal of Ethics: Ije 4:77.score: 160.0
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  15. Campbell Brown (2003). Giving Up Levelling Down. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):111-134.score: 140.0
  16. Jonathan Wolff, Levelling Down.score: 140.0
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  17. Patrick Lenta & Douglas Farland (2008). Desert, Justice and Capital Punishment. Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):273-290.score: 120.0
    Our purpose in this paper is to consider a procedural objection to the death penalty. According to this objection, even if the death penalty is deemed, substantively speaking, a morally acceptable punishment for at least some murderers, since only a small proportion of those guilty of aggravated murder are sentenced to death and executed, while the majority of murderers escape capital punishment as a result of arbitrariness and discrimination, capital punishment should be abolished. Our targets in this paper (...)
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  18. Larry S. Temkin (2005). Thinking About the Needy: A Reprise. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 8 (4):409 - 458.score: 97.3
    This article discusses Jan Narvesons Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Todays World, and Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy? and their relation to my Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations. Section 2 points out that Narvesons concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations (...)
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  19. Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.score: 93.0
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be construed (...)
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  20. Julia Tanner (2009). The Argument From Marginal Cases and the Slippery Slope Objection. Environmental Values 18 (1):51-66.score: 92.0
    Rationality (or something similar) is usually given as the relevant difference between all humans and animals; the reason humans do but animals do not deserve moral consideration. But according to the Argument from Marginal Cases not all humans are rational, yet if such (marginal) humans are morally considerable despite lacking rationality it would be arbitrary to deny animals with similar capacities a similar level of moral consideration. The slippery slope objection has it that although marginal humans are not strictly (...)
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  21. Larry S. Temkin (2003). Equality, Priority or What? Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):61-87.score: 90.0
    This paper aims to illuminate some issues in the equality, priority, or what debate. I characterize egalitarianism and prioritarianism, respond to the view that we should care about sufficiency or compassion rather than equality or priority, discuss the levelling down objection, and illustrate the significance of the distinction between prioritarianism and egalitarianism, establishing that the former is no substitute for the latter. In addition, I respond to Bertil Tungodden's views regarding the Slogan, the levelling down (...)
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  22. Larry S. Temkin (2003). Egalitarianism Defended. Ethics 113 (4):764-782.score: 90.0
    In "Equality, Priority, and Compassion," Roger Crisp rejects both egalitarianism and prioritarianism. Crisp contends that our concern for those who are badly off is best accounted for by appealing to "a sufficiency principle" based -- indirectly, via the notion of an impartial spectator -- on compassion for those who are badly off" (p. 745). A key example of Crisp's is the Beverly Hills case (discussed below). This example is directed against prioritarianism, but it also threatens egalitarianism. In this article, I (...)
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  23. Karsten Klint Jensen (2003). What is the Difference Between (Moderate) Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism? Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):89-109.score: 90.0
    It is common to define egalitarianism in terms of an inequality ordering, which is supposed to have some weight in overall evaluations of outcomes. Egalitarianism, thus defined, implies that levelling down makes the outcome better in respect of reducing inequality; however, the levelling down objection claims there can be nothing good about levelling down. The priority view, on the other hand, does not have this implication. This paper challenges the common view. The standard (...)
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  24. Marc Ramsay (2005). Teleological Egalitarianism Vs. The Slogan. Utilitas 17 (1):93-116.score: 90.0
    The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible (...)
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  25. Iwao Hirose (2009). Reconsidering the Value of Equality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):301-312.score: 90.0
    Some people believe that the equality of people's well-being makes an outcome better, other things being constant. Call this Telic Egalitarianism. In this paper I will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it with the interpretation that is proposed by Derek Parfit 1995 and widely accepted by many philosophers. I will argue that my proposed interpretation is more plausible than Parfit's. One of the virtues in my interpretation is that it shows his Levelling Down (...) does not undermine Telic Egalitarianism. I also believe that my interpretation better explains the important similarity and difference between Telic Egalitarianism and his proposed Priority View. (shrink)
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  26. Nils Holtug (2007). A Note on Conditional Egalitarianism. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):45-63.score: 90.0
    Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it (...)
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  27. Caj Strandberg (2001). Two Conceptions of Inequality. Philosophical Papers 30 (2):169–199.score: 90.0
    Abstract Following Temkin's Inequality I take my point of departure in an individualistic approach according to which a situation is bad in respect of inequality to the extent individuals in it have egalitarian complaints. After having criticised some of Temkin's notions of inequality, I argue that there are two proper egalitarian conceptions, the Equal Share Conception and the Place Conception. The first concerns how much welfare an individual can claim to have in order to have what she should have in (...)
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  28. Ingmar Persson (2012). Prioritarianism and Welfare Reductions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):289-301.score: 90.0
    Derek Parfit has argued that egalitarianism is exposed to a levelling down objection because it implies, implausibly, that a change, which consists only in the better-off sinking to the level of the worse-off, is in one respect better, though it is better for nobody. He claims that, in contrast, the prioritarian view that benefits to the worse-off have greater moral weight escapes this objection. This article contends, first, that prioritarianism is equally affected by the levelling (...)
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  29. O. F. Norheim (2009). A Note on Brock: Prioritarianism, Egalitarianism and the Distribution of Life Years. Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (9):565-569.score: 90.0
    The moral philosopher Dan Brock has argued that equality of health outcomes “even if achievable” is problematic as a goal in its own right—because it is open to the levelling down objection. The levelling down objection to egalitarianism has received surprisingly little attention in the bioethics literature on distribution of health and healthcare and deserves more attention. This paper discusses and accepts an example given by Brock showing that prioritarianism and egalitarianism may judge distributions (...)
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  30. Iwao Hirose, Equality, Priority, and Aggregation.score: 90.0
    In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy: Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse off people. The real difference between the two principles lies (...)
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  31. Ben Kotzee (2013). Educational Justice, Epistemic Justice, and Leveling Down. Educational Theory 63 (4):331-350.score: 68.0
    Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift argue that education is a positional good; this, they hold, implies that there is a qualified case for leveling down educational provision. In this essay, Ben Kotzee discusses Brighouse and Swift's argument for leveling down. He holds that the argument fails in its own terms and that, in presenting the problem of educational justice as one of balancing education's positional and nonpositional benefits, Brighouse and Swift lose sight of what a consideration of the (...)
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  32. Randall O'Reilly Dean Wyatte, Seth Herd, Brian Mingus (2012). The Role of Competitive Inhibition and Top-Down Feedback in Binding During Object Recognition. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 64.0
    How does the brain bind together visual features that are processed concurrently by different neurons into a unified percept suitable for processes such as object recognition? Here, we describe how simple, commonly accepted principles of neural processing can interact over time to solve the brain's binding problem. We focus on mechanisms of neural inhibition and top-down feedback. Specifically, we describe how inhibition creates competition among neural populations that code different features, effectively suppressing irrelevant information, and thus minimizing illusory conjunctions. (...)
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  33. Dean Wyatte, Seth Herd, Brian Mingus & Randall O'Reilly (2012). The Role of Competitive Inhibition and Top-Down Feedback in Binding During Object Recognition. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 64.0
    How does the brain bind together visual features that are processed concurrently by different neurons into a unified percept suitable for processes such as object recognition? Here, we describe how simple, commonly accepted principles of neural processing can interact over time to solve the brain's binding problem. We focus on mechanisms of neural inhibition and top-down feedback. Specifically, we describe how inhibition creates competition among neural populations that code different features, effectively suppressing irrelevant information, and thus minimizing illusory conjunctions. (...)
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  34. Shirley-Ann Rueschemeyer, Arthur M. Glenberg, Michael P. Kaschak, Karsten Mueller & Angela D. Friederici (2010). Top-Down and Bottom-Up Contributions to Understanding Sentences Describing Objects in Motion. Frontiers in Psychology 1:183-183.score: 60.0
    Theories of embodied language comprehension propose that the neural systems used for perception, action and emotion are also engaged during language comprehension. Consistent with these theories, behavioral studies have shown that the comprehension of language that describes motion is affected by simultaneously perceiving a moving stimulus (Kaschak et al., 2005). In two neuroimaging studies, we investigate whether comprehension of sentences describing moving objects activates brain areas known to support the visual perception of moving objects (i.e., area MT/V5). Our data indicate (...)
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  35. Ben Saunders (2011). Parfit's Leveling Down Argument Against Egalitarianism. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 56.7
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  36. Maciej Kosilo, Sophie M. Wuerger, Matt Craddock, Ben J. Jennings, Amelia R. Hunt & Jasna Martinovic (2013). Low-Level and High-Level Modulations of Fixational Saccades and High Frequency Oscillatory Brain Activity in a Visual Object Classification Task. Frontiers in Psychology 4:948.score: 52.0
    Until recently induced gamma-band activity (GBA) was considered a neural marker of cortical object representation. However induced GBA in the electroencephalogram (EEG) is susceptible to artifacts caused by miniature fixational saccades. Recent studies have demonstrated that fixational saccades also reflect high-level representational processes. Do high-level as opposed to low-level factors influence fixational saccades? What is the effect of these factors on artifact-free GBA? To investigate this, we conducted separate eye tracking and EEG experiments using identical designs. Participants classified line drawings (...)
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  37. Trevor A. Harley (1984). A Critique of Top‐Down Independent Levels Models of Speech Production: Evidence From Non‐Plan‐Internal Speech Errors. Cognitive Science 8 (3):191-219.score: 50.0
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  38. [deleted]El-Deredy W. (2008). Influence of Top-Down Predictions on Gamma Band Activity During Object Recognition with Incomplete Sensory Data. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2.score: 50.0
  39. Moshe Bar (2005). Top-Down Facilitation of Visual Object Recognition. In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. 140--145.score: 50.0
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  40. J. E. Hummel (2000). Where View-Based Theories of Human Object Recognition Break Down: The Role of Structure in Human Shape Perception. In Eric Dietrich Art Markman (ed.), Cognitive Dynamics: Conceptual Change in Humans and Machines. Lawrence Erlbaum. 157--185.score: 50.0
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  41. Zhe Li, Jannik Fritsch, Sven Wachsmuth & Gerhard Sagerer (2006). Recognition, Categorization and Detection-An Object-Oriented Approach Using a Top-Down and Bottom-Up Process for Manipulative Action Recognition. In O. Stock & M. Schaerf (eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag. 212-221.score: 50.0
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  42. A. Voss, K. Rothermund & J. Brandtstädter (2006). Motivated Binding: Top-Down Influences in the Encoding of Compound Objects. In Hubert Zimmer, Axel Mecklinger & Ulman Lindenberger (eds.), Handbook of Binding and Memory: Perspectives From Cognitive Neuroscience. Oup Oxford. 363--377.score: 50.0
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  43. Mark Schroeder, The Negative Reason Existential Fallacy.score: 48.7
    This style of argument comes up everywhere in the philosophy of practical reason, leveled against theories of the norm of means-end coherence on intention, against Humean theories of reasons, and many other places. It comes up in normative moral theory – for example, in arguments against buck-passing. It comes up in epistemology, in discussions of how to account for the rational connection between believing the premises of a valid argument and believing its conclusion. And it comes up in political philosophy, (...)
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  44. S. Segall (forthcoming). In Defense of Priority (and Equality). Politics, Philosophy and Economics:1470594-14550966.score: 48.7
    In a recent article, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism fails to account for the shift in moral significance in gains to individuals in interpersonal as compared to intrapersonal cases. In this article, I show that the priority view escapes this objection but in a way that deprives it of (some of) its anti-egalitarian stance. Despite Otsuka and Voorhoeve, prioritarianism, rightly understood, provides consistent and attractive recommendations in both single- and multi-person cases. Yet prioritarians, the article goes (...)
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  45. Michael Weber (2014). Prioritarianism. Philosophy Compass 9 (11):756-768.score: 48.7
    Prioritarianism can usefully be seen as a corrective to both egalitarianism and utilitarianism. It allegedly corrects for egalitarianism insofar as it tends toward equality but seems immune to the Leveling Down Objection. It allegedly corrects for utilitarianism insofar as it emphasizes improving peoples' lives but is distribution-sensitive, favoring benefiting those who are worse off over those who are better off, other things equal. The best way to understand the view and assess its prospects is to see whether on (...)
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  46. Ulrich Müller & Jeremy I. M. Carpendale (2001). Objectivity, Intentionality, and Levels of Explanation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):55-56.score: 48.0
    Notwithstanding many similarities between Thelen et al.'s and Piaget's accounts of the A-not-B error, we argue that, in contrast to Piaget, they do not explicitly address the issue of objectivity. We suggest that this omission is partly due to the fact that Thelen et al. and Piaget's accounts are pitched at different levels of explanation.
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  47. Michael H. Kottow (1980). Levels of Objectivity in the Analysis of Medicoethical Decision Making: A Reply. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 5 (3):230-233.score: 46.7
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  48. Tom R. Burns & Dave Meeker (1978). Conflict and Structure in Multi-Level Multiple Objective Decision-Making Systems. In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. 67--114.score: 46.7
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  49. Edmund T. Rolls (1997). ShimonUllmanHigh-Level Vision: Object Recognition and Visual Cognition£ 29.50 (Xviii+ 412 Pages) 1996MIT PressBradfordISBN 0 262 21013 4. [REVIEW] Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (5):197.score: 46.7
     
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  50. Andrew F. March (2011). Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):246-272.score: 45.0
    This paper argues that the four most plausible arguments compatible with public reason for an outright legal ban on all forms of polygamy are unvictorious. I consider the types of arguments political liberals would have to insist on, and precisely how strongly, in order for a general prohibition against polygamy to be justified, while also considering what general attitude towards "marriage" and legal recognition of the right to marry are most consistent with political liberalism. I argue that a liberal state (...)
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