Search results for 'levelling down objection' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Thomas Porter (2011). Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):197-206.
    I discuss Ingmar Persson’s recent argument that the Levelling Down Objection could be worse for prioritarians than for egalitarians. Persson’s argument depends upon the claim that indifference to changes in the average prioritarian value of benefits implies indifference to changes in the overall prioritarian value of a state of affairs. As I show, however, sensible conceptions of prioritarianism have no such implication. Therefore prioritarians have nothing to fear from the Levelling Down Objection.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2.  45
    Brett Doran (2001). Reconsidering the Levelling-Down Objection Against Egalitarianism. Utilitas 13 (1):65.
    The levelling-down objection rejects the egalitarian view that it is intrinsically good to eliminate the inequality of an outcome by lowering the relevant good of those better off to the level of those worse off. Larry Temkin suggests that the position underlying this objection is an exclusionary version of the person-affecting view, in which an outcome can be better or worse only if persons are affected for better or worse. Temkin then defends egalitarianism by rejecting this (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Ingmar Persson (2008). Why Levelling Down Could Be Worse for Prioritarianism Than for Egalitarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):295-303.
    Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  4.  75
    Ingmar Persson (2011). Prioritarianism, Levelling Down and Welfare Diffusion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):307-311.
    I have earlier argued that, like egalitarianism, prioritarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection—which I do not find serious—but also that it faces related, more serious objections that egalitarianism avoids. In this paper I reply to Thomas Porter’s attempt to rebut this argument. I also trace the more serious objections to prioritarianism to the fact that it implies the desirability of welfare diffusion, i.e. that it is better all things considered if a quantity of welfare is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  75
    Andrew Mason (2001). Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Analysis 61 (3):246–254.
    In an important piece of work Derek Parfit distinguishes two different forms of egalitarianism, ‘Deontic’ and ‘Telic’. He contrasts these with what he calls the Priority View, which is not strictly a form of egalitarianism at all, since it is not essentially concerned with how well off people are relative to each other. His main aim is to generate an adequate taxonomy of the positions available, but in the process he draws attention to some of the different problems they face. (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  6.  32
    Larry Temkin (2000). Equality, Priority, and the Levelling-Down Objection. In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. Macmillan 126-61.
  7. Nils Holtug (1998). Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Analysis 58 (2):166–174.
  8.  5
    N. Holtug (1998). Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Analysis 58 (2):166-174.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  4
    A. Mason (2001). Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection. Analysis 61 (3):246-254.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Thomas Christiano (2005). An Argument for Egalitarian Justice and Against the Levelling-Down Objection. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Law and Social Justice. MIT Press 3--41.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  71
    Campbell Brown (2003). Giving Up Levelling Down. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):111-134.
    The so-called “Levelling Down Objection” is commonly believed to occupy a central role in the debate between egalitarians and prioritarians. Egalitarians think that equality is good in itself, and so they are committed to finding value even in such equality as may only be achieved by “levelling down”–i.e., by merely reducing the better off to the level of the worse off. Although egalitarians might deny that levelling down could ever make for an all-things-considered (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  12.  55
    Re'em Segev (2009). Second-Order Equality and Levelling Down. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):425 – 443.
    Many think that equality is an intrinsic value. However, this view, especially when based on a consequential foundation, faces familiar objections related to the claim that equality is sometimes good for none and bad for some: most notably the levelling down objection. This article explores a unique (consequential) conception of equality, as part of a more general conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, which is not exposed to these objections.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  13. Thomas Christiano & Will Braynen (2008). Inequality, Injustice and Levelling Down. Ratio 21 (4):392-420.
    The levelling down objection is the most serious objection to the principle of equality, but we think it can be conclusively defeated. It is serious because it pits the principle of equality squarely against the welfares of the persons whose welfares or resources are equalized. It suggests that there is something perverse about the principle of equality. In this paper, we argue that levelling down is not an implication of the principle of equality. To (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14. Joseph Raz (2009). On the Value of Distributional Equality. In Stephen De Wijze, Matthew H. Kramer & Ian Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges. Routledge
    The paper returns to the question whether equality in distribution is valuable in itself, or, if you like, whether it is intrinsically valuable. Its bulk is an examination of two familiar arguments against the intrinsic value of distributional equality: the levelling down objection and the objection that equality violates some person-affecting condition, in that its realisation does not improve the lot of people.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Priority Equality & Levelling Down (2004). International Journal of Ethics ISSN 1535-4776 Volume 4 Number 1, Pp. 77-88© 2004 Nova Science Publishers, Inc. International Journal of Ethics: Ije 4:77.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  8
    David McCarthy (2015). Distributive Equality. Mind 124 (496):1045-1109.
    Egalitarians think that equality in the distribution of goods somehow matters. But what exactly is egalitarianism? This article argues for a characterization based on novel principles essentially involving risk. The characterization is then used to resolve disputed questions about egalitarianism. These include: the way egalitarianism is concerned with patterns, in particular its relationship to strong separability; the relationship between egalitarianism and other distributive views, such as concerns with fairness and with giving priority to the worse off; and the relationship between (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17.  9
    Oscar Horta (2010). Igualitarismo, igualación a la baja, antropocentrismo y valor de la vida. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 35 (1):133-152.
    Axiological egalitarianism claims that an outcome improves at least in some respect if the value it contains is more evenly distributed. In this paper I defend this form of egalitarianism and identify some of its corollaries. First, I consider and reject the levelling down objection. I then point out that egalitarianism casts doubt on the traditional view of the value of life in terms of maximization. Further, I argue that this theory also questions anthropocentric conceptions of value.
    Translate
      Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Jonathan Wolff, Levelling Down.
  19. Ingmar Persson (2008). Why Levelling Down Could Be Worse for Prioritarianism Than for Egalitarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):295-303.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Patrick Lenta & Douglas Farland (2008). Desert, Justice and Capital Punishment. Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):273-290.
    Our purpose in this paper is to consider a procedural objection to the death penalty. According to this objection, even if the death penalty is deemed, substantively speaking, a morally acceptable punishment for at least some murderers, since only a small proportion of those guilty of aggravated murder are sentenced to death and executed, while the majority of murderers escape capital punishment as a result of arbitrariness and discrimination, capital punishment should be abolished. Our targets in this paper (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  66
    Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  22. Larry S. Temkin (2003). Egalitarianism Defended. Ethics 113 (4):764-782.
    In "Equality, Priority, and Compassion," Roger Crisp rejects both egalitarianism and prioritarianism. Crisp contends that our concern for those who are badly off is best accounted for by appealing to "a sufficiency principle" based -- indirectly, via the notion of an impartial spectator -- on compassion for those who are badly off" (p. 745). A key example of Crisp's is the Beverly Hills case (discussed below). This example is directed against prioritarianism, but it also threatens egalitarianism. In this article, I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  23. Larry S. Temkin (2003). Equality, Priority or What? Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):61-87.
    This paper aims to illuminate some issues in the equality, priority, or what debate. I characterize egalitarianism and prioritarianism, respond to the view that we should care about sufficiency or compassion rather than equality or priority, discuss the levelling down objection, and illustrate the significance of the distinction between prioritarianism and egalitarianism, establishing that the former is no substitute for the latter. In addition, I respond to Bertil Tungodden's views regarding the Slogan, the levelling down (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  24.  34
    Iwao Hirose (2009). Reconsidering the Value of Equality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):301-312.
    Some people believe that the equality of people's well-being makes an outcome better, other things being constant. Call this Telic Egalitarianism. In this paper I will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it with the interpretation that is proposed by Derek Parfit 1995 and widely accepted by many philosophers. I will argue that my proposed interpretation is more plausible than Parfit's. One of the virtues in my interpretation is that it shows his Levelling Down (...) does not undermine Telic Egalitarianism. I also believe that my interpretation better explains the important similarity and difference between Telic Egalitarianism and his proposed Priority View. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  25.  95
    Karsten Klint Jensen (2003). What is the Difference Between (Moderate) Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism? Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):89-109.
    It is common to define egalitarianism in terms of an inequality ordering, which is supposed to have some weight in overall evaluations of outcomes. Egalitarianism, thus defined, implies that levelling down makes the outcome better in respect of reducing inequality; however, the levelling down objection claims there can be nothing good about levelling down. The priority view, on the other hand, does not have this implication. This paper challenges the common view. The standard (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  26.  20
    Ingmar Persson (2012). Prioritarianism and Welfare Reductions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):289-301.
    Derek Parfit has argued that egalitarianism is exposed to a levelling down objection because it implies, implausibly, that a change, which consists only in the better-off sinking to the level of the worse-off, is in one respect better, though it is better for nobody. He claims that, in contrast, the prioritarian view that benefits to the worse-off have greater moral weight escapes this objection. This article contends, first, that prioritarianism is equally affected by the levelling (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  10
    O. F. Norheim (2009). A Note on Brock: Prioritarianism, Egalitarianism and the Distribution of Life Years. Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (9):565-569.
    The moral philosopher Dan Brock has argued that equality of health outcomes “even if achievable” is problematic as a goal in its own right—because it is open to the levelling down objection. The levelling down objection to egalitarianism has received surprisingly little attention in the bioethics literature on distribution of health and healthcare and deserves more attention. This paper discusses and accepts an example given by Brock showing that prioritarianism and egalitarianism may judge distributions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28.  26
    Nils Holtug (2007). A Note on Conditional Egalitarianism. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):45-63.
    Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29.  58
    Marc Ramsay (2005). Teleological Egalitarianism Vs. The Slogan. Utilitas 17 (1):93-116.
    The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  13
    Iwao Hirose, Equality, Priority, and Aggregation.
    In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy: Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse off people. The real difference between the two principles lies (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  21
    Caj Strandberg (2001). Two Conceptions of Inequality. Philosophical Papers 30 (2):169–199.
    Abstract Following Temkin's Inequality I take my point of departure in an individualistic approach according to which a situation is bad in respect of inequality to the extent individuals in it have egalitarian complaints. After having criticised some of Temkin's notions of inequality, I argue that there are two proper egalitarian conceptions, the Equal Share Conception and the Place Conception. The first concerns how much welfare an individual can claim to have in order to have what she should have in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  22
    Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2014). Indirect Discrimination is Not Necessarily Unjust. Journal of Practical Ethics 2 (2):33-57.
    This article argues that, as commonly understood, indirect discrimination is not necessarily unjust: 1) indirect discrimination involves the disadvantaging in relation to a particular benefit and such disadvantages are not unjust if the overall distribution of benefits and burdens is just; 2) indirect discrimination focuses on groups and group averages and ignores the distribution of harms and benefits within groups subjected to discrimination, but distributive justice is concerned with individuals; and 3) if indirect discrimination as such is unjust, strict egalitarianism (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Julia Tanner (2009). The Argument From Marginal Cases and the Slippery Slope Objection. Environmental Values 18 (1):51-66.
    Rationality (or something similar) is usually given as the relevant difference between all humans and animals; the reason humans do but animals do not deserve moral consideration. But according to the Argument from Marginal Cases not all humans are rational, yet if such (marginal) humans are morally considerable despite lacking rationality it would be arbitrary to deny animals with similar capacities a similar level of moral consideration. The slippery slope objection has it that although marginal humans are not strictly (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  34.  10
    Julius Schälike (2009). Levelling-up-Egalitarismus Gerechtigkeit, Gleichheit und Neid. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (3):417-437.
    Die egalitaristische Position in der Debatte um distributive Gerechtigkeit wird üblicherweise so verstanden, dass sie die These enthält, der Relation der Gleichheit komme ein intrinsischer Wert zu. Diese These ist dem Levelling-down-Einwand ausgesetzt. Unter dem Eindruck dieses Einwandes ist vielfach argumentiert worden, Gerechtigkeit sei kein relationaler Begriff; Gerechtigkeit herrsche vielmehr dann, wenn nicht-relationale moralische Standards erfüllt seien. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass Gleichheit zwar tatsächlich keinen intrinsischen Wert besitzt, dass Gerechtigkeitsstandards jedoch nicht mit den non-relationalen Standards, auf die (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  42
    Larry S. Temkin (2005). Thinking About the Needy: A Reprise. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 8 (4):409 - 458.
    This article discusses Jan Narvesons Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Todays World, and Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy? and their relation to my Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations. Section 2 points out that Narvesons concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  2
    Zeljka Buturovic (2012). Deep Down: Consequentialist Assumptions Underlying Policy Differences. Critical Review 24 (2):269-289.
    A conditional survey establishes a preliminary case for believing that policy differences are to some extent driven by fundamental beliefs about empirical aspects of society and economics. The survey shows willingness in about a third of all respondents to shift their expressed policy preferences when asked a hypothetical question positing negative consequences of their initial preferences. This suggests that assumptions about the consequences of public policies may play as important a role in policy preferences, or a more important role, than (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  44
    Simon Wigley (2012). Justicized Consequentialism: Prioritizing the Right or the Good? [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (4):467-479.
    A standard criticism of act-utilitarianism is that it is only indirectly concerned with the distribution of welfare between individuals and, therefore, does not take adequate account of the separateness between individuals. In response a number of philosophers have argued that act-utilitarianism is only vulnerable to that objection because it adheres to a theory of the good which ignores non-welfarist sources of intrinsic value such as justice. Fred Feldman, for example, argues that intrinsic value is independently generated by the receipt (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  78
    Gábor Bács & János Tőzsér (2012). The Works of Art From the Philosophically Innocent Point of View. Hungarian Philosophical Review 57 (4):7-17.
    the Mona Lisa, the Mondscheinsonate, the Chanson d’automne are works of art, the salt shaker on your table, the car in your garage, or the pijamas on your bed are not. the basic question of the metaphysics of works of art is this: what makes a thing a work of art? that is: what sort of property do works of art have in virtue of which they are works of art? or more simply: what sort of property being a work (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  18
    Larry Temkin (2015). Equality as Comparative Fairness. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):n/a-n/a.
    The goal of this article is modest. It is simply to help illuminate the nature of egalitarianism. More particularly, I aim to show what certain egalitarians are committed to, and to suggest that equality, as these egalitarians understand it, is an important normative ideal that cannot simply be ignored in moral deliberations. In doing this, I distinguish between equality as universality, equality as impartiality, and equality as comparability, and also between instrumental and non-instrumental egalitarianism. I then characterise the version of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  7
    Michela Betta, Robert Jones & James Latham (2014). Being and Care in Organisation and Management – A Heideggerian Interpretation of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Philosophy of Management 13 (1):5-20.
    We propose to understand the global financial crisis of 2008 as an historical event marked by public decisions, economic evaluations and ratings, and business practices driven by a sense of subjugation to powerful others, uncritical conformity to serendipitous rules, and a levelling down of all meaningful differences. The crisis has also revealed two important things: that the free-market economy has inherent problems highlighting the limits of business, and, consequently, that the business organisation is not as strong (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  83
    Mark Schroeder, The Negative Reason Existential Fallacy.
    This style of argument comes up everywhere in the philosophy of practical reason, leveled against theories of the norm of means-end coherence on intention, against Humean theories of reasons, and many other places. It comes up in normative moral theory – for example, in arguments against buck-passing. It comes up in epistemology, in discussions of how to account for the rational connection between believing the premises of a valid argument and believing its conclusion. And it comes up in political philosophy, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  12
    Michael Weber (2014). Prioritarianism. Philosophy Compass 9 (11):756-768.
    Prioritarianism can usefully be seen as a corrective to both egalitarianism and utilitarianism. It allegedly corrects for egalitarianism insofar as it tends toward equality but seems immune to the Leveling Down Objection. It allegedly corrects for utilitarianism insofar as it emphasizes improving peoples' lives but is distribution-sensitive, favoring benefiting those who are worse off over those who are better off, other things equal. The best way to understand the view and assess its prospects is to see whether on (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  28
    Yujin Nagasawa (2013). Models of Anselmian Theism. Faith and Philosophy 30 (1):3-25.
    The so-called Anselmian thesis says that God is that than which no greater can be thought. This thesis has been widely accepted among traditional theists and it has for several hundred years been a central notion whenever philosophers debate the existence and nature of God. Proponents of the thesis are often silent, however, about exactly what it means to say that God is that than which no greater can be thought. The aim of this paper is to offer an answer (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  4
    Facundo García Valverde (2014). ¿Es Realmente Valiosa la Igualdad Política? Análisis Filosófico 34 (1):35-60.
    El objetivo de este artículo es defender el valor normativo de un principio de igualdad de oportunidades para influir políticamente en contra de un principio que las distribuya de manera desigual pero beneficiando a los peor situados. Para ello, se muestra que la influencia política es un bien de un tipo especial que permite rechazar la objeción de la nivelación hacia abajo y que la igualdad política, aunque pueda ser derrotada por consideraciones epistémicas, es absolutamente necesaria para criticar aspectos inequitativos (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  6
    S. Segall (2015). In Defense of Priority. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (4):343-364.
    In a recent article, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism fails to account for the shift in moral significance in gains to individuals in interpersonal as compared to intrapersonal cases. In this article, I show that the priority view escapes this objection but in a way that deprives it of its anti-egalitarian stance. Despite Otsuka and Voorhoeve, prioritarianism, rightly understood, provides consistent and attractive recommendations in both single- and multi-person cases. Yet prioritarians, the article goes on to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  1
    Shlomi Segall (2015). In Defense of Priority. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (4):343-364.
    In a recent article, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism fails to account for the shift in moral significance in gains to individuals in interpersonal as compared to intrapersonal cases. In this article, I show that the priority view escapes this objection but in a way that deprives it of its anti-egalitarian stance. Despite Otsuka and Voorhoeve, prioritarianism, rightly understood, provides consistent and attractive recommendations in both single- and multi-person cases. Yet prioritarians, the article goes on to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  49
    Mark R. Wicclair (2011). Conscientious Objection in Health Care: An Ethical Analysis. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Three approaches to conscientious objection in health care: conscience absolutism, the incompatibility thesis, and compromise; 3. Ethical limitations on the exercise of conscience; 4. Pharmacies, health care institutions, and conscientious objection; 5. Students, residents, and conscience-based exemptions; 6. Conscience clauses: too little and too much protection; References.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  48. Robert F. Card (2007). Conscientious Objection and Emergency Contraception. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (6):8 – 14.
    This article argues that practitioners have a professional ethical obligation to dispense emergency contraception, even given conscientious objection to this treatment. This recent controversy affects all medical professionals, including physicians as well as pharmacists. This article begins by analyzing the option of referring the patient to another willing provider. Objecting professionals may conscientiously refuse because they consider emergency contraception to be equivalent to abortion or because they believe contraception itself is immoral. This article critically evaluates these reasons and concludes (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  49.  75
    Nick Bostrom (2005). In Defense of Posthuman Dignity. Bioethics 19 (3):202–214.
    Positions on the ethics of human enhancement technologies can be (crudely) characterized as ranging from transhumanism to bioconservatism. Transhumanists believe that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves, and that parents should normally have the right to choose enhancements for their children-to-be. Bioconservatives (whose ranks include such diverse writers as Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, George Annas, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Rifkin, and Bill McKibben) are generally (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  50. John Keown (2002). Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation. Cambridge University Press.
    Whether the law should permit voluntary euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide is one of the most vital questions facing all modern societies. Internationally, the main obstacle to legalisation has proved to be the objection that, even if they were morally acceptable in certain 'hard cases', voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide could not be effectively controlled; society would slide down a 'slippery slope' to the killing of patients who did not make a free and informed request, or for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000