Search results for 'logical compounds' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  21
    Michael D. Root (1977). Nelson Goodman and the Logical Articulation of Nominal Compounds. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (2):259-271.
    Nelson Goodman claims to have given us a criterion for likeness of meaning that is more stringent than simple coextensiveness and yet that avoids the familiar extentionalist objections. The notion of a nominal compound plays a key role in his account. I show that Goodman's comments concerning this notion are inadequate, that his comments concerning expressions like unicorn-picture are subject to two serious objections: they don't support his claims about likeness of meaning and they make English an unlearnable language.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  8
    Angelo Gilio & Giuseppe Sanfilippo (2014). Conditional Random Quantities and Compounds of Conditionals. Studia Logica 102 (4):709-729.
    In this paper we consider conditional random quantities (c.r.q.’s) in the setting of coherence. Based on betting scheme, a c.r.q. X|H is not looked at as a restriction but, in a more extended way, as \({XH + \mathbb{P}(X|H)H^c}\) ; in particular (the indicator of) a conditional event E|H is looked at as EH + P(E|H)H c . This extended notion of c.r.q. allows algebraic developments among c.r.q.’s even if the conditioning events are different; then, for instance, we can give a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  9
    Peter M. Simons (1999). Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realists. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 109-136.
    Although Brentano generally regarded himself as at heart a metaphysician, his work then and subsequently has always been dominated by the Psychology. He is rightly celebrated as the person who reintroduced the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of intentio back into the study of the mind. Brentano's inspiration was Aristotle's theory of perception in De anima, though his terminology of intentional inexistence was medieval. For the history of the work and its position in his output may I refer to my Introduction to the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Mark Jago (2007). Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience. Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.
    I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6. Tuomas E. Tahko (2014). The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth. In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge University Press 233-248.
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7. Andrea Iacona (forthcoming). Two Notions of Logical Form. Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2002). What is Logical Form? In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Clarendon Press 54--90.
    Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the External World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9. Michael Heidelberger (2003). The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism. In Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee Salmon (eds.), Logical Empiricism: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 233--262.
    It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, de- riving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967). Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik of analytical philosophy, and launched the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. Michael Glanzberg (2015). Logical Consequence and Natural Language. In Colin Caret & Ole Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press 71-120.
    One of the great successes in the study of language has been the application of formal methods, including those of formal logic. Even so, this chapter argues against one way of accounting for this success, by arguing that the study of natural language semantics and of logical consequence relations are not the same. There is indeed a lot we can glean about logic from looking at our languages, and at our inferential practices, but the semantic properties of natural languages (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  19
    Yaroslav Shramko (2014). The Logical Way of Being True: Truth Values and the Ontological Foundation of Logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (2):119-131.
    In this paper I reject the normative interpretation of logic and give reasons for a realistic account based on the ontological treatment of logical values.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  4
    Andrzej Pietruszczak (2004). The Axiomatization of Horst Wessel's Strict Logical Consequence Relation. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:121-138.
    In his book from 1984 Horst Wessel presents the system of strict logical consequence Fs (see also (Wessel, 1979)). The author maintained that this system axiomatized the relation |=s of strict logical consequence between formulas of Classical Propositional Calculi (CPC). Let |= be the classical consequence relation in CPC. The relation |=s is defined as follows: phi |=s psi iff phi |= psi, every variable from psi occurs in phi and neither phi is a contradiction nor psi is (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  5
    Andrzej Pietruszczak (2004). The Consequence Relation Preserving Logical Information. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:89-120.
    Information is contained in statements and «flows» from their structure and meaning of expressions they contain. The information that flows only from the meaning of logical constants and logical structure of statements we will call logical information. In this paper we present a formal explication of this notion which is proper for sentences being Boolean combination of atomic sentences. 1 Therefore we limit ourselves to analyzing logical information flowing only from the meaning of truth-value connectives and (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  1
    G. Robles & J. M. Méndez (2011). A Class of Simpler Logical Matrices for the Variable-Sharing Property. Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (3):241-249.
    In our paper “A general characterization of the variable-sharing property by means of logical matrices”, a general class of so-called “Relevant logical matrices”, RMLs, is defined. The aim of this paper is to define a class of simpler Relevant logical matrices RMLs′serving the same purpose that RMLs, to wit: any logic verified by an RML′has the variable-sharing property and related properties predicable of the logic of entailment E and of the logic of relevance R.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (2015). Logical Consequence: Its Nature, Structure, and Application. In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press
    Recent work in philosophical logic has taken interesting and unexpected turns. It has seen not only a proliferation of logical systems, but new applications of a wide range of different formal theories to philosophical questions. As a result, philosophers have been forced to revisit the nature and foundation of core logical concepts, chief amongst which is the concept of logical consequence. This essay sets the contributions of the volume in context and identifies how they advance important debates (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Corine Besson (2014). A Note on Logical Truth. Logique Et Analyse 227:309-331.
    Classical logic counts sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ as logically true. A standard objection to classical logic is that Alice’s self-identity, for instance, is not a matter of logic because the identity of particular objects is not a matter of logic. For this reason, many philosophers argue that classical logic is not the right logic, and that it should be abandoned in favour of free logic — logic free of existential commitments with respect to singular terms. In (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Simone Aurora (2015). A Forgotten Source in the History of Linguistics: Husserl's Logical Investigations. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 11 (5).
    In appearance, Husserl’s writings seem not to have had any influence on linguistic research, nor does what the German philosopher wrote about language seem to be worth a place in the history of linguistics. The purpose of the paper is exactly to contrast this view, by reassessing both the position and the role of Husserl’s early masterpiece — the Logical Investigations — within the history of linguistics. To this end, I will focus mainly on the third (On the theory (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Declan Smithies (2015). Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience. Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Michael Friedman (1999). Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge University Press.
    In this collection of essays one of the preeminent philosophers of science writing today offers a reinterpretation of the enduring significance of logical positivism, the revolutionary philosophical movement centered around the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and '30s. Michael Friedman argues that the logical positivists were radicals not by presenting a new version of empiricism (as is often thought to be the case) but rather by offering a new conception of a priori knowledge and its role in empirical (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   63 citations  
  20.  19
    Hashem Morvarid (forthcoming). Hale on the Absoluteness of Logical Necessity. Acta Analytica:1-11.
    Hale has argued that logical necessities are absolute in the sense that there is no competing kind of modality under which they may be false. In this paper, I argue that there are competing kinds of modality, which I call “essentialist modalities,” under which logical necessities may be false. Since it is counter-intuitive to say that logical necessities are not absolute, my argument, if correct, shows that Hale’s characterization of absolute necessity does not adequately capture the intuitive (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  61
    Achille C. Varzi (2002). On Logical Relativity. Philosophical Issues 12 (1):197-219.
    One logic or many? I say—many. Or rather, I say there is one logic for each way of specifying the class of all possible circumstances, or models, i.e., all ways of interpreting a given language. But because there is no unique way of doing this, I say there is no unique logic except in a relative sense. Indeed, given any two competing logical theories T1 and T2 (in the same language) one could always consider their common core, T, and (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  15
    Thomas N. P. A. Brouwer (2015). Prospects for a Cognitive Norm Account of Logical Consequence. In Pavel Arazim & Michal Danzak (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2014. College Publications 1-19.
    When some P implies some Q, this should have some impact on what attitudes we take to P and Q. In other words: logical consequence has a normative import. I use this idea, recently explored by a number of scholars, as a stepping stone to a bolder view: that relations of logical consequence can be identified with norms on our propositional attitudes, or at least that our talk of logical consequence can be explained in terms of such (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  90
    Bertrand Russell (1985). The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Open Court.
    THE PHILOSOPHY which I advocate is generally regarded as a species of realism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in it which seem contrary to that doctrine. For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and their opponents as a funda- mental one; I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress. I hold that logic is what is fundamental (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   90 citations  
  24. John Corcoran & Alfred Tarski (1986). What Are Logical Notions? History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.
    In this manuscript, published here for the first time, Tarski explores the concept of logical notion. He draws on Klein's Erlanger Programm to locate the logical notions of ordinary geometry as those invariant under all transformations of space. Generalizing, he explicates the concept of logical notion of an arbitrary discipline.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   55 citations  
  25. Sean Crawford (2013). The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory. In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Corine Besson (2010). Propositions, Dispositions and Logical Knowledge. In M. Bonelli & A. Longo (eds.), Quid Est Veritas? Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes. Bibliopolis
    This paper considers the question of what knowing a logical rule consists in. I defend the view that knowing a logical rule is having propositional knowledge. Many philosophers reject this view and argue for the alternative view that knowing a logical rule is, at least at the fundamental level, having a disposition to infer according to it. To motivate this dispositionalist view, its defenders often appeal to Carroll’s regress argument in ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’. I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27. Lionel Shapiro (2011). Deflating Logical Consequence. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
    Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  28. Scott Edgar (2009). Logical Empiricism, Politics, and Professionalism. Science and Education 18 (2):177-189.
    This paper considers George A. Reisch’s account of the role of Cold War political forces in shaping the apolitical stance that came to dominate philosophy of science in the late 1940s and 1950s. It argues that at least as early as the 1930s, Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap already held that philosophy of science could not properly have political aims, and further suggests that political forces alone cannot explain this view’s rise to dominance during the Cold War, since (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Ian Proops (2011). Logical Atomism in Russell and Wittgenstein. In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. OUP Oxford
    An essay examining logical atomism as it arises in Russell and the early Wittgenstein.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Jens Christian Bjerring (2013). Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience: An Impossibility Result. Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.
    In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal agents (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31.  31
    Niels Skovgaard-Olsen (forthcoming). The Problem of Logical Omniscience, the Preface Paradox, and Doxastic Commitments. Synthese:1-23.
    The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom’s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in particular (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Philippe Mongin (2012). The Doctrinal Paradox, the Discursive Dilemma, and Logical Aggregation Theory. Theory and Decision 73 (3):315-355.
    Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33.  32
    Alan W. Richardson (1998). Carnap's Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to the history of analytic philosophy in general and of logical positivism in particular. It provides the first detailed and comprehensive study of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy. The focus of the book is Carnap's first major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World). It reveals tensions within the context of German epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   32 citations  
  34. Corine Besson (2012). Logical Knowledge and Ordinary Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):59-82.
    This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35.  40
    Roy T. Cook (2014). There is No Paradox of Logical Validity. Logica Universalis 8 (3-4):447-467.
    A number of authors have argued that Peano Arithmetic supplemented with a logical validity predicate is inconsistent in much the same manner as is PA supplemented with an unrestricted truth predicate. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, there is no genuine paradox of logical validity—a completely general logical validity predicate can be coherently added to PA, and the resulting system is consistent. In addition, this observation lead to a number of novel, and important, insights (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  36. Sean Crawford (2014). On the Logical Positivists' Philosophy of Psychology: Laying a Legend to Rest. In Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas Uebel & Marcel Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Vol. 5. Springer 711-726.
    The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and knowable only a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Derek Allan (2014). A Logical Redeemer: Kirillov in Dostoevsky’s 'Demons'. Journal of European Studies 44 (2).
    The engineer Kirillov, a major character in Dostoevsky's 'Demons', has provoked considerable critical disagreement. In 'The Myth of Sisyphus', Albert Camus argues that he expresses the theme of ‘logical suicide’ with ‘the most admirable range and depth’. Some recent commentators, however, have dismissed Kirillov as a madman in the grip of a mad theory. -/- While dissenting from Camus’s analysis in certain respects, this article offers an interpretation consistent with his basic argument. Kirillov’s suicide is based on a simple, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  68
    Thomas Mormann (forthcoming). Philipp Frank's Austro-American Logical Empiricism. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss the “Austro-American” logical empiricism proposed by physicist and philosopher Philipp Frank, particularly his interpretation of Carnap’s Aufbau, which he considered the charter of logical empiricism as a scientific world conception. According to Frank, the Aufbau was to be read as an integration of the ideas of Mach and Poincaré, leading eventually to a pragmatism quite similar to that of the American pragmatist William James. Relying on this peculiar interpretation, Frank intended (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Mark Jago (2009). Logical Information and Epistemic Space. Synthese 167 (2):327 - 341.
    Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space . Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  40. Miguel Hoeltje (2013). Logical Form. In Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), A Companion to Donald Davidson (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy). Blackwell
    Donald Davidson contributed to the discussion of logical form in two ways. On the one hand, he made several influential suggestions on how to give the logical forms of certain constructions of natural language. His account of adverbial modification and so called action-sentences is nowadays, in some form or other, widely employed in linguistics (Harman (forthcoming) calls it "the standard view"). Davidson's approaches to indirect discourse and quotation, while not as influential, also still attract attention today. On the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  32
    Michael De (2012). Can Logical Consequence Be Deflated? In Insolubles and Consequences : essays in honour of Stephen Read. 23-33.
    An interesting question is whether deflationism about truth (and falsity) extends to related properties and relations on truthbearers. Lionel Shapiro (2011) answers affirmatively by arguing that a certain deflationism about truth is as plausible as an analogous version of deflationism about logical consequence. I argue that the argument fails on two counts. First, it trivializes to any relation between truthbearers, including substantive ones; in other words, his argument can be used to establish that deflationism about truth is as plausible (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Andoni Ibarra & Thomas Mormann (2010). Appropriating Kuhn’s Philosophical Legacy. Three Attempts: Logical Empiricism, Structuralism, and Neokantianism. Cadernos de Filosofia Das Ciencias 8:65 - 102.
    In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical logical empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of logical empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called struc- turalist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. Finally, we (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  84
    William H. Hanson (2006). Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):437 - 459.
    The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it strikes close (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  44. Andrea Iacona (2015). Quantification and Logical Form. In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer 125-140.
    This paper deals with the logical form of quantified sentences. Its purpose is to elucidate one plausible sense in which quantified sentences can adequately be represented in the language of first-order logic. Section 1 introduces some basic notions drawn from general quantification theory. Section 2 outlines a crucial assumption, namely, that logical form is a matter of truth-conditions. Section 3 shows how the truth-conditions of quantified sentences can be represented in the language of first-order logic consistently with some (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  12
    Christopher S. Gifford (2015). The Value and the Identity of Business: Towards a Logical Framework of Business Value. Proceedings of The Third International Conference on Advances in Social Science, Management and Human Behaviour - SMHB 2015:47-51.
    This article is an exercise in the transposition of certain approaches in analytic philosophy to issues concerning business value and identity in business. We examine the notion of business value and several accounts of value that have been offered in the literature. Luciano Floridi’s formal logical account of a business is introduced and applied as a first step towards a logical framework of business value. Peter Peverelli has claimed that Chinese business identity is accounted for in terms of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  24
    Richard Creath (forthcoming). The Logical and the Analytic. Synthese:1-18.
    This paper considers various objections to Carnap’s logical syntax definition of ’logical expression’, including those by Saunders Mac Lane and W. V. O. Quine. While the specific objections of these two authors can be answered, if necessary by a slight modification of Carnap’s definition, there are other objections that I do not see how to meet. I also consider the proposal by Denis Bonnay for avoiding the objections to Carnap’s definition. In light of the unresolved problems with Carnap’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47.  54
    Rosanna Keefe (2014). What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be. Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390.
    Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  48. Corine Besson (2010). Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1):1-24.
    Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49.  2
    Ronald N. Giere & Alan W. Richardson (eds.) (1996). Origins of Logical Empiricism. Univ of Minnesota Press.
    This latest volume in the eminent Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series examines the main features of the intellectual milieu from which logical empiricism sprang, providing the first critical exploration of this context by ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  50. Michael Friedman (1995). Poincaré's Conventionalism and the Logical Positivists. Foundations of Science 1 (2):299-314.
    The logical positivists adopted Poincare's doctrine of the conventionality of geometry and made it a key part of their philosophical interpretation of relativity theory. I argue, however, that the positivists deeply misunderstood Poincare's doctrine. For Poincare's own conception was based on the group-theoretical picture of geometry expressed in the Helmholtz-Lie solution of the space problem, and also on a hierarchical picture of the sciences according to which geometry must be presupposed be any properly physical theory. But both of this (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000