Search results for 'logical consequence' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Andrzej Pietruszczak (2004). The Axiomatization of Horst Wessel's Strict Logical Consequence Relation. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:121-138.score: 246.0
    In his book from 1984 Horst Wessel presents the system of strict logical consequence Fs (see also (Wessel, 1979)). The author maintained that this system axiomatized the relation |=s of strict logical consequence between formulas of Classical Propositional Calculi (CPC). Let |= be the classical consequence relation in CPC. The relation |=s is defined as follows: phi |=s psi iff phi |= psi, every variable from psi occurs in phi and neither phi is a contradiction (...)
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  2. Gil Sagi (2014). Models and Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):943-964.score: 242.0
    This paper deals with the adequacy of the model-theoretic definition of logical consequence. Logical consequence is commonly described as a necessary relation that can be determined by the form of the sentences involved. In this paper, necessity is assumed to be a metaphysical notion, and formality is viewed as a means to avoid dealing with complex metaphysical questions in logical investigations. Logical terms are an essential part of the form of sentences and thus have (...)
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  3. William H. Hanson (1999). Ray on Tarski on Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):605-616.score: 242.0
    In "Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski" (Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 617-677), Greg Ray defends Tarski's account of logical consequence against the criticisms of John Etchemendy. While Ray's defense of Tarski is largely successful, his attempt to give a general proof that Tarskian consequence preserves truth fails. Analysis of this failure shows that de facto truth preservation is a very weak criterion of adequacy for a theory of logical consequence (...)
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  4. Owen Griffiths (2012). Reinflating Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-9.score: 242.0
    Shapiro (Philos Q 61:320–342, 2011) argues that, if we are deflationists about truth, we should be deflationists about logical consequence. Like the truth predicate, he claims, the logical consequence predicate is merely a device of generalisation and more substantial characterisation, e.g. proof- or model-theoretic, is mistaken. I reject his analogy between truth and logical consequence and argue that, by appreciating how the logical consequence predicate is used as well as the goals of (...)
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  5. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2000). A Note on Formality and Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):529-539.score: 242.0
    Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truthpreserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truthpreserving. But he did not offer the proof. The (...)
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  6. Samir Chopra & Eric Martin (2002). Generalized Logical Consequence: Making Room for Induction in the Logic of Science. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (3):245-280.score: 242.0
    We present a framework that provides a logic for science by generalizing the notion of logical (Tarskian) consequence. This framework will introduce hierarchies of logical consequences, the first level of each of which is identified with deduction. We argue for identification of the second level of the hierarchies with inductive inference. The notion of induction presented here has some resonance with Popper's notion of scientific discovery by refutation. Our framework rests on the assumption of a restricted class (...)
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  7. Jim Edwards (2003). Reduction and Tarski's Definition of Logical Consequence. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (1):49-62.score: 242.0
    In his classic 1936 paper Tarski sought to motivate his definition of logical consequence by appeal to the inference form: P(0), P(1), . . ., P(n), . . . therefore ∀nP(n). This is prima facie puzzling because these inferences are seemingly first-order and Tarski knew that Gödel had shown first-order proof methods to be complete, and because ∀nP(n) is not a logical consequence of P(0), P(1), . . ., P(n), . . . by Taski's proposed definition. (...)
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  8. Lionel Shapiro (2011). Deflating Logical Consequence. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.score: 240.0
    Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of (...)'s nature. I then argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth. (shrink)
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  9. Phil Corkum, Aristotle on Logical Consequence.score: 240.0
    Compare two conceptions of validity: under an example of a modal conception, an argument is valid just in case it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false; under an example of a topic-neutral conception, an argument is valid just in case there are no arguments of the same logical form with true premises and a false conclusion. This taxonomy of positions suggests a project in the philosophy of logic: the reductive analysis of the modal (...)
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  10. José L. Zalabardo (2010). The Tractatus on Logical Consequence. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):425-442.score: 240.0
    I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.
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  11. Jared Bates (1999). Etchemendy, Tarski, and Logical Consequence. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):47-54.score: 240.0
    John Etchemendy (1990) has argued that Tarski's definition of logical consequence fails as an adequate philosophical analysis. Since then, Greg Ray (1996) has defended Tarski's analysis against Etchemendy's criticisms. Here, I'll argue that--even given Ray's defense of Tarski's definition--we may nevertheless lay claim to the conditional conclusion that 'if' Tarski intended a conceptual analysis of logical consequence, 'then' it fails as such. Secondly, I'll give some reasons to think that Tarski 'did' intend a conceptual analysis of (...)
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  12. Marcus Rossberg & Daniel Cohnitz (2009). Logical Consequence for Nominalists. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 24 (2):147-168.score: 240.0
    It is often claimed that nominalistic programmes to reconstruct mathematics fail, since they will at some point involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we use an idea of Goodman and Quine to develop a nominalistically acceptable explication of logical consequence.
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  13. Jared Bates (2000). Comments on Foster's 'On Tarski's Theory of Logical Consequence--A Reply to Bates'. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (2):191-194.score: 216.0
    In the present commentary, I argue that Foster has attacked an uncharitable reconstruction of Etchemendy's argument against Tarski's account of the logical properties. I provide an alternative, more charitable reconstruction of that argument that withstands Foster's objections.
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  14. Pablo Cobreros (2011). Varzi on Supervaluationism and Logical Consequence. Mind 120 (479):833-43.score: 210.0
    Though it is standardly assumed that supervaluationism applied to vagueness is committed to global validity, Achille Varzi (2007) argues that the supervaluationist should take seriously the idea of adopting local validity instead. Varzi’s motivation for the adoption of local validity is largely based on two objections against the global notion: that it brings some counterexamples to classically valid rules of inference and that it is inconsistent with unrestricted higher-order vagueness. In this discussion I review these objections and point out ways (...)
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  15. Matthew McKeon, Logical Consequence, Philosophical Considerations. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 210.0
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  16. Matthew McKeon, Logical Consequence, Deductive-Theoretic Conceptions. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 210.0
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  17. Eli Dresner (2010). Logical Consequence and First-Order Soundness and Completeness: A Bottom Up Approach. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (1):75-93.score: 186.0
    What is the philosophical significance of the soundness and completeness theorems for first-order logic? In the first section of this paper I raise this question, which is closely tied to current debate over the nature of logical consequence. Following many contemporary authors' dissatisfaction with the view that these theorems ground deductive validity in model-theoretic validity, I turn to measurement theory as a source for an alternative view. For this purpose I present in the second section several of the (...)
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  18. Jacek Malinowski (2005). Some Remarks on Axiomatizing Logical Consequence Operations. Logic and Logical Philosophy 14 (1):103-117.score: 186.0
    In this paper we investigate the relation between the axiomatization of a given logical consequence operation and axiom systems defining the class of algebras related to that consequence operation. We show examples which prove that, in general there are no natural relation between both ways of axiomatization.
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  19. Matthew W. McKeon (2010). The Concept of Logical Consequence: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Peter Lang Pub..score: 184.0
    Introduction -- The concept of logical consequence -- Tarski's characterization of the common concept of logical consequence -- The logical consequence relation has a modal element -- The logical consequence relation is formal -- The logical consequence relation is A priori -- Logical and non-logical terminology -- The meanings of logical terms explained in terms of their semantic properties -- The meanings of logical terms explained in (...)
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  20. Greg Ray (1996). Logical Consequence: A Defense of Tarski. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):617 - 677.score: 182.0
    In his classic 1936 essay "On the Concept of Logical Consequence", Alfred Tarski used the notion of satisfaction to give a semantic characterization of the logical properties. Tarski is generally credited with introducing the model-theoretic characterization of the logical properties familiar to us today. However, in his book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Etchemendy argues that Tarski's account is inadequate for quite a number of reasons, and is actually incompatible with the standard model-theoretic account. (...)
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  21. Paul Rusnock & Mark Burke (2011). Etchemendy and Bolzano on Logical Consequence. History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (1):3-29.score: 182.0
    In a series of publications beginning in the 1980s, John Etchemendy has argued that the standard semantical account of logical consequence, due in its essentials to Alfred Tarski, is fundamentally mistaken. He argues that, while Tarski's definition requires us to classify the terms of a language as logical or non-logical, no such division is guaranteed to deliver the correct extension of our pre-theoretical or intuitive consequence relation. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, Tarski's account is (...)
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  22. Paul B. Thompson (1981). Bolzano's Deducibility and Tarski's Logical Consequence. History and Philosophy of Logic 2 (1-2):11-20.score: 182.0
    In this paper I argue that Bolzano's concept of deducibility and Tarski's concept of logical consequence differ with respect to their philosophical intent. I distinguish between epistemic and ontic approaches to logic, and argue that Bolzano's deducibility presupposes an epistemic approach, while Tarski's logical consequence presupposes an ontic approach.
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  23. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1996). Tarski on Logical Consequence. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):125-151.score: 182.0
    This paper examines from a historical perspective Tarski's 1936 essay, "On the concept of logical consequence." I focus on two main aims. The primary aim is to show how Tarski's definition of logical consequence satisfies two desiderata he himself sets forth for it: (1) it must declare logically correct certain formalizations of the -rule and (2) it must allow for variation of the individual domain in the test for logical consequence. My arguments provide a (...)
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  24. Jose Saguillo (2009). Methodological Practice and Complementary Concepts of Logical Consequence: Tarski's Model-Theoretic Consequence and Corcoran's Information-Theoretic Consequence. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):21-48.score: 182.0
    This article discusses two coextensive concepts of logical consequence that are implicit in the two fundamental logical practices of establishing validity and invalidity for premise-conclusion arguments. The premises and conclusion of an argument have information content (they ?say? something), and they have subject matter (they are ?about? something). The asymmetry between establishing validity and establishing invalidity has long been noted: validity is established through an information-processing procedure exhibiting a step-by-step deduction of the conclusion from the premise-set. Invalidity (...)
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  25. John Corcoran & George Weaver (1969). Logical Consequence in Modal Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 10 (4):370-384.score: 182.0
    This paper develops a modal, Sentential logic having "not", "if...Then" and necessity as logical constants. The semantics (system of meanings) of the logic is the most obvious generalization of the usual truth-Functional semantics for sentential logic and its deductive system (system of demonstrations) is an obvious generalization of a suitable (jaskowski-Type) natural deductive system for sentential logic. Let a be a set of sentences and p a sentence. "p is a logical consequence of a" is defined relative (...)
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  26. Bruno Whittle (2004). Dialetheism, Logical Consequence and Hierarchy. Analysis 64 (4):318–326.score: 180.0
    I argue that dialetheists have a problem with the concept of logical consequence. The upshot of this problem is that dialetheists must appeal to a hierarchy of concepts of logical consequence. Since this hierarchy is akin to those invoked by more orthodox resolutions of the semantic paradoxes, its emergence would appear to seriously undermine the dialetheic treatments of these paradoxes. And since these are central to the case for dialetheism, this would represent a significant blow to (...)
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  27. Pablo Cobreros (2008). Supervaluationism and Logical Consequence: A Third Way. Studia Logica 90 (3):291 - 312.score: 180.0
    It is often assumed that the supervaluationist theory of vagueness is committed to a global notion of logical consequence, in contrast with the local notion characteristic of modal logics. There are, at least, two problems related to the global notion of consequence. First, it brings some counterexamples to classically valid patterns of inference. Second, it is subject to an objection related to higher-order vagueness . This paper explores a third notion of logical consequence, and discusses (...)
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  28. Stewart Shapiro (2003). The Guru, the Logician, and the Deflationist: Truth and Logical Consequence. Noûs 37 (1):113–132.score: 180.0
    The purpose of this paper is to present a thought experiment and argument that spells trouble for “radical” deflationism concerning meaning and truth such as that advocated by the staunch nominalist Hartry Field. The thought experiment does not sit well with any view that limits a truth predicate to sentences understood by a given speaker or to sentences in (or translatable into) a given language, unless that language is universal. The scenario in question concerns sentences that are not understood but (...)
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  29. Ole T. Hjortland (2009). The Structure of Logical Consequence : Proof-Theoretic Conceptions. Dissertation, University of St Andrewsscore: 180.0
    The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, (...)
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  30. Edwin Mares & Francesco Paoli (2014). Logical Consequence and the Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):439-469.score: 180.0
    We group the existing variants of the familiar set-theoretical and truth-theoretical paradoxes into two classes: connective paradoxes, which can in principle be ascribed to the presence of a contracting connective of some sort, and structural paradoxes, where at most the faulty use of a structural inference rule can possibly be blamed. We impute the former to an equivocation over the meaning of logical constants, and the latter to an equivocation over the notion of consequence. Both equivocation sources are (...)
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  31. Paolo Fait (2004). Aristotle on a Puzzle About Logical Consequence: Necessity of Being Vs. Necessity of Saying. Topoi 23 (1):101-112.score: 180.0
    In the Posterior Analytics (I 6, 75a18–27) Aristotle discusses a puzzle which endangers the possibility of inferring a non-necessary conclusion. His solution relies on the distinction between the necessity of the conclusion's being the case and the necessity of admitting the conclusion once one has admitted the premisses. The former is a factual necessity, whereas the latter is meant to be a normative or deontic necessity that is independent of the facts stated by the premisses and the conclusion. This paper (...)
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  32. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2003). Logical Consequence and Logical Expressions. Theoria 18 (2):131-144.score: 180.0
    The pretheoretical notions of logical consequence and of a logical expression are linked in vague and complex ways to modal and pragmatic intuitions. I offer an introduction to the difficulties that these intuitions create when one attempts to give precise characterizations of those notions. Special attention is given to Tarski’s theories of logical consequence and logical constancy. I note that the Tarskian theory of logical consequence has fared better in the face of (...)
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  33. Manuel García-Carpintero (2003). Gómez-Torrente on Modality and Tarskian Logical Consequence. Theoria 18 (2):159-170.score: 180.0
    Gómez-Torrente’s papers have made important contributions to vindicate Tarski’s model-theoretic account of the logical properties in the face of Etchemendy’s criticisms. However, at some points his vindication depends on interpreting the Tarskian account as purportedly modally deflationary, i.e., as not intended to capture the intuitive modal element in the logical properties, that logical consequence is (epistemic or alethic) necessary truth-preservation. Here it is argued that the views expressed in Tarski’s seminal work do not support this modally (...)
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  34. Ronald Suter (1971). Sum is a Logical Consequence of Cogito. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (2):235-240.score: 180.0
    HINTIKKA ("COGITO, ERGO SUM: INFERENCE OR PERFORMANCE?") WISHES TO REJECT (1) IF B(A) THEN THERE EXISTS X SUCH THAT X=A, POINTING OUT THAT IT WOULD CEASE TO BE PROVABLE IN QUANTIFICATION THEORY IF LOGICIANS DROPPED THE DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT (2) ALL THE SINGULAR TERMS WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL DESIGNATE SOME ACTUALLY EXISTING INDIVIDUAL. HE ALSO ARGUES FOR THE FALSITY OF (3) THINKING ENTAILS EXISTENCE. WILLIAMS ("THE CERTAINTY OF THE COGITO") CONTENDS THAT DESCARTES INFERRED 'I EXIST' FROM 'I THINK' (...)
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  35. Ignacio Jane (1997). Theoremhood and Logical Consequence. Theoria 12 (1):139-160.score: 180.0
    In this paper, Tarskis notion of Logical Consequence is viewed as a special case of the more general notion of being a theorem of an axiomatic theory. As was recognized by Tarski, the material adequacy of his definition depends on having the distinction between logical and non logical constants right, but we find Tarskis analysis persuasive even if we dont agree on what constants are logical. This accords with the view put forward in this paper (...)
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  36. Francisco Rodriguez Consuegra (1997). Nominal Definitions and Logical Consequence in the Peano School. Theoria 12 (1):125-137.score: 180.0
    This paper is devoted to show the development of some of the model-theoretic ideas which are clearly present in the main members of the Peano school (Peano himself, Burali-Forti, Pieri and Padoa) asa result of their conception of nominal definitions. Also, their semantic definition of logical consequence (Pieri, Padoa) is viewed as one of the outcomes of that conception. Some examples of their use of theexpression “nominal definition” are presented first. Second, the main advantages of this kind of (...)
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  37. Daniel Cohnitz (2009). Logical Consequence for Nominalists. Theoria 24 (2):147-168.score: 180.0
    It has repeatedly been argued that nominalistic programmes in the philosophy of mathematics fail, since they will at some point or other involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we will argue that this is not the case. Using an idea of Nelson Goodman andW.V. Quine’s which they developed in Goodman and Quine (1947) and supplementing it with means that should be nominalistically acceptable, we present a way to explicate (...) consequence in a nominalistically acceptable way. (shrink)
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  38. Andrzej Pietruszczak (2004). The Consequence Relation Preserving Logical Information. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:89-120.score: 180.0
    Information is contained in statements and «flows» from their structure and meaning of expressions they contain. The information that flows only from the meaning of logical constants and logical structure of statements we will call logical information. In this paper we present a formal explication of this notion which is proper for sentences being Boolean combination of atomic sentences. 1 Therefore we limit ourselves to analyzing logical information flowing only from the meaning of truth-value connectives and (...)
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  39. Francisco Rodriguez Consuegra (1997). Nominal Definitions and Logical Consequence in the Peano School. Theoria 12 (1):125-137.score: 180.0
    This paper is devoted to show the development of some of the model-theoretic ideas which are clearly present in the main members of the Peano school (Peano himself, Burali-Forti, Pieri and Padoa) asa result of their conception of nominal definitions. Also, their semantic definition of logical consequence (Pieri, Padoa) is viewed as one of the outcomes of that conception. Some examples of their use of theexpression “nominal definition” are presented first. Second, the main advantages of this kind of (...)
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  40. Mario Gómez-torrente (2009). Rereading Tarski on Logical Consequence. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):249-297.score: 176.0
    I argue that recent defenses of the view that in 1936 Tarski required all interpretations of a language to share one same domain of quantification are based on misinterpretations of Tarskis views on the logical correctness of certain omega-arguments, on the Tarskian proof that Etchemendy took to be modal and fallacious, and on Tarskicommon concept of consequence”.
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  41. JC Beall & Greg Restall, Logical Consequence.score: 162.0
    A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the (...)
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  42. Greg Restall, Logical Consequence.score: 162.0
    A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich (...)
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  43. Denis Bonnay (2014). Logical Constants, or How to Use Invariance in Order to Complete the Explication of Logical Consequence. Philosophy Compass 9 (1):54-65.score: 156.0
    The problem of logical constants consists in finding a principled way to draw the line between those expressions of a language that are logical and those that are not. The criterion of invariance under permutation, attributed to Tarski, is probably the most common answer to this problem, at least within the semantic tradition. However, as the received view on the matter, it has recently come under heavy attack. Does this mean that the criterion should be amended, or maybe (...)
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  44. Philippe de Rouilhan (2009). Carnap on Logical Consequence for Languages I and II. In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 156.0
  45. John Etchemendy (1990). The Concept of Logical Consequence. Harvard University Press.score: 154.0
  46. John Etchemendy (1988). Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):51-79.score: 152.0
  47. Danilo Suster (2012). Informal Logic and Informal Consequence. In Trobok Majda, Miscevic Nenad & Zarnic Berislav (eds.), Between logic and reality : modeling inference, action and understanding, (Logic, epistemology, and the unity of science, vol. 25). Springer. 101--120.score: 152.0
    What is informal logic, is it ``logic" at all? Main contemporary approaches are briefly presented and critically commented. If the notion of consequence is at the heart of logic, does it make sense to speak about ``informal" consequence? A valid inference is truth preserving, if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. According to Prawitz two further conditions must also be satisfied in the case of classical logical consequence: (i) it is because of the (...) form of the sentences involved and not because of their specific content that the inference is truth preserving; (ii) it is necessary that if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion. According to the prevalent criteria of informal logic an argument is cogent if and only if (i) its premises are rationally Acceptable, (ii) its premises are Relevant to its conclusion and (iii) its premises constitute Grounds adequate for accepting the conclusion (the ``ARG" conditions according to Govier). The ARG criteria characterize a certain broad kind of consequence relation. We do not (in general) have truth preservence in cogent arguments but if the premises are acceptable and other criteria are met, then so is the conclusion. We can speak about form in a loose sense and finally, there is rational necessity of the grounding or support relation. So a certain broad notion of logical consequence emerges from this comparison. The norms of ARG are norms of elementary scientific methodology in which argument is seen as embodying reasoning within a process of inquiry or of belief formation in subject areas accessible to every informed intellectual. (shrink)
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  48. José M. Sagüillo (1997). Logical Consequence Revisited. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 3 (2):216-241.score: 152.0
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  49. Dale Jacquette (2012). Paraconsistent Logical Consequence. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 8 (4):337-351.score: 152.0
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