Search results for 'logical expressivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  86
    Paul Piwek (2011). Dialogue Structure and Logical Expressivism. Synthese 183 (S1):33-58.
    This paper aims to develop the implications of logical expressivism for a theory of dialogue coherence. I proceed in three steps. Firstly, certain structural properties of cooperative dialogue are identified. Secondly, I describe a variant of the multi-agent natural deduction calculus that I introduced in Piwek (J Logic Lang Inf 16(4):403–421, 2007 ) and demonstrate how it accounts for the aforementioned structures. Thirdly, I examine how the aforementioned system can be used to formalise an expressivist account of (...) vocabulary that is inspired by Brandom (Making it explicit: reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment, 1994 ; Articulating reasons: an introduction to inferentialism, 2000 ). This account conceives of the logical vocabulary as a tool which allows speakers to describe the inferential practices which underlie their language use, i.e., it allows them to make those practices explicit. The rewards of this exercise are twofold: (1) We obtain a more precise account of logical expressivism which can be defended more effectively against the critique that such accounts lead to cultural relativism. (2) The formalised distinction between engaging in a practice and expressing it, opens the way for a revision of the theory of dialogue coherence. This revision eliminates the need for logically complex formulae to account for certain structural properties of cooperative dialogue. (shrink)
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  2.  78
    Matthew Chrisman (2014). Attitudinal Expressivism and Logical Pragmatism. In Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind (eds.), Pragmatism, Law, and Language. 117-135.
    Contemporary discussions of expressivism in metaethics tend to run together two quite different antidescriptivist views, and only one of them is subject to the objection about compositional semantics pressed most recently by Schroeder (following Dreier, Unwinn, Hale, Geach and others). Here I distinguish the two versions of expressivism and then go on to suggest that those sympathetic to the second sort of expressivism might improve their account of normative vocabulary and the way it figures in reasoning by (...)
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  3. Pablo Navarro & Cristina Redondo (1990). Derogation, Logical Indeterminacy, and Legal Expressivism. Rechtstheorie 21:233-239.
     
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  4.  12
    Ulf Hlobil (2016). A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Inferentialist Expressivists. In Pavel Arazim & Michal Dančák (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2015. College Publications 87-105.
    I am presenting a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic consequence relation over an atomic language to a logically complex language. The system is in line with two guiding philosophical ideas: (i) logical inferentialism and (ii) logical expressivism. The extension defined by the sequent rules is conservative. The conditional tracks the consequence relation and negation tracks incoherence. Besides the ordinary propositional connectives, the sequent calculus introduces a new kind of modal operator that marks implications that hold monotonically. (...)
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  5.  20
    Thomas N. P. A. Brouwer (2015). Prospects for a Cognitive Norm Account of Logical Consequence. In Pavel Arazim & Michal Danzak (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2014. College Publications 1-19.
    When some P implies some Q, this should have some impact on what attitudes we take to P and Q. In other words: logical consequence has a normative import. I use this idea, recently explored by a number of scholars, as a stepping stone to a bolder view: that relations of logical consequence can be identified with norms on our propositional attitudes, or at least that our talk of logical consequence can be explained in terms of such (...)
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  6. Charlie Kurth (2011). Logic for Morals, Morals From Logic. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):161-180.
    The need to distinguish between logical and extra-logical varieties of inference, entailment, validity, and consistency has played a prominent role in meta-ethical debates between expressivists and descriptivists. But, to date, the importance that matters of logical form play in these distinctions has been overlooked. That’s a mistake given the foundational place that logical form plays in our understanding of the difference between the logical and the extra-logical. This essay argues that descriptivists are better positioned (...)
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  7. Catherine Legg, What Achilles Did and the Tortoise Wouldn't.
    This paper offers an expressivist account of logical form, arguing that in order to fully understand it one must examine what valid arguments make us do (or: what Achilles does and the Tortoise doesn’t, in Carroll’s famed fable). It introduces Charles Peirce’s distinction between symbols, indices and icons as three different kinds of signification whereby the sign picks out its object by learned convention, by unmediated indication, and by resemblance respectively. It is then argued that logical form is (...)
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  8.  11
    Edmund Wall (2015). Natural Morality, Descriptivism, and Non-Cognitivism. Philosophia 43 (1):233-248.
    I attempt to identify a problem running through the foundation of R. M. Hare’s ethical prescriptivism and the more recent sentimentalism/ethical expressivism of Simon Blackburn. The non-cognitivism to which Hare and Blackburn’s approaches are committed renders them unable to establish stable contents for basic moral principles and, thus, incapable of conducting a logical analysis of moral terms or statements. I argue that objective-descriptive- natural ethical theories are in a much better position to provide a satisfying account of the (...)
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  9. Catherine Legg (2013). What is a Logical Diagram? In Sun-Joo Shin & Amirouche Moktefi (eds.), Visual Reasoning with Diagrams. Springer 1-18.
    Robert Brandom’s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously - as more than a mere “heuristic aid” to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind (...)
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  10.  47
    Patricia Marino (2006). Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):517 - 533.
    On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot (...)
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  11.  89
    Carl Baker (2011). Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.
    Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against (...)
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  12.  47
    David Lauer (2012). Expressivism and the Layer Cake Picture of Discursive Practice. Philosophia 40 (1):55-73.
    Robert Brandom defends the intelligibility of the notion of a fully discursive practice that does not include any kind of logical vocabulary. Logical vocabulary, according to his account, should be understood as an optional extra to discursive practice, not as a necessary ingredient. Call this the Layer Cake Picture of the relation of logical to non-logical discursive practices. The aim pursued in this paper is to show, by way of an internal critique, that the Layer Cake (...)
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  13.  55
    Alex Silk (2015). How to Be an Ethical Expressivist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):47-81.
    Expressivism promises an illuminating account of the nature of normative judgment. But worries about the details of expressivist semantics have led many to doubt whether expressivism's putative advantages can be secured. Drawing on insights from linguistic semantics and decision theory, I develop a novel framework for implementing an expressivist semantics that I call ordering expressivism. I argue that by systematically interpreting the orderings that figure in analyses of normative terms in terms of the basic practical attitude of (...)
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  14.  35
    John Cantwell (2013). First Order Expressivist Logic. Erkenntnis 78 (6):1381-1403.
    This paper provides finitary jointly necessary and sufficient acceptance and rejection conditions for the logical constants of a first order quantificational language. By introducing the notion of making an assignment as a distinct object level practice—something you do with a sentence—(as opposed to a meta-level semantic notion) and combining this with the practice of (hypothetical and categorical) acceptance and rejection and the practice of making suppositions one gains a structure that is sufficiently rich to fully characterize the class of (...)
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  15.  42
    Mark van Roojen (2005). Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic. Ratio 18 (2):190–205.
    Expressivist analyses of evaluative discourse characterize unembedded moral claims as functioning primarily to express noncognitive attitudes. The most thorny problem for this project has been explaining the logical relations between such evaluative judgements and other judgements expressed using evaluative terms in unasserted contexts, such as when moral judgements are embedded in conditionals. One strategy for solving the problem derives logical relations among moral judgements from relations of "consistency" and "inconsistency" which hold between the attitudes they express. This approach (...)
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  16.  62
    Michael Pendlebury (2010). How to Be a Normative Expressivist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207.
    Abstract. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, (...)
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  17.  46
    Mark Lance & Philip Kremer (1996). The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment II: Systems of Relevant Commitment Entailment. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):425 - 449.
    In "The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment I" (The Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1994), 369-400), we sketch a linguistic theory (inspired by Brandom's Making it Explicit) which includes an "expressivist" account of the implication connective, →: the role of → is to "make explicit" the inferential proprieties among possible commitments which proprieties determine, in part, the significances of sentences. This motivates reading (A → B) as "commitment to A is, in part, commitment to B". Our project is to (...)
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  18.  55
    Alejandro Pérez Carballo (2016). Structuring Logical Space. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):460-491.
    I develop a non-representationalist account of mathematical thought, on which the point of mathematical theorizing is to provide us with the conceptual capacity to structure and articulate information about the physical world in an epistemically useful way. On my view, accepting a mathematical theory is not a matter of having a belief about some subject matter; it is rather a matter of structuring logical space, in a sense to be made precise. This provides an elegant account of the cognitive (...)
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  19.  11
    John Cantwell (2014). Unity and Autonomy in Expressivist Logic. Dialectica 68 (3):443-457.
    It is argued that expressivists can solve their problems in accounting for the unity and autonomy of logic – logic is topic independent and does not derive from a general ‘logic’ of mental states – by adopting an analysis of the logical connectives that takes logically complex sentences to express complex combinations of simple attitudes like belief and disapproval and dispositions to form such simple attitudes upon performing suppositional acts, and taking acceptance and rejection of sentences to be the (...)
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  20. Derek Baker & Jack Woods (2015). How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency. Ethics 125 (2):391-424.
    Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more natural choice in developing (...)
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  21. Mark van Roojen (1996). Expressivism and Irrationality. Philosophical Review 105 (3):311-335.
    Geach's problem, the problem of accounting for the fact that judgements expressed using moral terms function logically like other judgements, stands in the way of most noncognitive analyses of moral judgements. The non-cognitivist must offer a plausible interpretation of such terms when they appear in conditionals that also explains their logical interaction with straightforward moral assertions. Blackburn and Gibbard have offered a series of accounts each of which interprets such conditionals as expressing higher order commitments. Each then invokes norms (...)
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  22. James Dreier (2004). Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions. Analysis 64 (1):84–91.
    1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expressivism (and not non-cognitivism), but rather (...)
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  23.  8
    J. Robert Loftis (1999). Normativity and Mathematics: A Wittgensteinian Approach to the Study of Number. Dissertation, Northwestern University
    I argue for the Wittgensteinian thesis that mathematical statements are expressions of norms, rather than descriptions of the world. An expression of a norm is a statement like a promise or a New Year's resolution, which says that someone is committed or entitled to a certain line of action. A expression of a norm is not a mere description of a regularity of human behavior, nor is it merely a descriptive statement which happens to entail a norms. The view can (...)
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  24. Mark Jago (2007). Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience. Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.
    I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which (...)
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  25. Tuomas E. Tahko (2014). The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth. In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge University Press 233-248.
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models. (...)
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  26. Nate Charlow (2015). Prospects for an Expressivist Theory of Meaning. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (23):1-43.
    Advocates of Expressivism about basically any kind of language are best-served by abandoning a traditional content-centric approach to semantic theorizing, in favor of an update-centric or dynamic approach (or so this paper argues). The type of dynamic approach developed here — in contrast to the content-centric approach — is argued to yield canonical, if not strictly classical, "explanations" of the core semantic properties of the connectives. (The cases on which I focus most here are negation and disjunction.) I end (...)
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  27. Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2002). What is Logical Form? In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Clarendon Press 54--90.
    Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the External World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as (...)
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  28. Michael Friedman (1999). Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge University Press.
    In this collection of essays one of the preeminent philosophers of science writing today offers a reinterpretation of the enduring significance of logical positivism, the revolutionary philosophical movement centered around the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and '30s. Michael Friedman argues that the logical positivists were radicals not by presenting a new version of empiricism (as is often thought to be the case) but rather by offering a new conception of a priori knowledge and its role in empirical (...)
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  29. Michael Heidelberger (2003). The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism. In Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee Salmon (eds.), Logical Empiricism: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 233--262.
    It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, de- riving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967). Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik of analytical philosophy, and launched the (...)
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  30. Michael Glanzberg (2015). Logical Consequence and Natural Language. In Colin Caret & Ole Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press 71-120.
    One of the great successes in the study of language has been the application of formal methods, including those of formal logic. Even so, this chapter argues against one way of accounting for this success, by arguing that the study of natural language semantics and of logical consequence relations are not the same. There is indeed a lot we can glean about logic from looking at our languages, and at our inferential practices, but the semantic properties of natural languages (...)
     
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  31.  19
    Yaroslav Shramko (2014). The Logical Way of Being True: Truth Values and the Ontological Foundation of Logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (2):119-131.
    In this paper I reject the normative interpretation of logic and give reasons for a realistic account based on the ontological treatment of logical values.
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  32.  6
    Andrzej Pietruszczak (2004). The Axiomatization of Horst Wessel's Strict Logical Consequence Relation. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:121-138.
    In his book from 1984 Horst Wessel presents the system of strict logical consequence Fs (see also (Wessel, 1979)). The author maintained that this system axiomatized the relation |=s of strict logical consequence between formulas of Classical Propositional Calculi (CPC). Let |= be the classical consequence relation in CPC. The relation |=s is defined as follows: phi |=s psi iff phi |= psi, every variable from psi occurs in phi and neither phi is a contradiction nor psi is (...)
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  33.  6
    Andrzej Pietruszczak (2004). The Consequence Relation Preserving Logical Information. Logic and Logical Philosophy 13:89-120.
    Information is contained in statements and «flows» from their structure and meaning of expressions they contain. The information that flows only from the meaning of logical constants and logical structure of statements we will call logical information. In this paper we present a formal explication of this notion which is proper for sentences being Boolean combination of atomic sentences. 1 Therefore we limit ourselves to analyzing logical information flowing only from the meaning of truth-value connectives and (...)
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  34.  2
    G. Robles & J. M. Méndez (2011). A Class of Simpler Logical Matrices for the Variable-Sharing Property. Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (3):241-249.
    In our paper “A general characterization of the variable-sharing property by means of logical matrices”, a general class of so-called “Relevant logical matrices”, RMLs, is defined. The aim of this paper is to define a class of simpler Relevant logical matrices RMLs′serving the same purpose that RMLs, to wit: any logic verified by an RML′has the variable-sharing property and related properties predicable of the logic of entailment E and of the logic of relevance R.
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  35. Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (2015). Logical Consequence: Its Nature, Structure, and Application. In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press
    Recent work in philosophical logic has taken interesting and unexpected turns. It has seen not only a proliferation of logical systems, but new applications of a wide range of different formal theories to philosophical questions. As a result, philosophers have been forced to revisit the nature and foundation of core logical concepts, chief amongst which is the concept of logical consequence. This essay sets the contributions of the volume in context and identifies how they advance important debates (...)
     
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  36. Bertrand Russell (1985). The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Open Court.
    THE PHILOSOPHY which I advocate is generally regarded as a species of realism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in it which seem contrary to that doctrine. For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and their opponents as a funda- mental one; I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress. I hold that logic is what is fundamental (...)
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  37. Andrea Iacona (forthcoming). Two Notions of Logical Form. Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of (...)
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  38. Lionel Shapiro (2011). Deflating Logical Consequence. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
    Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I (...)
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  39. Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context (...)
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  40. Jack Woods (2015). Expressivism Worth the Name -- A Reply to Teemu Toppinen. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-7.
    I respond to an interesting objection to my 2014 argument against hermeneutic expressivism. I argue that even though Toppinen has identified an intriguing route for the expressivist to tread, the plausible developments of it would not fall to my argument anyways---as they do not make direct use of the parity thesis which claims that expression works the same way in the case of conative and cognitive attitudes. I close by sketching a few other problems plaguing such views.
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  41. Caj Strandberg (2015). Options for Hybrid Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):91-111.
    In contemporary metaethics, various versions of hybrid expressivism have been proposed according to which moral sentences express both non-cognitive attitudes and beliefs. One important advantage with such positions, its proponents argue, is that they, in contrast to pure expressivism, have a straightforward way of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem. In this paper, I provide a systematic examination of different versions of hybrid expressivism with particular regard to how they are assumed to evade this problem. The major conclusion is (...)
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  42. John Corcoran & Alfred Tarski (1986). What Are Logical Notions? History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.
    In this manuscript, published here for the first time, Tarski explores the concept of logical notion. He draws on Klein's Erlanger Programm to locate the logical notions of ordinary geometry as those invariant under all transformations of space. Generalizing, he explicates the concept of logical notion of an arbitrary discipline.
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  43. Mark Schroeder (2008). How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation. Noûs 42 (4):573-599.
    Expressivists have a problem with negation. The problem is that they have not, to date, been able to explain why ‘murdering is wrong’ and ‘murdering is not wrong’ are inconsistent sentences. In this paper, I explain the nature of the problem, and why the best efforts of Gibbard, Dreier, and Horgan and Timmons don’t solve it. Then I show how to diagnose where the problem comes from, and consequently how it is possible for expressivists to solve it. Expressivists should accept (...)
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  44.  33
    Alan W. Richardson (1997). Carnap's Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to the history of analytic philosophy in general and of logical positivism in particular. It provides the first detailed and comprehensive study of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy. The focus of the book is Carnap's first major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World). It reveals tensions within the context of German epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century. (...)
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  45. Simone Aurora (2015). A Forgotten Source in the History of Linguistics: Husserl's Logical Investigations. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 11 (5).
    In appearance, Husserl’s writings seem not to have had any influence on linguistic research, nor does what the German philosopher wrote about language seem to be worth a place in the history of linguistics. The purpose of the paper is exactly to contrast this view, by reassessing both the position and the role of Husserl’s early masterpiece — the Logical Investigations — within the history of linguistics. To this end, I will focus mainly on the third (On the theory (...)
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  46. Declan Smithies (2015). Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience. Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs (...)
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  47. Corine Besson (2014). A Note on Logical Truth. Logique Et Analyse 227:309-331.
    Classical logic counts sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ as logically true. A standard objection to classical logic is that Alice’s self-identity, for instance, is not a matter of logic because the identity of particular objects is not a matter of logic. For this reason, many philosophers argue that classical logic is not the right logic, and that it should be abandoned in favour of free logic — logic free of existential commitments with respect to singular terms. In (...)
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  48. Stephen Barker (2012). Expressivism About Making and Truth-Making. In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge University Press 272-293.
    My goal is to illuminate truth-making by way of illuminating the relation of making. My strategy is not to ask what making is, in the hope of a metaphysical theory about is nature. It's rather to look first to the language of making. The metaphor behind making refers to agency. It would be absurd to suggest that claims about making are claims about agency. It is not absurd, however, to propose that the concept of making somehow emerges from some feature (...)
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  49. Edmund Husserl (2001). Logical Investigations. Routledge.
    Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology. The Logical Investigations is Edmund Husserl's most famous work and has had a decisive impact on the direction of twentieth century philosophy. This is the first time both volumes of this classic work, translated by J.N. Findlay, have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Logical Investigations in historical context and bringing out its importance for contemporary philosophy.
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  50. Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
    Epistemic expressivism is the application of a nexus of ideas, which is prominent in ethical theory (more specifically, metaethics), to parallel issues in epistemological theory (more specifically, metaepistemology). Here, in order to help those new to the debate come to grips with epistemic expressivism and recent discussions of it, I first briefly present this nexus of ideas as it occurs in ethical expressivism. Then, I explain why and how some philosophers have sought to extend it to a (...)
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