Search results for 'logical truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tuomas E. Tahko (forthcoming). The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth. In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge University Press.score: 246.0
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of (...)
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  2. William H. Hanson (2006). Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):437 - 459.score: 240.0
    The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it strikes close (...)
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  3. Heinrich Wansing (2012). A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity. Topoi 31 (1):93-100.score: 240.0
    Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told (...)
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  4. William H. Hanson (2014). Logical Truth in Modal Languages: Reply to Nelson and Zalta. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 167 (2):327-339.score: 240.0
    Does general validity or real world validity better represent the intuitive notion of logical truth for sentential modal languages with an actuality connective? In (Philosophical Studies 130:436–459, 2006) I argued in favor of general validity, and I criticized the arguments of Zalta (Journal of Philosophy 85:57–74, 1988) for real world validity. But in Nelson and Zalta (Philosophical Studies 157:153–162, 2012) Michael Nelson and Edward Zalta criticize my arguments and claim to have established the superiority of real world validity. (...)
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  5. Susan Haack (1977). Analyticity and Logical Truth in The Roots of Reference. Theoria 43 (2):129-143.score: 210.0
  6. G. Hellman (1985). Determination and Logical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 82 (November):607-16.score: 208.0
    Some remarks on determination, physicalism, model theory, and logical truth.//An attempt to defend physicalism against objections that its bases are indeterminate.
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  7. Andrea Iacona (2013). Logical Form and Truth-Conditions. Theoria 28 (3):439-457.score: 192.0
    This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. Section 1 provides some preliminary clarifications. Section 2 shows that the main motivation for the view is the fact that fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented. Sections 3 and 4 articulate the view and dwell on its affinity with (...)
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  8. Mark Sainsbury (2005). Names in Free Logical Truth Theory. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press.score: 184.0
    Evans envisaged a language containing both Russellian and descriptive names. A language with descriptive names, which can contribute to truth conditions even if they have no bearer, needs a free logical truth theory. But a metalanguage with this logic threatens to emasculate Russellian names. The paper details this problem and shows, on Evans's behalf, how it might be resolved.
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  9. M. McKeon (2005). A Defense of the Kripkean Account of Logical Truth in First-Order Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (3):305 - 326.score: 182.0
    This paper responds to criticism of the Kripkean account of logical truth in first-order modal logic. The criticism, largely ignored in the literature, claims that when the box and diamond are interpreted as the logical modality operators, the Kripkean account is extensionally incorrect because it fails to reflect the fact that all sentences stating truths about what is logically possible are themselves logically necessary. I defend the Kripkean account by arguing that some true sentences about logical (...)
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  10. Matthew McKeon (2004). On the Substitutional Characterization of First-Order Logical Truth. History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (3):205-224.score: 182.0
    I consider the well-known criticism of Quine's characterization of first-order logical truth that it expands the class of logical truths beyond what is sanctioned by the model-theoretic account. Briefly, I argue that at best the criticism is shallow and can be answered with slight alterations in Quine's account. At worse the criticism is defective because, in part, it is based on a misrepresentation of Quine. This serves not only to clarify Quine's position, but also to crystallize what (...)
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  11. Marc Lange (2005). A Counterfactual Analysis of the Concepts of Logical Truth and Necessity. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):277 - 303.score: 180.0
    This paper analyzes the logical truths as (very roughly) those truths that would still have been true under a certain range of counterfactual perturbations.What’s nice is that the relevant range is characterized without relying (overtly, at least) upon the notion of logical truth. This approach suggests a conception of necessity that explains what the different varieties of necessity (logical, physical, etc.) have in common, in virtue of which they are all varieties of necessity. However, this approach (...)
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  12. Mario Gómez-torrente (1998). Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth. Synthese 117 (3):375-408.score: 180.0
    This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical (...)
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  13. R. T. Cook (2012). The T-Schema is Not a Logical Truth. Analysis 72 (2):231-239.score: 180.0
    It is shown that the logical truth of instances of the T-schema is incompatible with the formal nature of logical truth. In particular, since the formality of logical truth entails that the set of logical truths is closed under substitution, the logical truth of T-schema instances entails that all sentences are logical truths.
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  14. Miguel Hoeltje (2007). Theories of Meaning and Logical Truth: Edwards Versus Davidson. Mind 116 (461):121 - 129.score: 180.0
    Donald Davidson has claimed that for every logical truth 5 of a language L, a theory of meaning for L will entail that S is a logical truth of L. Jim Edwards has argued (2002) that this claim is false if we take 'entails' to mean 'has as a logical consequence. In this paper, I first show that, pace Edwards, Davidson's claim is correct even under this strong reading. I then discuss the argument given by (...)
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  15. Lorenz B. Puntel (1999). On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth: The Fundamental Problem and a New Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30 (1):101-130.score: 180.0
    The present article purports to show that the protocol sentence debate, pursued by some leading members of the Vienna Circle in the mid-1930s, was essentially a controversy over the explanation and the real significance of the concept of truth. It is further shown that the fundamental issue underlying the discussions about the concept of truth was the relationship between form and content, as well as between logic/language and the world. R. Carnap was the philosopher who most explicitly and (...)
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  16. Gerald Keaney (2007). The Identity of Indiscernibles as a Logical Truth. Crossroads 1 (2):28-36 Free Online.score: 180.0
    The Identity of Indiscernibles seems like a good enough way to define identity. Roughly it simply says that if x and y have all and only the same properties, these will be the same object. However the principle has come under attack using a series of thought experiments employing the idea of radical symmetry. I follow the history of the debate including its theological origins to assess the contemporary arguments against the Identity of Indiscernibles. I argue that the principle is (...)
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  17. Matthew Mckeon (1999). Bertrand Russell and Logical Truth. Philosophia 27 (3-4):541-553.score: 180.0
    I expose a tension in Bertrand Russell's, _Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, between his account of logical truth and his view that logical truth is knowable without taking into account what the world is like. Russell makes the logical truth of a sentence turn on the actual truth of its second-order universal closure. But this results in making logical truth relative to the number of worldly individuals. I aim to use the tension (...)
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  18. Yaroslav Shramko (forthcoming). The Logical Way of Being True: Truth Values and the Ontological Foundation of Logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy.score: 180.0
    In this paper I reject the normative interpretation of logic and give reasons for a realistic account based on the ontological treatment of logical values.
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  19. Robert F. Hadley (1978). Possibility, Necessity, and Logical Truth. Analysis 38 (4):182 - 186.score: 180.0
    An earlier article by the author, "quine and strawson on logical theory" ("analysis" volume 34, pages 207-208), is expanded and defended against criticisms made by charles sayward in "the province of logic" ("analysis" volume 36, pages 47-48). it is shown that quine's definition of logical truth presupposes an understanding of "possibility," even if the term 'sentence' is used set-theoretically, and that if quine is allowed the concept of "possibility," then strawson must be allowed modal concepts for his (...)
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  20. James F. Harris (1969). Quine on Analyticity and Logical Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):249-255.score: 180.0
    Quine claims that the analytic-synthetic distinction lacks a proper characterization of a notion to be used to reduce analytic statements "depending upon essential predication" to logically true statements. the author shows that the same arguments used by quine against analyticity can also be used against logical truth; if one notion is "given up", the other must be also. notions such as "filling blanks alike" and "identical propositions" presupposed by logical truth have the same deficiencies as does (...)
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  21. Matthew McKeon (1996). Logical Truth in Modal Logic. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):351-361.score: 180.0
    In this paper, I consider the criticism due to Hartry Field, John Pollack, William Hanson and James Hawthorne that the Kripkean requirement that a logical truth in modal logic be true at all possible worlds in _all quantified model structures is unmotivated and misses some logical truths. These authors do not see the basis for making the logical truth of a modal sentence turn on more than the model structure given by one reading of the (...)
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  22. Timothy McCarthy (1987). Modality, Invariance, and Logical Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4):423 - 443.score: 178.0
    Let us sum up. We began with the question, “What is the interest of a model-theoretic definition of validity?” Model theoretic validity consists in truth under all reinterpretations of non-logical constants. In this paper, we have described for each necessity concept a corresponding modal invariance property. Exemplification of that property by the logical constants of a language leads to an explanation of the necessity, in the corresponding sense, of its valid sentences. I have fixed upon the epistemic (...)
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  23. Giulia Terzian (forthcoming). Norms of Truth and Logical Revision. Topoi:1-9.score: 174.0
    Many take the lesson of the paradoxes to be that we ought to impose some form of logical revision. It is argued here that this kind of move should not be taken lightly.
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  24. Andrea Cantini (1996). Logical Frameworks for Truth and Abstraction: An Axiomatic Study. Elsevier Science B.V..score: 168.0
    This English translation of the author's original work has been thoroughly revised, expanded and updated. The book covers logical systems known as type-free or self-referential . These traditionally arise from any discussion on logical and semantical paradoxes. This particular volume, however, is not concerned with paradoxes but with the investigation of type-free sytems to show that: (i) there are rich theories of self-application, involving both operations and truth which can serve as foundations for property theory and formal (...)
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  25. Robert Barrett (1965). Quine, Synonymy and Logical Truth. Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):361-367.score: 164.0
    W. V. O. Quine's well-known attack upon the analytic-synthetic distinction is held to affect only one of the two species of analytic statements he distinguishes. In particular it is not directed at and does not affect the so-called logical truths. In this paper the scope of Quine's attack is extended so as to embrace the logical truths as well. It is shown that the unclarifiability of the notion of 'synonymy' deprives us not only of "analytic statements that are (...)
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  26. Manuel E. Bremer (2003). Do Logical Truths Carry Information? Minds and Machines 13 (4):567-575.score: 160.0
    The paper deals with the question whether logical truth carry information. On the one hand it seems that we gain new information by drawing inferences or arriving at some theorems. On the other hand the formal accounts of information and information content which are most widely known today say that logical truth carry no information at all. The latter is shown by considering these accounts. Then several ways to deal with the dilemma are distinguished, especially syntactic (...)
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  27. Corine Besson (2009). Externalism, Internalism, and Logical Truth. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1):1-29.score: 158.0
    The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist-internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic (...)
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  28. T. Parent (2008). Quine and Logical Truth. Erkenntnis 68 (1):103 - 112.score: 156.0
    It is a consequence of Quine’s confirmation holism that the logical laws are in principle revisable. Some have worried this is at odds with another dictum in Quine, viz., that any translation which construes speakers as systematically illogical is ipso facto inadequate. In this paper, I try to formulate exactly what the problem is here, and offer a solution to it by (1) disambiguating the term ‘logic,’ and (2) appealing to a Quinean understanding of ‘necessity.’ The result is that (...)
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  29. Pradip Kumar Sengupta (1968). Demonstration and Logical Truth. Calcutta, Academic Publishers.score: 156.0
    But to infer is not to be trained in Logic. The primitive persons inferred ; the common layman infers. But they do not know any bit of what is known as ...
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  30. Wim De Neys (2011). The Freak in All of Us: Logical Truth Seeking Without Argumentation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):75-76.score: 156.0
    Mercier and Sperber (M&S) sketch a bleak picture of logical reasoning in classic, nonargumentative tasks. I argue that recent processing data indicate that despite people's poor performance they at least seek to adhere to traditional logical norms in these tasks. This implies that classic reasoning tasks are less artificialthan M&S's framework suggests.
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  31. M. J. Cresswell (1972). Intensional Logics and Logical Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1):2 - 15.score: 152.0
  32. William S. Hatcher (1966). Logical Truth and Logical Implication. Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (4):561.score: 152.0
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  33. Alonzo Church (1950). Review: G. H. V. Wright, On the Idea of Logical Truth (I); G. H. Von Wright, Form and Content in Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):58-59.score: 152.0
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  34. Gerald J. Massey (1974). Review: Charles E. Caton, A Stipulation of Logical Truth in a Modal Propositional Calculus; Charles E. Caton, A Stipulation of a Modal Propositional Calculus in Terms of Modalized Truth-Values. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (3):611-611.score: 152.0
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  35. Steven E. Boër (1977). Logical Truth and Indeterminacy. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 18 (1):85-94.score: 152.0
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  36. Wilhelm Ackermann (1951). Review: G. H. Von Wright, On the Idea of Logical Truth (II). [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):147-148.score: 152.0
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  37. Romane Clark (1956). Review: Max Black, Report on Analysis Problem No. 3; Arnold Kapp, Does the Logical Truth $(Exists X)(Fx V Thicksim Fx)$ Entail That at Least One Individual Exists; Neil Cooper, Does the Logical Truth $(Xexists)(Fx V Thicksim Fx)$ Entail That at Least One Individual Exists. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (2):206-207.score: 152.0
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  38. George W. Patterson (1952). Review: Wilton R. Abbott, Computing Logical Truth with the California Digital Computer. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 17 (4):280-281.score: 152.0
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  39. W. V. Quine (1960). Carnap and Logical Truth. Synthese 12 (4):350--74.score: 150.0
    Kant's question 'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' pre- cipitated the Critique of Pure Reason. Question and answer notwith- standing, Mill and others persisted in doubting that such judgments were possible at all. At length some of Kant's own clearest purported.
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  40. Warren D. Goldfarb (1982). Logicism and Logical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):692-695.score: 150.0
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  41. John Etchemendy (1988). Models, Semantics and Logical Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (1):91 - 106.score: 150.0
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  42. Ken Akiba (1995). Quine and the Linguistic Doctrine of Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 78 (3):237 - 256.score: 150.0
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  43. James Dreier (2004). Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions. Analysis 64 (1):84–91.score: 150.0
    1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expressivism (and not non-cognitivism), but rather a version (...)
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  44. David Berlinski & Daniel Gallin (1969). Quine's Definition of Logical Truth. Noûs 3 (2):111-128.score: 150.0
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  45. Michael McKinsey (2006). Direct Reference and Logical Truth: A Reply to Lasonen-Aamio. Dialectica 60 (4):447-451.score: 150.0
  46. Marion Deckert (1973). Quine, Strawson and Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 24 (1):52 - 56.score: 150.0
  47. Henry Veatch (1956). I. Logical Truth and Logic. Journal of Philosophy 53 (22):671-679.score: 150.0
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  48. Peter G. Hinman, Jaegwon Kim & Stephen P. Stich (1968). Logical Truth Revisited. Journal of Philosophy 65 (17):495-500.score: 150.0
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  49. Gary Ebbs (2014). Can First-Order Logical Truth Be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):343-367.score: 150.0
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  50. Michael E. Levin (1978). Quine's View(s) of Logical Truth. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):45-67.score: 150.0
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