Search results for 'luminosity' (try it on Scholar)

72 found
Order:
See also:
Bibliography: Luminosity in Epistemology
  1. Murali Ramachandran (2009). Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673.
    In KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS Timothy Williamson argues against the luminosity of phenomenal states in general by way of arguing against the luminosity of feeling cold, that is, against the view that if one feels cold, one is at least in a position to know that one does. In this paper I consider four strategies that emerge from his discussion, and argue that none succeeds.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  2.  80
    Elia Zardini (2013). Luminosity and Determinacy. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.
    The paper discusses some ways in which the phenomenon of borderline cases may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are fully open to our view. The discussion focusses on a very influential argument (due to Tim Williamson) to the effect that, roughly, no such domains of luminous facts exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts that are best candidates for being luminous plays an (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3.  23
    Miriam Schoenfield (2015). Internalism Without Luminosity. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):252-272.
    Internalists face the following challenge: what is it about an agent's internal states that explains why only these states can play whatever role the internalist thinks these states are playing? Internalists have frequently appealed to a special kind of epistemic access that we have to these states. But such claims have been challenged on both empirical and philosophical grounds. I will argue that internalists needn't appeal to any kind of privileged access claims. Rather, internalist conditions are important because of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  1
    Gary Olson & Richard A. King (1962). Supplementary Report: Stimulus Generalization Gradients Along a Luminosity Continuum. Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (4):414.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Selim Berker (2008). Luminosity Regained. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (2):1-22.
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  6.  43
    Elia Zardini (2012). Luminosity and Vagueness. Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
    The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  66
    Jessica Brown (2005). Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):319–327.
    According to contextualism, the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists take their view to be supported by cases in which the intuitive correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the attributor's context. Williamson offers a complex invariantist account of such cases which appeals to two elements, psychological bias and a failure of luminosity. He provides independent reasons for thinking that contextualist cases are characterized by psychological bias and a failure of luminosity, and argues (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  38
    P. X. Monaghan (2008). Williamson and the Argument From Luminosity. Dialogue 47 (3-4):619-.
    ABSTRACT: Many of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  5
    Davide Panagia (2015). Films Blancs : Luminosity in the Films of Michael Mann. Film-Philosophy 19:33-54.
    This paper is a study of the place of luminosity in the films of Michael Mann and the way in which luminosity is not a tool of illumination but a radiance that signals the bodying forth of appearances. The event of luminosity in Mann's films is an attempt to re-imagine the conventional value structures that create a link between film and indexicality, as if his admiration for the photoreal effects of film belies an insistence that the advenience (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Murali Ramachandran, Anti-Luminosity.
    Timothy Williamson (2000) reckons that hardly any mental state is luminous, i.e. is such that if one were in it, then one would invariably be in a position to know that one was. This paper examines an argument he presents against the luminosity of feeling cold, which he claims generalizes to other phenomenal states, such as e.g. being in pain. As we shall see, the argument fails. However, our deliberations do yield two anti-luminosity results: a simple refutation of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
    In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   54 citations  
  12. Stewart Cohen (2010). Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):718-730.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  13. Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco (2002). Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  14. Jonathan Vogel (2010). Luminosity and Indiscriminability. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  59
    Thomas A. Blackson (2007). On Williamson's Argument for (Ii) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16.  82
    Wai-hung Wong (2008). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.
    Abstract: Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  47
    Rudolph Bauer (2011). Meditation on Natural Luminosity 9 V1. Transmission 1.
    This paper focuses on meditation as natural luminousity.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  21
    Brueckner Anthony (2002). Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophical Studies 110 (3).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Al Gilchrist (1988). Perception of Luminosity. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 26 (6):495-495.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar (forthcoming). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  18
    David S. Pacini (2009). Review of David Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9).
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  18
    T. Remington Harkness (2011). The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. By David Walsh. Heythrop Journal 52 (1):153-154.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  21
    M. M. Trivedi (1987). Citsukha's View on Self-Luminosity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (2):115-123.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. J. D. F. Gilchrist (1918). Luminosity and its Origin in a South African Earthworm. Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa 7 (1):203-212.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25. Girdhari Lal Chaturvedi (1982). The Concept of Self-Luminosity of Knowledge in Advaita Vedānta. Adarsha Prakashan.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. C. L. Franklin (1897). Review of On Reciprocal Action in the Retina as Studied by Means of Some Rotating Discs, Luminosity and Photometry, and Ueber den Einfluss des Maculapigments Auf Farbengleichungen. [REVIEW] Psychological Review 4 (5):539-541.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. J. J. Nassau (1962). A survey of stars of high luminosity in the Northern Milk Way. Scientia 56 (97):48.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  8
    David Walsh (2008). The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. Cambridge University Press.
    The Modern Philosophical Revolution breaks new ground by demonstrating the continuity of European philosophy from Kant to Derrida. Much of the literature on European philosophy has emphasized the breaks that have occurred in the course of two centuries of thinking. But as David Walsh argues, such a reading overlooks the extent to which Kant, Hegel, and Schelling were already engaged in the turn toward existence as the only viable mode of philosophizing. Where many similar studies summarize individual thinkers, this book (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. David Walsh (2012). The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. Cambridge University Press.
    The Modern Philosophical Revolution breaks new ground by demonstrating the continuity of European philosophy from Kant to Derrida. Much of the literature on European philosophy has emphasised the breaks that have occurred in the course of two centuries of thinking. But as David Walsh argues, such a reading overlooks the extent to which Kant, Hegel, and Schelling were already engaged in the turn toward existence as the only viable mode of philosophising. Where many similar studies summarise individual thinkers, this book (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Kelly Becker (2009). Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.
    Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  31. Susanne Bobzien (2012). If It's Clear, Then It's Clear That It's Clear, or is It? Higher-Order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom. In B. Morison K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Episteme, etc. OUP UK
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, axiom 4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it is clear (determinate, definite) that A, then it is clear (determinate, definite) that it is clear (determinate, definite) that A’, or, more formally, CA → CCA. We show how in the debate over axiom 4 two different notions of clarity are in play (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32.  85
    Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré (2009). Inexact Knowledge with Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179 - 227.
    Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  33. Julien Dutant & Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Just Do It? When to Do What You Judge You Ought to Do. Synthese.
    While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Adam Elga (2013). The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock and the New Rational Reflection Principle. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.
    The “puzzle of the unmarked clock” derives from a conflict between the following: (1) a plausible principle of epistemic modesty, and (2) “Rational Reflection”, a principle saying how one’s beliefs about what it is rational to believe constrain the rest of one’s beliefs. An independently motivated improvement to Rational Reflection preserves its spirit while resolving the conflict.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  35. Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
    Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson's argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  36. Troy Cross (2010). Skeptical Success. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:35-62.
    The following is not a successful skeptical scenario: you think you know you have hands, but maybe you don't! Why is that a failure, when it's far more likely than, say, the evil genius hypothesis? That's the question.<br><br>This is an earlier draft.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  37. Nicholas Silins (2012). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
  38. Ishani Maitra & Brian Weatherson (2010). Assertion, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99-118.
    We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  39.  62
    Ralph Wedgwood (2014). Rationality as a Virtue. Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):319-338.
    A concept that can be expressed by the term ‘rationality’ plays a central role in both epistemology and ethics -- and especially in formal epistemology and decision theory. It is argued here that when the term is used in this way, the concept of “rationality” is the concept of a kind of virtue, with all the central features that are ascribed to the virtues by Plato and Aristotle, among others. Interpreting rationality as a kind of virtue helps to solve several (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. Glen Hoffmann (2012). Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):55-68.
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Patrick Greenough (2012). Discrimination and Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42. Richard Fumerton (2009). Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):67 - 76.
    In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of what we think we know and justifiably believe.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  43.  3
    Rodrigo Borges (2015). How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme (2):133-140.
    The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  60
    Julien Dutant, Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection. Proceedings of Tark XI.
    Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45.  65
    Christoph Jäger (2009). Affective Ignorance. Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.
    According to one of the most influential views in the philosophy of self-knowledge each person enjoys some special cognitive access to his or her own current mental states and episodes. This view faces two fundamental tasks. First, it must elucidate the general conceptual structure of apparent asymmetries between beliefs about one’s own mind and beliefs about other minds. Second, it must demarcate the mental territory for which first-person-special-access claims can plausibly be maintained. Traditional candidates include sensations, experiences (of various kinds), (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  46.  23
    John Morrison (2015). Triangulating How Things Look. Mind and Language 30 (2):140-161.
    Suppose you're unable to discriminate the colors of two objects. According to the triangulation view, their colors might nonetheless look different to you, and that's something you can discover as a result of further comparisons. The primary motivation for this view is its apparent ability to solve a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indiscriminable objects. I argue that, due to visual noise, the triangulation view doesn't really solve the puzzle.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  29
    David Peter Lawrence (2009). Proof of a Sentient Knower: Utpaladeva's Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi with the Vṛtti of Harabhatta Shastri. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 37 (6):627-653.
    Utpaladeva (c. 900–950 C.E.) was the chief originator of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology of monistic Kashmiri Śaivism, which was further developed by Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1020 C.E.) and other successors. The Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi, “Proof of a Sentient Knower,” is one component of Utpaladeva’s trio of specialized studies called the Siddhitrayī, “Three Proofs.” This article provides an introduction to and translation of the Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi along with the Vṛtti commentary on it by the nineteenth–twentieth century paṇḍit, Harabhatta Shastri. Utpaladeva in this work presents “transcendental” (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  16
    Guy Longworth (2002). Timothy Williamson. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. Xi + 340. [REVIEW] SATS 3 (1):135-139.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  3
    Lorrin A. Riggs & E. Parker Johnson (1949). Electrical Responses of the Human Retina. Journal of Experimental Psychology 39 (4):415.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. David Hemp, KK (Knowing That One Knows) Principle. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 72