Search results for 'luminosity' (try it on Scholar)

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Bibliography: Luminosity in Epistemology
  1. Elia Zardini (2013). Luminosity and Determinacy. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.score: 18.0
    The paper discusses some ways in which the phenomenon of borderline cases may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are fully open to our view. The discussion focusses on a very influential argument (due to Tim Williamson) to the effect that, roughly, no such domains of luminous facts exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts that are best candidates for being luminous plays an (...)
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  2. John G. Hartnett & Firmin J. Oliveira (2007). Luminosity Distance, Angular Size and Surface Brightness in Cosmological General Relativity. Foundations of Physics 37 (3):446-454.score: 18.0
    This paper corrects the explanation given by Oliveira and Hartnett, Found. Phys. Lett. 19(6), 519–535, 2006 for the luminosity distance in Cosmological General Relativity. The mathematical expression for the luminosity distance used in that paper is correct but the explanation in Eqs. (22) and (23) is flawed. Expressions for the angular size and surface brightness of sources are also derived. Finally some comment is made about the calculations of χ2 values in that paper compared with an earlier paper, (...)
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  3. Gary Olson & Richard A. King (1962). Supplementary Report: Stimulus Generalization Gradients Along a Luminosity Continuum. Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (4):414.score: 15.0
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  4. Selim Berker (2008). Luminosity Regained. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (2):1-22.score: 12.0
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, (...)
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  5. Murali Ramachandran, Four Anti-Luminosity Strategies.score: 12.0
    Timothy Williamson (2000) reckons that hardly any mental state is luminous, i.e. is such that if one were in it, then one would invariably be in a position to know that one was. To this end he presents an argument against the luminosity of feeling cold— which he claims generalizes to other phenomenal states, such as e.g. being in pain. As we shall see, however, no fewer than four lines of argument for that conclusion can be extracted from Williamson’s (...)
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  6. Jessica Brown (2005). Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):319–327.score: 12.0
    According to contextualism, the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists take their view to be supported by cases in which the intuitive correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the attributor's context. Williamson offers a complex invariantist account of such cases which appeals to two elements, psychological bias and a failure of luminosity. He provides independent reasons for thinking that contextualist cases are characterized by psychological bias and a failure of luminosity, and argues (...)
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  7. Murali Ramachandran (2009). Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673.score: 12.0
    In Knowledge and Its Limits Timothy Williamson argues against the luminosity of phenomenal states in general by way of arguing against the luminosity of feeling cold, that is, against the view that if one feels cold, one is at least in a position to know that one does. In this paper I consider four strategies that emerge from his discussion, and argue that none succeeds.
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  8. P. X. Monaghan (2008). Williamson and the Argument From Luminosity. Dialogue 47 (3-4):619-.score: 12.0
    ABSTRACT: Many of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental (...)
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  9. Murali Ramachandran, Anti-Luminosity.score: 12.0
    Timothy Williamson (2000) reckons that hardly any mental state is luminous, i.e. is such that if one were in it, then one would invariably be in a position to know that one was. This paper examines an argument he presents against the luminosity of feeling cold, which he claims generalizes to other phenomenal states, such as e.g. being in pain. As we shall see, the argument fails. However, our deliberations do yield two anti-luminosity results: a simple refutation of (...)
     
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  10. Susanne Bobzien (2012). If It's Clear, Then It's Clear That It's Clear, or is It? Higher-Order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom. In B. Morison K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Episteme, etc. OUP UK.score: 9.0
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, axiom 4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it is clear (determinate, definite) that A, then it is clear (determinate, definite) that it is clear (determinate, definite) that A’, or, more formally, CA → CCA. We show how in the debate over axiom 4 two different notions of clarity are in play (...)
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  11. Kelly Becker (2009). Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.score: 9.0
    Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
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  12. Jonathan Vogel (2010). Luminosity and Indiscriminability. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.score: 9.0
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  13. Stewart Cohen (2010). Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):718-730.score: 9.0
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  14. Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco (2002). Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.score: 9.0
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  15. Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.score: 9.0
    In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one (...)
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  16. Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré (2009). Inexact Knowledge with Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179 - 227.score: 9.0
    Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated (...)
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  17. Wai-hung Wong (2008). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.score: 9.0
    Abstract: Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his (...)
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  18. Thomas A. Blackson (2007). On Williamson's Argument for (Ii) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.score: 9.0
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  19. David S. Pacini (2009). Review of David Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9).score: 9.0
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  20. M. M. Trivedi (1987). Citsukha's View on Self-Luminosity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (2):115-123.score: 9.0
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  21. T. Remington Harkness (2011). The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. By David Walsh. Heythrop Journal 52 (1):153-154.score: 9.0
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  22. Elia Zardini (2012). Luminosity and Vagueness. Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.score: 9.0
  23. Rudolph Bauer (2011). Meditation on Natural Luminosity 9 V1. Transmission 1.score: 9.0
    This paper focuses on meditation as natural luminousity.
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  24. Brueckner Anthony (2002). Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophical Studies 110 (3).score: 9.0
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  25. Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar (forthcoming). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 9.0
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  26. Girdhari Lal Chaturvedi (1982). The Concept of Self-Luminosity of Knowledge in Advaita Vedānta. Adarsha Prakashan.score: 9.0
     
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  27. Al Gilchrist (1988). Perception of Luminosity. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 26 (6):495-495.score: 9.0
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  28. David Walsh (2008). The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. Cambridge University Press.score: 9.0
    The Modern Philosophical Revolution breaks new ground by demonstrating the continuity of European philosophy from Kant to Derrida. Much of the literature on European philosophy has emphasized the breaks that have occurred in the course of two centuries of thinking. But as David Walsh argues, such a reading overlooks the extent to which Kant, Hegel, and Schelling were already engaged in the turn toward existence as the only viable mode of philosophizing. Where many similar studies summarize individual thinkers, this book (...)
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  29. Troy Cross (2010). Skeptical Success. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:35-62.score: 6.0
    The following is not a successful skeptical scenario: you think you know you have hands, but maybe you don't! Why is that a failure, when it's far more likely than, say, the evil genius hypothesis? That's the question.<br><br>This is an earlier draft.
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  30. Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.score: 6.0
    Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson's argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it (...)
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  31. Patrick Greenough (2012). Discrimination and Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 6.0
    In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but (...)
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  32. Nicholas Silins (2012). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 6.0
  33. Ishani Maitra & Brian Weatherson (2010). Assertion, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99 - 118.score: 6.0
    We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue (...)
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  34. Glen Hoffmann (2012). Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):55-68.score: 6.0
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.
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  35. Richard Fumerton (2009). Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):67 - 76.score: 6.0
    In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of what we think we know and justifiably believe.
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  36. Adam Elga (2013). The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock and the New Rational Reflection Principle. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.score: 6.0
    The “puzzle of the unmarked clock” derives from a conflict between the following: (1) a plausible principle of epistemic modesty, and (2) “Rational Reflection”, a principle saying how one’s beliefs about what it is rational to believe constrain the rest of one’s beliefs. An independently motivated improvement to Rational Reflection preserves its spirit while resolving the conflict.
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  37. David Peter Lawrence (2009). Proof of a Sentient Knower: Utpaladeva's Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi with the Vṛtti of Harabhatta Shastri. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 37 (6):627-653.score: 6.0
    Utpaladeva (c. 900–950 C.E.) was the chief originator of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology of monistic Kashmiri Śaivism, which was further developed by Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1020 C.E.) and other successors. The Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi, “Proof of a Sentient Knower,” is one component of Utpaladeva’s trio of specialized studies called the Siddhitrayī, “Three Proofs.” This article provides an introduction to and translation of the Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi along with the Vṛtti commentary on it by the nineteenth–twentieth century paṇḍit, Harabhatta Shastri. Utpaladeva in this work presents “transcendental” (...)
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  38. David Hemp, KK (Knowing That One Knows) Principle. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 6.0
     
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  39. Julien Dutant, Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection. Proceedings of Tark XI.score: 6.0
    Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge (...)
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  40. Lorrin A. Riggs & E. Parker Johnson (1949). Electrical Responses of the Human Retina. Journal of Experimental Psychology 39 (4):415.score: 6.0
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  41. Daniel Alroy (1995). Inner Light. Synthese 104 (1):147-160.score: 3.0
    Neural impulses from the senses to the brain convey information, not sensation. The direct electrical stimulation of the cortex produces sensations. Hence, such sensations are evoked in the brain, and not received from the senses, nor from the outside world through the senses. More specifically, the experience of light is evoked in the brain and not received from the eyes. Consequently, the born blind, too, would experience light in response to electrical brain stimulation. The luminosity of light is not (...)
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  42. Murali Ramachandran, Williamson's Argument Against the KK-Principle.score: 3.0
    Timothy Williamson (2000 ch. 5) presents a reductio against the luminosity of knowing, against, that is, the so-called KK-principle: if one knows p, then one knows (or is at least in a position to know) that one knows p.1 I do not endorse the principle, but I do not think Williamson’s argument succeeds in refuting it. My aim here is to show that the KK-principle is not the most obvious culprit behind the contradiction Williamson derives.
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  43. Duncan Pritchard (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford University Press.score: 3.0
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge? -- Achievement without (...)
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  44. Brian Weatherson (2004). Luminous Margins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):373 – 383.score: 3.0
    Timothy Williamson has recently argued that few mental states are luminous , meaning that to be in that state is to be in a position to know that you are in the state. His argument rests on the plausible principle that beliefs only count as knowledge if they are safely true. That is, any belief that could easily have been false is not a piece of knowledge. I argue that the form of the safety rule Williamson uses is inappropriate, and (...)
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  45. Kevin Meeker & Ted Poston (2010). Skeptics Without Borders. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):223.score: 3.0
    Timothy Williamson’s anti luminosity argument has received considerable attention. Escaping unnoticed, though, is a strikingly similar argument from David Hume. This paper highlights some of the arresting parallels between Williamson’s reasoning and Hume’s that will allow us to appreciate more deeply the plausibility of Williamson’s reasoning and to understand how, following Hume, we can extend this reasoning to undermine the “luminosity” of simple necessary truths. More broadly the parallels help us to identify a common skeptical predicament underlying both (...)
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  46. Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré (2009). Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge. Synthese 166 (1):1 - 20.score: 3.0
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a (...)
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  47. Adrian Haddock (2011). The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):23-42.score: 3.0
    John McDowell's conception of perceptual knowledge commits him to the claim that if I perceive that P then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P. In the first part of this essay, I present some reasons to be suspicious of this claim - reasons which derive from a general argument against 'luminosity' - and suggest that McDowell can reject this claim, while holding on to almost all of the rest of his conception of perceptual (...)
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  48. Baron Reed (2006). Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless. Synthese 148 (2):303 - 308.score: 3.0
    One of the main strands of the Cartesian tradition is the view that the mental realm is cognitively accessible to us in a special way: whenever one is in a mental state of a certain sort, one can know it just by considering the matter. In that sense, the mental realm is thought to be a cognitive home for us, and the mental states it comprises are luminous. Recently, however, Timothy Williamson has argued that we are cognitively homeless: no mental (...)
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  49. Maciej Witek, Contextual Facilitation of Colour Recognition: Penetrating Beliefs or Colour-Shape Associations?score: 3.0
    My aim in this paper is to defend the view that the processes underlying early vision are informationally encapsulated. Following Marr (1982) and Pylyshyn (1999) I take early vision to be a cognitive process that takes sensory information as its input and produces the so-called primal sketches or shallow visual outputs: informational states that represent visual objects in terms of their shape, location, size, colour and luminosity. Recently, some researchers (Schirillo 1999, Macpherson 2012) have attempted to undermine the idea (...)
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