Online research in philosophy

Margaret Moore | : Les questions de justice soulevées par la possession du territoire sont nombreuses. Qui a droit à quoi ? La distribution est-elle équitable ? Quels sont les droits censés découler d’un droit au territoire ? Et il y en a bien d’autres. Le présent article met en évidence que ces questions de justice sont abordées sous une perspective plutôt différente selon la conception que l’on se fait du territoire. Il existe à ce dernier égard deux courants dominants (...) : le premier, souvent identifié à Locke, voit le territoire sous l’angle de la propriété ; le second, que l’on rattache à Kant, est considéré comme le domaine géographique du pouvoir juridictionnel. | : There are many justice issues raised by the possession of territory ; questions of who is entitled to what ; the fairness of the distribution ; and the entitlements that are thought to follow from having a right to territory, to name a few. This paper then goes on to show that these justice issues are framed somewhat differently depending on one’s conception of territory. There are two dominant conceptions of territory : territory as property ; and territory as the geographical domain of jurisdictional authority. The former is often identified with Locke, and the latter with Kant. (shrink)

Associative duties—duties inherent to some of our relationships—are most commonly discussed in terms of intimate associations such as of families, friends, or lovers. In this essay I ask whether impersonal associations such as state or nation can also give rise to genuinely associative duties, i.e., duties of patriotism or nationalism. I distinguish between the two in terms of their objects: the object of patriotism is an institutionalized political community, whereas the object of nationalism is a group of people who share (...) a common identity, often grounded in a belief in shared history, and an aspiration for collective self-government together. I explore three arguments for the thesis that a special concern for one’s polity and fellow-citizens, or one’s nation and co-nationals, is an associative duty: from reciprocity, from collective self-determination, and from the well-being of compatriots or co-nationals. I argue that the relationship among compatriots is a more plausible contender for generating associative duties than the relationship among co-nationals, although even in this case there are questions whether these are genuinely associative duties, or simply special duties. Although the relationship among co-nationals is a less plausible contender for associative duties, the well-being argument does apply to the relationship among both co-nationals and compatriots. I also suggest that there is a certain privileging of the status quo in the way that associative duties arguments work, because they tend to operate from existing relations and associations. (shrink)

This essay examines the central claim of Caney's book, viz., that there is no reason to treat the global sphere differently from the domestic sphere. It suggests that there is much that is valuable in having relatively autonomous, differentiated political communities, which both versions of Caney's scope argument ignore. This insight is explored via a critical assessment of both versions of Caney's scope argument; version 1, which is focused on civil and political rights (and argues that that they should be (...) universalized) and version 2, which applies to theories of distributive justice (particularly Caney's global equality of opportunity principle). (shrink)

The Ethics of Nationalism blends a philosophical discussion of the ethical merits and limits of nationalism with a detailed understanding of nationalist aspirations and a variety of national conflict zones. The author discusses the controversial and contemporary issues of rights of secession, the policies of the state in privileging a particular national group, the kinds of accommodations of minority national, and multi cultural identity groups that are justifiable and appropriate. These insights are then applied to two central nationalist aspirations: nation-building (...) and national self-determination projects. The discussion of nation-building projects invloves a theory of the appropriate policies and principles that the state should follow in giving preferences to a particular national group. The discussion of national self-determination projets analyses the kind of prodedual right to secession that should be institutionalized in domestic constitutions or international law, and the psooibilities for accomodation rival caims to national recognition in the changing international order. (shrink)

The nation is usually taken to be an expression, and ?nationalism? a defence, of culture. But we may have sanguinary national conflict (as in Northern Ireland or the former Yugoslavia) where cultural difference is small; and we may have minimal conflict (as in Switzerland or Belgium) where cultural difference is great. This essay proposes a shift, away from seeing nations as grounded in culture, to seeing them as grounded in ?identity? ? often forged by historical forces having nothing to do (...) with culture per se. This essay rejects a cultural argument for liberal nationalism (associated with the work of Raz, Miller and Kymlicka among others) precisely because it confounds national identity with common culture. Since nations diverge despite a common culture, ?common culture? cannot explain them. Identity is more fundamental. It persists where culture changes. (shrink)