Search results for 'maximizing rationality' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. John Broomespecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality (2007). Is Rationality Normative? Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques 2 (23).score: 210.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Duncan MacIntosh (2013). Assuring, Threatening, a Fully Maximizing Theory of Practical Rationality, and the Practical Duties of Agents. Ethics 123 (4):625-656.score: 150.0
    Theories of practical rationality say when it is rational to form and fulfill intentions to do actions. David Gauthier says the correct theory would be the one our obeying would best advance the aim of rationality, something Humeans take to be the satisfaction of one’s desires. I use this test to evaluate the received theory and Gauthier’s 1984 and 1994 theories. I find problems with the theories and then offer a theory superior by Gauthier’s test and immune to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Of Rationality (2012). Rationality, Normativity, and-1 Commitment. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:138.score: 120.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Oxford University Press.score: 96.0
    This is a book on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, I defend a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Young-Ran Roh (2005). Is the Disposition of Constrained Maximization Chosen Rationally? Theory and Decision 59 (1):19-41.score: 88.0
    One of the most important issues in moral philosophy is whether morality can be justified by rationality. The purpose of this study is to examine Gauthier’s moral theory, focusing on the disposition of constrained maximization, which is the main thrust of his project to justify morality rationally. First of all, I shall investigate Gauthier’s assumption and condition for the rationality of the disposition of constrained maximization so as to disclose that the disposition of constrained maximization is not necessarily (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality. Dialogue 30 (1991):3-32.score: 84.0
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Alex C. Michalos (1972). Rationality Between the Maximizers and the Satisficers. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:423 - 445.score: 84.0
    It is argued that by explicating rationality in terms of benefits balancing or outweighing costs instead of in terms of maximizing or satisficing something, a more adequate view of rationality is obtained.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Robert Bass, Maximizing, Satisficing and the Normative Distinction Between Means and Ends.score: 78.0
    Decision theory, understood as providing a normative account of rationality in action, is often thought to be an adequate formalization of instrumental reasoning. As a model, there is much to be said for it. However, if decision theory is to adequately account for correct instrumental reasoning, then the axiomatic conditions by which it links preference to action must be normative for choice. That is, a choice must be rationally defective unless it proceeds from a preference set that satisfies the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Robert C. Pinto (1995). Inconsistency, Rationality and Relativism. Informal Logic 17 (2).score: 78.0
    In section I, I argue that the principal reason why inconsistency is a fault is that it involves having at least one false belief. In section 2, I argue that inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic fault. The argument in section 2 is based on the notion that what matters epistemically is always in the final analysis an item's effect on attaining the goal of truth. In section 3 I describe two cases in which it is best from an (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Richard L. Lewis, Andrew Howes & Satinder Singh (2014). Computational Rationality: Linking Mechanism and Behavior Through Bounded Utility Maximization. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (1):279-311.score: 78.0
    We propose a framework for including information-processing bounds in rational analyses. It is an application of bounded optimality (Russell & Subramanian, 1995) to the challenges of developing theories of mechanism and behavior. The framework is based on the idea that behaviors are generated by cognitive mechanisms that are adapted to the structure of not only the environment but also the mind and brain itself. We call the framework computational rationality to emphasize the incorporation of computational mechanism into the definition (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Pat Barclay & Martin Daly (2003). Humans Should Be Individualistic and Utility-Maximizing, but Not Necessarily “Rational”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):154-155.score: 72.0
    One reason why humans don't behave according to standard game theoretical rationality is because it's not realistic to assume that everyone else is behaving rationally. An individual is expected to have psychological mechanisms that function to maximize his/her long-term payoffs in a world of potentially “irrational” individuals. Psychological decision theory has to be individualistic because individuals make decisions, not groups.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Adrian M. S. Piper (2008). Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception. APRA Foundation Berlin.score: 66.0
    The Humean conception of the self consists in the belief-desire model of motivation and the utility-maximizing model of rationality. This conception has dominated Western thought in philosophy and the social sciences ever since Hobbes’ initial formulation in Leviathan and Hume’s elaboration in the Treatise of Human Nature. Bentham, Freud, Ramsey, Skinner, Allais, von Neumann and Morgenstern and others have added further refinements that have brought it to a high degree of formal sophistication. Late twentieth century moral philosophers such (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentializing Commonsense Morality.score: 66.0
    This is Chapter 4 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that, for any plausible nonconsequentialist theory, we can construct a consequentialist theory that yields the exact same set of deontic verdicts that it yields.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Darrell P. Rowbottom & Otávio Bueno (2011). How to Change It: Modes of Engagement, Rationality, and Stance Voluntarism. Synthese 178 (1):7-17.score: 66.0
    We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change (within the framework of other constraints, e.g., beliefs, one has) also maximizes one’s rationality.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Herbert A. Simon (2000). Bounded Rationality in Social Science: Today and Tomorrow. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 1 (1):25-39.score: 66.0
    With the discovery of voluminous discordant empirical evidence, maximizing expected utility is rapidly disappearing as the core of the theory of human rationality, and a theory of bounded rationality, embracing both the processes and products of choice, is replacing it. There remains a large task of organizing our picture of economic and social processes and adding the new facts needed to shape the theory in an empirically sound way. It is also urgent that new tools now available (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Maurice Lagueux, Omniscience and Rationality in Microeconomics.score: 54.0
    It would be very difficult to discuss the question concerning the hypothesis of omniscience in microeconomics without relating this hypothesis to the more fundamental hypothesis of rationality (usually referred to as rationality principle or postulate) which is at the base of the very idea of an economic theory and even social sciences. Indeed omniscience is a quality which was typically attributed to homo oeconomicus whose essential characteristic is to be perfectly "rational". This association between omniscience and rationality (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Mozaffar Qizilbash (2002). Rationality, Comparability and Maximization. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):141-156.score: 54.0
    James Griffin (1986, 1997, 2000) and Ruth Chang (1997) have argued that alternatives (and values) can be comparable when it is neither true that one is better than the other, nor true that they are exactly equal in value. The relation which holds between them has gone under various names: the alternatives are (Griffin) or (Chang). In this paper, I give a formal analysis of this relation. This analysis allows us to distinguish between two slightly different notions of . It (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Grant Brown (1992). Satisficing Rationality: In Praise of Folly. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (2):261-269.score: 54.0
    From a psychological point of view, human wants and desires form a multitiered structure. If values are related in any way to human affectivity or desire - and this is something most maximizing theorists would certainly not dispute - then we are forced to recognize that human values also form a multi-tiered structure. Failure to appreciate this connection leads maximization theorists seriously astray, both in their interpretation of human behavior and in their postulates of rationality. Optimizing involves satisficing, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Michel Cabanac (1996). The Evolutionary Point of View: Rationality is Elsewhere. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):322-322.score: 54.0
    Baron has provided some examples of nonconsequentialism in decision making and describes them as biases; these may be the remnants of the biological origin of decision making. One may argue that decisions are made on the basis not of rationality but affective processes. Behavior follows the trend toward maximizing pleasure. This mechanism might explain apparent nonconsequentialism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Paola Tubaro (2009). Is Individual Rationality Essential to Market Price Formation? The Contribution of Zero‐Intelligence Agent Trading Models. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (1):1-19.score: 54.0
    The paper investigates the minimum level of individual rationality that is needed for market prices to converge toward their equilibrium level. It does so by examining the theoretical and methodological foundations of the ?zero?intelligence? (ZI) agent trading approach, with which Gode and Sunder (1993a) claimed that weak individual rationality requirements suffice to obtain equilibrium prices. The paper shows that ZI agents are endowed with a higher degree of rationality than previously believed. Though not maximizing utility, they (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Markus Wartiovaara (2011). Rationality, REMM, and Individual Value Creation. Journal of Business Ethics 98 (4):641 - 648.score: 54.0
    This article evaluates alternative models for explaining human behavior. In particular, it compares the resourceful, evaluative, maximizing model (REMM) with the economic (or money maximizing) model of human behavior. The theoretical framework is developed to enhance our understanding of "individual value creation" and to seek an economically rational explanation to: Why Warren Buffett is giving his money away to charity? The article develops a framework of biological, material, and immaterial sources of value. The article additionally extends the existing (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. David Gauthier (1984). Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality. Ethics 94 (3):474-495.score: 50.0
  23. Ingmar Persson (1988). Rationality and Maximization of Satisfaction. Noûs 22 (4):537-554.score: 50.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Begoña Subiza & Josep E. Peris (2000). Choice Functions: Rationality Re-Examined. Theory and Decision 48 (3):287-304.score: 50.0
    On analyzing the problem that arises whenever the set of maximal elements is large, and a selection is then required (see Peris & Subiza 1998), we realize that logical ways of selecting among maximals violate the classical notion and axioms of rationality. We arrive at the same conclusion if we analyze solutions to the problem of choosing from a tournament (where maximal elements do not necessarily exist). So, in our opinion the notion of rationality must be discussed, not (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Isaac Levi (2008). Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):1-17.score: 48.0
    Hans Herzberger's 1973 essay 'Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice' is a classic milestone in the erosion of the idea that rational agents are maximizers of utility. By the time Herzberger wrote, many authors had replaced this claim with the thesis that rational agents are maximizers of preference. That is to say, it was assumed that at the moment of choice a rational agent has a weak ordering representing his or her preferences among the options available to the agent for choice (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Maarten Franssen (1994). Constrained Maximization Reconsidered — an Elaboration and Critique of Gauthier's Modelling of Rational Cooperation in a Single Prisoner's Dilemma. Synthese 101 (2):249 - 272.score: 48.0
    Gauthier's argument for constrained maximization, presented inMorals by Agreement, is perfected by taking into account the possibility of accidental exploitation and discussing the limitations on the values of the parameters which measure the translucency of the actors. Gauthier's argument is nevertheless shown to be defective concerning the rationality of constrained maximization as a strategic choice. It can be argued that it applies only to a single actor entering a population of individuals who are themselves not rational actors but simple (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Danny Frederick, Adversus Homo Economicus: Critique of Lester’s Account of Instrumental Rationality.score: 44.0
    In Chapter 2 of Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester defends two hypotheses: that instrumental rationality requires agents to maximise the satisfaction of their wants and that all agents actually meet this requirement. In addition, he argues that all agents are self-interested (though not necessarily egoistic) and he offers an account of categorical moral desires which entails that no agent ever does what he genuinely feels to be morally wrong. I show that Lester’s two hypotheses are false because they cannot (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Michael Byron (ed.) (2004). Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.score: 42.0
    This collection of essays explores two competing views of practical rationality. How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different reply. Since we are not equipped to maximize, we must often choose the next best alternative--one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called "satisficing" (a term coined by the economist Herb Simon).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Horacio Arló Costa (2006). Rationality and Value: The Epistemological Role of Indeterminate and Agent-Dependent Values. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):7 - 48.score: 42.0
    An important trend in contemporary epistemology centers on elaborating an old idea of pragmatist pedigree: theory selection (and in general the process of changing view and fixing beliefs) presupposes epistemic values. This article focuses on analyzing the case where epistemic values are indeterminate or when the sources of valuation are multiple (epistemic values like coherence and simplicity need not order options in compatible ways). According to the theory that thus arises epistemic alternatives need not be fully ordered by an underlying (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Robert P. Wolff (1970). Maximization of Expected Utility as a Criterion of Rationality in Military Strategy and Foreign Policy. Social Theory and Practice 1 (1):99-111.score: 40.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Daniel M. Farrell (1993). Utility-Maximizing Intentions and the Theory of Rational Choice. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):53-78.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Kathryn Montgomery Hunter (1997). Aphorisms, Maxims, and Old Saws Narrative Rationality and The. In Hilde Lindemann (ed.), Stories and Their Limits: Narrative Approaches to Bioethics. Routledge.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Carlo Alberto Magni, Anna Maffioletti, Michele Santoni & Do Trade (2005). Biung-Ghi Ju/Unanimity and Resource Monotonicity 1–17 Young-Ran Roh/Is the Disposition of Constrained Maximization Chosen Rationally? 19–41 Eric Langlais/Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction and Risk Aversion Without the Expected Utility As. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 59:345-346.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2009). Entitlement, Value and Rationality. Synthese 171 (3):443-457.score: 38.0
    In this paper I discuss two fundamental challenges concerning Crispin Wright's notion of entitlement of cognitive project: firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic kind of warrant since, seemingly, it is not underwritten by epistemic reasons, and, secondly, whether, in the absence of such reasons, the kind of rationality associated with entitlement is epistemic in nature. The paper investigates three possible lines of response to these challenges. According to the first line of response, entitlement of cognitive project is underwritten by (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Gerd Gigerenzer (2010). Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):528-554.score: 38.0
    What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):261-280.score: 38.0
    We develop a logical system that captures two different interpretations of what extensive games model, and we apply this to a long-standing debate in game theory between those who defend the claim that common knowledge of rationality leads to backward induction or subgame perfect (Nash) equilibria and those who reject this claim. We show that a defense of the claim à la Aumann (1995) rests on a conception of extensive game playing as a one-shot event in combination with a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Reed Richter (1990). Ideal Rationality and Hand Waving. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):147 – 156.score: 38.0
    In discussions surrounding epistemology and rationality, it is often useful to assume an agent is rational or ideally rational. Often, this ideal rationality assumption is spelled out along the following lines: -/- 1. The agent believes everything about a situation which the evidence entitles her to believe and nothing which it does not. -/- 2. The agent believes all the logical consequences of any of her beliefs. -/- 3. The agent knows her own mind: if she believes P, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Julian Fink (2014). A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'. Erkenntnis:1-33.score: 38.0
    The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Duncan Macintosh (1991). Co-Operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):309 - 321.score: 36.0
    For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Robert C. Robinson (2006). Bounded Epistemology. Ssrn Elibrary.score: 36.0
    Game theory is a branch of economics that uses powerful mathematical models to predict what agents ought to do when interacting with other agents strategically. Bounded rationality is a sub-field of game theory that sets out to explain why, in some interesting cases, people don't act according their utility maximizing strategies, as described by game theory. Interactive Epistemology is formal tool used by Game Theorists and computer scientists to model interactive cases of knowledge. This interesting and useful tool (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Hans Lottenbach (1994). Expected Utility and Constrained Maximization: Problems of Compatibility. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 41 (1):37 - 48.score: 34.0
    In recent attempts at deriving morality from rationality expected utility theory has played a major role. In the most prominent such attempt, Gauthier'sMorals by Agreement, a mode of maximizing utility calledconstrained maximization is defended. I want to show that constrained maximization or any similar proposal cannot be coherently supported by expected utility theory. First, I point to an important implication of that theory. Second, I discuss the question of what the place of constrained maximization in utility theory might (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Andrew M. Colman (2003). Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.score: 34.0
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Isaac Levi (2006). Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” Minimal Rationality. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 5 (2):199-211.score: 34.0
    An argument is advanced to show why E-admissibility should be preferred over maximality as a principle of rational choice where rationality is understood as minimal rationality. Consideration is given to the distinction between second best and second worst options in three way choice that is ignored according to maximality. It is shown why the behavior exhibited in addressing the problems posed by Allais (Econometrica 21:503–546, 1952) and by Ellsberg (Q Econ 75:643–669, 1961) do not violate the independence postulate (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. James Wood Bailey (1998). mIs It Rationale to Maximize? M. Utilitas 10 (2):195-.score: 34.0
    Most versions of utilitarianism depend on the plausibility and coherence of some conceptionof maximizing well-being, but these conceptions have been attacked on various grounds. This paper considers two such contentions. First, it addresses the argument that because goods are plural and incommensurable, maximization is incoherent. It is shown that any conception of incommensurability strong enough to show the incoherence of maximization leads to an intolerable paradox. Several misunderstandings of what maximization requires are also addressed. Second, this paper responds to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Nien-Hê Hsieh (2007). Maximization, Incomparability, and Managerial Choice. Business Ethics Quarterly 17 (3):497-513.score: 34.0
    According to one prominent view of rationality, for the choice of alternative to be justified, it must be at least as good as other alternatives. Michael Jensen has recently invoked this view to argue that managers should act exclusively to maximize the long-run market value of economic enterprises. According to Jensen, alternative accounts of managerial responsibility, such as stakeholder theory, are to be rejected because they lack a single measure to compare alternatives as better or worse. Against Jensen’s account, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Ran Spiegler, Competition Over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations.score: 34.0
    I study a market model in which profit-maximizing firms compete in multidimensional pricing strategies over a consumer, who is limited in his ability to grasp such complicated objects and therefore uses a sampling procedure to evaluate them. Firms respond to increased competition with an increased effort to obfuscate, rather than with more competitive pricing. As a result, consumer welfare is not enhanced and may even deteriorate. Specifically, when firms control both the price and the quality of each dimension, and (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Andrew Howes, Richard L. Lewis & Satinder Singh (2014). Utility Maximization and Bounds on Human Information Processing. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (1):198-203.score: 34.0
    Utility maximization is a key element of a number of theoretical approaches to explaining human behavior. Among these approaches are rational analysis, ideal observer theory, and signal detection theory. While some examples of these approaches define the utility maximization problem with little reference to the bounds imposed by the organism, others start with, and emphasize approaches in which bounds imposed by the information processing architecture are considered as an explicit part of the utility maximization problem. These latter approaches are the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Reed Richter (1984). Rationality Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403.score: 32.0
    This paper looks at a dispute decision theory about how best to characterize expected utility maximization and express the logic of rational choice. Where A1, … , An are actions open to some particular agent, and S1, … , Sn are mutually exclusive states of the world such that the agent knows at least one of which obtains, does the logic of rational choice require an agent to consider the conditional probability of choice Ai given that some state Si obtains, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. S. E. N. Amartya (2005). Why Exactly is Commitment Important for Rationality? Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):5-14.score: 30.0
    Gary Becker and others have done important work to broaden the content of self interest, but have not departed from seeing rationality in terms of the exclusive pursuit of self-interest. One reason why committed behavior is important is that a person can have good reason to pursue objectives other than self interest maximization (no matter how broadly it is construed). Indeed, one can also follow rules of behavior that go beyond the pursuit of one's own goals, even if the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Sven Ove Hansson (2006). Economic (Ir)Rationality in Risk Analysis. Economics and Philosophy 22 (2):231-241.score: 30.0
    Mainstream risk analysis deviates in at least two important respects from the rationality ideal of mainstream economics. First, expected utility maximization is not applied in a consistent way. It is applied to endodoxastic uncertainty, i.e. the uncertainty (or risk) expressed in a risk assessment, but in many cases not to metadoxastic uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about which of several competing assessments is correct. Instead, a common approach to metadoxastic uncertainty is to only take the most plausible assessment into account. This (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000