Search results for 'maximizing rationality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  84
    John Broomespecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality (2007). Is Rationality Normative? Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques 2 (23).
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  2.  34
    Of Rationality (2012). Rationality, Normativity, and-1 Commitment. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:138.
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  3.  73
    Duncan MacIntosh (2013). Assuring, Threatening, a Fully Maximizing Theory of Practical Rationality, and the Practical Duties of Agents. Ethics 123 (4):625-656.
    Theories of practical rationality say when it is rational to form and fulfill intentions to do actions. David Gauthier says the correct theory would be the one our obeying would best advance the aim of rationality, something Humeans take to be the satisfaction of one’s desires. I use this test to evaluate the received theory and Gauthier’s 1984 and 1994 theories. I find problems with the theories and then offer a theory superior by Gauthier’s test and immune to (...)
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  4. Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    This is a book on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, I defend a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
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  5.  11
    Robert C. Pinto (1995). Inconsistency, Rationality and Relativism. Informal Logic 17 (2).
    In section I, I argue that the principal reason why inconsistency is a fault is that it involves having at least one false belief. In section 2, I argue that inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic fault. The argument in section 2 is based on the notion that what matters epistemically is always in the final analysis an item's effect on attaining the goal of truth. In section 3 I describe two cases in which it is best from an (...)
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  6. Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality. Dialogue 30 (1991):3-32.
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational (...)
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  7.  95
    Darrell P. Rowbottom & Otávio Bueno (2011). How to Change It: Modes of Engagement, Rationality, and Stance Voluntarism. Synthese 178 (1):7-17.
    We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change (within the framework of other constraints, e.g., beliefs, one has) also maximizes one’s rationality.
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  8.  38
    Adrian Piper (2013). Rationality and the Structure of the Self. APRA Foundation.
    The Humean conception of the self consists in the belief-desire model of motivation and the utility-maximizing model of rationality. This conception has dominated Western thought in philosophy and the social sciences ever since Hobbes’ initial formulation in Leviathan and Hume’s elaboration in the Treatise of Human Nature. Bentham, Freud, Ramsey, Skinner, Allais, von Neumann and Morgenstern and others have added further refinements that have brought it to a high degree of formal sophistication. Late twentieth century moral philosophers such (...)
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  9.  52
    Herbert A. Simon (2000). Bounded Rationality in Social Science: Today and Tomorrow. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 1 (1):25-39.
    With the discovery of voluminous discordant empirical evidence, maximizing expected utility is rapidly disappearing as the core of the theory of human rationality, and a theory of bounded rationality, embracing both the processes and products of choice, is replacing it. There remains a large task of organizing our picture of economic and social processes and adding the new facts needed to shape the theory in an empirically sound way. It is also urgent that new tools now available (...)
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  10. Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentializing Commonsense Morality.
    This is Chapter 4 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that, for any plausible nonconsequentialist theory, we can construct a consequentialist theory that yields the exact same set of deontic verdicts that it yields.
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  11.  66
    Robert Bass, Maximizing, Satisficing and the Normative Distinction Between Means and Ends.
    Decision theory, understood as providing a normative account of rationality in action, is often thought to be an adequate formalization of instrumental reasoning. As a model, there is much to be said for it. However, if decision theory is to adequately account for correct instrumental reasoning, then the axiomatic conditions by which it links preference to action must be normative for choice. That is, a choice must be rationally defective unless it proceeds from a preference set that satisfies the (...)
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  12. Adrian M. S. Piper (2008). Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception. APRA Foundation Berlin.
    The Humean conception of the self consists in the belief-desire model of motivation and the utility-maximizing model of rationality. This conception has dominated Western thought in philosophy and the social sciences ever since Hobbes’ initial formulation in Leviathan and Hume’s elaboration in the Treatise of Human Nature. Bentham, Freud, Ramsey, Skinner, Allais, von Neumann and Morgenstern and others have added further refinements that have brought it to a high degree of formal sophistication. Late twentieth century moral philosophers such (...)
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  13.  30
    Darrell P. Rowbottom & Otávio Bueno (2011). How to Change It: Modes of Engagement, Rationality, and Stance Voluntarism. Synthese 178 (1):7-17.
    We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change also maximizes one’s rationality.
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  14.  6
    Paola Tubaro (2009). Is Individual Rationality Essential to Market Price Formation? The Contribution of Zero‐Intelligence Agent Trading Models. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (1):1-19.
    The paper investigates the minimum level of individual rationality that is needed for market prices to converge toward their equilibrium level. It does so by examining the theoretical and methodological foundations of the ?zero?intelligence? (ZI) agent trading approach, with which Gode and Sunder (1993a) claimed that weak individual rationality requirements suffice to obtain equilibrium prices. The paper shows that ZI agents are endowed with a higher degree of rationality than previously believed. Though not maximizing utility, they (...)
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  15.  2
    Michel Cabanac (1996). The Evolutionary Point of View: Rationality is Elsewhere. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):322-322.
    Baron has provided some examples of nonconsequentialism in decision making and describes them as biases; these may be the remnants of the biological origin of decision making. One may argue that decisions are made on the basis not of rationality but affective processes. Behavior follows the trend toward maximizing pleasure. This mechanism might explain apparent nonconsequentialism.
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  16.  12
    Grant Brown (1992). Satisficing Rationality: In Praise of Folly. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (2):261-269.
    From a psychological point of view, human wants and desires form a multitiered structure. If values are related in any way to human affectivity or desire - and this is something most maximizing theorists would certainly not dispute - then we are forced to recognize that human values also form a multi-tiered structure. Failure to appreciate this connection leads maximization theorists seriously astray, both in their interpretation of human behavior and in their postulates of rationality. Optimizing involves satisficing, (...)
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  17. Maurice Lagueux, Omniscience and Rationality in Microeconomics.
    It would be very difficult to discuss the question concerning the hypothesis of omniscience in microeconomics without relating this hypothesis to the more fundamental hypothesis of rationality (usually referred to as rationality principle or postulate) which is at the base of the very idea of an economic theory and even social sciences. Indeed omniscience is a quality which was typically attributed to homo oeconomicus whose essential characteristic is to be perfectly "rational". This association between omniscience and rationality (...)
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  18.  4
    Julian Nida-rümelin (1998). Structural Rationality in Game Theory. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:81-93.
    When I began to think about normative questions of rationality and morality, I soon became a consequentialist. This is the natural result of questioning socially established institutional and moral rules and their metaphysical underpinnings. A critical mind cannot accept a duty to do this or that just because it is told that this duty is implied by some general principle. The immediate question is: Where does this principle come from and how is it justified? And if this question cannot (...)
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  19.  1
    Alex C. Michalos (1972). Rationality Between the Maximizers and the Satisficers. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:423 - 445.
    It is argued that by explicating rationality in terms of benefits balancing or outweighing costs instead of in terms of maximizing or satisficing something, a more adequate view of rationality is obtained.
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  20. Darrell Patrick Rowbottom & Otávio Bueno, How to Change It : Modes of Engagement, Rationality, and Stance Voluntarism.
    We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change also maximizes one’s rationality.
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  21. Michael E. Weber (1998). Satisficing: The Rationality of Preferring What is Good Enough. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    It is widely maintained that self-interested rationality is a matter of maximizing one's own good or well-being. Rationality more generally is also frequently characterized in maximizing terms: the rational thing to do in any decision context is whatever is best in terms of one's interests or will lead to the greatest preference-satisfaction, My dissertation consists of three independent papers that challenge this orthodoxy by lending support to "satisficing," the idea that it is rational to prefer what (...)
     
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  22. Markus Wartiovaara (2011). Rationality, REMM, and Individual Value Creation. Journal of Business Ethics 98 (4):641 - 648.
    This article evaluates alternative models for explaining human behavior. In particular, it compares the resourceful, evaluative, maximizing model (REMM) with the economic (or money maximizing) model of human behavior. The theoretical framework is developed to enhance our understanding of "individual value creation" and to seek an economically rational explanation to: Why Warren Buffett is giving his money away to charity? The article develops a framework of biological, material, and immaterial sources of value. The article additionally extends the existing (...)
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  23.  20
    Michael Moehler (2015). Rational Cooperation and the Nash Bargaining Solution. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):577-594.
    In a recent article, McClennen (2012) defends an alternative bargaining theory in response to his criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution as a principle of distributive justice in the context of the social contract. McClennen rejects the orthodox concept of expected individual utility maximizing behavior that underlies the Nash bargaining model in favor of what he calls full rationality, and McClennen’s full cooperation bargaining theory demands that agents select the most egalitarian strictly Pareto-optimal distributional outcome that is (...)
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  24.  61
    Michael Byron (ed.) (2004). Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays explores two competing views of practical rationality. How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different reply. Since we are not equipped to maximize, we must often choose the next best alternative--one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called "satisficing" (a term coined by the economist Herb Simon).
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  25.  18
    Patrick Suppes (2016). Qualitative Axioms of Uncertainty as a Foundation for Probability and Decision-Making. Minds and Machines 26 (1-2):185-202.
    Although the concept of uncertainty is as old as Epicurus’s writings, and an excellent quantitative theory, with entropy as the measure of uncertainty having been developed in recent times, there has been little exploration of the qualitative theory. The purpose of the present paper is to give a qualitative axiomatization of uncertainty, in the spirit of the many studies of qualitative comparative probability. The qualitative axioms are fundamentally about the uncertainty of a partition of the probability space of events. Of (...)
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  26.  13
    Horacio Arló Costa (2006). Rationality and Value: The Epistemological Role of Indeterminate and Agent-Dependent Values. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):7 - 48.
    An important trend in contemporary epistemology centers on elaborating an old idea of pragmatist pedigree: theory selection (and in general the process of changing view and fixing beliefs) presupposes epistemic values. This article focuses on analyzing the case where epistemic values are indeterminate or when the sources of valuation are multiple (epistemic values like coherence and simplicity need not order options in compatible ways). According to the theory that thus arises epistemic alternatives need not be fully ordered by an underlying (...)
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  27.  52
    Duncan Macintosh (1991). Co-Operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):309 - 321.
    For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or (...)
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  28.  14
    Young-Ran Roh (2005). Is the Disposition of Constrained Maximization Chosen Rationally? Theory and Decision 59 (1):19-41.
    One of the most important issues in moral philosophy is whether morality can be justified by rationality. The purpose of this study is to examine Gauthier’s moral theory, focusing on the disposition of constrained maximization, which is the main thrust of his project to justify morality rationally. First of all, I shall investigate Gauthier’s assumption and condition for the rationality of the disposition of constrained maximization so as to disclose that the disposition of constrained maximization is not necessarily (...)
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  29.  26
    Pat Barclay & Martin Daly (2003). Humans Should Be Individualistic and Utility-Maximizing, but Not Necessarily “Rational”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):154-155.
    One reason why humans don't behave according to standard game theoretical rationality is because it's not realistic to assume that everyone else is behaving rationally. An individual is expected to have psychological mechanisms that function to maximize his/her long-term payoffs in a world of potentially “irrational” individuals. Psychological decision theory has to be individualistic because individuals make decisions, not groups.
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  30.  23
    Robert C. Robinson (2006). Bounded Epistemology. Ssrn Elibrary.
    Game theory is a branch of economics that uses powerful mathematical models to predict what agents ought to do when interacting with other agents strategically. Bounded rationality is a sub-field of game theory that sets out to explain why, in some interesting cases, people don't act according their utility maximizing strategies, as described by game theory. Interactive Epistemology is formal tool used by Game Theorists and computer scientists to model interactive cases of knowledge. This interesting and useful tool (...)
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  31. Michael Byron (ed.) (2004). Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.
    How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different answer: since we are not equipped to maximize we often choose the next best alternative, one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called satisficing. This collection of essays explores both these accounts of practical reason, examining the consequences for adopting one or the other for (...)
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  32. Michael Byron (ed.) (2009). Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.
    How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different answer: since we are not equipped to maximize we often choose the next best alternative, one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called satisficing. This collection of essays explores both these accounts of practical reason, examining the consequences for adopting one or the other for (...)
     
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  33. Miriam Schoenfield (2015). Bridging Rationality and Accuracy. Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.
    This paper is about the connection between rationality and accuracy. I show that one natural picture about how rationality and accuracy are connected emerges if we assume that rational agents are rationally omniscient. I then develop an alternative picture that allows us to relax this assumption, in order to accommodate certain views about higher order evidence.
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  34. Jordan Howard Sobel (1994). Taking Chances. Cambridge University Press.
    J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the perspective of (...)
     
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  35.  56
    Tamás Demeter & Gábor Á Zemplén (2010). Being Charitable to Scientific Controversies: On the Demonstrativity of Newton's Experimentum Crucis. The Monist 93 (4):640-656.
    Current philosophical reflections on science have departed from mainstream history of science with respect to both methodology and conclusions. The article investigates how different approaches to reconstructing commitments can explain these differences and facilitate a mutual understanding and communication of these two perspectives on science. Translating the differences into problems pertaining to principles of charity, the paper offers a platform for clarification and resolution of the differences between the two perspectives. The outlined contextual approach occupies a middle ground between mainstream (...)
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  36.  42
    Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (1999). In What Way Are Constraints Paradoxical? Utilitas 11 (1):49.
    It is impermissible to violate a constraint, even if by doing so a greater number of violations of the very same constraint were to be prevented. Most find this puzzling. But what makes the impermissibility of such minimizing violations puzzling? This article discusses some recent answers to this question. The article's first aim is to make clear in what way these answers differ. The second aim is to evaluate the answers, along with Kamm's and Nagel's proposed solutions of what they (...)
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  37.  8
    Paul Weirich (1995). Book Review:Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. Jordan Howard Sobel. [REVIEW] Ethics 106 (1):191-.
    J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the perspective of (...)
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  38. Jordan Howard Sobel (1994). Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. Cambridge University Press.
    J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the perspective of (...)
     
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  39. Stephen Puryear (2016). Sentience, Rationality, and Moral Status: A Further Reply to Hsiao. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (4):697-704.
    Timothy Hsiao argues that animals lack moral status because they lack the capacity for the sort of higher-level rationality required for membership in the moral community. Stijn Bruers and László Erdős have already raised a number of objections to this argument, to which Hsiao has replied with some success. But I think a stronger critique can be made. Here I raise further objections to three aspects of Hsiao's view: his conception of the moral community, his idea of root capacities (...)
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  40. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West (2000). Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):645-665.
    Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational (...)
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  41.  49
    Luca Ferrero (2014). Diachronic Structural Rationality. Inquiry 57 (3):311-336.
    In this paper I investigate whether there are genuine and irreducible pressures of diachronic rationality grounded on the structure of the subject rather than on substantive considerations, such as pragmatic ones. I argue that structural pressures of diachronic rationality have a limited scope. The most important pressure only tells against arbitrary interference with the mechanisms for the retention of attitudes over time. I then argue that in the practical case, a substantial account in terms of the agent's temporal (...)
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  42. John R. Searle (2003). Rationality in Action. MIT Press.
    The study of rationality and practical reason, or rationality in action, has been central to Western intellectual culture. In this invigorating book, John Searle lays out six claims of what he calls the Classical Model of rationality and shows why they are false. He then presents an alternative theory of the role of rationality in thought and action. -/- A central point of Searle's theory is that only irrational actions are directly caused by beliefs and desires—for (...)
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  43.  42
    Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (2004). Introduction: Aspects of Rationality. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press
    This article examines the nature of rationality. The domain of rationality is customarily divided into the theoretical and the practical. Whereas theoretical or epistemic rationality is concerned with what it is rational to believe, and sometimes with rational degrees of belief, practical rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, or intend or desire to do. This article raises some of the main issues relevant to philosophical discussion of the nature of rationality. Discussions (...)
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  44. Tomasz Żuradzki (2016). Time-Biases and Rationality: The Philosophical Perspectives on Empirical Research About Time Preferences. In Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brożek & Łukasz Kurek (eds.), The Emergence of Normative Orders. Copernicus Press 149-187.
    The empirically documented fact is that people’s preferences are time -biased. The main aim of this paper is to analyse in which sense do time -biases violate the requirements of rationality, as many authors assume. I will demonstrate that contrary to many influential views in psychology, economy and philosophy it is very difficult to find why the bias toward the near violates the requirements rationality. I will also show why the bias toward the future violates the requirements of (...)
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  45. Christopher Cherniak (1986). Minimal Rationality. MIT Press.
    In Minimal Rationality, Christopher Cherniak boldly challenges the myth of Man the the Rational Animal and the central role that the "perfectly rational...
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  46. Brian Hedden (2015). Time-Slice Rationality. Mind 124 (494):449-491.
    I advocate Time-Slice Rationality, the thesis that the relationship between two time-slices of the same person is not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of distinct persons. The locus of rationality, so to speak, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. This claim is motivated by consideration of puzzle cases for personal identity over time and by a very moderate form of internalism about rationality. Time-Slice Rationality conflicts with (...)
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  47.  88
    Luca Ferrero (2012). Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):144-164.
    In this paper, I discuss whether there are genuinely *diachronic* constraints of practical rationality, that is, pressures on combinations of practical attitudes over time, which are not reducible to mere synchronic rational pressures. Michael Bratman has recently argued that there is at least one such diachronic rational constraint that governs the stability of intentions over time. *Pace* Bratman, I argue that there are no genuinely diachronic constraints on intentions that meet the stringent desiderata set by him. But I show (...)
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  48. Jens Gillessen (2015). Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3):1-36.
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The paper challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action—or (...)
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  49. Gerd Gigerenzer & Thomas Sturm (2012). How (Far) Can Rationality Be Naturalized? Synthese 187 (1):243-268.
    The paper shows why and how an empirical study of fast-and-frugal heuristics can provide norms of good reasoning, and thus how (and how far) rationality can be naturalized. We explain the heuristics that humans often rely on in solving problems, for example, choosing investment strategies or apartments, placing bets in sports, or making library searches. We then show that heuristics can lead to judgments that are as accurate as or even more accurate than strategies that use more information and (...)
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  50. Shannon Spaulding (2015). Imagination, Desire, and Rationality. Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):457-476.
    We often have affective responses to fictional events. We feel afraid for Desdemona when Othello approaches her in a murderous rage. We feel disgust toward Iago for orchestrating this tragic event. What mental architecture could explain these affective responses? In this paper I consider the claim that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires. Some theorists argue that accounts that do not invoke imaginative desires imply that consumers of fiction have irrational desires. I argue that (...)
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