Search results for 'mental content' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Florence Claude Gabriel, Denes Szucs & Alain Content (2013). The Mental Representations of Fractions: Adults' Same–Different Judgments. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 140.0
    Two experiments examined whether the mental representation of the magnitude of fractions is global or componential. Previously, some authors concluded that adults process the numerators and denominators of fractions separately and do not access the global magnitude of fractions. Conversely, others reported evidence suggesting that the global magnitude of fractions is accessed. We hypothesized that in a fraction matching task, participants automatically extract the magnitude of the components but that the activation of the global magnitude of the whole fraction (...)
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  2. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.score: 80.0
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main (...)
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  3. Todd Buras (2009). An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.score: 80.0
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
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  4. Jeff Speaks (2006). Is Mental Content Prior to Linguistic Meaning?: Stalnaker on Intentionality. Noûs 40 (3):428-467.score: 80.0
    Since the 1960's, work in the analytic tradition on the nature of mental and linguistic content has converged on the views that social facts about public language meaning are derived from facts about the thoughts of individuals, and that these thoughts are constituted by properties of the internal states of agents. I give a two-part argument against this picture of intentionality: first, that if mental content is prior to public language meaning, then a view of (...) content much like the causal-pragmatic theory presented by Robert Stalnaker in Inquiry must be correct; second, that the causal-pragmatic theory is false. I conclude with some positive suggestions regarding alternative solutions to the `problem of intentionality.'. (shrink)
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  5. Andrew E. Newman (2004). The Good, the Bad, and the Irrational: Three Views of Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):95-106.score: 80.0
    Recent philosophy of psychology has seen the rise of so-called "dual-component" and "two-dimensional" theories of mental content as what I call a "Middle Way" between internalism (the view that contents of states like belief are "narrow") and externalism (the view that by and large, such contents are "wide"). On these Middle Way views, mental states are supposed to have two kinds of content: the "folk-psychological" kind, which we ordinarily talk about and which is wide; and some (...)
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  6. Gerard O'Brien (1989). Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content. Acta Analytica 22 (22):111-31.score: 80.0
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brain’s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone unnoticed that connectionism (...)
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  7. Axel Mueller (2011). Does Kantian Mental Content Externalism Help Metaphysical Realists? Synthese 182 (3):449-473.score: 80.0
    Standard interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism take it as a commitment to the view that the objects of cognition are structured or made by conditions imposed by the mind, and therefore to what Van Cleve calls “honest-to-God idealism”. Against this view, many more recent investigations of Kant’s theory of representation and cognitive significance have been able to show that Kant is committed to a certain form of Mental Content Externalism, and therefore to the realist view that the objects (...)
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  8. Christopher Gauker (1991). Mental Content and the Division of Epistemic Labour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (September):302-18.score: 80.0
    Tyler Burge's critique of individualistic conceptions of mental content is well known.This paper employs a novel strategy to defend a strong form of Burge's conclusion. The division of epistemic labor rests on the possibility of language-mediated transactions, such as asking for something in a store and getting it. The paper shows that any individualistic conception of content will render such transactions unintelligible.
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  9. Josep E. Corbí & Josep L. Prades (2000). Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing Mechanisms. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1-11.score: 80.0
    In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that fine-grained (...)
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  10. James Baillie (1997). Personal Identity and Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.score: 76.0
    In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their (...)
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  11. Colin Allen (1992). Mental Content and Evolutionary Explanation. Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.score: 76.0
    Cognitive ethology is the comparative study of animal cognition from an evolutionary perspective. As a sub-discipline of biology it shares interest in questions concerning the immediate causes and development of behavior. As a part of ethology it is also concerned with questions about the function and evolution of behavior. I examine some recent work in cognitive ethology, and I argue that the notions of mental content and representation are important to enable researchers to answer questions and state generalizations (...)
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  12. Robert C. Cummins (1997). The LOT of the Causal Theory of Mental Content. Journal of Philosophy 94 (10):535-542.score: 76.0
    The thesis of this paper is that the causal theory of mental content (hereafter CT) is incompatible with an elementary fact of perceptual psychology, namely, that the detection of distal properties generally requires the mediation of a “theory.” I shall call this fact the nontransducibility of distal properties (hereafter NTDP). The argument proceeds in two stages. The burden of stage one is that, taken together, CT and the language of thought hypothesis (hereafter LOT) are incompatible with NTDP. The (...)
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  13. David Houghton (1997). Mental Content and External Representations: Internalism, Anti-Internalism. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):159-77.score: 74.0
    According to ‘internalism’, what mental states people are in depends wholly on what obtains inside their heads. This paper challenges that view without relying on arguments about the identity‐conditions of concepts that make up the content of mental states. Instead, it questions the internalist’s underlying assumption that, in Searle’s words, “the brain is all we have for the purpose of representing the world to ourselves”, which neglects the fact that human beings have used their brains to devise (...)
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  14. Gualtiero Piccinini (2004). Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental Contents. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.score: 72.0
    Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions. # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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  15. J. Brown (2000). Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-35.score: 72.0
    I consider whether one particular anti-individualist claim, the doctrine of object-dependent thoughts (DODT), is compatible with the Principle of Privileged Access, or PPA, which states that, in general, a subject can have non-empirical knowledge of her thought contents. The standard defence of the compatibility of anti-individualism and PPA emphasises the reliability of the process which produces a subject's second order beliefs about her thought contents. I examine whether this defence can be applied to DODT, given that DODT generates the possibility (...)
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  16. Brian Loar (2003). Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press. 229--258.score: 70.0
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  17. Liza Skidelsky (2003). Mental Content: Many Semantics, One Single Project. Dialogos 38 (82):31-55.score: 70.0
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  18. M. J. Cain (1999). Fodor's Attempt to Naturalize Mental Content. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):520-26.score: 70.0
  19. Bernard W. Kobes (1996). Mental Content and Hot Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 24 (1):71-99.score: 70.0
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  20. Bernard W. Kobes (2003). Mental Content and Hot Self-Knowledge. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press. 71-99.score: 70.0
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  21. Laird Addis (2005). The Necessity and Nature of Mental Content. In Gabor Forrai & George Kampis (eds.), Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.score: 70.0
     
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  22. Jussi Haukioja (2005). Normativity and Mental Content. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.score: 70.0
     
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  23. William G. Lycan (1990). Mental Content in Linguistic Form. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):147-54.score: 66.0
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  24. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1994). The Supervenience of Mental Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135.score: 66.0
  25. Alberto Voltolini (1997). Is Narrow Content the Same as Content of Mental State Types Opaquely Taxonomized? In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.score: 66.0
    Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they (...)
     
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  26. Colin McGinn (1989). Mental Content. Blackwell.score: 66.0
     
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  27. Joe Lau, Externalism About Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 64.0
    Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way.
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  28. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies.score: 64.0
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
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  29. Pascal Engel (2000). Wherein Lies the Normative Dimension in Meaning and Mental Content? Philosophical Studies 100 (3):305-321.score: 62.0
    This paper argues that the normative dimension in mental and semantic content is not a categorical feature of content, but an hypothetical one, relative to the features of the interpretation of thoughts and meaning. The views of Robert Brandom are discussed. The thesis defended in this paper is not interpretationist about thought. It implies that the normative dimension of content arises from the real capacity of thinkers and speakers to self ascribe thoughts to themselves and to (...)
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  30. Paul Boghossian (2011). The Transparency of Mental Content Revisited. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 155 (3):457-465.score: 60.0
    The transparency of mental content revisited Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9611-3 Authors Paul Boghossian, Department of Philosophy, New York University (NYU), 5 Washington Place, New York, 10003 USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  31. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa, Causal Theories of Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
    Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are (...)
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  32. Robert D. Rupert (2008). Causal Theories of Mental Content. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380.score: 60.0
    Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. Section 1 explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. Section 2 specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. Sections 3, 4, and 5 critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Garrett Millikan, David Papineau, Dennis Stampe, Dan Ryder, (...)
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  33. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). A Trilemma About Mental Content. In Schear Joseph (ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-world. Routledge. 272-282.score: 60.0
    Schellenberg sheds light on the recent debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the role and nature of concepts in perceptual experience, by considering the following trilemma: (C1) Non-rational animals and humans can be in mental states with the same kind of content when they are perceptually related to the very same environment. (C2) Non-rational animals do not possess concepts. (C3) Content is constituted by modes of presentations and is, thus, conceptually structured. She discusses reasons for accepting and (...)
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  34. Bence Nanay (2011). Function, Modality, Mental Content. Journal of Mind and Behavior 32:84-87.score: 60.0
    I clarify some of the details of the modal theory of function I outlined in Nanay (2010): (a) I explicate what it means that the function of a token biological trait is fixed by modal facts; (b) I address an objection to my trait type individuation argument against etiological function and (c) I examine the consequences of replacing the etiological theory of function with a modal theory for the prospects of using the concept of biological function to explain mental (...)
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  35. Adam Pautz (2013). Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford. 194-234.score: 60.0
    I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases" (independently discussed by Horgan here), "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence (not natuarlness) plays the central role (...)
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  36. Colin Allen (1992). Mental Content. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (4):537-553.score: 60.0
    Daniel Dennett and Stephen Stich have independently, but similarly, argued that the contents of mental states cannot be specified precisely enough for the purposes of scientific prediction and explanation. Dennett takes this to support his view that the proper role for mentalistic terms in science is heuristic. Stich takes it to support his view that cognitive science should be done without reference to mental content at all. I defend a realist understanding of mental content against (...)
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  37. Curtis Brown, Narrow Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
    Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or (...)
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  38. Anthony Newman (2006). The Burning Barn Fallacy in Defenses of Externalism About Mental Content. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:37-57.score: 60.0
    Externalism says that many ordinary mental contents are constituted by relations to things outside the mental subject’s head. An infl uential objection says that externalism is incompatible with our commonsense belief in mental causation, because such extrinsic relations cannot play the important causal role in producing behavior that we ordinarily think mental content plays.An extremely common response is that it is simply obvious, from examples of ordinary causal processes, that extrinsic relations can play the desired (...)
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  39. Gerard O'Brien (1998). Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content. Acta Analytica 22 (22):111-31.score: 60.0
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brain’s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone unnoticed that connectionism (...)
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  40. Andrés L. Jaume (2013). Indeterminacy, Uselessness, and Abstraction. Problems Posed by Teleological Theories of Mental Content. Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):35-52.score: 60.0
    RESUMEN La teleosemántica es el intento de naturalizar el contenido mental mediante el recurso al concepto de función biológica. En el presente artículo se argumenta que la teleosemántica carece de los recursos necesarios para hacer frente a tres problemas: la indeterminación del contenido, el carácter abstracto de este y la inutilidad biológica de algunas de las representaciones que pueden albergar organismos como los humanos. ABSTRACT Teleosemantics is the attempt to naturalize mental content by resorting to the concept (...)
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  41. Max Kistler (2000). Source and Channel in the Informational Theory of Mental Content. Facta Philosophica 2 (2):213-36.score: 58.0
    With the aim of giving a naturalistic foundation to the notion of mental representation, Fred Dretske (1981;1988) has put forward and developed the idea that the relation between a representation and its intentional content is grounded on an informational relation. In this explanatory model, mental representations are conceived of as states of organisms which a learning process has selected to play a functional role: a necessary condition for fulfilling this role is that the organism or some proper (...)
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  42. Paul A. Boghossian (1994). The Transparency of Mental Content. Philosophical Perspectives 8:33-50.score: 56.0
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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  43. Richard E. Aquila (1989). Intentionality, Content, and Primitive Mental Directedness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):583-604.score: 56.0
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  44. Akeel Bilgrami (1992). Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Blackwell.score: 54.0
  45. Stephen R. Schiffer, Mental Content and Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.score: 52.0
    David’s epistemic understanding of two-dimensional semantics has these two features. First, although he considers at least two construals of epistemically possible worlds, on one of them they are centered metaphysically possible worlds. Second, David intends epistemic two-dimensional semantics to yield a theory of propositional-attitude content, as well as having application to the semantics of natural language expressions. These two features come together in David’s “The Components of Content,” where he deploys the apparatus of epistemic two-dimensional semantics to provide (...)
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  46. Frances Egan (2013). How to Think About Mental Content. Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.score: 52.0
    Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so (...)
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  47. Robert D. Rupert (1999). Mental Representations and Millikan's Theory of Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.score: 52.0
    In her landmark book, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Millikan1984),1 Ruth Garrett Millikan utilizes the idea of a biological function to solve philosophical problems associated with the phenomena of language, thought, and meaning. Language and thought are activities of biological organisms, according to Millikan, and we should treat them as such when trying to answer related philosophical questions. Of special interest is Millikan’s treatment of intentionality. Here Millikan employs the notion of a biological function to explain what it is (...)
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  48. Nigel J. T. Thomas (1999). Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content. Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.score: 50.0
  49. Karen Neander (2007). Teleological Theories of Mental Content: Can Darwin Solve the Problem of Intentionality? In Michael Ruse (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology. Oxford University Press.score: 50.0
  50. Karen Neander, Teleological Theories of Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 50.0
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