Search results for 'mental content externalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Axel Mueller (2011). Does Kantian Mental Content Externalism Help Metaphysical Realists? Synthese 182 (3):449-473.score: 534.0
    Standard interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism take it as a commitment to the view that the objects of cognition are structured or made by conditions imposed by the mind, and therefore to what Van Cleve calls “honest-to-God idealism”. Against this view, many more recent investigations of Kant’s theory of representation and cognitive significance have been able to show that Kant is committed to a certain form of Mental Content Externalism, and therefore to the realist view that the (...)
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  2. Joe Lau, Externalism About Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 432.0
    Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way.
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  3. Andrew E. Newman (2004). The Good, the Bad, and the Irrational: Three Views of Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):95-106.score: 387.0
    Recent philosophy of psychology has seen the rise of so-called "dual-component" and "two-dimensional" theories of mental content as what I call a "Middle Way" between internalism (the view that contents of states like belief are "narrow") and externalism (the view that by and large, such contents are "wide"). On these Middle Way views, mental states are supposed to have two kinds of content: the "folk-psychological" kind, which we ordinarily talk about and which is wide; and (...)
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  4. Anthony Newman (2006). The Burning Barn Fallacy in Defenses of Externalism About Mental Content. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:37-57.score: 348.0
    Externalism says that many ordinary mental contents are constituted by relations to things outside the mental subject’s head. An infl uential objection says that externalism is incompatible with our commonsense belief in mental causation, because such extrinsic relations cannot play the important causal role in producing behavior that we ordinarily think mental content plays.An extremely common response is that it is simply obvious, from examples of ordinary causal processes, that extrinsic relations can play (...)
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  5. Florence Claude Gabriel, Denes Szucs & Alain Content (2013). The Mental Representations of Fractions: Adults' Same–Different Judgments. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 300.0
    Two experiments examined whether the mental representation of the magnitude of fractions is global or componential. Previously, some authors concluded that adults process the numerators and denominators of fractions separately and do not access the global magnitude of fractions. Conversely, others reported evidence suggesting that the global magnitude of fractions is accessed. We hypothesized that in a fraction matching task, participants automatically extract the magnitude of the components but that the activation of the global magnitude of the whole fraction (...)
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  6. Colin McGinn (1989). Mental Content. Blackwell.score: 300.0
     
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  7. Chris Tillman (2012). Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism. Synthese 187 (2):419-440.score: 297.0
    At first pass, internalism about justification is the view that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Externalism about mental content is the view that there are differences in mental content without an internal difference. Assuming (complete) mental contents are the primary bearers of justificatory features, the two views are in obvious tension. The goal of this paper is to determine how the tension is best resolved. The paper proceeds as follows. In (...)
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  8. Brie Gertler (2012). Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):51-75.score: 291.0
    Externalism about mental content is now widely accepted. It is therefore surprising that there is no established definition of externalism. I believe that this is a symptom of an unrecognized fact: that the labels 'mental content externalism'-and its complement 'mental content internalism'-are profoundly ambiguous. Under each of these labels falls a hodgepodge of sometimes conflicting claims about the organism's contribution to thought contents, the nature of the self, relations between the individual (...)
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  9. Marcus Arvan, Something Mental is Just in the Head, and What the Mental Out of the Head is Like.score: 288.0
    In, “Why Nothing Mental is Just in The Head,” Justin Fisher (Noȗs, 2007) uses a novel thought-experiment to argue that every form of mental internalism is false. This paper shows that Fisher fails to refute mental internalism, and that a new variant of his example actually (a) confirms a form of mental internalism, as well as (b) John Locke's “resemblance thesis,” thereby (c) disconfirming all externalist theories of mental content.
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  10. Maciej Witek (2003). Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma. In W. Löffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.score: 288.0
    It can be said that Wittgenstein"s Private Language Argument initiated the internalism-externalism dilemma. In one of its interpretations the argument is read as a criticism of methodological solipsism. Internalism, in turn, assumes that methodological solipsism is an adequate account of mental content. Therefore some externalists refer to Wittgenstein as their forerunner. I argue, first, that the Private Language Argument does not support the claim of externalism that meanings are not in the head, even though it undermines (...)
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  11. Itay Shani (2013). Making It Mental: In Search for the Golden Mean of the Extended Cognition Controversy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):1-26.score: 288.0
    This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance with other externalist theories of cognition, MAE is committed to the view that certain cognitive processes extend across brain, body, and world—a conclusion which follows from (...)
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  12. James Baillie (1997). Personal Identity and Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.score: 285.0
    In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their (...)
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  13. Pierre Jacob (1993). Externalism and the Explanatory Relevance of Broad Content. Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.score: 282.0
  14. Oron Shagrir (2001). Content, Computation and Externalism. Mind 110 (438):369-400.score: 279.0
    The paper presents an extended argument for the claim that mental content impacts the computational individuation of a cognitive system (section 2). The argument starts with the observation that a cognitive system may simultaneously implement a variety of different syntactic structures, but that the computational identity of a cognitive system is given by only one of these implemented syntactic structures. It is then asked what are the features that determine which of implemented syntactic structures is the computational structure (...)
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  15. Axel Mueller, Can Mental Content Externalism Prove Realism?score: 270.0
    Recently, Kenneth Westphal has presented a highly interesting and innovative reading of Kant's critical philosophy.2 This reading continues a tradition of Kantscholarship of which, e.g., Paul Guyer's work is representative, and in which the antiidealistic potential of Kant's critical philosophy is pitted against its idealistic selfunderstanding. Much of the work in this tradition leaves matters at observing the tensions this introduces in Kant's work. But Westphal's proposed interpretation goes farther. Its attractiveness derives for the most part from the promise that (...)
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  16. Filip Buekens (1994). Externalism, Content, and Causal Histories. Dialectica 48 (3-4):267-86.score: 270.0
  17. Halvor Nordby (2012). Mental Content Externalism and Social Understanding. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-9.score: 270.0
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  18. Kenneth R. Westphal (2003). ‘Can Pragmatic Realists Argue Transcendentally?’. In John Shook (ed.), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism. Prometheus.score: 270.0
    Kant’s and Hegel’s transcendental argument for mental-content externalism breaks the deadlock between ‘internal’ and genuine realists. This argument shows that human beings can only be self-conscious in a world that provides a humanly recognizable regularity and variety among the things (or events) we sense. This feature of the world cannot result from human thought or language. Hence semantic arguments against realism can only be developed if realism about the world is true. Some of Putnam’s arguments for internal (...)
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  19. Kenneth R. Westphal (1998). ‘Transcendental Reflections on Pragmatic Realism’. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason, & Norms: A Realistic Assessment. Fordham UP. 17--58.score: 267.0
    By deepening Austin’s reflections on the ‘open texture’ of empirical concepts, Frederick L. Will defends an ‘externalist’ account of mental content: as human beings we could not think, were we not in fact cognizant of a natural world structured by events and objects with identifiable and repeatable similarities and differences. I explicate and defend Will’s insight by developing a parallel critique of Kant’s and Carnap’s rejections of realism, both of whom cannot account properly for the content of (...)
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  20. Kenneth R. Westphal (2007). ‘Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt’. In Lähteenmäki & Remes Heinämaa (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer.score: 267.0
    Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. (...)
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  21. Keith Butler (1997). Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.score: 261.0
    Externalism holds, and internalism denies, that the individuation of many of an individual's mental states (e.g., thoughts about the physical world) depends necessarily on relations that individual bears to the physical and/or social environment. Many philosophers, externalists and internalists alike, believe that introspection yields knowledge of the contents of our thoughts that is direct and authoritative. It is not obvious, however, that the metaphysical claims of externalism are compatible with this epistemological thesis. Some (e.g., Burge, 1988; Falvey (...)
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  22. Andrew E. Newman (2005). Two Grades of Internalism (Pass and Fail). Philosophical Studies 122 (2):153-169.score: 249.0
    Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates full-stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone who believes that Aristotle was wise, for instance, must share that same belief. Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, sociolinguistic, or historical context. To have a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle himself (e.g., by (...)
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  23. Basil Smith, Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 243.0
    How are the contents of our beliefs, our intentions, and other attitudes individuated? Just what makes our contents what they are? Content externalism, as Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and others have argued, is the position that our contents depend in a constitutive manner on items in the external world, that they can be individuated by our causal interaction with the items they are about. Content internalism, by contrast, is the position that our contents depend primarily on the (...)
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  24. Amir Horowitz (2001). Contents Just Are in the Head. Erkenntnis 54 (3):321-344.score: 219.0
    The purpose of the paper is to show that semanticexternalism – the thesis that contents are notdetermined by ``individualistic'' features of mentalstates – is mistaken. Externalist thinking, it isargued, rests on two mistaken assumptions: theassumption that if there is an externalist wayof describing a situation the situation exemplifiesexternalism, and the assumption that cases in which adifference in the environment of an intentional stateentails a difference in the state's intentional objectare cases in which environmental factors determine thestate's content. Exposing these (...)
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  25. Pierre Jacob (1992). Externalism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (New Series):203-19.score: 216.0
    Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive activities of others external to the system.
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  26. Crystal L'Hote (2012). From Content-Externalism to Vehicle-Externalism. Dialogue 51 (2):275-287.score: 213.0
    ABSTRACT: Consensus has it that Putnam-Burge style arguments for content-externalism do not strengthen the case for vehicle-externalism, i.e., the thesis that some mental states include as their parts notebooks, iPhones, and other extra-bodily phenomena. Rowlands and Sprevak, among others, argue that vehicle-externalism gets stronger support from Clark and Chalmers’s parity principle and functionalism, generally. I contest this assessment and thereby give reason to reconsider the support that content-externalism provides the extended mind thesis: although (...)
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  27. Paul Schweizer (2012). The Externalist Foundations of a Truly Total Turing Test. Minds and Machines 22 (3):191-212.score: 210.0
    The paper begins by examining the original Turing Test (2T) and Searle’s antithetical Chinese Room Argument, which is intended to refute the 2T in particular, as well as any formal or abstract procedural theory of the mind in general. In the ensuing dispute between Searle and his own critics, I argue that Searle’s ‘internalist’ strategy is unable to deflect Dennett’s combined robotic-systems reply and the allied Total Turing Test (3T). Many would hold that the 3T marks the culmination of the (...)
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  28. Ronald Loeffler (2014). Belief Ascriptions and Social Externalism. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):211-239.score: 210.0
    I outline Brandom’s theory of de re and de dicto belief ascriptions, which plays a central role in Brandom’s overall theory of linguistic communication, and show that this theory offers a surprising, new response to Burge’s (Midwest Stud 6:73–121, 1979) argument for social externalism. However, while this response is in principle available from the perspective of Brandom’s theory of belief ascription in abstraction from his wider theoretical enterprise, it ceases to be available from this perspective in the wider context (...)
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  29. Amy Schmitter (2014). The Third Meditation on Objective Being: Representation and Intentional Content. In David Cunning (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations. Cambridge University Press. 149-67.score: 201.0
  30. Akeel Bilgrami (1992). Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Blackwell.score: 198.0
  31. John-Michael Kuczynski (2007). Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism. John Benjamins & Co.score: 195.0
    Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain (...)
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  32. Paul A. Boghossian (1997). What the Externalist Can Know A Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):161-75.score: 186.0
    Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at (...)
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  33. Anthony L. Brueckner (1990). Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.score: 186.0
    Focuses on the arguments that show the externalism of mental content. Discussion on the principle of knowledge identification; Account of basic self-knowledge; Interpretations of sentence content; Skepticism of knowledge content.
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  34. Harold Langsam (2002). Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Inner Observation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):42-61.score: 186.0
    There is a continuing debate as to whether externalism about mental content is compatible with certain commonly accepted views about the nature of self-knowledge. Both sides to this debate seem to agree that externalism is _not compatible with the traditional view that self-knowledge is acquired by means of observation. In this paper, I argue that externalism is compatible with this traditional view of self-knowledge, and that, in fact, we have good reason to believe that the (...)
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  35. Ana Gavran (2004). Tim Crane on the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):207-218.score: 186.0
    The subject of this paper is the debate between externalism and internalism about mental content presented by Tim Crane in Chapter 4 of his book Elements of Mind. Crane’s sympathies in this debate are with internalism. The paper attempts to show that Crane’s argumentation is not refuting the Twin Earth argument and externalism, and that in its basis it does not differ much from externalism itself Crane’s version of the argument for externalism features two (...)
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  36. William E. Seager (1992). Externalism and Token Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):439-48.score: 186.0
    Donald Davidson espouses two fundamental theses about the individuation of mental events. The thesis of causal individuation asserts that sameness of cause and effect is sufficient and necessary for event identity. The thesis of content individuation gives only a sufficient condition for difference of mental events: if e and f have different contents then they are different mental events. I argue that given these theses, psychological externalism--the view that mental content is determined by (...)
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  37. Gary Bartlett (2008). Whither Internalism? How Internalists Should Respond to the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.score: 183.0
    A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist (...)
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  38. Kenneth R. Westphal (2003). Epistemic Reflection and Cognitive Reference in Kant's Transcendental Response to Skepticism. Kant-Studien 94 (2):135-171.score: 180.0
    Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’ plainly has an anti-Cartesian conclusion: ‘inner experience in general is only possible through outer experience in general’ (B278). Due to wide-spread preoccupation with Cartesian skepticism, and to the anti-naturalism of early analytic philosophy, most of Kant’s recent commentators have sought to find a purely conceptual, ‘analytic’ argument in Kant’s Refutation of Idealism – and then have dismissed Kant when no such plausible argument can be reconstructed from his text. Kant’s argument supposedly cannot eliminate all relevant alternatives, (...)
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  39. Marian David (2002). Content Essentialism. Acta Analytica 17 (28):103-114.score: 180.0
    The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat (...)
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  40. Kenneth R. Westphal (1997). Affinity, Idealism and Naturalism: The Stability of Cinnabar and the Possibility of Experience. Kant-Studien 88 (2):139-189.score: 180.0
    In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant introduced both transcendental idealism and transcendental arguments into philosophy. Transcendental arguments in general aim to establish conditions necessary for our having self-conscious experience at all. Transcendental idealism holds that such conditions do not hold independently of human subjects; those conditions obtain or are satisfied because they are generated or fulfilled by the structure or functioning of the subject’s cognitive capacities. Is transcendental idealism the only possible explanation of such conditions? I pursue this question (...)
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  41. Kenneth R. Westphal (2004). ‘Must the Transcendental Conditions for the Possibility of Experience Be Ideal?’. In C. Ferrini (ed.), Eredità Kantiane (1804–2004): questioni emergenti e problemi irrisolti. Bibliopolis.score: 180.0
    Three genuinely transcendental conditions for the possibility of self-conscious experience are and can only be material (§§2–4). Identifying these conditions shows that the link between transcendental proof and transcendental idealism is not direct, but must be justified by substantive argument (§§ 4, 5). This illuminates the prospect of separating transcendental proofs from transcendental idealism. Indeed, examining these conditions reveals a powerful strategy for using transcendental proof to defend realism sans phrase. Strikingly, this prospect illuminates some otherwise occluded aspects of post-Kantian (...)
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  42. Kenneth R. Westphal (1997). ‘Frederick L. Will’s Pragmatic Realism: An Introduction’. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Frederick L. Will, Pragmatism and Realism. Rowman & Littlefield.score: 180.0
    This critical editorial introduction summarizes and explicates Frederick Will’s pragmatic realism and his account of the nature, assessment, and revision of cognitive and practical norms in connection with: the development of Will’s pragmatic realism, Hume’s problem of induction, the oscillations between foundationalism and coherentism, the nature of philosophical reflection, Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’, the open texture of empirical concepts, the correspondence conception of truth, Putnam’s ‘internal realism’, the redundancy theory of truth, sociology of knowledge, the governance of practice by norms (...)
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  43. Kenneth R. Westphal (1996). ‘Kant, Hegel, and the Transcendental Material Conditions of Possible Experience’. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 33:23-41.score: 180.0
    I argue that Hegel is aware of a crucial problem in Kant’s transcendental account of the conditions of human knowledge. Unless the matter of sensation is sufficiently ordered (and sufficiently varied) we could not make any cognitive judgments. In that case we could not distinguish ourselves from objects we know, and so could not be self-conscious. This is a necessary, formal and transcendental condition of possible human experience. However, it is also (as Kant acknowledged) a material – not a conceptual (...)
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  44. Kent Bach & Reinaldo Elugardo (2003). Conceptual Minimalism and Anti-Individualism: A Reply to Goldberg. Noûs 37 (1):151-160.score: 174.0
  45. Harold W. Noonan (2000). McKinsey-Brown Survives. Analysis 60 (268):353-356.score: 174.0
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  46. Anthony L. Brueckner (2004). Brewer on the McKinsey Problem. Analysis 64 (1):41-43.score: 174.0
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  47. Maria Cristina Amoretti & Riccardo Manzotti (2012). Externalisms. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (1):41-68.score: 174.0
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  48. John Heil (ed.) (2004). Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.score: 174.0
    Edited by a renowned scholar in the field, this anthology provides a comprehensive and self-contained introduction to the philosophy of mind. Featuring an extensive and varied collection of fifty classical and contemporary readings, it also offers substantial section introductions--which set the extracts in context and guide readers through them--discussion questions, and guides to further reading. Ideal for undergraduate courses, the book is organized into twelve sections, providing instructors with flexibility in designing and teaching a variety of courses.
     
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  49. Paulo Faria (2009). Unsafe Reasoning: A Survey. Doispontos 6 (2):185-20.score: 171.0
    Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that such was indeed the case. Current discussion about (...)
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  50. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.score: 168.0
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main (...)
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