Search results for 'mental representation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Angela Mendelovici (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.score: 240.0
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  2. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 161-179.score: 240.0
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  3. Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics. Dissertation, Princeton Universityscore: 240.0
    This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
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  4. Whit Schonbein (2012). The Linguistic Subversion of Mental Representation. Minds and Machines 22 (3):235-262.score: 240.0
    Embedded and embodied approaches to cognition urge that (1) complicated internal representations may be avoided by letting features of the environment drive behavior, and (2) environmental structures can play an enabling role in cognition, allowing prior cognitive processes to solve novel tasks. Such approaches are thus in a natural position to oppose the ‘thesis of linguistic structuring’: The claim that the ability to use language results in a wholesale recapitulation of linguistic structure in onboard mental representation. Prominent examples (...)
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  5. Hugh Clapin (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.score: 228.0
    In Philosophy of Mental Representation five of the most original and important thinkers in philosophy of mind engage in an overlapping dialogue about mental representation. In new papers, contributors Andy Clark, Robert Cummins, Daniel Dennett, John Haugeland, and Brian Cantwell Smith each investigate the views and claims of one of the other contributors regarding mental representation. The subject then offers a reply. An exciting feature of this collection is the dynamic discussion among all contributors (...)
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  6. Pete Mandik (2001). Mental Representation and the Subjectivity of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):179-202.score: 212.0
    Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the knowledge argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which pictorial representations (...)
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  7. Deborah J. Brown (1996). A Furry Tile About Mental Representation. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):448-66.score: 210.0
  8. Gregory McCulloch (2002). Mental Representation and Mental Presentation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language. Cambridge University Press. 19-36.score: 210.0
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  9. William E. Smythe (1989). The Case for Cognitive Conservatism: A Critique of Dan Lloyd's Approach to Mental Representation. Behaviorism 17:63-73.score: 210.0
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  10. Mikkel Gerken (2013). A Puzzle About Mental Self-Representation and Causation. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.score: 204.0
  11. Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.score: 198.0
  12. Tim Crane (2003). The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines, and Mental Representation. Routledge.score: 198.0
    This edition has been fully revised and updated, and includes a new chapter on consciousness and a new section on modularity. There are also guides for further reading, and a new glossary of terms such as mentalese, connectionism, and the homunculus fallacy.
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  13. Stephen P. Stich (1992). What is a Theory of Mental Representation? Mind 101 (402):243-61.score: 198.0
  14. Dan Ryder (2004). SINBaD Neurosemantics: A Theory of Mental Representation. Mind and Language 19 (2):211-240.score: 198.0
  15. Frances Egan (2003). Naturalistic Inquiry: Where Does Mental Representation Fit In? In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 89--104.score: 198.0
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  16. Eduard Marbach (1993). Mental Representation and Consciousness: Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Kluwer.score: 198.0
    The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.
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  17. Peter Gardenfors (1996). Mental Representation, Conceptual Spaces and Metaphors. Synthese 106 (1):21-47.score: 198.0
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  18. Melinda Hogan (1994). What is Wrong with an Atomistic Account of Mental Representation. Synthese 100 (2):307-27.score: 198.0
  19. Daniel C. Dennett (1983). Styles of Mental Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83:213-226.score: 198.0
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  20. Stuart Silvers (1991). On Naturalizing the Semantics of Mental Representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (March):49-73.score: 198.0
  21. Stuart Silvers (ed.) (1989). Representation: Readings In The Philosophy Of Mental Representation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.score: 198.0
    One kind of philosopher takes it as a working hypothesis that belief/desire psychology (or, anyhow, some variety of prepositional attitude psychology) is ...
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  22. Robert C. Cummins (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. MIT Press.score: 198.0
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  23. D. D. Gamble (1992). Meaning and Mental Representation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):343-357.score: 198.0
     
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  24. Sam S. Rakover (1983). In Defense of Memory Viewed as Stored Mental Representation. Behaviorism 11 (April):53-62.score: 198.0
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  25. Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.) (1994). Mental Representation. Blackwell.score: 198.0
  26. Gyula Klima, Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy.score: 180.0
    It is supposed to be common knowledge about the history of ideas that one of the few medieval philosophical contributions preserved in modern philosophical thought is the idea that mental phenomena are distinguished from physical phenomena by their intentionality, their directedness toward some object. As is usually the case with such commonplaces about the history of ideas, this claim is not quite true. Medieval philosophers routinely described ordinary physical phenomena, such as reflections in mirrors or sounds in the air, (...)
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  27. Timothy L. Hubbard (2007). What is Mental Representation? And How Does It Relate to Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):37-61.score: 180.0
    The relationship between mental representation and consciousness is considered. What it means to 'represent', and several types of representation (e.g., analogue, digital, spatial, linguistic, mathematical), are described. Concepts relevant to mental representation in general (e.g., multiple levels of processing, structure/process differences, mapping) and in specific domains (e.g., mental imagery, linguistic/propositional theories, production systems, connectionism, dynamics) are discussed. Similarities (e.g., using distinctions between different forms of representation to predict different forms of consciousness, parallels between (...)
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  28. Jeffrey Brower & Susan Brower-Toland (2008). Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality. Philosophical Review 117 (2):193 - 243.score: 180.0
    This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of (...)
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  29. David Pitt, Mental Representation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 180.0
    The notion of a "mental representation" is, arguably, in the first instance a theoretical construct of cognitive science. As such, it is a basic concept of the Computational Theory of Mind, according to which cognitive states and processes are constituted by the occurrence, transformation and storage (in the mind/brain) of information-bearing structures (representations) of one kind or another.
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  30. Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2004). Notes Toward a Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation. In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Elsevier. 1--20.score: 180.0
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  31. Kim Sterelny (2004). Philosophy of Mental Representation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):351 – 353.score: 180.0
    Book Information Philosophy of Mental Representation. Philosophy of Mental Representation Hugh Clapin , ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2002 , xv + 332 , £40 ( cloth ), £18.99 ( paper ) Edited by Hugh Clapin . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xv + 332. £40.
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  32. James A. Blachowicz (1997). Analog Representation Beyond Mental Imagery. Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):55-84.score: 180.0
  33. David Landy (2011). Descartes' Compositional Theory of Mental Representation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):214-231.score: 180.0
    In his, ‘Descartes' Ontology of Thought’, Alan Nelson presents, on Descartes' behalf, a compositional theory of mental representation according to which the content of any mental representation is either simple or is entirely constituted by a combination of innate simples. Here the simples are our ideas of God, thought, extension, and union. My objection will be that it is simply ludicrous to think that any four simples are adequate to the task of combining to constitute all (...)
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  34. Karl Schafer (2013). Hume's Unified Theory of Mental Representation. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2).score: 180.0
    On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on (...)
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  35. Jay L. Garfield, Intention (Doing Away with Mental Representation).score: 180.0
    Mental representation is a metaphor. It has perhaps become so entrenched that it appears to have been frozen, and it is easy to lose sight of its metaphorical character. Literally, a representation is a re-presentation, a symbol that stands for something else because that thing can’t be with us. I send my parents photos of the grandchildren because e-mail is cheaper than air tickets. I consult a map of Adelaide to find the shortest route to the philosophy (...)
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  36. Stephen Stich (1993). Moral Philosophy and Mental Representation. In R. Michod, L. Nadel & M. Hechter (eds.), The Origin of Values. Aldine de Gruyer. 215--228.score: 180.0
    Here is an overview of what is to come. In Sections I and II, I will sketch two of the projects frequently pursued by moral philosophers, and the methods typically invoked in those projects. I will argue that these projects presuppose (or at least suggest) a particular sort of account of the mental representation of human value systems, since the methods make sense only if we assume a certain kind of story about how the human mind stores information (...)
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  37. Mark Perlman (2000). Conceptual Flux: Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change. Kluwer.score: 180.0
    Readership: One of the most thorough examinations of mental representation and meaning holism available, this book should be read by everyone interested in the...
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  38. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (2013). Programs as Causal Models: Speculations on Mental Programs and Mental Representation. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1171-1191.score: 180.0
    Judea Pearl has argued that counterfactuals and causality are central to intelligence, whether natural or artificial, and has helped create a rich mathematical and computational framework for formally analyzing causality. Here, we draw out connections between these notions and various current issues in cognitive science, including the nature of mental “programs” and mental representation. We argue that programs (consisting of algorithms and data structures) have a causal (counterfactual-supporting) structure; these counterfactuals can reveal the nature of mental (...)
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  39. S. C. Garrod & A. J. Sanford (1982). The Mental Representation of Discourse in a Focussed Memory System: Implications for the Interpretation of Anaphoric Noun Phrases. Journal of Semantics 1 (1):21-41.score: 180.0
    To a cognitive psychologist discourse comprehension poses a number of interesting problems both in terms of mental representation and mental operations. In this paper we suggest that certain of these problems can be brought into clear focus by employing a procedural approach to discourse description. In line with this approach a general framework for the mental representation of discourse is discussed in which distinctions between different types of memory partitions are proposed. It is argued that (...)
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  40. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2005). Untangling the Evolution of Mental Representation. In António Zilhão (ed.), Evolution, Rationality, and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century. Routledge.score: 180.0
    The "tangle" referred to in my title is a special set of problems that arise in understanding the evolution of mental representation. These are problems over and above those involved in reconstructing evolutionary histories in general, over and above those involved in dealing with human evolution, and even over and above those involved in tackling the evolution of other human psychological traits. I am talking about a peculiar and troublesome set of interactions and possibilities, linked to long-standing debates (...)
     
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  41. Terence Horgan (1994). Computation and Mental Representation. In Stephen P. Stich (ed.), Mental Representation: A Reader. Cambridge: Blackwell.score: 180.0
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  42. Stuart Silvers (1989). Introduction: Some Remarks on Meaning and Mental Representation. In , Representation: Readings in the Philosophy of Mental Representation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.score: 180.0
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  43. Gottfried Vosgerau (2009). Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness: From Basic Self-Representation to Self-Related Cognition. Dissertation, Ruhr-Universität Bochumscore: 174.0
    One oft the most fascinating abilities of humans is the ability to become conscious of the own physical and mental states. In this systematic investigation of self-consciousness, a representational theory is developed that is able to distinguish between different levels of self-consciousness. The most basic levels are already present in such simple animals as ants. From these basic forms, which are also relevant for adult human self-consciousness, high-level self-consciousness including self-knowledge can arise. Thereby, the theory is not only able (...)
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  44. Nancy Salay (2014). Dress Rehearsals, Previews, and Encores: A New Account of Mental Representation. Theoria 80 (1):84-97.score: 168.0
    One of the central debates in cognitive science is the dispute over the role of representation in cognition: on computational/representational accounts, representations are theoretically central; on dynamic systems approaches in which cognition is investigated as a particular sort of physical process, representations play either no role, or, at best, a derivative one. But these two perspectives lead to a deeply unsatisfying theoretical divide: accounts situated in the representational camp are plagued by the inscrutable problem of intentionality, while those hedging (...)
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  45. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2002). Intelligence Without Representation – Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation the Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):367-383.score: 164.0
    Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are stored, not as representations in the mind, (...)
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  46. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2004). Mental Representation, Naturalism, and Teleosemantics. In David Papineau & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 164.0
    The "teleosemantic" program is part of the attempt to give a naturalistic explanation of the semantic properties of mental representations. The aim is to show how the internal states of a wholly physical agent could, as a matter of objective fact, represent the world beyond them. The most popular approach to solving this problem has been to use concepts of physical correlation with some kinship to those employed in information theory (Dretske 1981, 1988; Fodor 1987, 1990). Teleosemantics, which tries (...)
     
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  47. Costas Pagondiotis (2013). “Hallucination, Mental Representation, and the Presentational Character”. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press.score: 164.0
    In this paper, I argue that the indirect realists’ recourse to mental representations does not allow them to account for the possibility of hallucination, nor for the presentational character of visual experience. To account for the presentational character, I suggest a kind of intentionalism that is based on the interdependency between the perceived object and the embodied perceiver. This approach provides a positive account to the effect that genuine perception and hallucination are different kinds of states. Finally, I offer (...)
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  48. Terence E. Horgan (1992). From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):449-484.score: 162.0
  49. Kim Sterelny (1983). Mental Representation: What Language is Brainese? Philosophical Studies 43 (May):365-82.score: 162.0
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  50. Kathleen Emmett (1988). Meaning and Mental Representation. In Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.score: 162.0
     
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