Search results for 'metaepistemology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Cheng-Hung Tsai (2011). The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.score: 24.0
    Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, second, by introducing and (...)
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  2. Richard A. Fumerton (1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Rowman & Littlefield.score: 18.0
    ... and Normative Epistemology The Distinction Between Metaepistemology and Normative Epistemology Although this terminology is relatively new, ...
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  3. Jonathan Weinberg (2006). What's Epistemology For? The Case for Neopragmatism in Normative Metaepistemology. In S. Hetherington (ed.), Epistemological Futures. Oxford University Press. 26--47.score: 18.0
    How ought we to go about forming and revising our beliefs, arguing and debating our reasons, and investigating our world? If those questions constitute normative epistemology, then I am interested here in normative metaepistemology: the investigation into how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs about how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs -- how we ought to argue about how we ought to argue. Such investigations have become urgent of late, for (...)
     
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  4. Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (2013). Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities 2 (3):351-368.score: 16.0
    We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem (...)
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  5. Andrei Buckareff (2009). Metaepistemology and Divine Revelation. Heythrop Journal 50 (1):85-90.score: 16.0
    In Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation,1 William Abraham offers a rich, subtle defense of an epistemology of divine revelation. While I believe there is much about Abraham’s work that is commendable, my remarks in this paper will be primarily critical. But the fact that Abraham’s work is worthy of critical comment should be evidence enough of the importance of Abraham’s book. My focus here will be on a cluster of metaepistemological claims made by Abraham. Specifically, I will argue that (...)
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  6. Stewart Cohen (1998). Review: Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):913 - 918.score: 15.0
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  7. Richard Fumerton (1998). Review: Précis of Metaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):905 - 906.score: 15.0
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  8. Scott P. Roberts (1985). The Generalized Argument From Verification: Work Toward the Metaepistemology of Perception. Metaphilosophy 16 (1):21–28.score: 15.0
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  9. Richard Fumerton (1998). Précis of Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):905-906.score: 15.0
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  10. Duncan Pritchard (2010). Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and the 'Metaepistemological' Challenge. Principia 4 (2):187-214.score: 7.0
    It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued (...)
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  11. John Turri (2009). The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons. Noûs 43 (3):490-512.score: 6.0
    Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 (...)
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  12. Engel (2000). Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:99-117.score: 6.0
    When it comes to second-order knowledge (i.e. knowing that one knows), internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier problem generates three (...)
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  13. Jorge Ornelas Bernal & G. Armando Cíntora (2014). ¿Qué está mal con el dogmatismo de Pryor? Areté. Revista de Filosofía 26 (1):7-31.score: 6.0
    It is argued that Pryor's criticism of scepticism of perceptual justification misses the point: while Pryor's dogmatism can provide a successful explication of the perceptual justification of first order empirical beliefs ( i.e. , an explication of propositional justification), it is barren vis à vis second order sceptical criticisms about the epistemic status of beliefs justified via perception (that is, criticisms pointing to the lack of doxastic justification). We argue that the two main motivations that Pryor offers for his dogmatism (...)
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  14. Jorge Ornelas Bernal & G. Cíntora (2014). ¿Qué está mal con el dogmatismo de Pryor? Areté. Revista de Filosofía 26 (1):7-31.score: 6.0
    It is argued that Pryor's criticism of scepticism of perceptual justification misses the point: while Pryor's dogmatism can provide a successful explication of the perceptual justification of first order empirical beliefs ( i.e. , an explication of propositional justification), it is barren vis à vis second order sceptical criticisms about the epistemic status of beliefs justified via perception (that is, criticisms pointing to the lack of doxastic justification). We argue that the two main motivations that Pryor offers for his dogmatism (...)
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  15. Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.score: 3.0
    Epistemic expressivism is the application of a nexus of ideas, which is prominent in ethical theory (more specifically, metaethics), to parallel issues in epistemological theory (more specifically, metaepistemology). Here, in order to help those new to the debate come to grips with epistemic expressivism and recent discussions of it, I first briefly present this nexus of ideas as it occurs in ethical expressivism. Then, I explain why and how some philosophers have sought to extend it to a version of (...)
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  16. Peter Klein (1998). Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919 - 925.score: 3.0
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  17. Kourken Michaelian (2008). Privileged Standpoints/ Reliable Processes. Hypatia 23 (1):65-98.score: 3.0
    : This article attempts to reconcile Sandra Harding's postmodernist standpoint theory with process reliabilism in first-order epistemology and naturalism in metaepistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory is best understood as consisting of an applied epistemological component and a metaepistemological component. Naturalist metaepistemology and the metaepistemological component of postmodernist standpoint theory have produced complementary views of knowledge as a socially and naturally located phenomenon and have converged on a common concept of objectivity. The applied epistemological claims of postmodernist standpoint theory usefully (...)
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  18. Chris Ranalli (2013). Skepticism, Invulnerability, and Epistemological Dissatisfaction. In C. Illies & C. Schaefer (eds.), Metaphysics or Modernity? Bamberg University Press. 113-148.score: 1.0
    How should we understand the relationship between the contents of our color, causal, modal, and evaluative beliefs, on the one hand, and color, causal, modal, and evaluative properties, on the other? According to Barry Stroud (2011), because of the nature of the contents of those types of beliefs, we should also think that what he calls a “negative metaphysical verdict” on the latter is not one that we could consistently maintain. The metaphysical project aims to arrive at an improved conception (...)
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  19. Axel Gelfert (2005). Richard Foley: Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. [REVIEW] Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 8:220-227.score: 1.0
    In his previous books, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality (1987) and Working Without a Net (1993), Richard Foley presented a highly influential account of what it means for one’s beliefs and belief-forming practices to be rational. Developing a positive new account of epistemic rationality, however, has never been Foley’s sole concern. His project is metaepistemological in character as much as it is epistemological. Put crudely, questions such as ‘What makes some beliefs knowledge?’ are of equal importance to Foley as such (...)
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  20. Tito Alencar Flores (2005). The Problem of the Criterion, Knowing That One Knows and Infinitism. Veritas 50 (4).score: 1.0
    O problema do critério é um dos mais importantes da epistemologia. A resposta que se dá a ele definirá um aspecto fundamental das teorias do conhecimento. Neste ensaio, o problema do critério é apresentado e algumas das conseqüências geradas pela aceitação de exigências metaepistemicas são analisadas. Em especial, essas conseqüências são avaliadas em relação ao infinitismo – a teoria epistemológica segundo a qual as razões que sustentam nossas crenças devem ser infinitas em número e não-repetidas. Ao final, sustenta-se que cláusulas (...)
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  21. Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.) (2011). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.score: 1.0
    Epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge, is at the core of many of the central debates and issues in philosophy, interrogating the notions of truth, objectivity, trust, belief and perception. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology provides a comprehensive and the up-to-date survey of epistemology, charting its history, providing a thorough account of its key thinkers and movements, and addressing enduring questions and contemporary research in the field. Organized thematically, the Companion is divided into ten sections: Foundational Issues, The Analysis of Knowledge, (...)
     
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