Search results for 'metaepistemology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Cheng-Hung Tsai (2011). The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.
    Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, second, by introducing and (...)
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  2. Richard A. Fumerton (1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Rowman & Littlefield.
    ... and Normative Epistemology The Distinction Between Metaepistemology and Normative Epistemology Although this terminology is relatively new, ...
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  3. Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden (forthcoming). Uniqueness and Metaepistemology. Journal of Philosophy.
    We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in what beliefs to form in response to your evidence. We argue for Uniqueness by appealing to two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. First, rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others. Second, they help (...)
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  4.  8
    Iep Author, Metaepistemology.
    Metaepistemology Metaepistemology is, roughly, the branch of epistemology that asks questions about first-order epistemological questions. It inquires into fundamental aspects of epistemic theorizing like metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, agency, psychology, responsibility, reasons for belief, and beyond. So, if as traditionally conceived, epistemology is the theory of knowledge, metaepistemology is the theory of the theory of knowledge. … Continue reading Metaepistemology →.
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  5. Jonathan Weinberg (2006). What's Epistemology For? The Case for Neopragmatism in Normative Metaepistemology. In S. Hetherington (ed.), Epistemological Futures. Oxford University Press 26--47.
    How ought we to go about forming and revising our beliefs, arguing and debating our reasons, and investigating our world? If those questions constitute normative epistemology, then I am interested here in normative metaepistemology: the investigation into how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs about how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs -- how we ought to argue about how we ought to argue. Such investigations have become urgent of late, for (...)
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  6.  34
    Christos Kyriacou, Metaepistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An Introduction to basic metaepistemological debates and positions.
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  7. Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (2013). Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities 2 (3):351-368.
    We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem (...)
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  8. Andrei Buckareff (2009). Metaepistemology and Divine Revelation. Heythrop Journal 50 (1):85-90.
    In Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation,1 William Abraham offers a rich, subtle defense of an epistemology of divine revelation. While I believe there is much about Abraham’s work that is commendable, my remarks in this paper will be primarily critical. But the fact that Abraham’s work is worthy of critical comment should be evidence enough of the importance of Abraham’s book. My focus here will be on a cluster of metaepistemological claims made by Abraham. Specifically, I will argue that (...)
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  9.  4
    Christos Kyriacou, Metaepistemology. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
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  10.  46
    Stewart Cohen (1998). Review: Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):913 - 918.
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  11.  18
    Richard Fumerton (1998). Précis of Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):905-906.
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  12.  35
    Richard Fumerton (1998). Review: Précis of Metaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):905 - 906.
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  13.  6
    Scott P. Roberts (1985). The Generalized Argument From Verification: Work Toward the Metaepistemology of Perception. Metaphilosophy 16 (1):21–28.
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  14. C. McHugh J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.) (forthcoming). Metaepistemology.
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  15.  49
    Marek Pepliński (2014). Miejsce i znaczenie problematyki normatywnej w analitycznej epistemologii w erze postgettierowskiej. Filo-Sofija 27 (4/II):67-86.
    I present argument for different than traditional continental classification of epistemological issues. Paper has two parts, first concerned with K. Ajdukiewicz and J. Woleński conception of epistemology and its branches and with different methods of epistemological inquiry based on different task posed for epistemology. Second part discuss main important topics of current postgettieral analytic epistemology like virtue epistemology, ethics of belief, problems of epistemic value, epistemic value monism and pluralism, metaepistemology and concludes that in traditional continental classification the issues (...)
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  16. John Turri (2009). The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons. Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
    Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 (...)
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  17.  31
    Charles Côté-Bouchard (2015). Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.
    According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After (...)
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  18. David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.) (2015). Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Epistemic Evaluation aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point or purpose of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several contributions to this volume explicitly address this general methodology, or some version of it. Others focus on (...)
     
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  19.  9
    Jorge Ornelas Bernal & G. Cíntora (2014). ¿Qué está mal con el dogmatismo de Pryor? Areté. Revista de Filosofía 26 (1):7-31.
    It is argued that Pryor's criticism of scepticism of perceptual justification misses the point: while Pryor's dogmatism can provide a successful explication of the perceptual justification of first order empirical beliefs ( i.e. , an explication of propositional justification), it is barren vis à vis second order sceptical criticisms about the epistemic status of beliefs justified via perception (that is, criticisms pointing to the lack of doxastic justification). We argue that the two main motivations that Pryor offers for his dogmatism (...)
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  20.  9
    Terence Cuneo & Christos Kyriacou (forthcoming). Defending the Moral/Epistemic Parity. In C. McHugh J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology.
  21. Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
    Epistemic expressivism is the application of a nexus of ideas, which is prominent in ethical theory (more specifically, metaethics), to parallel issues in epistemological theory (more specifically, metaepistemology). Here, in order to help those new to the debate come to grips with epistemic expressivism and recent discussions of it, I first briefly present this nexus of ideas as it occurs in ethical expressivism. Then, I explain why and how some philosophers have sought to extend it to a version of (...)
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  22.  53
    Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (forthcoming). On Metaepistemological Scepticism. In Michael Bergmann & Brett Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press
    Fumerton’s distinctive brand of metaepistemological scepticism is compared and contrasted with the related position outlined by Stroud. It is argued that there are at least three interesting points of contact between Fumerton and Stroud’s metaepistemology. The first point of contact is that both Fumerton and Stroud think that (1) externalist theories of justification permit a kind of non-inferential, perceptual justification for our beliefs about non-psychological reality, but it’s not sufficient for philosophical assurance. However, Fumerton claims, while Stroud denies, that (...)
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  23.  56
    Joachim Horvath (2016). Conceptual Analysis and Natural Kinds: The Case of Knowledge. Synthese 193 (1):167-184.
    There is a line of reasoning in metaepistemology that is congenial to naturalism and hard to resist, yet ultimately misguided: that knowledge might be a natural kind, and that this would undermine the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. In this paper, I first bring out various problems with Hilary Kornblith’s argument from the causal–explanatory indispensability of knowledge to the natural kindhood of knowledge. I then criticize the argument from the natural kindhood of knowledge against the (...)
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  24.  62
    Peter Klein (1998). Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919 - 925.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  25.  62
    Daniel Greco (2015). Epistemological Open Questions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):509-523.
    While there has been a great deal of recent interest in parallels between metaethics and metaepistemology, there has been little discussion of epistemological analogues of the open question argument. This is somewhat surprising—the general trend in recent work is in the direction of emphasizing the continuity between metaethics and metaepistemology, and to treat metanormative questions as arising in parallel in these two normative domains. And while the OQA has been subjected to a wide variety of objections, it is (...)
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    Kourken Michaelian (2008). Privileged Standpoints/ Reliable Processes. Hypatia 23 (1):65-98.
    : This article attempts to reconcile Sandra Harding's postmodernist standpoint theory with process reliabilism in first-order epistemology and naturalism in metaepistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory is best understood as consisting of an applied epistemological component and a metaepistemological component. Naturalist metaepistemology and the metaepistemological component of postmodernist standpoint theory have produced complementary views of knowledge as a socially and naturally located phenomenon and have converged on a common concept of objectivity. The applied epistemological claims of postmodernist standpoint theory usefully (...)
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  27. Matthew Chrisman (2016). What is This Thing Called Metaethics? Routledge.
    Are moral standards relative to cultures? Are there any moral facts? What is goodness? If there are moral facts how do we learn about them?_ _These are all questions in metaethics, the branch of ethics that investigates the status of morality, the nature of ethical facts, and the meaning of ethical statements. To the uninitiated it can appear abstract and far removed from its two more concrete cousins, ethical theory and applied ethics, yet it is one of the fastest-growing and (...)
     
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