Search results for 'methodological naturalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke & Johan Braeckman (2010). How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism: Philosophical Misconceptions About Methodological Naturalism. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 15 (3):227-244.score: 240.0
    In recent controversies about Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC), the principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has played an important role. In this paper, an often neglected distinction is made between two different conceptions of MN, each with its respective rationale and with a different view on the proper role of MN in science. According to one popular conception, MN is a self-imposed or intrinsic limitation of science, which means that science is simply not equipped to deal with claims of (...)
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  2. Reed Richter (2002). What Science Can and Cannot Say: The Problems with Methodological Naturalism. Reports of the National Center for Science Education 22 (Jan-Apr 2002):18-22.score: 240.0
    This paper rejects a view of science called "methodological naturalism." -/- According to many defenders of mainstream science and Darwinian evolution, anti-evolution critics--creationists and intelligent design proponents--are conceptually and epistemologically confusing science and religion, a supernatural view of world. These defenders of evolution contend that doing science requires adhering to a methodology that is strictly and essentially naturalistic: science is essentially committed to "methodological naturalism" and assumes that all the phenomena it investigates are entirely natural and (...)
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  3. Disenchanted Naturalism, Disenchanted Naturalism.score: 210.0
    Naturalism is the label for the thesis that the tools we should use in answering philosophical problems are the methods and findings of the mature sciences—from physics across to biology and increasingly neuroscience. It enables us to rule out answers to philosophical questions that are incompatible with scientific findings. It enables us to rule out epistemological pluralism—that the house of knowledge has many mansions, as well as skepticism about the reach of science. It bids us doubt that there are (...)
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  4. Daniel F. Hartner (2013). Conceptual Analysis as Armchair Psychology: In Defense of Methodological Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):921-937.score: 198.0
    Three proponents of the Canberra Plan, namely Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, have developed a collective functionalist program—Canberra Functionalism—spanning from philosophical psychology to ethics. They argue that conceptual analysis is an indispensible tool for research on cognitive processes since it reveals that there are some folk concepts, like belief and desire, whose functional roles must be preserved rather than eliminated by future scientific explanations. Some naturalists have recently challenged this indispensability argument, though the point of that challenge has been blunted by (...)
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  5. Alvin Plantinga (1997). Methodological Naturalism. Origins and Design 18 (1):18-27.score: 180.0
    The philosophical doctrine of methodological naturalism holds that, for any study of the world to qualify as "scientific," it cannot refer to God's creative activity (or any sort of divine activity). The methods of science, it is claimed, "give us no purchase" on theological propositions--even if the latter are true--and theology therefore cannot influence scientific explanation or theory justification. Thus, science is said to be religiously neutral, if only because science and religion are, by their very natures, epistemically (...)
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  6. Barbara Forrest (2000). Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism. Philo 3 (2):7-29.score: 180.0
    In response to the charge that methodological naturalism in science logically requires the a priori adoption of a naturalistic metaphysics, I examine the question whether methodological naturalism entails philosophical (ontological or metaphysical) naturalism. I conclude that the relationship between methodological and philosophical naturalism, while not one of logical entailment, is the only reasonable metaphysical conclusion given (1) the demonstrated success of methodological naturalism, combined with (2) the massive amount of knowledge gained (...)
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  7. Michael Ruse (2005). Methodological Naturalism Under Attack. South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):44-60.score: 180.0
    Methodological naturalism is the assumption or working hypothesis that understanding nature (the physical world including humans and their thoughts and actions) can be understood in terms of unguided laws. There is no need to Suppose interventions (miracles) from outside. It does not commit one to metaphysical naturalism, the belief that there is nothing other than nature as we can see and observe it (in other words, that atheism is the right theology for the sound thinker). Recently the (...)
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  8. Alvin Plantinga (1997). Methodological Naturalism, Part 2. Origins and Design 18 (2):22-34.score: 180.0
    So why must a scientist proceed in accordance with methodological naturalism? Michael Ruse suggests that methodological naturalism or at any rate part of it is true by definition: Furthermore, even if Scientific Creationism were totally successful in making its case as science, it would not yield a scientific explanation of origins. Rather, at most, it could prove that science shows that there can be no scientific explanation of origins. The Creationists believe that the world started miraculously. (...)
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  9. Christopher H. Pearson (2010). Methodological Naturalism, Intelligent Design, and Lessons From the History of Embryology. Philo 13 (1):67-79.score: 180.0
    Intelligent Design proponents consistently deny that science is rightfully governed by the norm of methodological naturalism—that independent of one’s actual metaphysical commitments regarding the natural/supernatural, a scientist, qua scientist, must behave as if the world is constituted by the natural, material world. This essay works to develop more fully a pragmatic justification for methodological naturalism, one that focuses on a number of key elements found in 17th and 18th century embryology.
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  10. Glenn Branch (2002). In Defense of Methodological Naturalism. Philo 5 (2):249-255.score: 180.0
    According to Theodore Schick, Jr., Eugenie C. Scott’s endorsement of methodological naturalism---roughly, the view that science is limited by its methodology to be neutral vis-à-vis the supernatural---is misguided. He offers three arguments; I contend that none is successful.
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  11. Stephen C. Dilley (2010). Philosophical Naturalism and Methodological Naturalism. Philosophia Christi 12 (1):118-141.score: 180.0
    This essay argues that philosophical naturalists who draw epistemic support from science for their worldview ought to set aside methodological naturalism in certain historical sciences. When linked to methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism opens itself to several problems. Specifically, when joined with methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism can 'never' be scientifically disconfirmed but will nearly 'always' be confirmed, no matter what the empirical evidence. Theistic-friendly "God hypotheses," on the other hand, can 'never' be scientifically (...)
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  12. Michael Bradie (2009). What's Wrong with Methodological Naturalism? Human Affairs 19 (2):126 - 137.score: 180.0
    The compatibility of Darwinism with religious beliefs has been the subject of vigorous debate from 1859 to the present day. Darwin himself did not think that there was any incompatibility between his theory of natural selection and the existence of God. However, he did not think that appeals to the direct or indirect activity of a Creator substantially increased our understanding of any natural phenomenon. In effect, Darwin endorsed what we would today label as ’methodological naturalism,’ roughly the (...)
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  13. Gregory Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira (2008). Methodological Naturalism and Epistemic Internalism. Synthese 163 (3):315 - 328.score: 162.0
    Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer (...)
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  14. Theodore Schick Jr (2000). Methodological Naturalism Vs. Methodological Realism. Philo 3 (2):30-37.score: 156.0
    According to Eugenie Scott, methodological materialism---the view that science attempts to explain the world using material processes---does not imply philosophical materialism---the view that all that exists are material processes. Thus one can consistently be both a scientist and a theist. According to Phillip Johnson, however, methodological materialism presupposes philosophical materialism. Consequently, scientists are unable to see the cogency of supernatural explanations, like creationism. I argue that both Scott and Johnson are wrong: scientists are not limited to explaining tbe (...)
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  15. Owen Anderson (2013). Kinds of Gaps in Knowledge: The Conflict of Appeals to God and Methodological Naturalism in Developing Explanations of the World. Heythrop Journal 54 (4):574-589.score: 150.0
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  16. Stephen Dilley (2013). The Evolution of Methodological Naturalism in the Origin of Species. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (1):20-58.score: 150.0
  17. Del Ratzsch (2004). Natural Theology, Methodological Naturalism, and “Turtles All the Way Down”. Faith and Philosophy 21 (4):436-455.score: 150.0
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  18. Philip J. Jacobs (2008). An Argument Over 'Methodological Naturalism' at the Vatican Observatory. Heythrop Journal 49 (4):542-581.score: 150.0
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  19. Robert A. Larmer (forthcoming). Is Methodological Naturalism Question-Begging? Philosophia Christi.score: 150.0
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  20. Florian Demont (2012). Chomsky's Methodological Naturalism and the Mereological Fallacy. In Piotr Stalmaszcyzk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos Verlag. 113.score: 150.0
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  21. Robert T. Pennock (2007). God of the Gaps: The Argument From Ignorance and the Limits of Methodological Naturalism. In A. J. Petto & L. R. Godfrey (eds.), Scientists Confront Intelligent Design and Creationism. Norton. 309--338.score: 150.0
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  22. Kólá Abímbólá (2006). A Critique of Methodological Naturalism. Science in Context 19 (2):191.score: 150.0
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  23. Kenneth W. Kemp (2000). 9. Scientific Method and Appeal to Supernatural Agency: A Christian Case for Modest Methodological Naturalism. Logos 3 (2).score: 150.0
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  24. Theodore Schick Jr, (2000). Methodological Naturalism Vs. Methodological Realism. Philo 3 (2):30-37.score: 150.0
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  25. Alvin Plantinga (1996). Methodological Naturalism. In Jitse M. van der Meer (ed.), Facets of Faith and Science, Volume I: Historiography and Modes of Interaction.score: 150.0
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  26. Piotr Bylica-Dariusz Sagan (2008). God, Design, and Naturalism: Implications of Methodological Naturalism in Science for Science-Religion Relation. Pensamiento 64 (242):621-638.score: 150.0
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  27. Howard Sankey (1996). Normative Naturalism and the Challenge of Relativism: Laudan Versus Worrall on the Justification of Methodological Principles. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (1):37 – 51.score: 126.0
    In a recent exchange, John Worrall and Larry Laudan have debated the merits of the model of rational scientific change proposed by Laudan in his book Science and Values. On the model advocated by Laudan, rational change may take place at the level of scientific theory and methodology, as well as at the level of the epistemic aims of science. Moreover, the rationality of a change which occurs at any one of these three levels may be dependent on considerations at (...)
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  28. Gerald Doppelt (1990). The Naturalist Conception of Methodological Standards in Science: A Critique. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):1-19.score: 126.0
    In this essay, I criticize Laudan's view that methodological rules in science are best understood as hypothetical imperatives, for example, to realize cognitive aim A, follow method B. I criticize his idea that such rules are best evaluated by a naturalized philosophy of science which collects the empirical evidence bearing on the soundness of these rules. My claim is that this view yields a poor explanation of (1) the role of methodological rules in establishing the rationality of scientific (...)
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  29. Howard Sankey (2000). Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science. In Howard Sankey & Robert Nola (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method.score: 122.0
    There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.
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  30. Alexander Paseau (2010). A Puzzle About Naturalism. Metaphilosophy 41 (5):642-648.score: 120.0
    Abstract: This article presents and solves a puzzle about methodological naturalism. Trumping naturalism is the thesis that we must accept p if science sanctions p, and biconditional naturalism the apparently stronger thesis that we must accept p if and only if science sanctions p. The puzzle is generated by an apparently cogent argument to the effect that trumping naturalism is equivalent to biconditional naturalism. It turns out that the argument for this equivalence is subtly (...)
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  31. I. A. Kieseppä (2000). Rationalism, Naturalism, and Methodological Principles. Erkenntnis 53 (3):337-352.score: 120.0
    The nature of the distinction between rational andnon-rational accounts of the development of science isanalyzed. These two kinds of accounts differ mostlyin the status which they give to methodologicalprinciples. It is shown that there are severaldimensions with respect to which the status of suchprinciples can resemble more or less the kind ofstatus that a paradigmatic rational account would givethem. It is concluded that, under the most plausibledefinitions of a rational account, the extent to whicha philosophical account of scientific change isrational (...)
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  32. Pigliucci Massimo (2002). Methodological Vs. Philosophical Naturalism. Free Inquiry 23 (1):53.score: 120.0
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  33. Steve Clarke (2009). Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural. Sophia 48 (2):127-142.score: 102.0
    There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment. It is further argued that properly applied scientific (...)
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  34. Reed Richter, American Science and its Anti-Evolutionist Critics: It's the Evidence Stupid.score: 90.0
    This is an unpublished talk written for a meeting of French philosophers. The paper describes the evolution versus creationism/intelligent design controversy in the U.S. A number of philosophers and scientists try to resolve this issue by sharply distinguishing the realm of science versus any talk of the supernatural. These pro-evolutionists often appeal to science's essential commitment to "methodological naturalism," the view that scientific methodology is essentially committed to naturalism and cannot meaningfully entertain hypotheses concerning the supernatural. I (...)
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  35. Robert T. Pennock (2011). Can't Philosophers Tell the Difference Between Science and Religion? Demarcation Revisited. Synthese 178 (2):177-206.score: 90.0
    In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and (...)
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  36. Scott Tanona (2010). The Pursuit of the Natural. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):79 - 87.score: 90.0
    In recent years, it has become common to defend science against charges of bias against the supernatural by explaining that science must remain methodologically natural but does not assume metaphysical naturalism. While such a response is correct, some details about the distinction between methodological naturalism and ontological or metaphysical naturalism have been lacking, as has a clear understanding of the distinction between the methodological restriction of science to natural explanations and naturalistic claims about the scope (...)
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  37. Robert C. Bishop (2009). What is This Naturalism Stuff All About? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):108-113.score: 90.0
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  38. Paul A. Nelson (1996). The Role of Theology in Current Evolutionary Reasoning. Biology and Philosophy 11 (4):493-517.score: 90.0
    A remarkable but little studied aspect of current evolutionary theory is the use by many biologists and philosophers of theological arguments for evolution. These can be classed under two heads: imperfection arguments, in which some organic design is held to be inconsistent with God's perfection and wisdom, and homology arguments, in which some pattern of similarity is held to be inconsistent with God's freedom as an artificer. Evolutionists have long contended that the organic world falls short of what one might (...)
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  39. Charles Goodman (2014). Buddhism, Naturalism, and the Pursuit of Happiness. Zygon 49 (1):220-230.score: 90.0
    Owen Flanagan's important book The Bodhisattva's Brain presents a naturalized interpretation of Buddhist philosophy. Although the overall approach of the book is very promising, certain aspects of its presentation could benefit from further reflection. Traditional teachings about reincarnation do not contradict the doctrine of no self, as Flanagan seems to suggest; however, they are empirically rather implausible. Flanagan's proposed “tame” interpretation of karma is too thin; we can do better at fitting karma into a scientific worldview. The relationship between eudaimonist (...)
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  40. Gregory W. Dawes (2011). In Defense of Naturalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):3-25.score: 88.0
    History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a methodological naturalism that disregards talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. (...)
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  41. Robert T. Pennock (1996). Naturalism, Evidence and Creationism: The Case of Phillip Johnson. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 11 (4):543-559.score: 84.0
    Phillip Johnson claims that Creationism is a better explanation of the existence and characteristics of biological species than is evolutionary theory. He argues that the only reason biologists do not recognize that Creationist's negative arguments against Darwinism have proven this is that they are wedded to a biased ideological philosophy —Naturalism — which dogmatically denies the possibility of an intervening creative god. However,Johnson fails to distinguish Ontological Naturalism from Methodological Naturalism. Science makes use of the latter (...)
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  42. Ingo Brigandt (2011). Natural Kinds and Concepts: A Pragmatist and Methodologically Naturalistic Account. In Jonathan Knowles & Henrik Rydenfelt (eds.), Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism. Peter Lang Publishing.score: 80.0
    The central aim of this essay is to put forward a notion of naturalism that broadly aligns with pragmatism. I do so by outlining my views on natural kinds and my account of concepts, which I have defended in recent publications (Brigandt 2009, in press-b). Philosophical accounts of both natural kinds and concepts are usually taken to be metaphysical endeavours, which attempt to develop a theory of the nature of natural kinds (as objectively existing entities of the world) or (...)
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  43. Janet Levin (2013). Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism. Synthese 190 (18):4117-4136.score: 80.0
    In traditional armchair methodology, philosophers attempt to challenge a thesis of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’ by describing a scenario that elicits the intuition that what has been described is an F that isn’t G. If they succeed, then the judgment that there is, or could be, an F that is not G counts as good prima facie evidence against the target thesis. Moreover, if these intuitions remain compelling after further (good faith) reflection, then traditional (...)
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  44. Dan McArthur (2005). Normative Naturalism and the Relativised a Priori. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):331 - 350.score: 78.0
    In this paper I address some shortcomings in Larry Laudan's normative naturalism. I make it clear that Laudan's rejection of the "meta-methodology thesis", or MMT is unnecessary, and that a reformulated version MMT can be sustained. I contend that a major difficulty that attends Laudan's account is his contention that a naturalistic philosophy of science cannot accommodate any a priori justification of methodological rules, and consider what sort of naturalism might best replace Laudan's. To do this, I (...)
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  45. Alexander Paseau (2008). Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 72.0
    Contemporary philosophy’s three main naturalisms are methodological, ontological and epistemological. Methodological naturalism states that the only authoritative standards are those of science. Ontological and epistemological naturalism respectively state that all entities and all valid methods of inquiry are in some sense natural. In philosophy of mathematics of the past few decades methodological naturalism has received the lion’s share of the attention, so we concentrate on this. Ontological and epistemological naturalism in the philosophy of (...)
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  46. R. Scott Smith (2011). Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality: Testing Religious Truth-Claims. Ashgate.score: 72.0
    Introduction -- Direct realism. An introduction to direct realism : the views of D.M. Armstrong -- The representationalism of Dretske, Tye, and Lycan -- Searle's naturalism and the prospects for knowledge -- Philosophy as science : neuroscience, neurophilosophy, and naturalized epistemology. Cognitive science, philosophy, and our knowledge of reality, pt. 1. The views of David Papineau -- Cognitive science, philosophy, and our knowledge of reality, pt. 2. The views of Daniel Dennett -- Can the Churchlands' neurocomputational theory cognition ground (...)
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  47. Nicholas Tebben (forthcoming). On the Prospects for Naturalism. In Christian Illies & Christian Shaefer (eds.), Metaphysics or Modernity? Bamberg University Press.score: 72.0
    Contemporary naturalism has two components. The first is ontological, and says, roughly, that all and only what the sciences say exists, really does exist. The other is methodological, and it says that only scientific explanations are legitimate explanations. Together these commitments promise a coherent picture of the world that is nicely integrated with an attractive epistemology. Despite the obvious appeal of naturalism, I would like to sound a note of caution. First, I would like to argue that (...)
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  48. Scott F. Aikin (2006). Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology. Human Studies 29 (3):317 - 340.score: 66.0
    Pragmatism’s naturalism is inconsistent with the phenomenological tradition’s anti-naturalism. This poses a problem for the methodological consistency of phenomenological work in the pragmatist tradition. Solutions such as phenomenologizing naturalism or naturalizing phenomenology have been proposed, but they fail. As a consequence, pragmatists and other naturalists must answer the phenomenological tradition’s criticisms of naturalism.
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  49. Howard Sankey (2013). Methodological Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism. Topoi 32 (1):33-41.score: 66.0
    This paper revisits one of the key ideas developed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In particular, it explores the methodological form of incommensurability which may be found in the original edition of Structure. It is argued that such methodological incommensurability leads to a form of epistemic relativism. In later work, Kuhn moved away from the original idea of methodological incommensurability with his idea of a set of epistemic values that provides a basis for rational theory choice, (...)
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  50. Stuart Silvers (1997). Nonreductive Naturalism. Theoria 12 (28):163-84.score: 66.0
    Nonreductive naturalism holds that we can preserve the (scientifically valued) metaphysical truth of physicalism while averting the methodological mistakes of reductionism. Acceptable scientificexplanation need not (in some cases cannot and in many cases, should not) be formulated in the language of physical science. Persuasive arguments about the properties of phenomenal consciousnesspurport to show that physicalism is false, namely that phenomenal experience is a nonphysical fact. I examine two recent, comprehensive efforts to naturalize phenomenal consciousness and argue thatnonreductive (...) yields a dilemma of reductionism or panpsychism. (shrink)
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