Search results for 'mind body problem' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  59
    Rafael Ferber (2010). Zeno's Metrical Paradox of Extension and Descartes' Mind-Body Problem. In Stefania Giombini E. Flavia Marcacci (ed.), Estratto da/Excerpt from: Il quinto secolo. Studi di loso a antica in onore di Livio Rossetti a c. di Stefania Giombini e Flavia Marcacci. Aguaplano—Of cina del libro, Passignano s.T. 2010, pp. 295-310 [isbn/ean: 978-88-904213-4-1]. 205-310.
    The article uses Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension, or Zeno’s fundamental paradox, as a thought-model for the mind-body problem. With the help of this model, the distinction contained between mental and physical phenomena can be formulated as sharply as possible. I formulate Zeno’s fundamental paradox and give a sketch of four different solutions to it. Then I construct a mind-body paradox corresponding to the fundamental paradox. Through that, it becomes possible to copy the solutions to (...)
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  2.  63
    Janusz Sytnik-Czetwertyński (2013). Some Eighteenth Century Contributions to the MindBody Problem (Wolff, Taurellus, Knutzen, Bülfiger and the Pre-Critical Kant). Axiomathes 23 (3):567-577.
    This work speaks about very special solution of the mindbody problem. This solution based on the so-called Principle of Co-existence stands out as one of the most interesting attempts at solving the mindbody problem. It states that substances can only exert a mutual influence on one another if they have something in common. This does not have to be a common property but rather, a binding relationship. Thus, substances co-exist when they remain bound by (...)
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  3.  90
    Nicholas Humphrey (2000). In Reply [Reply to Commentaries on "How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem"]. Humphrey, Nicholas (2000) in Reply [Reply to Commentaries on "How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem"]. [Journal (Paginated)] 7 (4):98-112.
    Response to commentaries on ‘How to Solve the Mind Body Problem’ by Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett, Naomi Elian, Ralph Ellis, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Stevan Harnad, Natika Newton, Christian de Quincey, Carol Rovane and Robert van Gulick.
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  4. Colin McGinn (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66.
  5. Nicholas Maxwell (2000). The Mind-Body Problem and Explanatory Dualism. Philosophy 75 (291):49-71.
    An important part of the mind-brain problem arises because sentience and consciousness seem inherently resistant to scientific explanation and understanding. The solution to this dilemma is to recognize, first, that scientific explanation can only render comprehensible a selected aspect of what there is, and second, that there is a mode of explanation and understanding, the personalistic, quite different from, but just as viable as, scientific explanation. In order to understand the mental aspect of brain processes - that aspect (...)
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  6. Katalin Balog (2012). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press 16.
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
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  7. Katalin Balog (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...)
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  8. Thomas Nagel (1998). Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy 73 (285):337-52.
    Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is not conceivable.1 This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -- an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the first- (...)
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  9. Robert van Gulick (2001). Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem: A Philosophic Overview. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):1-34.
    Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that (...)
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  10. Marleen Rozemond (2009). Can Matter Think? The Mind-Body Problem in the Clarke-Collins Correspondence. In Jon Miller (ed.), Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind. Springer
    The Clarke-Collins correspondence was widely read and frequently printed during the 18th century. Its central topic is the question whether matter can think. Samuel Clarke defends the immateriality of the human soul against Anthony Collins’ materialism. Clarke argues that consciousness must belong to an indivisible entity, and matter is divisible. Collins contends that consciousness could belong to a composite subject by emerging from material qualities that belong to its parts. While many early modern thinkers assumed that this is not possible, (...)
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  11.  86
    Kirk Ludwig (2003). The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 1--46.
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  12. Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
    This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind...
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  13.  76
    Nathan Stemmer (2001). The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory. Behavior and Philosophy 29:187-202.
    Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. (...)
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  14.  10
    Marc F. Krellenstein (1987). A Reply to Parallel Computation and the Mind-Body Problem. Cognitive Science 11 (2):155-7.
  15. Michael Heidelberger (2003). The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism. In Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee Salmon (eds.), Logical Empiricism: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 233--262.
    It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, de- riving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967). Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik (...)
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  16. Todd Moody (2014). Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: The State of the Argument. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (3-4):177-190.
  17. Alex Byrne (2006). What Mind-Body Problem? Boston Review:27-30.
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  18. Jaegwon Kim (2004). The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Clarendon Press 129-152.
    A plausible terminus for the mind-body debate begins by embracing ontological physicalism—the view that there is only one kind of substance in the concrete world, and that it is material substance. Taking mental causation seriously, this terminus also embraces conditional reductionism, the thesis that only physically reducible (i.e., functionalizable) mental properties can be causally efficacious. Intentional/cognitive properties (what David Chalmers calls “psychological” aspects of mind) are physically reducible, but qualia (“phenomenal” aspects of mind) are not. In (...)
     
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  19. Stevan Harnad (2000). Correlation Vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind-Body Problem is Hard. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):54-61.
    The Mind/Body Problem is about causation not correlation. And its solution will require a mechanism in which the mental component somehow manages to play a causal role of its own, rather than just supervening superflously on other, nonmental components that look, for all the world, as if they can do the full causal job perfectly well without it. Correlations confirm that M does indeed "supervene" on B, but causality is needed to show how/why M is not supererogatory; (...)
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  20. Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.) (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.
    This collection of new essays put the debates on the mind-body problem into historical context.
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  21. Michael G. F. Martin (2000). Beyond Dispute: Sense-Data, Intentionality, and the Mind-Body Problem. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge
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  22.  25
    Olga Markic (2004). Crane on the Mind-Body Problem and Emergence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):199-205.
    In his book Elements of Mind, Tim Crane gives us a very clear and interesting introduction to the main problems in the philosophy of mind. The central theme of his book is intentionality, but he also gives an account of the mind-body problem, consciousness, and perception, and then he suggests his own solutions to these problems. In this paper I will concentrate on a part in which he discusses the mind-body problem. My (...)
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  23.  54
    Jochen Fahrenberg & Marcus Cheetham (2000). The Mind-Body Problem as Seen by Students of Different Disciplines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):47-59.
    The mind body problem is a continuing issue in philosophy. No surveys known to us have been conducted about the actual preferences of, for example, psychology students for particular preconceptions about the mind body relation. These preconceptions may have different practical implications for decisions concerning the object and method of research, the choice of explanatory device for psychological and other research data and for the approach of professionals in practice. A questionnaire comprising ten different preconceptions (...)
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  24.  34
    Jesus Ezquerro & Agustin Vicente (2000). Explanatory Exclusion, Over-Determination, and the Mind-Body Problem. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr 13-21.
    Taking into account the difficulties that all attempts at a solution of the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion have experienced, we analyze in this paper the chances that mind-body causation is a case of overdetermination, a line of attack that has scarcely been explored. Our conclusion is that claiming that behaviors are causally overdetermined cannot solve the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion. The reason is the problem of massive coincidence, that can only be avoided by establishing a (...)
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  25. Michael Tye (2006). Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.
    At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one (...)
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  26. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The Mind-Body Problem. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
    * Argument from authoritative self-knowledge 1. We have a "privileged access" to our own mental states in the sense we have the authority on what mental states we are in. 2. Through introspection, we are aware of our mental states but not aware of them as physical states of any sort or as functional states. 3. Therefore, our mental states cannot be physical states.
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  27. Douglas C. Long (1977). Disembodied Existence, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 31 (May):307-316.
    The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. It may seem doubtful that anything new could be added to the debate at (...)
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  28.  43
    Jaegwon Kim (1998). The Mind-Body Problem After Fifty Years. In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press 3-21.
    It was about half a century ago that the mindbody problem, which like much else in serious metaphysics had been moribund for several decades, was resurrected as a mainstream philosophical problem. The first impetus came from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind , published in 1948, and Wittgenstein's well-known, if not well-understood, reflections on the nature of mentality and mental language, especially in his Philosophical Investigations which appeared in 1953. The primary concerns of Ryle and (...)
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  29. Dale Jacquette (1987). Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 41 (4):293-300.
    SummaryMind‐body identity theories are standardly supposed to be logically contingent. Kripke defends a quasi‐Cartesian property dualism by observing that bodies and minds or mental and neurophysiological events or event‐types can always be assigned distinct rigid designators. The concept of rigid designation implies that possibly nonidentical rigidly designated bodies and minds are necessarily and therefore actually nonidentical. But Kripke's argument does not refute materialist reductions that affirm the actual identity of minds and bodies while admitting only the possible nonidentity of (...)
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  30.  13
    Robert E. French (1987). The Geometry Of Vision And The Mind Body Problem. Lang.
    In this thesis, I both analyze the phenomenology of vision from a geometrical point of view, and also develop certain connections between that geometrical analysis and the mind body problem. In order to motivate the need for such an analysis, I first show, by means of a refutation of direct realism, that visual space is never identical with any of the physical objects being indirectly "seen" by constituting color arrangements in it. It thus follows that the geometry (...)
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  31.  49
    Ruth Weintraub (1999). The Spatiality of the Mental and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 117 (3):409-17.
    I consider a seemingly attractive strategy for grappling with the mind-body problem. It is often thought that materialists are committed to spatially locating mental events, whereas dualists are barred from so doing. The thought naturally arises, then, that reasons for or against the spatiality of the mental may be wielded to adjudicate between the different positions in the mind-body dispute. Showing that mental events are spatially located, it may be thought, is ipso facto showing the (...)
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  32. John Macnamara (1994). The Mind-Body Problem and Contemporary Psychology. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
     
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  33. Brian O'Shaughnessy (1994). The Mind-Body Problem. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell
     
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  34. Irving Krakow (2002). Why the Mind-Body Problem Cannot Be Solved: Some Final Conclusions in the Philosophy of Mind. University Press of America.
    In Why the Mind-Body Problem CANNOT Be Solved, Irving Krakow shows that a satisfactory scientific explanation of conscious experience isn't possible for methodological and semantic reasons. The reason is that sentences about conscious experience cannot be deduced from sentences about the brain's neurology without using brain-mind correlations.
     
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  35.  43
    Sergio Moravia & Scott Staton (eds.) (1995). The Enigma of the Mind: The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Sergio Moravia's The Enigma of the Mind offers a broad and lucid critical and historical survey of one of the fundamental debates in the philosophy of mind - the relationship of mind and body. This problem continues to raise deep questions concerning the nature of man. The book has two central aims. First, Professor Moravia sketches the major recent contributions to the mind/body problem from philosophers of mind. Having established this framework (...)
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  36.  97
    Michael Della Rocca (1995). Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford University Press.
    This first extensive study of Spinoza's philosophy of mind concentrates on two problems crucial to the philosopher's thoughts on the matter: the requirements for having a thought about a particular object, and the problem of the mind's relation to the body. Della Rocca contends that Spinoza's positions are systematically connected with each other and with a principle at the heart of his metaphysical system: his denial of causal or explanatory relations between the mental and the physical. (...)
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  37.  90
    Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). Collingwood's Solution to the Problem of Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):349-368.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to the mind-body problem and the possibility of mental causation: the conceptual approach advocated by Collingwood/Dray and the metaphysical approach advocated by Davidson. On the conceptual approach to show that mental causation is possible is equivalent to demonstrating that mentalistic explanations possess a different logical structure from naturalistic explanations. On the metaphysical approach to show that mental causation is possible entails explaining how the mind can intelligibly be accommodated within a physicalist (...)
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  38. Marleen Rozemond (1999). Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction: What's the Problem? Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (3):435-467.
    I argue that Descartes treated the action of body on mind differently from the action of mind on body, as was common in the period. Descartes explicitly denied that there is a problem for interaction but his descriptions of interaction seem to suggest that he thought there was a problem. I argue that these descriptions are motivated by a different issue, the seemingly arbitrary connections between particular physical states and the particular mental states they (...)
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  39.  15
    Michael Della Rocca (1997). Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. OUP Usa.
    Della Rocca concentrates on two problems crucial to Spinoza 's philosophy of mind: the requirements for having a thought about a particular object, and the problem of the mind's relation to the body. He contends that for Spinoza these two problems are linked and thus part of a systematic philosophy of mind.
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  40. J. Almog (2001). What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford University Press.
    In his Meditations, Rene Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These (...)
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  41. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). The Mind-Body Problem. Scientific American 244:114-25.
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  42.  41
    Harold J. Morowitz (1987). The Mind Body Problem and the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):271-275.
    Cartesian mind body dualism and modern versions of this viewpoint posit a mind thermodynamically unrelated to the body but informationally interactive. The relation between information and entropy developed by Leon Brillouin demonstrates that any information about the state of a system has entropic consequences. It is therefore impossible to dissociate the mind's information from the body's entropy. Knowledge of that state of the system without an energetically significant measurement would lead to a violation of (...)
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  43.  45
    Amit Goswami (1990). Consciousness in Quantum Physics and the Mind-Body Problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 11 (1):75-96.
    Following the lead of von Neumann and Wigner, Goswami has developed a paradox-free interpretation of quantum mechanics based on the idealistic notion that consciousness collapes the quantum wave function. This solution of quantum measurement theory sheds a considerable amount of light on the nature of consciousness. Quantum theory is applied to the mind-brain problem and a solution is proposed for the paradox of the causal potency of the conscious mind and of self-reference. Cognitive and neurophysiological data in (...)
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  44. Gabriel Vacariu (2011). The Mind-Body Problem Today. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):26-34.
    An old philosophical problem, the mind-body problem, has not been yet solved by philosophers or scientists. Even if in cognitive neuroscience has been a stunning development in the last 20 years, the mind-body problem remained unsolved. Even if the majority of researchers in this domain accept the identity theory from an ontological viewpoint, many of them reject this position from an epistemological viewpoint. In this context, I consider that it is quite possible the (...)
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  45. Mario Augusto Bunge (1980). The Mind-Body Problem: A Psychobiological Approach. Pergamon Press.
  46.  52
    J. N. Wright & P. Potter (eds.) (2003). Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem From Antiquity to Enlightenment. Oxford University Press University Press.
    This is a multi-disciplinary exploration of the history of understanding of the human mind or soul and its relationship to the body, through the course of more than two thousand years. Thirteen specially commissioned chapters, each written by a recognized expert, discuss such figures as the doctors Hippocrates and Galen, the theologians St Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas, and philosophers from Plato to Leibniz.
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  47. Karl R. Popper (ed.) (1994). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction. Routledge.
    One of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century, Sir Karl Popper here examines the problems connected with human freedom, creativity, rationality and the relationship between human beings and their actions. In this illuminating series of papers, Popper suggests a theory of mind-body interaction that relates to evolutionary emergence, human language and what he calls "the three worlds." Rene; Descartes first posited the existence of two worlds--the world of physical bodies and the world of mental states. Popper (...)
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  48. Alex Byrne (2006). Color and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.
    b>: there is no “mind-body problem”, or “hard problem of consciousness”; if there is a hard problem of something, it is the problem of reconciling the manifest and scientific images.
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  49. Christopher S. Hill (1997). Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.
  50.  17
    David Ray Griffin (1998). Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem. University of California Press.
    David Ray Griffin develops a third form of realism, one that resolves the basic problem (common to dualism and materialism) of the continued acceptance of the Cartesian view of matter.
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