Search results for 'mind-brain question' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  74
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2001). Operational Architectonics of the Human Brain Biopotential Field: Toward Solving the Mind-Brain Problem. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.
    The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and (...)
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  2.  39
    Camilo J. Cela-Conde & Gisèle Marty (1997). Mind Architecture and Brain Architecture. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):327-340.
    The use of the computer metaphor has led to the proposal of mind architecture (Pylyshyn 1984; Newell 1990) as a model of the organization of the mind. The dualist computational model, however, has, since the earliest days of psychological functionalism, required that the concepts mind architecture and brain architecture be remote from each other. The development of both connectionism and neurocomputational science, has sought to dispense with this dualism and provide general models of consciousness – a uniform cognitive architecture –, (...)
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  3.  4
    H. Tristram Engelhardt (1977). Husserl and the Mind-Brain Relation. In Don Ihde & Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Interdisciplinary Phenomenology. M. Nijhoff 51--70.
    The mind-body relation or, more particularly, the mind-brain relation 1 has been a perennial puzzle for philosophers—how can things so different be intimately related? Husserl dealt with the mind-brain relation in Section 63 of Ideen II, “Psychophysischer Parallelismus and Wechselwirkung,” 2 where he gave a critique of psychophysical parallelism. For Husserl, the mind-brain relation is to be understood not as a material or metaphysical relation, but as a relation between the presented sense or significance of two varieties (...)
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  4. H. F. J. Müller (2007). Brain in Mind: The Mind–Brain Relation with the Mind at the Center. Constructivist Foundations 3 (1):30-37.
    Purpose: To show that the mind--brain relation can be understood from a perspective that keeps the mind at the center. Problem: Since at least the time of Augustine, the puzzle of the mind--brain relation has been how the mind is attached to, or originates from, the body or brain. This is still the prevalent scientific question. It implies assumption of a primary (ontological) subject--object split, and furthermore that subjective experience can be derived from, or even reduced to, a fictitious (...)
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  5.  2
    Rajendra Prasad Baijpai (2015). Biophotonic Route for Understanding Mind, Brain and the World. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 11 (2):189-200.
    Man is endowed with brain and mind for comprehending reality of the world. Brain is material entity and is observable, while mind is a non-physical conceived entity. Scientific investigations enhance our knowledge of the functioning of brain and its constituents. They indicate mind-brain association but do not rule out the possibility, in which mind is a property of brain. The perceived reality of the world has both objective and subjective components. The objective components are attributed to brain either alone (...)
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  6. Peter Slezak (2000). The Mind-Brain Problem. In Evian Gordon (ed.), Integrative Neuroscience. Harwood Academic Publishers
    The problem of explaining the mind persists essentially unchanged today since the time of Plato and Aristotle. For the ancients, of course, it was not a question of the relation of mind to brain, though the question was fundamentally the same nonetheless. For Plato, the mind was conceived as distinct from the body and was posited in order to explain knowledge which transcends that available to the senses. For his successor, Aristotle, the mind was conceived as intimately related (...)
     
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  7.  8
    William P. Bechtel (1986). What Happens to Accounts of Mind-Brain Relations If We Forgo an Architecture of Rules and Representations? Philosophy of Science Association 1986:159 - 171.
    The notion that the mind is a physical symbol system (Newell) with a determinate functional architecture (Pylyshyn) provides a compelling conception of the relation of cognitive inquiry to neuroscience inquiry: cognitive inquiry explores the activity within the symbol system while neuroscience explains how the symbol system is realized in the brain. However, the view the the mind is a physical symbol system is being challenged today by researchers in artificial intelligence who propose that the mind is a connectionist system and (...)
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  8.  26
    Simon van Rysewyk, Pain in the Brain? The Question of Fetal Pain.
  9.  8
    Fernand Gobet (2014). William R. Uttal: Mind and Brain: A Critical Appraisal of Cognitive Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 24 (2):221-226.
    The relation between mind and brain is one of the big scientific questions that has attracted scientists’ attention for centuries but also eluded their understanding. In this book, William Uttal provides a critical review of cognitive neuroscience, focusing on a specific question: What do the brain-imaging techniques developed in the last two decades or so—mostly functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography —tell us about the brain-mind problem? His unambiguous and abrasive answer is: nothing.The book is organized in (...)
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  10.  29
    Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon (2011). What's on Your Mind? A Brain Scan Won't Tell. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):699-722.
    Reverse Inference ( RI ) is an imaging-based type of inference from brain states to mental states, which has become highly widespread in neuroscience, most especially in neuroeconomics. Recent critical studies of RI may be taken to show that, if cautiously used, RI can help achieve research goals that may be difficult to achieve by way of behavior-based procedures alone. But can RI exceed the limits of these procedures and achieve research goals that are impossible for them to achieve alone? (...)
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  11.  15
    Henri Cohen & Brigitte Stemmer (eds.) (2007). Consciousness and Cognition: Fragments of Mind and Brain. Elxevier Academic Press.
    What were the circumstances that led to the development of our cognitive abilities from a primitive hominid to an essentially modern human? The answer to this question is of profound importance to understanding our present nature. Since the steep path of our cognitive development is the attribute that most distinguishes humans from other mammals, this is also a quest to determine human origins. This collection of outstanding scientific problems and the revelation of the many ways they can be addressed (...)
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  12.  35
    Kevin Corrigan (2010). Simmias’ Objection to Socrates in the Phaedo: Harmony, Symphony and Some Later Platonic/ Patristic Responses to the Mind/Soul-Body Question. International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 4 (2):147-162.
    Simmias' famous epiphenomenalist analogy of the soul-body relation to the harmony and strings of a lyre leads to Socrates' initial refutation and subsequent prolonged defense of soul's immortality in the Phaedo. It also yields in late antiquity significant treatments of the harmony relation by Plotinus and Porphyry that present a larger context for viewing the nature of harmony in the soul and the psycho-somatic compound. But perhaps the most detailed treatment of the musical analogy, and certainly the most radical, is (...)
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  13.  14
    Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.) (2008). Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.
    The phenomenon of consciousness has always been a central question for philosophers and scientists. Emerging in the past decade are new approaches to the understanding of consciousness in a scientific light. This book presents a series of essays by leading thinkers giving an account of the current ideas prevalent in the scientific study of consciousness. The value of the book lies in the discussion of this interesting though complex subject from different points of view ranging from physics, computer science (...)
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  14. Mostyn W. Jones (2010). How To Make Mind-Brain Relations Clear. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5 - 6.
    The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. But to clearly (...)
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  15.  87
    Patricia S. Churchland (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.
    This is a unique book. It is excellently written, crammed with information, wise and a pleasure to read.' ---Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University.
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  16. W. Teed Rockwell (2005). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" -- and (...)
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  17.  26
    Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (forthcoming). Of Brains and Planets: On a Causal Criterion for Mind-Brain Identities. Synthese:1-13.
    Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to empirically (...)
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  18.  5
    David A. Booth (1978). Mind-Brain Puzzle Versus Mind-Physical World Identity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):348-349.
    To maintain my neutral monist or multi-aspect view of human reality (or indeed to defend the Cartesian dualism assumed by Puccetti & Dykes, it is wrong to relate the mind to the brain alone. A person's mind should be related to the physical environment, including the body, in addition to the brain. Furthermore, we are unlikely to understand the detailed functioning of an individual brain without knowing the history of its interactions with the external and internal environments during that person's (...)
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  19. Jakob Hohwy (2011). Mind–Brain Identity and Evidential Insulation. Philosophical Studies 26 (3):261-286.
    Is it rational to believe that the mind is identical to the brain? Identity theorists say it is (or looks like it will be, once all the neuroscientific evidence is in), and they base this claim on a general epistemic route to belief in identity. I re-develop this general route and defend it against some objections. Then I discuss how rational belief in mind–brain identity, obtained via this route, can be threatened by an appropriately adjusted version of the anti-physicalist knowledge (...)
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  20.  3
    Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2016). Of Brains and Planets: On a Causal Criterion for Mind-Brain Identities. Synthese 193 (4):1177-1189.
    Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to empirically (...)
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  21. Paul D. MacLean (1997). The Brain and Subjective Experience: Question of Multilevel Role of Resonance. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (2-3):247-268.
    Everything we experience and do as individuals is assumed to be a function of the nervous system. It is as though we were born with a total supply of algorithms for all given forms of psychic states and solutions for immediate or eventual actions. There is evidence that the forebrain is, so to speak, the central processor for psychic experience and psychologically directed behavior. Since information itself is immaterial, all forms of psychic experience represent immaterial emanations of the forebrain, including (...)
     
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  22.  18
    Zachary Stein & Kurt W. Fischer (2011). Directions for Mind, Brain, and Education: Methods, Models, and Morality. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (1):56-66.
    In this article we frame a set of important issues in the emerging field of Mind, Brain, and Education in terms of three broad headings: methods, models, and morality. Under the heading of methods we suggest that the need for synthesis across scientific and practical disciplines entails the pursuit of usable knowledge via a catalytic symbiosis between theory, research, and practice. Under the heading of models the goal of producing usable knowledge should shape the construction of theories that provide comprehensive (...)
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  23.  4
    Mark Crooks (2002). Intertheoretic Identification and Mind-Brain Reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):193-222.
    A recurrent candidate for exemplification of intertheoretic reduction, put forward over past decades within philosophy of science, is the proposition "pitch is identical with sound-frequency." Paul Churchland revives this nominal ontological reduction, placing it beside others as "lightning is an electrical discharge," and "heat is high kinetic energy." Yet no matter whether frequency is considered physically or merely semantically, there is no conceivable format in which such an identity is viable. An analysis of objective qualia said to represent the ground (...)
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  24. Martin Cohen (2010). Mind Games: 31 Days to Rediscover Your Brain. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This original and innovative book is an exploration of one of the key mysteries of the mind, the question of consciousness. Conducted through a one month course of both practical and entertaining ‘thought experiments’, these stimulating mind-games are used as a vehicle for investigating the complexities of the way the mind works. By turns, fun, eye-opening and intriguing approach to thinking about thinking, which contains inventive and engaging ‘thought experiments’ for the general reader Includes specially drawn illustrations by the (...)
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  25. Martin Cohen (2011). Mind Games: 31 Days to Rediscover Your Brain. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This original and innovative book is an exploration of one of the key mysteries of the mind, the question of consciousness. Conducted through a one month course of both practical and entertaining ‘thought experiments’, these stimulating mind-games are used as a vehicle for investigating the complexities of the way the mind works. By turns, fun, eye-opening and intriguing approach to thinking about thinking, which contains inventive and engaging ‘thought experiments’ for the general reader Includes specially drawn illustrations by the (...)
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  26. M. L. Lonky (2003). Human Consciousness: A Systems Approach to the Mind/Brain Interaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (1):91-118.
    The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Winter 2003, Volume 24, Number 1, Pages 91–118, ISSN 0271–0137 This paper focuses on a logical systems flow-down of a set of consciousness requirements, which together with biological quantification of human brain anatomy sets limits on the neurological network in the cerebrum in order to produce the mind. It employs data to validate inferences, or when data do not exist, proposes methods for acquiring valid evidence. Many of these systems requirements will be imposed after (...)
     
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  27.  20
    Joseph M. Notterman (2000). Note on Reductionism in Cognitive Psychology: Reification of Cognitive Processes Into Mind, Mind-Brain Equivalence, and Brain-Computer Analogy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):116-121.
    This note brings together three phenomena leading to a tendency toward reductionism in cognitive psychology. They are the reification of cognitive processes into an entity called mind; the identification of the mind with the brain; and the congruence by analogy of the brain with the digital computer. Also indicated is the need to continue studying the effects upon behavior of variables other than brain function. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  28. Clive Vernon Borst (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers. New York,St Martin's P..
    Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. Smart.--Could mental states be brain (...)
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  29. Gabriel Vacariu & Vacariu (2013). The Mind-Brain Problem in Cognitive Neuroscience (Only Content).
    (June 2013) “The mind-body problem in cognitive neuroscience”, Philosophia Scientiae 17/2, Gabriel Vacariu and Mihai Vacariu (eds.): 1. William Bechtel (Philosophy, Center for Chronobiology, and Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science University of California, San Diego) “The endogenously active brain: the need for an alternative cognitive architecture” 2. Rolls T. Edmund (Oxford Centre for Computational Neuroscience, Oxford, UK) “On the relation between the mind and the brain: a neuroscience perspective” 3. Cees van Leeuwen (University of Leuven, Belgium; Riken Brain Science Institute, (...)
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  30.  8
    Martin J. Sliwinski (1987). Mind, Brain and Explanation. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):103-111.
    The question "What constitutes a good explanation of psychological phenomena?" is the most important if not the most commonly asked question facing students of psychology. Often this question is answered, or maybe is cast aside, by adopting the position that any theory that can predict behavior therefore explains the behavior. However, the notion of prediction is not one without controversy. In this article the author has attempted to demonstrate that neither the identity thesis nor functionalism is well (...)
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  31.  56
    Ullin T. Place (2000). The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.
    The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinctionbetween the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental,and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as thebrain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mentalstates depend causally on and are, thus, ''''distinct existences'''' fromthe states of the brain microstructure with which ''they'' are correlated.It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity andits composition/underlying structure applies across the board. allstuffs and processes are the same (...)
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  32.  30
    Jaak Panksepp, Thomas Fuchs, Victor Garcia & Adam Lesiak (2007). Does Any Aspect of Mind Survive Brain Damage That Typically Leads to a Persistent Vegetative State? Ethical Considerations. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2 (1):32-.
    Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of (...)
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  33.  71
    Robert Rosen (1993). Drawing the Boundary Between Subject and Object: Comments on the Mind-Brain Problem. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):89-100.
    Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes objectivity, especially in identifying it with what a machine can do. I approach the problem in the light (...)
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  34.  51
    W. R. Webster (2002). A Case of Mind/Brain Identity: One Small Bridge for the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 131 (2):275-287.
    Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that the (...)
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  35.  62
    John Bickle (1992). Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.
    Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that (...)
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  36.  16
    Margaret T. Lynn, Christopher C. Berger, Travis A. Riddle & Ezequiel Morsella (2010). Mind Control? Creating Illusory Intentions Through a Phony Brain–Computer Interface. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1007-1012.
    Can one be fooled into believing that one intended an action that one in fact did not intend? Past experimental paradigms have demonstrated that participants, when provided with false perceptual feedback about their actions, can be fooled into misperceiving the nature of their intended motor act. However, because veridical proprioceptive/perceptual feedback limits the extent to which participants can be fooled, few studies have been able to answer our question and induce the illusion to intend. In a novel paradigm addressing (...)
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  37.  40
    John Bickle (1997). From Sensory Neuroscience to Neurophilosophy: Reflections on Llinas and Churchland's Mind-Brain Continuum. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):523-530.
    Philosophers and psychologists seeking an accessible introduction to current neuroscience will find much value in this volume. Befitting the neuroscientific focus on sensory processes, many essays address explicitly the binding problem. Theoretical and experimental work pertaining to the “temporal synchronicity” solution is prominent. But there are also some surprising implications for current philosophical concerns, such as the intemalism/extemalism debate about representational content, epistemological realism, a “bottom-up” approach to naturalizing intentionality, Humean concerns about the self, and implications from phantom-limb phenomena. Higher-level (...)
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  38. D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.) (2005). The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. OUP.
    What holds together the various fields, which - considered together - are supposed to constitute the general intellectual discipline that people now call cognitive science? Some theorists identify the common subject matter as the mind, but scientists have not been able to agree on any single, satisfactory answer to the question of what the mind is. This book argues that all cognitive sciences are not equal, and that rather only neurophysiology and cultural psychology are suited to account for the (...)
     
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  39. Christina E. Erneling & David M. Johnson (eds.) (2004). The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press Usa.
    What holds together the various fields that are supposed to consititute the general intellectual discipline that people now call cognitive science? In this book, Erneling and Johnson identify two problems with defining this discipline. First, some theorists identify the common subject matter as the mind, but scientists and philosophers have not been able to agree on any single, satisfactory answer to the question of what the mind is. Second, those who speculate about the general characteristics that belong to cognitive (...)
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  40.  81
    Gabriel Vacariu (2005). Mind, Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds. Synthese 147 (3):515-548.
    The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the (...)
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  41.  33
    Mitchell G. Ash, Horst Gundlach & Thomas Sturm (2010). Irreducible Mind? On E. Kelly Et Al., Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. [REVIEW] American Journal of Psychology 123:246-250.
    This is a review of a book that tries to re-establish mind-body dualism by using (a) empirical research on near-death experiences, placebo effects, creativity, claiming even that parapsychology should become a respected part of science, and (b) Frederic W. H. Myers' (1843-1901) metaphor of the brain as a kind of receiving device that records what the irreducible mind sends as messages. Among other things, we criticize the lack of philosophical clarity about mind-body relation, and question the book's tendency to (...)
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  42.  8
    Ian Glynn (1999). An Anatomy of Thought the Origin and Machinery of Mind. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    Amazon.com Love, fear, hope, calculus, and game shows-how do all these spring from a few delicate pounds of meat? Neurophysiologist Ian Glynn lays the foundation for answering this question in his expansive An Anatomy of Thought, but stops short of committing to one particular theory. The book is a pleasant challenge, presenting the reader with the latest research and thinking about neuroscience and how it relates to various models of consciousness. Combining the aim of a textbook with the style (...)
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  43.  6
    Roland Puccetti & Robert W. Dykes (1978). Sensory Cortex and the Mind-Brain Problem. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):337.
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  44. J. R. Smythies (2002). Comment on Crooks's Intertheoretic Identification and Mind-Brain Reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):245-248.
    This paper focuses on perception and surveys the scientific evidence that the theory of direct realism adopted by most contemporary philosophers is incorrect. This evidence is provided by experiments on the spatial and temporal "filling-in" of percepts. It also examines the myth of the projection of sensations. The conclusion is that we do not perceive the world as it actually is, but as the brain computes it most probably to be.
     
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  45. Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Andrew A. Fingelkurts (2009). Is Our Brain Hardwired to Produce God, or is Our Brain Hardwired to Perceive God? A Systematic Review on the Role of the Brain in Mediating Religious Experience. Cognitive Processing 10 (4):293-326.
    To figure out whether the main empirical question “Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?” is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), (...)
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  46. Kaj Sotala & Harri Valpola (2012). Coalescing Minds: Brain Uploading-Related Group Mind Scenarios. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):293-312.
    We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where arti cial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain as seamlessly as (...)
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  47.  18
    Colin Gray & Phil Russell (1998). Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates: A Question of Language? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):121-121.
    Two substantive comments are made. The first is methodological, and concerns Heyes's proposals for a critical test for theory of mind. The second is theoretical, and concerns the appropriateness of asking questions about theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Although Heyes warns against the apparent simplicity of the theory of mind hypothesis, she underplays the linguistic implications.
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  48.  11
    Robert M. Gordon (1998). The Prior Question: Do Human Primates Have a Theory of Mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):120-121.
    Given Heyes's construal of there is still no convincing evidence of theory of mind in human primates, much less nonhuman. Rather than making unfounded assumptions about what underlies human social competence, one should ask what mechanisms other primates have and then inquire whether more sophisticated elaborations of those might not account for much of human competence.
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    Simon van Rysewyk, Critique of Max Velmans on Mind-Brain Identity Theory and Consciousness – Part I.
  50.  21
    Simon van Rysewyk, Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ‘Brain-Sex’ Theory of Transsexualism and the Dimorphic Brain.
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