Search results for 'minimal self' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin (2010). Reconstructing the Minimal Self, or How to Make Sense of Agency and Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual (...)
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  2.  40
    M. CerMolacce, J. Naudin & J. Parnas (2007). The “Minimal Self” in Psychopathology: Re-Examining the Self-Disorders in the Schizophrenia Spectrum☆. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):703-714.
    The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the ‘mineness’ of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the (...)
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  3.  7
    Julian Kiverstein (2008). Consciousness, the Minimal Self, and Brain. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):335-360.
    This paper explores the possibility of a neuroscientific explanation of consciousness, and what such an explanation might look like. More specifically, I will be concerned with the claim that for any given experience there is neural representational system that constitutes the minimal supervenience base of that experience. I will call this hypothesis the minimal supervenience thesis. I argue that the minimal supervenience thesis is subject to two readings, which I call the localist and holist readings. Localist theories (...)
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    Paweł Weroński, Yi Jiang & Steen Rasmussen (2008). Application of Molecular Dynamics Computer Simulations in the Design of a Minimal Self-Replicating Molecular Machine. Complexity 13 (4):10-17.
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  5. D. Zahavi (2010). Minimal Self and Narrative Self. A Distinction in Need of Refinement. In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen (eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders. Heningnsen 3--11.
     
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  6.  5
    Robert Ehrlich (1984). The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times. Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 1984 (62):223-230.
    Few works of social criticism about contemporary America have elicited so much response as The Culture of Narcissism. There Christopher Lasch argued that the traditional American emphasis on individualism has degenerated into a narcissistic preoccupation with the self. He explained this transformation by pointing to the psychological consequences resulting from changes in the nature of production, consumption, and socialization. Of particular importance was the shift from handicraft to factory modes of production and the subsequent takeover of workers' knowledge by (...)
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  7. Michael Locke McLendon (2014). Rousseau and the Minimal Self: A Solution to the Problem of Amour-Propre. European Journal of Political Theory 13 (3):341-361.
    Over the past few decades, scholars have reassessed the role of amour-propre in Rousseau’s thought. While it was once believed that he had an entirely negative valuation of the emotion, it is now widely held that he finds it useful and employs it to strengthen moral attachments, conjugal love, civic virtue and moral heroism. At the same time, scholars are divided as to whether this positive amour-propre is an antidote to the negative or dangerous form. Some scholars are confident that (...)
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  8.  31
    Thor Grünbaum (2012). First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag 47--273.
  9.  6
    A. MishAra (2007). Is Minimal Self Preserved in Schizophrenia? A Subcomponents View☆. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):715-721.
  10.  5
    Brian P. Mclaughlin (2004). Anti-Individualism and Minimal Self-Knowledge: A Dissolution of Ebbs's Puzzle. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter 2--427.
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  11. R. Ehrlich (1984). The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times. Télos 1984 (62):223-230.
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  12.  22
    Nini Praetorius (2009). The Phenomenological Underpinning of the Notion of a Minimal Core Self: A Psychological Perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):325-338.
    The paper argues that Zahavi’s defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. “identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena”, and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object “feels” like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of (...)
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  13. Julian Kiverstein (2009). Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain. Psyche 15 (1).
    Cognitive neuroscientists are currently busy searching for the neural signatures of conscious experience. I shall argue that the notion of neural correlates of consciousness employed in much of this work is subject to two very different interpretations depending on how one understands the relation between the concepts of “state consciousness” and “creature consciousness”. Localist theories treat the neural correlates of creature consciousness as a kind of background condition that must be in place in order for the brain to realise particular (...)
     
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  14.  95
    Adrian J. T. Smith (2010). Comment: Minimal Conditions for the Simplest Form of Self-Consciousness. In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Henningsen (eds.), The embodied self: Dimensions, coherence, disorders. Schattauer
    Commentary on: Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger, Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 7-13, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003.
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  15.  21
    Michael Wheeler, The Devils in the Details: A Response to Kiverstein's 'Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain'.
    While remaining in broad agreement with the overall position developed and defended by Kiverstein, I identify and discuss what I take to be a number of problems with the details of the argument. These concern (a) the claim that a certain temporal structure to conscious experience is necessary for there to be a minimal sense of self, (b) the alleged ubiquitous presence in experience of a minimal sense of self, and (c) the claim that the distinction (...)
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  16.  6
    James R. O’Shea (2015). Kantian Reflections on the Givenness of Zahavi’s Minimal Experiential Self. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):619-625.
    At the core of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was a decisive break with certain fundamental Cartesian assumptions or claims about consciousness and self-consciousness, claims that have nonetheless remained perennially tempting, from a phenomenological perspective, independently of any further questions concerning the metaphysics of mind and its place in nature. The core of this philosophical problem has recently been helpfully exposed and insightfully probed in Dan Zahavi’s book, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. In these remarks (...)
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  17.  6
    Walter Riofrio (2008). Self-Organizing Dynamics of a Minimal Protocell. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:185-191.
    In this paper, we present an argument showing why the general properties of a self-organizing system (e.g. being far from equilibrium) may be too weak to characterize biological and proto-biological systems. The special character of biological systems, tell us that its distinctive capacities could have been developed in pre-biotic times. In other words, the basic properties of life would be better comprehended if we think that they were much more likely early in time. We developed a conceptual proposal on (...)
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  18.  7
    Maureen Sie (2014). Self-Knowledge and the Minimal Conditions of Responsibility: A Traffic-Participation View on Human Agency. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):271-291.
    “I demote practical reason from the conductor’s podium on which it is traditionally pictured, leading the performance. I picture practical reason less as an orchestral conductor than as a theatrical prompter — out of sight, following the action in case it needs to be nudged back into an intelligible course.” (David Velleman 2009, p. 4)IntroductionIn this paper I discuss our practice of exchanging explanatory and justifying reasons with one another, that is, reasons with which we explain or justify our actions, (...)
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  19.  9
    Monima Chadha (2013). The Self in Early Nyāya: A Minimal Conclusion. Asian Philosophy 23 (1):24-42.
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  20.  9
    Anna Strasser (2012). How Minimal Can Self-Consciousness Be? Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):39-62.
  21.  8
    Andrew W. Schwartz (2004). Minimal Rationality and Self-Transformation. Social Theory and Practice 30 (2):215-228.
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  22.  31
    Thomas Metzinger (2013). Why Are Dreams Interesting for Philosophers? The Example of Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood, Plus an Agenda for Future Research. Frontiers in Psychology 4:746.
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but (...)
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  23. Shaun Gallagher (2000). Philosophical Conceptions of the Self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and (...)
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  24. Timothy Lane (2012). Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.
    Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited (...)
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  25.  8
    Jann E. Schlimme (2013). Sense of Self-Determination and the Suicidal Experience. A Phenomenological Approach. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):211-223.
    In this paper phenomenological descriptions of the experiential structures of suicidality and of self-determined behaviour are given; an understanding of the possible scopes and forms of lived self-determination in suicidal mental life is offered. Two possible limits of lived self-determination are described: suicide is always experienced as minimally self-determined, because it is the last active and effective behaviour, even in blackest despair; suicide can never be experienced as fully self-determined, even if valued as the authentic (...)
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  26.  58
    Chris Dobbyn & Susan A. J. Stuart (2003). The Self as an Embedded Agent. Minds and Machines 13 (2):187-201.
    In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, (...)
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  27. John Schwenkler (2014). Vision, Self‐Location, and the Phenomenology of the 'Point of View'. Noûs 48 (1):137-155.
    According to the Self-Location Thesis, one’s own location can be among the things that visual experience represents, even when one’s body is entirely out of view. By contrast, the Minimal View denies this, and says that visual experience represents things only as "to the right", etc., and never as "to the right of me". But the Minimal View is phenomenologically inadequate: it cannot explain the difference between a visual experience of self-motion and one of an oppositely (...)
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  28.  21
    Monima Chadha (forthcoming). No-Self and the Phenomenology of Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    The Buddhists philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a “self” in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. The first task in the paper is to answer the question: what is the “self” that the Buddhists are denying? To answer this question, I look at the Abhidharma arguments for the No-Self doctrine and then work back to an interpretation of the self that is the target of such a doctrine. (...)
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  29. Alain Morin (2006). Levels of Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Comparison and Integration of Various Neurocognitive Views. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.
    Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of (...)
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  30.  62
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Open Neuroimaging Journal 6:55-68.
    The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN’s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To (...)
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  31.  63
    Karsten R. Stueber (2002). The Problem of Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):269-96.
    This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledgethat is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that ifone conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive ofbelief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent hasknowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however,preclude the conceptual possibility of being (...)
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  32.  5
    Miriam Kyselo (forthcoming). The Enactive Approach and Disorders of the Self - the Case of Schizophrenia. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
    The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomenological and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in philosophy and cognitive science can elaborate accounts of psychopathologies of the self. It is argued that the notion of the minimal and bodily self underlying these approaches is still limited since it downplays the relevance of social interactions and relations for the formation of a coherent sense of self. These approaches also illustrate that we still lack an (...)
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  33.  52
    Andy Lamey (2012). Primitive Self-Consciousness and Avian Cognition. The Monist 95 (3):486-510.
    Recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of theories of moral standing, which increasingly recognize a position of intermediate standing between fully self-conscious entities and those which are merely conscious. Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to more precisely elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. New research into the structure of the avian brain offers a revised view of the (...)
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  34.  29
    Susan A. J. Stuart (2002). A Radical Notion of Embeddedness: A Logically Necessary Precondition for Agency and Self-Awareness. Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):98-109.
    The aim of this paper is to establish the logically necessary preconditions for the existence of self-awareness in an artificial or a natural agent. We examine the terms, agent, situated, embodied, embedded, and representation, as employed ubiquitously in cognitive science, attempting to clarify their meaning and the limits of their use. We discuss the minimal conditions for an agent’s environment constituting a ‘world’ and reject most, though not all, types of virtual world. We argue that to qualify as (...)
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  35.  48
    Pablo López-Silva (2014). Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience.
    Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of ‘mineness’ of the experience reveals the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess (...)
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  36. Pablo López-Silva (2014). Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience.
    Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of ‘mineness’ of the experience reveals the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess (...)
     
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  37. Pablo López-Silva (2014). Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience. BoD Germany.
    Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of ‘mineness’ of the experience reveals the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess (...)
     
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  38. Jakob Hohwy (2007). The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception. Psyche 13 (2).
    The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, (...)
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  39.  37
    Patrick Stokes (2011). Naked Subjectivity: Minimal Vs. Narrative Selves in Kierkegaard. Inquiry 53 (4):356-382.
    In recent years a significant debate has arisen as to whether Kierkegaard offers a version of the “narrative approach” to issues of personal identity and self-constitution. In this paper I do not directly take sides in this debate, but consider instead the applicability of a recent development in the broader literature on narrative identity—the distinction between the temporally-extended “narrative self” and the non-extended “minimal self—to Kierkegaard's work. I argue that such a distinction is both necessary for (...)
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  40.  50
    Erica Cosentino (2011). Self in Time and Language. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):777-783.
    Time has been considered a crucial factor in distinguishing between two levels of self-awareness: the “core,” or “minimal self,” and the “extended,” or “narrative self.” Herein, I focus on this last concept of the self and, in particular, on the relationship between the narrative self and language. In opposition to the claim that the narrative self is a linguistic construction, my idea is that it is created by the functioning of mental time travel, (...)
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  41.  1
    Louis Sass, Elizabeth Pienkos & Barnaby Nelson (2013). IntrospectionIntrospection and Schizophrenia: A Comparative Investigation of Anomalous Self Experiences. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):853-867.
    This paper offers a comparative investigation of anomalous self-experiences common in schizophrenia instrument) and those of normal individuals in an intensely introspective orientation . The latter represent a relatively pure manifestation of certain forms of exaggerated self-consciousness , one facet of the disturbance of core- or minimal-self postulated as central in schizophrenia. Significant similarities with schizophrenia-like experience were found but important differences also emerged. Affinities included feelings of passivity, fading of self or world, and alienation (...)
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  42.  4
    Philippe Rochat (2011). The Self as Phenotype. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):109-119.
    Self-awareness is viewed here as the phenotypic expression of an interaction between genes and the environment. Brain and behavioral development of fetuses and newborn infants are a rich source of information regarding what might constitute minimal self-awareness. Research indicates that newborns have feeling experience. Unlike automata, they do not just sense and respond to proximal stimulations. In light of the explosive brain growth that takes place inside and outside of the womb, first signs of feeling (...)
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  43.  1
    J. Cloutier & C. NeilmaCrae (2008). The Feeling of Choosing: Self-Involvement and the Cognitive Status of Things Past. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):125-135.
    Previous research has demonstrated that self-involvement enhances the memorability of information encountered in the past. The emergence of this effect, however, is dependent on guided evaluative processing and the explicit association of items with self. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether self-memory effects would emerge in task contexts characterized by incidental-encoding and minimal self-involvement. Integrating insights from work on source monitoring and action recognition, we hypothesized that the effects of self-involvement on memory function (...)
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  44. Anthony Brueckner & Gary Ebbs (2015). Debating Self-Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In (...)
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  45. Jasmin Cloutier & C. Neil Macrae (2008). The Feeling of Choosing: Self-Involvement and the Cognitive Status of Things Past. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):125-135.
    Previous research has demonstrated that self-involvement enhances the memorability of information encountered in the past. The emergence of this effect, however, is dependent on guided evaluative processing and the explicit association of items with self. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether self-memory effects would emerge in task contexts characterized by incidental-encoding and minimal self-involvement. Integrating insights from work on source monitoring and action recognition, we hypothesized that the effects of self-involvement on memory function (...)
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  46. Shaun Gallagher (2008). Are Minimal Representations Still Representations? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369.
    I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non-representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self-organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub-personal level is superior. I further recommend (...)
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  47. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment (...)
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  48.  27
    Dorothée Legrand (2007). Pre-Reflective Self-as-Subject From Experiential and Empirical Perspectives. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. (...)
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  49.  38
    Christopher Peacocke (2014). Interpersonal Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):1-24.
    If one were to write a book titled TheVarieties of Self-Consciousness, one would start off with some distinctions. It will help to locate my topic in relation to those distinctions.The first distinction concerns that kind of self-consciousness which involves only the minimal ability on the part of a subject to self-represent, to be in mental states with first person content, be it conceptual or nonconceptual. This minimal ability involves very little as compared with the more (...)
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  50.  33
    Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris (2012). The Bodily Social Self: A Link Between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):125-144.
    The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS (...)
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