Search results for 'minimal self' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin (2010). Reconstructing the Minimal Self, or How to Make Sense of Agency and Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.score: 240.0
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a (...)
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  2. Felix Blankenburg Jakub Limanowski (2013). Minimal Self-Models and the Free Energy Principle. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 228.0
    The term "minimal phenomenal selfhood" describes the basic, pre-reflective experience of being a self (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). Theoretical accounts of the minimal self have long recognized the importance and the ambivalence of the body as both part of the physical world, and the enabling condition for being in this world (Gallagher, 2005; Grafton, 2009). A recent account of minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS, Metzinger, 2004a) centers on the consideration that minimal selfhood emerges as the (...)
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  3. Paweł Weroński, Yi Jiang & Steen Rasmussen (2008). Application of Molecular Dynamics Computer Simulations in the Design of a Minimal Self-Replicating Molecular Machine. Complexity 13 (4):10-17.score: 162.0
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  4. Robert Ehrlich (1984). The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times. Telos 1984 (62):223-230.score: 156.0
    Few works of social criticism about contemporary America have elicited so much response as The Culture of Narcissism. There Christopher Lasch argued that the traditional American emphasis on individualism has degenerated into a narcissistic preoccupation with the self. He explained this transformation by pointing to the psychological consequences resulting from changes in the nature of production, consumption, and socialization. Of particular importance was the shift from handicraft to factory modes of production and the subsequent takeover of workers' knowledge by (...)
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  5. D. Zahavi (2010). Minimal Self and Narrative Self. A Distinction in Need of Refinement. In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen (eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders. Heningnsen. 3--11.score: 156.0
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  6. M. CerMolacce, J. Naudin & J. Parnas (2007). The “Minimal Self” in Psychopathology: Re-Examining the Self-Disorders in the Schizophrenia Spectrum☆. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):703-714.score: 150.0
  7. Michael Locke McLendon (2014). Rousseau and the Minimal Self: A Solution to the Problem of Amour-Propre. European Journal of Political Theory 13 (3):341-361.score: 150.0
    Over the past few decades, scholars have reassessed the role of amour-propre in Rousseau’s thought. While it was once believed that he had an entirely negative valuation of the emotion, it is now widely held that he finds it useful and employs it to strengthen moral attachments, conjugal love, civic virtue and moral heroism. At the same time, scholars are divided as to whether this positive amour-propre is an antidote to the negative or dangerous form. Some scholars are confident that (...)
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  8. Thor Grünbaum (2012). First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. 47--273.score: 150.0
  9. A. MishAra (2007). Is Minimal Self Preserved in Schizophrenia? A Subcomponents View☆. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):715-721.score: 150.0
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  10. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2004). Anti-Individualism and Minimal Self-Knowledge: A Dissolution of Ebbs's Puzzle. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 2--427.score: 150.0
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  11. Julian Kiverstein (2008). Consciousness, the Minimal Self, and Brain. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):335-360.score: 150.0
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  12. Adrian J. T. Smith (2010). Comment: Minimal Conditions for the Simplest Form of Self-Consciousness. In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Henningsen (eds.), The embodied self: Dimensions, coherence, disorders. Schattauer.score: 144.0
    Commentary on: Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger, Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 7-13, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003.
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  13. Michael Wheeler, The Devils in the Details: A Response to Kiverstein's 'Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain'.score: 144.0
    While remaining in broad agreement with the overall position developed and defended by Kiverstein, I identify and discuss what I take to be a number of problems with the details of the argument. These concern (a) the claim that a certain temporal structure to conscious experience is necessary for there to be a minimal sense of self, (b) the alleged ubiquitous presence in experience of a minimal sense of self, and (c) the claim that the distinction (...)
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  14. Walter Riofrio (2008). Self-Organizing Dynamics of a Minimal Protocell. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:185-191.score: 126.0
    In this paper, we present an argument showing why the general properties of a self-organizing system (e.g. being far from equilibrium) may be too weak to characterize biological and proto-biological systems. The special character of biological systems, tell us that its distinctive capacities could have been developed in pre-biotic times. In other words, the basic properties of life would be better comprehended if we think that they were much more likely early in time. We developed a conceptual proposal on (...)
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  15. Nini Praetorius (2009). The Phenomenological Underpinning of the Notion of a Minimal Core Self: A Psychological Perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):325-338.score: 120.0
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  16. Andrew W. Schwartz (2004). Minimal Rationality and Self-Transformation. Social Theory and Practice 30 (2):215-228.score: 120.0
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  17. Anna Strasser (2012). How Minimal Can Self-Consciousness Be? Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):39-62.score: 120.0
  18. Monima Chadha (2013). The Self in Early Nyāya: A Minimal Conclusion. Asian Philosophy 23 (1):24-42.score: 120.0
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  19. Maureen Sie (2014). Self-Knowledge and the Minimal Conditions of Responsibility: A Traffic-Participation View on Human (Moral) Agency. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):271-291.score: 120.0
    “I demote practical reason from the conductor’s podium on which it is traditionally pictured, leading the performance. I picture practical reason less as an orchestral conductor than as a theatrical prompter — out of sight, following the action in case it needs to be nudged back into an intelligible course.” (David Velleman 2009, p. 4)IntroductionIn this paper I discuss our practice of exchanging explanatory and justifying reasons with one another, that is, reasons with which we explain or justify our actions, (...)
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  20. Thomas K. Metzinger (2013). Why Are Dreams Interesting for Philosophers? The Example of Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood, Plus an Agenda for Future Research1. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 102.0
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood”, which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly (...)
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  21. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Open Neuroimaging Journal 6:55-68.score: 96.0
    The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN’s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To (...)
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  22. Armando D'Agostino, Anna Castelnovo & Silvio Scarone (2013). Dreaming and the Neurobiology of Self: Recent Advances and Implications for Psychiatry. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 96.0
    Dreaming and the neurobiology of self: recent advances and implications for psychiatry.
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  23. Jann E. Schlimme (2013). Sense of Self-Determination and the Suicidal Experience. A Phenomenological Approach. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):211-223.score: 92.0
    In this paper phenomenological descriptions of the experiential structures of suicidality and of self-determined behaviour are given; an understanding of the possible scopes and forms of lived self-determination in suicidal mental life is offered. Two possible limits of lived self-determination are described: suicide is always experienced as minimally self-determined, because it is the last active and effective behaviour, even in blackest despair; suicide can never be experienced as fully self-determined, even if valued as the authentic (...)
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  24. Yair Dor-Ziderman, Aviva Berkovich-Ohana, Joseph Glicksohn & Abraham Goldstein (2013). Mindfulness-Induced Selflessness: A MEG Neurophenomenological Study. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7 (582).score: 90.0
    Contemporary philosophical and neurocognitive studies of the self have dissociated two distinct types of self-awareness: a ’narrative’ self-awareness (NS) weaving together episodic memory, future planning and self-evaluation into a coherent self-narrative and identity, and a ’minimalself-awareness (MS) focused on present momentary experience and closely tied to the sense of agency and ownership. Long-term Buddhist meditation practice aims at realization of a ’selfless’ mode of awareness (SL), where identification with a static sense of (...)
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  25. Timothy Lane (2012). Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.score: 84.0
    Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited (...)
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  26. Shaun Gallagher (2000). Philosophical Conceptions of the Self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.score: 72.0
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and (...)
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  27. Chris Dobbyn & Susan A. J. Stuart (2003). The Self as an Embedded Agent. Minds and Machines 13 (2):187-201.score: 72.0
    In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, and offer (...)
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  28. John Schwenkler (2014). Vision, Self‐Location, and the Phenomenology of the 'Point of View'. Noûs 48 (1):137-155.score: 66.0
    According to the Self-Location Thesis, one’s own location can be among the things that visual experience represents, even when one’s body is entirely out of view. By contrast, the Minimal View denies this, and says that visual experience represents things only as "to the right", etc., and never as "to the right of me". But the Minimal View is phenomenologically inadequate: it cannot explain the difference between a visual experience of self-motion and one of an oppositely (...)
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  29. Alain Morin (2006). Levels of Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Comparison and Integration of Various Neurocognitive Views. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.score: 66.0
    Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of (...)
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  30. Shaun Gallagher (2013). A Pattern Theory of Self. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7 (443):1-7.score: 66.0
    I argue for a pattern theory of self as a usefulway to organize an interdisciplinary approach to discussions of what constitutes a self. According to the pattern theory, a self is constituted by a number of characteristic features or aspects that may include minimal embodied, minimal experiential, affective, intersubjective, psychological/cognitive, narrative, extended, and situated aspects. A pattern theory of self helps to clarify various interpretations of self as compatible or commensurable instead of thinking (...)
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  31. Karsten R. Stueber (2002). The Problem of Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):269-96.score: 66.0
    This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledgethat is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that ifone conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive ofbelief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent hasknowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however,preclude the conceptual possibility of being (...)
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  32. Andy Lamey (2012). Primitive Self-Consciousness and Avian Cognition. The Monist 95 (3):486-510.score: 66.0
    Recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of theories of moral standing, which increasingly recognize a position of intermediate standing between fully self-conscious entities and those which are merely conscious. Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to more precisely elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. New research into the structure of the avian brain offers a revised view of the cognitive (...)
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  33. Susan A. J. Stuart (2002). A Radical Notion of Embeddedness: A Logically Necessary Precondition for Agency and Self-Awareness. Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):98-109.score: 66.0
    The aim of this paper is to establish the logically necessary preconditions for the existence of self-awareness in an artificial or a natural agent. We examine the terms, agent, situated, embodied, embedded, and representation, as employed ubiquitously in cognitive science, attempting to clarify their meaning and the limits of their use. We discuss the minimal conditions for an agent’s environment constituting a ‘world’ and reject most, though not all, types of virtual world. We argue that to qualify as (...)
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  34. James R. Blair Harma Meffert, Laura Blanken, Karina S. Blair, Stuart F. White (2013). The Influence of Valence and Decision Difficulty on Self-Referential Processing. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 66.0
    Self-referential processing is defined as the process by which a person becomes aware that specific contents are related to his or her own self. Cortical midline structures, such as dorsal and medial prefrontal cortex, and regions such as inferior frontal cortex, insula and temporal pole have been implicated in self-referential processing. However, the specific contribution of each of these areas is still largely unknown. More particularly, not many studies have examined the influence of valence and decision making (...)
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  35. Benoit Montalan, Thierry Lelard, Olivier Godefroy & Harold Mouras (2012). Behavioral Investigation of the Influence of Social Categorization on Empathy for Pain: A Minimal Group Paradigm Study. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 66.0
    Research on empathy for pain has provided evidence of an empathic bias toward racial ingroup members. In this study, we used for the first time the “minimal group paradigm” in which participants were assigned to artificial groups and required to perform pain judgments of pictures of hands and feet in painful or non-painful situations from self, ingroup and outgroup-perspectives. Findings showed that the mere categorization of people into two distinct arbitrary social groups appears to be sufficient to elicit (...)
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  36. Jakob Hohwy, The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception.score: 60.0
    The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, (...)
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  37. Patrick Stokes (2011). Naked Subjectivity: Minimal Vs. Narrative Selves in Kierkegaard. Inquiry 53 (4):356-382.score: 60.0
    In recent years a significant debate has arisen as to whether Kierkegaard offers a version of the “narrative approach” to issues of personal identity and self-constitution. In this paper I do not directly take sides in this debate, but consider instead the applicability of a recent development in the broader literature on narrative identity—the distinction between the temporally-extended “narrative self” and the non-extended “minimal self—to Kierkegaard's work. I argue that such a distinction is both necessary for (...)
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  38. Dan Zahavi (2009). Is the Self a Social Construct? Inquiry 52 (6):551-573.score: 54.0
    There is a long tradition in philosophy for claiming that selfhood is socially constructed and self-experience intersubjectively mediated. On many accounts, we consequently have to distinguish between being conscious or sentient and being a self. The requirements that must be met in order to qualify for the latter are higher. My aim in the following is to challenge this form of social constructivism by arguing that an account of self which disregards the fundamental structures and features of (...)
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  39. Jakob Hohwy (2014). The Self‐Evidencing Brain. Noûs 48 (1).score: 54.0
    An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between (...)
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  40. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 54.0
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment (...)
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  41. Alain Morin, Self-Awareness Part 1: Definition, Measures, Effects, Functions, and Antecedents.score: 54.0
    Self-awareness represents the capacity of becoming the object of one’s own attention. In this state one actively identifies, processes, and stores information about the self. This paper surveys the self-awareness literature by emphasizing definition issues, measurement techniques, effects and functions of self-attention, and antecedents of self-awareness. Key self-related concepts (e.g., minimal, reflective consciousness) are distinguished from the central notion of self-awareness. Reviewed measures include questionnaires, implicit tasks, and self-recognition. Main effects and (...)
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  42. Lea Ypi (2011). Self-Ownership and the State: A Democratic Critique. Ratio 24 (1):91-106.score: 54.0
    Libertarians often invoke the principle of self-ownership to discredit distributive interventions authorized by the more-than-minimal state. But if one takes a democratic approach to the justification of ownership claims, including claims of ownership over oneself, the validity of the self-ownership principle is theoretically inseparable from the normative justification of the state. Since the idea of the state is essential to the very assertion (not just the positive enforcement) of the principle of self-ownership, invoking the principle to (...)
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  43. Shaun Gallagher (2008). Are Minimal Representations Still Representations? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369.score: 54.0
    I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non-representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self-organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub-personal level is superior. I further recommend (...)
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  44. Alain Morin (2004). Levels of Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Comparison and Integration of Various Views. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.score: 54.0
    Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situ- ation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redun- dantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add (...)
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  45. Henry Jackman (2003). Charity, Self-Interpretation, and Belief. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-168.score: 54.0
    The purpose of this paper is to motivate and defend a recognizable version of N. L. Wilson's "Principle of Charity" Doing so will involve: (1) distinguishing it fromthe significantly different versions of the Principle familiar through the work of Quine and Davidson; (2) showing that it is compatible with, among other things, both semantic externalism and "simulation" accounts of interpretation; and (3) explaining how it follows from plausible constraints relating to the connection between interpretation and self-interpretation. Finally, it will (...)
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  46. Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris (2012). The Bodily Social Self: A Link Between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):125-144.score: 54.0
    The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS (...)
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  47. Hans-Martin Sass (1992). Criteria for Death: Self-Determination and Public Policy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (4):445-454.score: 54.0
    in Western cultures in regard to post-mortem organ donation and the termination of care for patients meeting these strict criteria. But they are of minimal use in Asian cultures and in the ethics of caring for the persistent vegetative patient. This paper introduces a formula for a global Uniform Determination of Death statute, based on the ‘entire brain including brain stem’ criteria as a default position, but allowing competent adults by means of advance directives to choose other criteria for (...)
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  48. Chakravathi Ram-Prasad (2011). The Phenomenal Separateness of Self: Udayana on Body and Agency. Asian Philosophy 21 (3):323 - 340.score: 54.0
    Classical Indian debates about ?tman?self?concern a minimal or core entity rather than richer notions of personal identity. These debates recognise that there is phenomenal unity across time; but is a core self required to explain it? Contemporary phenomenologists foreground the importance of a phenomenally unitary self, and Udayana's position is interpreted in this context as a classical Indian approach to this issue. Udayana seems to dismiss the body as the candidate for phenomenal identity in a way (...)
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  49. C. Petitmengin (2011). Is the “Core Self” a Construct? Review of “Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective” by Dan Zahavi. Constructivist Foundations 6 (2):270-274.score: 54.0
    Upshot: Is lived experience always the experience of a self? The central thesis of Dan Zahavi’s book is that there is a “minimal” or “core” self, according to which a quality of “self-givenness” is a constitutive feature of experience. The adoption of a dynamic phenomenological perspective leads us to call this thesis into question.
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  50. Kathinka Evers (2001). The Importance of Being a Self. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (1):65-83.score: 54.0
    A traditional belief is that there is but one self to a body, and that each of us has a single biography and personality. Varieties of this monistic view have dominated most of mankind’s intellectual history in philosophy, science, religion, and psychology, as well as legal and social theory. It has been challenged by appeal to those people whom psychiatry labels “multiple,” or “dissociated” personalities who, some claim, are “multiple selves.” This may be adequate if the self is (...)
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