Search results for 'minimalism about truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  43
    Richard Holton (1993). Minimalism About Truth. In B. Garrett & K. Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 4
    My main task here is first to distinguish, and then to map out possibilities. I won’t be concerned to argue for a certain position as much as to argue that various combinations of positions are consistent. In particular, I want to argue that a commitment to minimalism about truth does not bring an automatic commitment to what has been called a minimalist theory of truth-aptitude: the claim that every assertoric sentence which is used in a systematic (...)
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  2.  16
    Massimiliano Vignolo (2010). Does Deflationism Lead Necessarily to Minimalism About Truth-Aptness? Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):81-98.
    I argue that deflationism about truth does not imply minimalism about truthaptness. The condition for truth-aptness can be strengthened and the disquotationalschema restricted without resorting to any inflationary conception of truth-theoretic notions.
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  3. Marian David (2002). Minimalism and the Facts About Truth. In R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?
    Minimalism, Paul Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich’s highly stimulating book Truth1. I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only (...)
     
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  4.  88
    John Divers & Alexander Miller (1994). Why Expressivists About Value Should Not Love Minimalism About Truth. Analysis 54 (1):12 - 19.
  5.  54
    Michael Smith (1994). Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimalism About Truth. Analysis 54 (1):1 - 11.
  6.  76
    J. A. Burgess (1997). What is Minimalism About Truth? Analysis 57 (4):259–267.
  7.  18
    Kirk Ludwig (2004). Davidson's Objection to Horwich's Minimalism About Truth. Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):429 - 437.
  8.  1
    A. Sierszulska (2006). Realistic Minimalism About Truth. Filozofia Nauki 14 (2 (54)):75-84.
  9.  43
    A. R. J. Fisher (2014). Examination of Merricks' Primitivism About Truth. Metaphysica 15 (2):281-98.
    Trenton Merricks argues for and defends a novel version of primitivism about truth : being true is a primitive monadic but non-intrinsic property. This examination consists of the following triad: a critical discussion of Merricks’ argument for his view, a rejection of his objection against Paul Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, and a direct objection against his view on the grounds that it entails being true is a mysterious and suspicious property. The conclusion is that Merricks’ primitivism (...)
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  10. Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
    Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a transparent concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the redundancy theory of truth. I also outline three of the primary challenges facing minimalism, its formulation, explanatory adequacy and stability, and draw some lessons for the soundness of its (...)
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  11. Glen Hoffmann (2007). A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist About Truth. Sorites 18:129-137.
    The weak deflationist about truth is committed to two theses: one conceptual, the other ontological. On the conceptual thesis (what might be called a ‘triviality thesis’), the content of the truth predicate is exhausted by its involvement in some version of the ‘truth-schema’. On the ontological thesis, truth is a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I focus on weak deflationism’s ontological thesis, arguing that it generates an instability in its view of (...)
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  12.  83
    Richard Holton (2000). Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):135-165.
    The question is asked whether one can consistently both be a minimalist about truth, and hold that some meaningful assertoric sentences fail to be either true or false. It is shown that one can, but the issues are delicate, and the price is high: one must either refrain from saying that the sentences lack truth values, or else one must invoke a novel non-contraposing three-valued conditional. Finally it is shown that this does not help in reconciling (...) with emotivism, where this latter is understood as involving the view that ethical sentences are neither true nor false. (shrink)
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  13. James Dreier (1996). Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth. Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
    This paper is about Truth Minimalism, Norm Expressivism, and the relation between them. In particular, it is about whether Truth Minimalism can help to solve a problem thought to plague Norm Expressivism. To start with, let me explain what I mean by 'Truth Minimalism' and 'Norm Expressivism.'.
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  14.  32
    By Michael P. Lynch (2004). Minimalism and the Value of Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497–517.
    Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and (...)
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  15.  6
    Michael P. Lynch (2004). Minimalism and the Value of Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497 - 517.
    Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and (...)
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  16.  12
    Douglas O. Edwards, Truth and Goodness : A Minimalist Study.
    Philosophers are often thought to be in the business of analysing concepts, in particular, concepts taken to be fundamental in human thought and practice: truth, goodness, beauty, knowledge, meaning, rightness, causation, to name just a few. But what can we expect from such analyses? Can we expect a comprehensive account of one concept in terms of one or more others? Can we expect to reduce these kinds of concepts to concepts which are taken to be more fundamental? This study (...)
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  17. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
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  18. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Against Naturalism About Truth. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism.
    The chapter distinguishes between a weak and a strong form of ontological naturalism. Strong ontological naturalism is the view that all truths can be deduced, at least in principle, from truths about physical entities at the lowest level of organization, for example, truths about the elementary particles and forces. Weak ontological naturalism is the view that only physical properties can be causally efficacious. Strong ontological naturalism entails weak ontological naturalism but not vice versa. (...)
     
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  19. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Against Naturalism About Truth. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism.
    The chapter distinguishes between a weak and a strong form of ontological naturalism. Strong ontological naturalism is the view that all truths can be deduced, at least in principle, from truths about physical entities at the lowest level of organization, for example, truths about the elementary particles and forces. Weak ontological naturalism is the view that only physical properties can be causally efficacious. Strong ontological naturalism entails weak ontological naturalism but not vice versa. (...)
     
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  20. Isidora Stojanovic (2007). Talking About Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):691-706.
    In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn , according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much more than notational variants of one another. In other words, given any (...)
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  21.  45
    Juan José Lara Peñaranda (2013). Ontology: Minimalism and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):683-696.
    In this paper, I develop a criticism to a method for metaontology, namely, the idea that a discourse’s or theory’s ontological commitments can be read off its sentences’ truth- conditions. Firstly, I will put forward this idea’s basis and, secondly, I will present the way Quine subscribed to it. However, I distinguish between two readings of Quine’s famous ontological criterion, and I center the focus on the one currently dubbed “ontological minimalism”, a kind of modern Ockhamism applied to (...)
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  22.  35
    Tim Button (2014). The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists From Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):261-289.
    Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When (...)
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  23.  40
    Bradley Armour-Garb (2013). A Minimalist Theory of Truth. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):53-57.
    This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what “true” does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation for opting for such a (...)
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  24.  33
    Dirk Greimann (2000). Explicating Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):133-155.
    This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that Horwich's anti-primitivist version of minimalism must be rejected because, already for formal reasons, the truth-schema does not achieve a positive explication of any property of propositions. The second goal is to develop a more moderate primitivist version of minimalism according to which the truth-schema is admittedly powerless to underpin truth with something more basic but it still succeeds in giving a complete account of the (...)
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  25.  86
    Michael Smith, Frank Jackson & Graham Oppy (1994). Minimalism and Truth Aptness. Mind 103 (411):287 - 302.
  26. Stephen Barker, Expressivism About Truth-Making.
    My goal is to illuminate truth-making by way of illuminating the relation of making. My strategy is not to ask what making is, in the hope of a metaphysical theory about is nature. It's rather to look first to the language of making. The metaphor behind making refers to agency. It would be absurd to suggest that claims about making are claims about agency. It is not absurd, however, to propose that the concept of making somehow (...)
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  27.  76
    Cory D. Wright (2012). Is Pluralism About Truth Inherently Unstable? Philosophical Studies 159 (1):89-105.
    Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable---or, worse, just a non-starter---it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.
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  28.  39
    Michael Horton & Ted Poston (2012). Functionalism About Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Acta Analytica 27 (1):13-27.
    Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order, domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to (...)
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  29.  25
    Claes Strannegård, Fredrik Engström, Abdul Rahim Nizamani & Lance Rips (2013). Reasoning About Truth in First-Order Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (1):115-137.
    First, we describe a psychological experiment in which the participants were asked to determine whether sentences of first-order logic were true or false in finite graphs. Second, we define two proof systems for reasoning about truth and falsity in first-order logic. These proof systems feature explicit models of cognitive resources such as declarative memory, procedural memory, working memory, and sensory memory. Third, we describe a computer program that is used to find the smallest proofs in the aforementioned proof (...)
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  30.  5
    Alexus McLeod (2011). Pluralism About Truth in Early Chinese Philosophy: A Reflection on Wang Chong's Approach. Comparative Philosophy 2 (1):38.
    The debate concerning truth in Classical Chinese philosophy has for the most part avoided the possibility that pluralist theories of truth were part of the classical philosophical framework. I argue that the Eastern Han philosopher Wang Chong (c. 25-100 CE) can be profitably read as endorsing a kind of pluralism about truth grounded in the concept of shi 實 , or “actuality”. In my exploration of this view, I explain how it offers a different account of (...)
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  31.  91
    Jamin Asay (2015). Epistemicism and the Liar. Synthese 192 (3):679-699.
    One well known approach to the soritical paradoxes is epistemicism, the view that propositions involving vague notions have definite truth values, though it is impossible in principle to know what they are. Recently, Paul Horwich has extended this approach to the liar paradox, arguing that the liar proposition has a truth value, though it is impossible to know which one it is. The main virtue of the epistemicist approach is that it need not reject classical logic, and in (...)
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  32. Mark Schroeder (2010). How to Be an Expressivist About Truth. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan 282--298.
    In this paper I explore why one might hope to, and how to begin to, develop an expressivist account of truth – that is, a semantics for ‘true’ and ‘false’ within an expressivist framework. I do so for a few reasons: because certain features of deflationism seem to me to require some sort of nondescriptivist semantics, because of all nondescriptivist semantic frameworks which are capable of yielding definite predictions rather than consisting merely of hand-waving, expressivism is that with which (...)
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  33. Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
    I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. (...)
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  34.  21
    Wolfram Hinzen (2006). Internalism About Truth. Mind and Society 5 (2):139-166.
    Internalism is an explanatory strategy that makes the internal structure and constitution of the organism a basis for the investigation of its external function and the ways in which it is embedded in an environment. It is opposed to an externalist explanatory strategy, which takes its departure from observations about external function and mind-environment interactions, and infers and rationalizes internal organismic structure from that. This paper addresses the origins of truth, a basic ingredient in the human conceptual scheme. (...)
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  35.  19
    Max Kölbel (2002). Truth Without Objectivity. Routledge.
    The mainstream view in the philosophy of language holds that every meaningful sentence has a truth-condition. This view, however, runs into difficulties with non-objective sentences such as sentences on matters of taste or value: these do not appear to be either true or false, but are generally taken to be meaningful. How can this conflict be resolved? -/- Truth Without Objectivity examines various ways of resolving this fundamental problem, before developing and defending its own original solution, a relativist (...)
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  36. Matti Eklund (2010). Rejectionism About Truth. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan
    I think it often happens, for various reasons, that philosophers defend radical views which, first, are too radical to be plausible, and second, are such that a less radical and more plausible view would satisfy the underlying motivations. Here is a historical example. The logical positivists famously sought to eliminate traditional metaphysics by arguing that the statements metaphysicians make are meaningless because of being unverifiable. Much of the ensuing discussion concerned whether verifiability is really necessary for meaningfulness. But clearly, even (...)
     
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  37. Panu Raatikainen (2005). On Horwich's Way Out. Analysis 65 (287):175-177.
    The minimalist view of truth endorsed by Paul Horwich denies that truth has any underlying nature. According to minimalism, the truth predicate ‘exists solely for the sake of a certain logical need’; ‘the function of the truth predicate is to enable the explicit formulation of schematic generalizations’. Horwich proposes that all there really is to truth follows from the equivalence schema: The proposition that p is true iff p, or, using Horwich’s notation, ·pÒ is (...)
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  38. Christine Tappolet (1997). Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Analysis 57 (3):209–210.
    In reply to Geach's objection against expressivism, some have claimed that there is a plurality of truth predicates. I raise a difficulty for this claim: valid inferences can involve sentences assessable by any truth predicate, corresponding to 'lightweight' truth as well as to 'heavyweight' truth. To account for this, some unique truth predicate must apply to all sentences that can appear in inferences. Mixed inferences remind us of a central platitude about truth: (...) is what is preserved in valid inferences. The question is why we should postulate truth predicates that do not satisfy this platitude. (shrink)
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  39.  36
    Maarten Boudry & Michael Vlerick (2014). Natural Selection Does Care About Truth. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):65-77.
    True beliefs are better guides to the world than false ones. This is the commonsense assumption that undergirds theorizing in evolutionary epistemology. According to Alvin Plantinga, however, evolution by natural selection does not care about truth, it only cares about fitness. If our cognitive faculties are the products of blind evolution, we have no reason to trust them, anytime or anywhere. Evolutionary naturalism, consequently, is a self-defeating position. Following up on earlier objections, we uncover three additional flaws (...)
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  40.  30
    Paul Horwich (2014). An Undermining Diagnosis of Relativism About Truth. Mind 123 (491):733-752.
    The view that the basic statements in some areas of language are never true or false absolutely, but only relative to an assessment-perspective, has been advanced by several philosophers in the last few years. This paper offers a critique of that position, understood first as a claim about our everyday concept of truth, and second as a claim about the key theoretical concept of an adequate empirical semantics. Central to this pair of critical discussions will be an (...)
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  41.  97
    Huw Price (1997). What Should a Deflationist About Truth Say About Meaning? Philosophical Issues 8:107-115.
    Paul Horwich aims to apply some the lessons of deflationism about truth to the debate about the nature of a theory of meaning. Having pacified the philosophical debate about truth to his satisfaction, he wants to use a bridge between truth and meaning to extend the same peace−making techniques into new territory. His goal is to make the debate about meaning more hospitable for an account based on use, by showing that certain apparent (...)
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  42.  32
    Stefan Wintein (2011). A Framework for Riddles About Truth That Do Not Involve Self-Reference. Studia Logica 98 (3):445-482.
    In this paper, we present a framework in which we analyze three riddles about truth that are all (originally) due to Smullyan. We start with the riddle of the yes-no brothers and then the somewhat more complicated riddle of the da-ja brothers is studied. Finally, we study the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE). We present the respective riddles as sets of sentences of quotational languages , which are interpreted by sentence-structures. Using a revision-process the consistency of these sets (...)
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  43. Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (2011). A Modern Version of Relativism About Truth. Filozofia Nauki 4.
    In the paper I describe John MacFarlane’s version of relativism about truth. I begin by discussing Twardowski’s (1900) and Kokoszynska’s (1948; 1951) arguments against relativism. They think — just as Haack does (see 2011) — that sentences may be relatively true, if they are incomplete, but once they are completed they become true (or false) absolutely. MacFarlane distinguishes between nonindexical contextualism (which was anticipated by Kokoszynska (sic!)) and relativism which requires the introduction of the context of assessment. According (...)
     
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  44.  4
    Paul Horwich (1998). Truth. Clarendon Press.
    Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a prominent philosophical theory about truth, `minimalism'. His theory has attracted much attention since the first edition of Truth in 1990; he has now developed, refined, and updated his treatment of the subject, while preserving the distinctive format of the book. This revised edition appears simultaneously with a new companion volume, Meaning; the two books demystify central philosophical issues, and will be essential reading for all who work on the (...)
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  45.  48
    William D'Alessandro (forthcoming). Explicitism About Truth in Fiction. British Journal of Aesthetics.
    The problem of truth in fiction concerns how to tell whether a given proposition is true in a given fiction. Thus far, the nearly universal consensus has been that some propositions are ‘implicitly true’ in some fictions: such propositions aren’t expressed by any explicit statements in the relevant work (or works), but are nevertheless held to be true in those works on the basis of some other set of criteria. I call this family of views ‘implicitism’. I argue that (...)
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  46.  12
    Jeremy Wyatt (forthcoming). The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv085.
    It's often said that according to deflationary theories of truth, truth is not a ‘substantial’ property. While this is a fine slogan, it is far from transparent what deflationists mean (or ought to mean) in saying that truth is ‘insubstantial’. Focusing so intently upon the concept of truth and the word ‘true’, I argue, deflationists and their critics have been insufficiently attentive to a host of metaphysical complexities that arise for deflationists in connection with the property (...)
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  47. Berit Brogaard (2008). The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press
    Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will look at three possible ways to (...)
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  48. Jamin Asay (2013). Tarski and Primitivism About Truth. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (17):1-18.
    Tarski’s pioneering work on truth has been thought by some to motivate a robust, correspondence-style theory of truth, and by others to motivate a deflationary attitude toward truth. I argue that Tarski’s work suggests neither; if it motivates any contemporary theory of truth, it motivates conceptual primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental, indefinable concept. After outlining conceptual primitivism and Tarski’s theory of truth, I show how the two approaches to truth share (...)
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  49.  89
    Arvid Båve (2006). Deflationism: A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate. Dissertation, Stockholm University
    I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be (...)
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  50. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2010). The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction. In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications 603--615.
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda as (...)
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