Search results for 'modal fallacy' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Frank A. Lewis (2009). Parmenides' Modal Fallacy. Phronesis 54 (1):1-8.score: 216.0
    In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not , joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not . Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades - is becomes cannot not be , and is not becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories of one another. And (...)
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  2. J. Westphal (2012). Is There a Modal Fallacy in van Inwagen's 'First Formal Argument'? Analysis 72 (1):36-41.score: 162.0
    The argument given by Peter van Inwagen for the second premise on his "First Formal Argument" in An Essay on Free Will is invalid. The second premise hinges on the principle that since a proposition p , some statement about the present, is actually true, ~p can't be true. ~p must be false. What is the reason? The principle is that ~p cannot be true at the same time as p . I argue that, among other things, in its attachment (...)
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  3. Norman Swartz, 'The' Modal Fallacy.score: 150.0
    Note: the technical vocabulary used in this article is explained in a glossary that I prepared for my introductory logic course in 1997.
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  4. John Bacon (1965). Entailment and the Modal Fallacy. Review of Metaphysics 18 (3):566 - 571.score: 150.0
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  5. Edward E. Dawson (1973). Review: R. W. Ashby, Entailment and Modality; John O. Nelson, A Question of Entailment; John Bacon, Entailment and the Modal Fallacy. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (4):668-670.score: 150.0
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  6. Lars Bo Gundersen (2000). Goodman's Gruesome Modal Fallacy. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 76:447-462.score: 150.0
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  7. Dale Jacquette (2006). Tarski's Analysis of Logical Consequence and Etchemendy's Criticism of Tarski's Modal Fallacy. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 89:345.score: 150.0
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  8. Manuel Ppérez Otero (2001). A Fallacy About the Modal Status of Logic. Dialectica 55 (1):9–27.score: 120.0
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  9. Eduardo Alejandro Barrio (2007). Consecuencia lógica: modelos conjuntistas y aspectos modales. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 31 (2):203-220.score: 100.0
    According to Etchemendy, in attempting to offer an analysis of the modal features of the intuitive concept of logical consequence, Tarski has committed a modal fallacy. In this paper, I consider the thesis according to it is posible to analyze the modals properties of concept of logical consequence through of a generalization on set-theoretical interpretations. As is known, some philosophers have tried to argue for the transit from the general to the modal by showing that there (...)
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  10. Norman M. Swartz, Foreknowledge and Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 90.0
    Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will (...)
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  11. David Botting (2012). Fallacies of Accident. Argumentation 26 (2):267-289.score: 86.0
    In this paper I will attempt a unified analysis of the various examples of the fallacy of accident given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations. In many cases the examples underdetermine the fallacy and it is not trivial to identify the fallacy committed. To make this identification we have to find some error common to all the examples and to show that this error would still be committed even if those other fallacies that the examples exemplify were (...)
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  12. T. Parent, The Modal Ontological Argument Meets Modal Fictionalism.score: 66.0
    This paper attacks the modal ontological argument, as advocated by Plantinga among others. Whereas other criticisms in the literature reject one of its premises, the present line is that the argument is invalid. This becomes apparent once we run the argument assuming fictionalism about possible worlds. Broadly speaking, the problem is that if one defines “x” as something that exists, it does not follow that there is anything satisfying the definition. Yet unlike non-modal ontological arguments, the modal (...)
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  13. Theodore Sider (1999). Michael Jubien, Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference. [REVIEW] Noûs 33 (2):284–294.score: 60.0
    Michael Jubien’s Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference is an interesting and lively discussion of those three topics. In ontology, Jubien defends, to a first approximation, a Quinean conception: a world of objects that may be arbitrarily sliced or summed. Slicing yields temporal parts; summing yields aggregates, or fusions. Jubien is very unQuinean in his explicit Platonism regarding properties and propositions, but concerns about abstracta are peripheral to much of the argumentation in the book.1 His version of the (...)
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  14. Nicole A. Vincent (2009). Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments. Neuroethics 4 (1):35-49.score: 60.0
    Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people’s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection—an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s responsibility.
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  15. William Hasker (1998). Swinburne's Modal Argument for Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):366-370.score: 60.0
    Most critics of Richard Swinburne’s modal argument for mind-body substance dualism have alleged that the argument is unsound, either because its premises are false or because it commits a modal fallacy. I show that the argument is epistemically circular, and thus provides no support for its conclusion even if it is sound.
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  16. Michael Jubien (1993). Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference. Cambridge University Press.score: 44.0
    This is a book about the concept of a physical thing and about how the names of things relate to the things they name. It questions the prevalent view that names 'refer to' or 'denote' the things they name. Instead it presents a new theory of proper names, according to which names express certain special properties that the things they name exhibit. This theory leads to some important conclusions about whether things have any of their properties as a matter of (...)
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  17. John P. Burgess (2003). Which Modal Models Are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)? Theoria 18 (2):145-158.score: 42.0
    Recently it has become almost the received wisdom in certain quarters that Kripke models are appropriate only for something like metaphysical modalities, and not for logical modalities. Here the line of thought leading to Kripke models, and reasons why they are no less appropriate for logical than for other modalities, are explained. It is also indicated where the fallacy in the argument leading to the contrary conclusion lies. The lessons learned are then applied to the question of the status (...)
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  18. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1998). On a Fallacy Attributed to Tarski. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (4):227-234.score: 42.0
    The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski?s paper ?On the concept of logical consequence? and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further claims that the argument he attributes to Tarski is fallacious. (...)
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  19. Alicia Finch (2013). On Behalf of the Consequence Argument: Time, Modality, and the Nature of Free Action. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):151-170.score: 40.0
    The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. (...)
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  20. Jonathan E. Adler (2000). Three Fallacies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):665-666.score: 40.0
    Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.
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  21. Fernando Migura (1995). Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference. Theoria 10 (2):231-234.score: 40.0
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  22. Scott A. Shalkowski (1995). Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference. Philosophical Review 104 (4):630-632.score: 40.0
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  23. R. Routley & V. Routley (1969). A Fallacy of Modality. Noûs 3 (2):129-153.score: 40.0
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  24. Chen Bo (2012). A Descriptivist Refutation of Kripke's Modal Argument and of Soames's Defence. Theoria 78 (3):225-260.score: 38.0
    This article systematically challenges Kripke's modal argument and Soames's defence of this argument by arguing that, just like descriptions, names can take narrow or wide scopes over modalities, and that there is a big difference between the wide scope reading and the narrow scope reading of a modal sentence with a name. Its final conclusions are that all of Kripke's and Soames's arguments are untenable due to some fallacies or mistakes; names are not “rigid designators”; if there were (...)
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  25. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2005). Antirealism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy. Noûs 39 (1):123–139.score: 36.0
    In his presidential address to the APA, ‘‘How to be an Anti-realist’’ (1982, 64–66), Alvin Plantinga argues that the only sensible way to be an antirealist is to be a theist.1 Anti-realism (AR) in this context is the epistemic analysis of truth that says, (AR) necessarily, a statement is true if and only if it would be believed by an ideally [or sufficiently] rational agent/community in ideal [or sufficiently good] epistemic circumstances. Plantinga demonstrates, with modest modal resources, that AR (...)
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  26. Remmel T. Nunn (1979). I. Psychologism, Functionalism, and the Modal Status of Logical Laws. Inquiry 22 (1-4):343-349.score: 36.0
    In a recent article (Inquiry, Vol. 19 [1976]), J. W. Meiland addresses the issue of psychologism in logic, which holds that logic is a branch of psychology and that logical laws (such as the Principle of Non?Contradiction) are contingent upon the nature of the mind. Meiland examines Husserl's critique of psychologism, argues that Husserl is not convincing, and offers two new objections to the psychologistic thesis. In this paper I attempt to rebut those objections. In question are the acceptable criteria (...)
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  27. Nuel Belnap & Thomas Müller (2013). BH-CIFOL: Case-Intensional First Order Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic (2-3):1-32.score: 36.0
    This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-order logic (CIFOL; Belnap and Müller (2013)). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events (extending all the way into the future) that that moment (...)
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  28. Maria J. Frápolli (1992). Identity, Necessity and a Prioricity:The Fallacy of Equivocation. History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (1):91-109.score: 36.0
    The aim of this paper is to discuss Kripkc?s reasons for declaring the existence of both necessary a posteriori as well as contingent a priori statements, thus breaking the traditional extensional coincidence of the two pairs of concepts:necessary?contingent and a priori?a posteriori. As I shall argue, there is no reason, from Kripke?s work at least, to reject the usual picture of the topic The appeal ot his arguments rests on the ambiguity with which his expressions are used and on the (...)
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  29. Tim O'Keefe & Harald Thorsrud (2003). Aristotle's 'Cosmic Nose' Argument for the Uniqueness of the World. Apeiron 36 (4):311 - 326.score: 30.0
    David Furley's work on the cosmologies of classical antiquity is structured around what he calls "two pictures of the world." The first picture, defended by both Plato and Aristotle, portrays the universe, or all that there is (to pan), as identical with our particular ordered world-system. Thus, the adherents of this view claim that the universe is finite and unique. The second system, defended by Leucippus and Democritus, portrays an infinite universe within which our particular kosmos is only one of (...)
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  30. Joseph Diekemper (2004). Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294.score: 30.0
    I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. (...)
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  31. Greg Ray (1996). Logical Consequence: A Defense of Tarski. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):617 - 677.score: 30.0
    In his classic 1936 essay "On the Concept of Logical Consequence", Alfred Tarski used the notion of satisfaction to give a semantic characterization of the logical properties. Tarski is generally credited with introducing the model-theoretic characterization of the logical properties familiar to us today. However, in his book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Etchemendy argues that Tarski's account is inadequate for quite a number of reasons, and is actually incompatible with the standard model-theoretic account. Many of his criticisms are meant (...)
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  32. Dennis Schulting (2008). On Strawson on Kantian Apperception. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):257-271.score: 30.0
    Strawson famously argues that Kant’s argument for the necessary conditions of experience can only be retained once freed from a priori synthesis. Strawson claims that a purely ‘analytical connexion’ between experience and the object of experience is conceptually inferable from a thoroughly analytic premise concerning the capacity for self-ascription of representations. In this paper, I take issue with the way in which Strawson construes the analyticity of the principle of self-ascription or what Kant calls the principle of transcendental apperception. More (...)
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  33. Kadri Vihvelin (2000). Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23.score: 30.0
    The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry Frankfurt argued (...)
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  34. John P. Burgess (1999). Which Modal Logic Is the Right One? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):81-93.score: 30.0
    The question, "Which modal logic is the right one for logical necessity?," divides into two questions, one about model-theoretic validity, the other about proof-theoretic demonstrability. The arguments of Halldén and others that the right validity argument is S5, and the right demonstrability logic includes S4, are reviewed, and certain common objections are argued to be fallacious. A new argument, based on work of Supecki and Bryll, is presented for the claim that the right demonstrability logic must be contained in (...)
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  35. Roger Wertheimer (1972). The Significance of Sense. Ithaca [N.Y.]Cornell University Press.score: 30.0
    Univocalist analyses of the modal auxiliary verbs ('ought'/'must'/'can') and the adjective 'right'/'wrong'.
     
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  36. Kordula Świętorzecka (2002). O stosowalności niektórych modalnych reguł inferencji w rozumowaniach pozalogicznych. Filozofia Nauki 1.score: 30.0
    The presented paper takes up the attempt to analyse and specify the suspicion that some modal rules of inference are paralogical in application to non-logical reasonings (s.c. modal fallacy). The considerations have been limited to modal prepositional calculi: K and S5, which are intended to be a formal base of these non-logical reasonings - proofs of so called specific thesis on the grounds of the particular specific theories. Pointing out the properties of being permitted, being valid (...)
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  37. Tuomas E. Tahko (forthcoming). Empirically-Informed Modal Rationalism. In Robert William Fischer & Felipe Leon (eds.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Synthese Library.score: 27.0
    In this chapter, it is suggested that our epistemic access to metaphysical modality generally involves rationalist, a priori elements. However, these a priori elements are much more subtle than ‘traditional’ modal rationalism assumes. In many cases of modal inquiry, a priori and a posteriori elements are deeply intertwined and it is not easy to tell them apart. Supposed metaphysically necessary identity statements involving natural kind terms are a good example: the fact that empirical input is crucial in establishing (...)
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  38. Wesley H. Holliday (forthcoming). Partiality and Adjointness in Modal Logic. In Rajeev Gore, Barteld Kooi & Agi Kurucz (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic, Vol. 10. College Publications. 313-332.score: 27.0
    Following a proposal of Humberstone, this paper studies a semantics for modal logic based on partial “possibilities” rather than total “worlds.” There are a number of reasons, philosophical and mathematical, to find this alternative semantics attractive. Here we focus on the construction of possibility models with a finitary flavor. Our main completeness result shows that for a number of standard modal logics, we can build a canonical possibility model, wherein every logically consistent formula is satisfied, by simply taking (...)
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  39. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge. Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):537-552.score: 24.0
    The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true. This is something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based account of modal knowledge relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) (...)
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  40. George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.score: 24.0
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, (...)
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  41. Peter Hawke (2011). Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):351-364.score: 24.0
    In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism, offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that (...)
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  42. Francesco Berto (2011). Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: The Best of Three Worlds. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):313-35.score: 24.0
    We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make this explicit (...)
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  43. Andrea Sauchelli (2010). Concrete Possible Worlds and Counterfactual Conditionals: Lewis Versus Williamson on Modal Knowledge. Synthese 176 (3):345-359.score: 24.0
    The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.
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  44. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Essentialism Vis-à-Vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):54-64.score: 24.0
    Pace Necessitism – roughly, the view that existence is not contingent – essential properties provide necessary conditions for the existence of objects. Sufficiency properties, by contrast, provide sufficient conditions, and individual essences provide necessary and sufficient conditions. This paper explains how these kinds of properties can be used to illuminate the ontological status of merely possible objects and to construct a respectable possibilist ontology. The paper also reviews two points of interaction between essentialism and modal logic. First, we will (...)
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  45. T. Parent, Modal Realism and the Meaning of 'Exist'.score: 24.0
    Here I first raise an argument purporting to show that Lewis’ Modal Realism ends up being entirely trivial. But although I reject this line, the argument reveals how difficult it is to interpret Lewis’ thesis that possibilia “exist.” Five natural interpretations are considered, yet upon reflection, none appear entirely adequate. In particular, under the three different “concretist” interpretations of ‘exist’, Modal Realism looks insufficient for genuine ontological commitment. Whereas under the “multiverse” interpretation or the “broadly Actualist” interpretation, (...) Realism omits various nonactual possibilities. I close with a related, more general dilemma for Modal Realism: Are Lewisian possibilia in the proper domain of physics or not? Since our physics aims to explain everything that exists, it seems so. Yet then the omission of some possibilities seems inevitable. (shrink)
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  46. Robert Stalnaker (2004). Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):299-322.score: 24.0
    This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of (...)
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  47. Robert Stalnaker (2006). Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics. In Garc (ed.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 293-309.score: 24.0
    This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of (...)
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  48. Casey O'Callaghan (2008). Seeing What You Hear: Cross-Modal Illusions and Perception. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):316-338.score: 24.0
    Cross-modal perceptual illusions occur when a stimulus to one modality impacts perceptual experience associated with another modality. Unlike synaesthesia, cross-modal illusions are intelligible as results of perceptual strategies for dealing with sensory stimulation to multiple modalities, rather than as mere quirks. I argue that understanding cross-modal illusions reveals an important flaw in a widespread conception of the senses, and of their role in perceptual experience, according to which understanding perception and perceptual experience is a matter of assembling (...)
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  49. Sonia Roca-Royes (2010). Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts and the Integration Challenge. Dialectica 64 (3):335-361.score: 24.0
    The paper argues against Peacocke's moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke's account has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account's metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. Yet, once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the resulting account cannot (...)
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  50. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Cross-Modal Experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):429-468.score: 24.0
    This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena.
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