Search results for 'modal fallacy' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  62
    Frank A. Lewis (2009). Parmenides' Modal Fallacy. Phronesis 54 (1):1-8.
    In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not , joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not . Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades - is becomes cannot not be , and is not becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories of one another. And (...)
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  2.  68
    J. Westphal (2012). Is There a Modal Fallacy in van Inwagen's 'First Formal Argument'? Analysis 72 (1):36-41.
    The argument given by Peter van Inwagen for the second premise on his "First Formal Argument" in An Essay on Free Will is invalid. The second premise hinges on the principle that since a proposition p , some statement about the present, is actually true, ~p can't be true. ~p must be false. What is the reason? The principle is that ~p cannot be true at the same time as p . I argue that, among other things, in its attachment (...)
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  3.  5
    Dale Jacquette (2006). Tarski's Analysis of Logical Consequence and Etchemendy's Criticism of Tarski's Modal Fallacy. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 89:345.
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  4.  10
    John Bacon (1965). Entailment and the Modal Fallacy. Review of Metaphysics 18 (3):566 - 571.
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  5.  11
    Norman Swartz, 'The' Modal Fallacy.
    Note: the technical vocabulary used in this article is explained in a glossary that I prepared for my introductory logic course in 1997.
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  6. Edward E. Dawson (1973). Review: R. W. Ashby, Entailment and Modality; John O. Nelson, A Question of Entailment; John Bacon, Entailment and the Modal Fallacy. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (4):668-670.
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  7. Lars Bo Gundersen (2000). Goodman's Gruesome Modal Fallacy. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 76:447-462.
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  8.  3
    Manuel Ppérez Otero (2001). A Fallacy About the Modal Status of Logic. Dialectica 55 (1):9–27.
    In John Etchemendy's book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, several arguments are put forth against the standard model‐theoretic account of logical consequence and logical truth. I argue in this article that crucial parts of Etchemendy's attack depend on a failure to distinguish two senses of logic and two correlative senses of being something a logical question. According to one of these senses, the logic of a language, L, is the set of logical truths of L. In the other sense, logic (...)
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  9. Norman M. Swartz, Foreknowledge and Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will (...)
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  10.  1
    Eduardo Alejandro Barrio (2007). Consecuencia lógica: modelos conjuntistas y aspectos modales. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 31 (2):203-220.
    According to Etchemendy, in attempting to offer an analysis of the modal features of the intuitive concept of logical consequence, Tarski has committed a modal fallacy. In this paper, I consider the thesis according to it is posible to analyze the modals properties of concept of logical consequence through of a generalization on set-theoretical interpretations. As is known, some philosophers have tried to argue for the transit from the general to the modal by showing that there (...)
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  11.  17
    David Botting (2012). Fallacies of Accident. Argumentation 26 (2):267-289.
    In this paper I will attempt a unified analysis of the various examples of the fallacy of accident given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations. In many cases the examples underdetermine the fallacy and it is not trivial to identify the fallacy committed. To make this identification we have to find some error common to all the examples and to show that this error would still be committed even if those other fallacies that the (...)
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  12. T. Parent, The Modal Ontological Argument Meets Modal Fictionalism.
    This paper attacks the modal ontological argument, as advocated by Plantinga among others. Whereas other criticisms in the literature reject one of its premises, the present line is that the argument is invalid. This becomes apparent once we run the argument assuming fictionalism about possible worlds. Broadly speaking, the problem is that if one defines “x” as something that exists, it does not follow that there is anything satisfying the definition. Yet unlike non-modal (...) arguments, the modal argument commits this “existential fallacy” not in relation to the definition of ‘God’. Rather, it occurs in relation to the modal facts quantified over within a Kripkean modal logic. In brief, we can describe the modal facts by whichever logic we prefer—yet it does not follow that there are genuine modal facts, as opposed to mere facts-according-to-the-fiction. A broader consequence of the discussion is that the existential fallacy is an issue for many projects in “armchair metaphysics.”. (shrink)
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  13.  51
    Nicole A. Vincent (2009). Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments. Neuroethics 4 (1):35-49.
    Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people’s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection—an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s responsibility.
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  14.  31
    William Hasker (1998). Swinburne's Modal Argument for Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):366-370.
    Most critics of Richard Swinburne’s modal argument for mind-body substance dualism have alleged that the argument is unsound, either because its premises are false or because it commits a modal fallacy. I show that the argument is epistemically circular, and thus provides no support for its conclusion even if it is sound.
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  15.  24
    Nuel Belnap & Thomas Müller (2013). BH-CIFOL: Case-Intensional First Order Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic (2-3):1-32.
    This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-order logic (CIFOL; Belnap and Müller (2013)). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events (extending all the way into the future) that that moment (...)
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  16.  66
    Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2005). Antirealism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy. Noûs 39 (1):123–139.
    In his presidential address to the APA, ‘‘How to be an Anti-realist’’ (1982, 64–66), Alvin Plantinga argues that the only sensible way to be an antirealist is to be a theist.1 Anti-realism (AR) in this context is the epistemic analysis of truth that says, (AR) necessarily, a statement is true if and only if it would be believed by an ideally [or sufficiently] rational agent/community in ideal [or sufficiently good] epistemic circumstances. Plantinga demonstrates, with modest modal resources, that AR (...)
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  17.  23
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (1998). On a Fallacy Attributed to Tarski. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (4):227-234.
    The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski?s paper ?On the concept of logical consequence? and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further claims that the argument he attributes to Tarski is fallacious. (...)
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  18.  61
    John P. Burgess (2003). Which Modal Models Are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)? Theoria 18 (2):145-158.
    Recently it has become almost the received wisdom in certain quarters that Kripke models are appropriate only for something like metaphysical modalities, and not for logical modalities. Here the line of thought leading to Kripke models, and reasons why they are no less appropriate for logical than for other modalities, are explained. It is also indicated where the fallacy in the argument leading to the contrary conclusion lies. The lessons learned are then applied to the question of the status (...)
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  19.  11
    Maria J. Frápolli (1992). Identity, Necessity and a Prioricity:The Fallacy of Equivocation. History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (1):91-109.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss Kripkc?s reasons for declaring the existence of both necessary a posteriori as well as contingent a priori statements, thus breaking the traditional extensional coincidence of the two pairs of concepts:necessary?contingent and a priori?a posteriori. As I shall argue, there is no reason, from Kripke?s work at least, to reject the usual picture of the topic The appeal ot his arguments rests on the ambiguity with which his expressions are used and on the (...)
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  20.  24
    Remmel T. Nunn (1979). I. Psychologism, Functionalism, and the Modal Status of Logical Laws. Inquiry 22 (1-4):343-349.
    In a recent article (Inquiry, Vol. 19 [1976]), J. W. Meiland addresses the issue of psychologism in logic, which holds that logic is a branch of psychology and that logical laws (such as the Principle of Non?Contradiction) are contingent upon the nature of the mind. Meiland examines Husserl's critique of psychologism, argues that Husserl is not convincing, and offers two new objections to the psychologistic thesis. In this paper I attempt to rebut those objections. In question are the acceptable criteria (...)
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  21. Joseph Diekemper (2004). Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294.
    I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. (...)
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  22.  87
    Kadri Vihvelin (2000). Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23.
    The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry Frankfurt argued (...)
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  23. Tim O'Keefe & Harald Thorsrud (2003). Aristotle's 'Cosmic Nose' Argument for the Uniqueness of the World. Apeiron 36 (4):311 - 326.
    David Furley's work on the cosmologies of classical antiquity is structured around what he calls "two pictures of the world." The first picture, defended by both Plato and Aristotle, portrays the universe, or all that there is (to pan), as identical with our particular ordered world-system. Thus, the adherents of this view claim that the universe is finite and unique. The second system, defended by Leucippus and Democritus, portrays an infinite universe within which our particular kosmos is only one of (...)
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  24. Greg Ray (1996). Logical Consequence: A Defense of Tarski. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):617 - 677.
    In his classic 1936 essay "On the Concept of Logical Consequence", Alfred Tarski used the notion of satisfaction to give a semantic characterization of the logical properties. Tarski is generally credited with introducing the model-theoretic characterization of the logical properties familiar to us today. However, in his book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Etchemendy argues that Tarski's account is inadequate for quite a number of reasons, and is actually incompatible with the standard model-theoretic account. Many of his criticisms are meant (...)
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  25. Alicia Finch (2013). On Behalf of the Consequence Argument: Time, Modality, and the Nature of Free Action. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):151-170.
    The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. (...)
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  26. Dennis Schulting (2008). On Strawson on Kantian Apperception. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):257-271.
    *The version archived here is the corrected version* Strawson famously argues that Kant’s argument for the necessary conditions of experience can only be retained once freed from a priori synthesis. Strawson claims that a purely ‘analytical connexion’ between experience and the object of experience is conceptually inferable from a thoroughly analytic premise concerning the capacity for self-ascription of representations. In this paper, I take issue with the way in which Strawson construes the analyticity of the principle of self-ascription or what (...)
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  27.  53
    Jonathan E. Adler (2000). Three Fallacies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):665-666.
    Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.
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  28. Kordula Świętorzecka (2002). O stosowalności niektórych modalnych reguł inferencji w rozumowaniach pozalogicznych. Filozofia Nauki 1.
    The presented paper takes up the attempt to analyse and specify the suspicion that some modal rules of inference are paralogical in application to non-logical reasonings (s.c. modal fallacy). The considerations have been limited to modal prepositional calculi: K and S5, which are intended to be a formal base of these non-logical reasonings - proofs of so called specific thesis on the grounds of the particular specific theories. Pointing out the properties of being permitted, being valid (...)
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  29. J. Adam Carter & Martin Peterson (forthcoming). The Modal Account of Luck Revisited. Synthese:1-10.
    According to the canonical formulation of the modal account of luck (e.g. Pritchard (2005, 128)), an event is lucky just when that event occurs in the actual world but not in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where the relevant conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world. This paper argues, with reference to a novel variety of counterexample, that it is a mistake to focus, when assessing a given event for luckiness, (...)
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  30. Tuomas E. Tahko (forthcoming). Empirically-Informed Modal Rationalism. In Robert William Fischer & Felipe Leon (eds.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Synthese Library
    In this chapter, it is suggested that our epistemic access to metaphysical modality generally involves rationalist, a priori elements. However, these a priori elements are much more subtle than ‘traditional’ modal rationalism assumes. In fact, some might even question the ‘apriority’ of these elements, but I should stress that I consider a priori and a posteriori elements especially in our modal inquiry to be so deeply intertwined that it is not easy to tell them apart. Supposed metaphysically necessary (...)
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  31.  20
    Wesley H. Holliday (2014). Partiality and Adjointness in Modal Logic. In Rajeev Gore, Barteld Kooi & Agi Kurucz (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic, Vol. 10. College Publications 313-332.
    Following a proposal of Humberstone, this paper studies a semantics for modal logic based on partial “possibilities” rather than total “worlds.” There are a number of reasons, philosophical and mathematical, to find this alternative semantics attractive. Here we focus on the construction of possibility models with a finitary flavor. Our main completeness result shows that for a number of standard modal logics, we can build a canonical possibility model, wherein every logically consistent formula is satisfied, by simply taking (...)
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  32.  86
    Tomoji Shogenji (2012). The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 184 (1):29-48.
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that (...)
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  33. Francesco Berto & Graham Priest (2014). Modal Meinongianism and Characterization. Grazer Philosophische Studien 90:183-200.
    In this paper we reply to arguments of Kroon (“Characterization and Existence in Modal Meinongianism”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86, 23–34) to the effect that Modal Meinongianism cannot do justice to Meinongian claims such as that the golden mountain is golden, and that it does not exist.
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  34.  68
    Peter Fritz (forthcoming). First-Order Modal Logic in the Necessary Framework of Objects. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    I consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes that only (...)
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  35.  82
    Leone Gazziero (2015). Exempla Docent. How to Make Sense of Aristotle’s Examples of the Fallacy of Accident (Doxography Matters). Acta Philosophica 24 (2):333-354.
    Scholarly dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s fallacy of accident has traditionally focused on his examples, whose compatibility with the fallacy’s definition has been doubted time and again. Besides a unified account of the fallacy of accident itself, the paper provides a formalized analysis of its several examples in Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi. The most problematic instances are dealt with by means of an internal reconstruction of their features as conveyed by Aristotle’s text and an extensive survey of (...)
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  36. Hans Lycke (2010). Inconsistency-Adaptive Modal Logics. On How to Cope with Modal Inconsistency. Logic and Logical Philosophy 19 (1-2):31-61.
    In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency-adaptive logics, namely inconsistency-adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency-adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the part of human reasoning they are intended for.
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  37. Sheldon Wein (2013). Intolerance and the Zero Tolerance Fallacy. In Gabrijela Kišiček (ed.), What Do We Know About the World? Centre for Research on Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric 132-144.
    When an activity is unwanted, administrators often adopt a zero tolerance policy towards that activity. The background assumption is that, by adopting a zero tolerance policy, one is doing everything that one can to reduce or eliminate the activity in question. Yet which policy best serves to reduce an unwanted behavior is always an empirical question. Thus, those who adopt a zero tolerance policy towards some behavior without first investigating and finding that they are in a set of circumstances where (...)
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  38. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  39. Mark Jago (2013). Against Yagisawa's Modal Realism. Analysis 73 (1):10-17.
    In his book Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise (2010), Takashi Yagisawa presents and argues for a novel and imaginative version of modal realism. It differs both from Lewis’s modal realism (Lewis 1986) and from actualists’ ersatz accounts (Adams 1974; Sider 2002). In this paper, I’ll present two arguments, each of which shows that Yagisawa’s metaphysics is incoherent. The first argument shows that the combination of Yagisawa’s metaphysics with impossibilia leads to triviality: every sentence whatsoever comes out true. (...)
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  40.  60
    Mikkel Gerken (2015). Philosophical Insights and Modal Cognition. In Eugen Fischer John Collins (ed.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. 110-131.
    Modal rationalists uphold a strong constitutive relationship between a priori cognition and modal cognition. Since both a priori cognition and modal cognition have been taken to be characteristic of philosophical insights, I will critically assess an ambitious modal rationalism and an associated ambitious methodological rationalism. I begin by examining Kripkean cases of the necessary a posteriori in order to characterize the ambitious modal rationalism that will be the focus of my criticism. I then argue that (...)
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  41.  15
    Bob Fischer (2016). Hale on the Architecture of Modal Knowledge. Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):76-89.
    There are many modal epistemologies available to us. Which should we endorse? According to Bob Hale, we can start to answer this question by examining the architecture of modal knowledge. That is, we can try to decide between the following claims: knowing that p is possible is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that there are no conflicting necessities—a necessity-based approach—and knowing that p is necessary is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that there (...)
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  42.  39
    Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema (2002). Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    This modern, advanced textbook reviews modal logic, a field which caught the attention of computer scientists in the late 1970's.
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  43.  69
    Heylen Jan (2009). Carnapian Modal and Epistemic Arithmetic. In Carrara Massimiliano & Morato Vittorio (eds.), Language, Knowledge, and Metaphysics. Selected papers from the First SIFA Graduate Conference. College Publications 97-121.
    The subject of the first section is Carnapian modal logic. One of the things I will do there is to prove that certain description principles, viz. the ''self-predication principles'', i.e. the principles according to which a descriptive term satisfies its own descriptive condition, are theorems and that others are not. The second section will be devoted to Carnapian modal arithmetic. I will prove that, if the arithmetical theory contains the standard weak principle of induction, modal truth collapses (...)
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  44. Francesco Berto (2011). Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: The Best of Three Worlds. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):313-35.
    We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make this explicit (...)
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  45. Dimiter Vakarelov (2008). A Modal Approach to Dynamic Ontology: Modal Mereotopology. Logic and Logical Philosophy 17 (1-2):163-183.
    In this paper we show how modal logic can be applied in the axiomatizations of some dynamic ontologies. As an example we consider the case of mereotopology, which is an extension of mereology with some relations of topological nature like contact relation. We show that in the modal extension of mereotopology we may define some new mereological and mereotopological relations with dynamic nature like stable part-of and stable contact. In some sense such “stable” relations can be considered as (...)
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  46. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Cross-Modal Experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):429-468.
    This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena.
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  47. David Yates (2015). Dispositionalism and the Modal Operators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):411-424.
    Actualists of a certain stripe—dispositionalists—hold that metaphysical modality is grounded in the powers of actual things. Roughly: p is possible iff something has, or some things have, the power to bring it about that p. Extant critiques of dispositionalism focus on its material adequacy, and question whether there are enough powers to account for all the possibilities we intuitively want to countenance. For instance, it seems possible that none of the actual contingent particulars ever existed, but it is impossible to (...)
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  48. Peter Van Inwagen (1998). Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 92 (1):67--84.
    Many important metaphysical arguments validly deduce an actuality from a possibility. For example: Because it is possible for me to exist in the absence of anything material, I am not my body. I argue that there is no reason to suppose that our capacity for modal judgment is equal to the task of determining whether the "possibility" premise of any of these arguments is true. I connect this thesis with Stephen Yablo's recent work on the epistemology of modal (...)
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  49. Bence Nanay (2010). A Modal Theory of Function. Journal of Philosophy 107 (8):412-431.
    The function of a trait token is usually defined in terms of some properties of other (past, present, future) tokens of the same trait type. I argue that this strategy is problematic, as trait types are (at least partly) individuated by their functional properties, which would lead to circularity. In order to avoid this problem, I suggest a way to define the function of a trait token in terms of the properties of the very same trait token. To able to (...)
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    Duško Prelević (2015). Modal Empiricism and Knowledge of De Re Possibilities: A Critique of Roca-Royes' Account. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (4):488–498.
    Accounting for our knowledge of de re modalities is probably the main reason why the proponents of modal empiricism think that their view should be preferred to modal rationalism. In this paper, I address Sonia Roca-Royes' account, which is taken to be a representative modal empiricist view, in order to show that modal empiricism faces serious problems even in explaining our knowledge of possibility de re, something which seems to be the easiest (...)
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