Search results for 'modal knowledge' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. L. Lismont (1994). Common Knowledge: Relating Anti-Founded Situation Semantics to Modal Logic Neighbourhood Semantics. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (4):285-302.score: 144.0
    Two approaches for defining common knowledge coexist in the literature: the infinite iteration definition and the circular or fixed point one. In particular, an original modelization of the fixed point definition was proposed by Barwise (1989) in the context of a non-well-founded set theory and the infinite iteration approach has been technically analyzed within multi-modal epistemic logic using neighbourhood semantics by Lismont (1993). This paper exhibits a relation between these two ways of modelling common knowledge which (...)
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  2. Riccardo Rosati (1999). Reasoning About Minimal Knowledge in Nonmonotonic Modal Logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (2):187-203.score: 144.0
    We study the problem of embedding Halpern and Moses's modal logic of minimal knowledge states into two families of modal formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning, McDermott and Doyle's nonmonotonic modal logics and ground nonmonotonic modal logics. First, we prove that Halpern and Moses's logic can be embedded into all ground logics; moreover, the translation employed allows for establishing a lower bound (3p) for the problem of skeptical reasoning in all ground logics. Then, we show a translation (...)
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  3. Stephen Cade Hetherington (1991). Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. In Tamara Horowitz (ed.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Rowman and Littlefield.score: 144.0
    I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true.
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  4. Dustin Stokes (2006). Art and Modal Knowledge. In Dominic Lopes & Matthew Kieran (eds.), Knowing Art: Essays in Epistemology and Aesthetics. Springer.score: 138.0
  5. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge. Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):537-552.score: 132.0
    The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true. This is something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based account of modal knowledge relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem (...)
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  6. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge. Noûs 45 (1):22-49.score: 124.0
    The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.
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  7. M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):364-380.score: 120.0
    The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal (...)
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  8. Albert Casullo, Counterfactuals and Modal Knowledge.score: 120.0
    One infl uential argument in support of the existence of a priori knowledge is due to Kant, who claimed that necessity is a criterion of the a priori—that is, that all knowledge of necessary propositions is a priori. Th at claim, together with two others that Kant took to be evident—we know some mathematical propositions and such propositions are necessary—led directly to the conclusion that some knowledge is a priori. Kripke ( 1971 , 1980 ) challenged Kant’s (...)
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  9. Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Noûs 46 (1):127 - 158.score: 114.0
    How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemology. When we discover what is possible or what is impossible, we generally exploit important connections between what (...)
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  10. Christopher S. Hill (1998). Chalmers on the Apriority of Modal Knowledge. Analysis 58 (1):20-26.score: 114.0
  11. Tuomas E. Tahko (2008). A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis. Metaphysica 9 (2):57-68.score: 108.0
    In this paper I will offer a novel understanding of a priori knowledge. My claim is that the sharp distinction that is usually made between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is groundless. It will be argued that a plausible understanding of a priori and a posteriori knowledge has to acknowledge that they are in a constant bootstrapping relationship. It is also crucial that we distinguish between a priori propositions that hold in the actual world and merely (...)
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  12. Andrea Sauchelli (2010). Concrete Possible Worlds and Counterfactual Conditionals: Lewis Versus Williamson on Modal Knowledge. Synthese 176 (3):345-359.score: 108.0
    The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.
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  13. Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2013). Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):605-623.score: 108.0
    Abstract Timothy Williamson has recently proposed to undermine modal skepticism by appealing to the reducibility of modal to counterfactual logic ( Reducibility ). Central to Williamson’s strategy is the claim that use of the same non-deductive mode of inference ( counterfactual development , or CD ) whereby we typically arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals suffices for arriving at knowledge of metaphysical necessity via Reducibility. Granting Reducibility, I ask whether the use of CD plays any essential role (...)
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  14. E. J. Lowe (2012). What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths? Mind 121 (484):919-950.score: 102.0
    There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capacity for modal (...) is just an extension, or by-product, of our general capacity to acquire knowledge of true counterfactual conditionals — a capacity that we deploy ubiquitously in everyday life. Williamson’s account crucially involves a thesis to the effect that modal truths can be explained in terms of counterfactual truths. In this paper, I query Williamson’s account on a number of points, including this thesis. My positive proposal, which owes a debt to the work of Kit Fine on modality and essence, appeals instead to our capacity to grasp essences, understood in a neo-Aristotelian fashion, according to which essences are expressed by ‘real definitions’. (shrink)
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  15. Rene Woudenberg (2006). Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):210-221.score: 102.0
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  16. George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.score: 96.0
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - (...)
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  17. Simon Evnine (2008). Modal Epistemology: Our Knowledge of Necessity and Possibility. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):664-684.score: 96.0
    I survey a number of views about how we can obtain knowledge of modal propositions, propositions about necessity and possibility. One major approach is that whether a proposition or state of affairs is conceivable tells us something about whether it is possible. I examine two quite different positions that fall under this rubric, those of Yablo and Chalmers. One problem for this approach is the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and I deal with some of the ways (...)
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  18. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of 'Knowledge'-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315 - 331.score: 96.0
    Jason Stanley has argued recently that Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI) are explanatorily on a par with regard to certain data arising from modal and temporal embeddings of 'knowledge'-ascriptions. This paper argues against Stanley that EC has a clear advantage over SSI in the discussed field and introduces a new type of linguistic datum strongly suggesting the falsity of SSI.
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  19. Thomas Kroedel (2012). Counterfactuals and the Epistemology of Modality. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (12).score: 96.0
    The paper provides an explanation of our knowledge of metaphysical modality, or modal knowledge, from our ability to evaluate counterfactual conditionals. The latter ability lends itself to an evolutionary explanation since it enables us to learn from mistakes. Different logical principles linking counterfactuals to metaphysical modality can be employed to extend this explanation to the epistemology of modality. While the epistemological use of some of these principles is either philosophically implausible or empirically inadequate, the equivalence of ‘Necessarily (...)
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  20. Alexander Bird (2008). Remarks on Our Knowledge of Modal Facts. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 43:54--60.score: 96.0
    Can we have a posteriori knowledge of modal facts? And if so, is that knowledge fundamentally a posteriori, or does a priori intuition provide the modal component of what is known? Though the latter view seems more straightforward, there are also reasons for taking the first option seriously.
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  21. Stephen K. McLeod (2009). Rationalism and Modal Knowledge. Crítica 41 (122):29-42.score: 96.0
    The article argues against attempts to combine ontological realism about modality with the rejection of modal rationalism and it suggests that modal realism requires (at least a weak form of) modal rationalism. /// El artículo da argumentos en contra de que se intente combinar el realismo ontológico sobre la modalidad con el rechazo del racionalismo modal y sugiere que el realismo modal exige (por lo menos una forma débil de) racionalismo modal.
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  22. M. J. Winfield, A. Basden & I. Cresswell (1996). Knowledge Elicitation Using a Multi-Modal Approach. World Futures 47 (1):93-101.score: 96.0
    (1996). Knowledge elicitation using a multi‐modal approach. World Futures: Vol. 47, Unity and Diversity in Contemporary Systems Tinking: Systematic Pictures at an Exhibition, pp. 93-101.
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  23. C. S. Jenkins (2008). Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):693-701.score: 92.0
    In recent work Timothy Williamson argues that the epistemology of metaphysical modality is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson has not provided an adequate argument for this controversial claim, and that it is not obvious how what he says should be supplemented in order to derive such an argument. But I suggest that an important moral of his discussion survives this point. The moral is that experience could play an epistemic role which is more (...)
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  24. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge. In Greg Restall & Gillian Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic. MacMillan.score: 90.0
  25. Anand Jayprakash Vaidya (2010). Understanding and Essence. Philosophia 38 (4):811-833.score: 90.0
    Modal epistemology has been dominated by a focus on establishing an account either of how we have modal knowledge or how we have justified beliefs about modality. One component of this focus has been that necessity and possibility are basic access points for modal reasoning. For example, knowing that P is necessary plays a role in deducing that P is essential, and knowing that both P and ¬P are possible plays a role in knowing that P (...)
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  26. M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):364–380.score: 90.0
  27. René van Woudenberg (2006). Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):210–221.score: 90.0
    This article is a discussion of Hume's maxim Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. First I explain this maxim and distinguish it from the principle Whatever cannot be imagined (conceived), is impossible. Next I argue that Thomas Reid's criticism of the maxim fails and that the arguments by Tamar Szábo Gendler and John Hawthorne for the claim that "it is uncontroversial that there are cases where we are misled" by the maxim are unconvincing. Finally I state the limited but real (...)
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  28. Tijn Borghuis (1998). Modal Pure Type Systems. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (3):265-296.score: 90.0
    We present a framework for intensional reasoning in typed -calculus. In this family of calculi, called Modal Pure Type Systems (MPTSs), a propositions-as-types-interpretation can be given for normal modal logics. MPTSs are an extension of the Pure Type Systems (PTSs) of Barendregt (1992). We show that they retain the desirable meta-theoretical properties of PTSs, and briefly discuss applications in the area of knowledge representation.
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  29. Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim & Sébastien Motta (2012). On Modal Knowledge. Philosophia Scientiae 16:3-37.score: 90.0
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  30. Todd M. Stewart (2012). Comments on Robert Fischer's “Modal Knowledge, in Theory”. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):95-99.score: 90.0
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  31. Robert William Fischer (2012). Modal Knowledge, in Theory. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):227-235.score: 90.0
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  32. Leslie Smith (1994). Modal Knowledge and Transmodularity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):729.score: 90.0
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  33. A. Casullo (2010). Knowledge and Modality. Synthese 172 (3):341 - 359.score: 84.0
    Kripke claims that there are necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori truths. These claims challenge the traditional Kantian view that (K) All knowledge of necessary truths is a priori and all a priori knowledge is of necessary truths. Kripke’s claims continue to be resisted, which indicates that the Kantian view remains attractive. My goal is to identify the most plausible principles linking the epistemic and the modal. My strategy for identifying the principles is to investigate (...)
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  34. Stephen K. McLeod (2008). Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism. Philosophy 83 (324):179-191.score: 84.0
    By the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted (...)
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  35. Joseph Y. Halpern, Dov Samet & Ella Segev (2009). Defining Knowledge in Terms of Belief: The Modal Logic Perspective. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):469-487.score: 78.0
    The question of whether knowledge is definable in terms of belief, which has played an important role in epistemology for the last 50 years, is studied here in the framework of epistemic and doxastic logics. Three notions of definability are considered: explicit definability, implicit definability, and reducibility, where explicit definability is equivalent to the combination of implicit definability and reducibility. It is shown that if knowledge satisfies any set of axioms contained in S5, then it cannot be explicitly (...)
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  36. James Theophilus Edwards (forthcoming). The Perfectly True Knowledge. None.score: 72.0
    My paper discusses the philosophical interrelationship between perfection, truth, and knowledge. The connection that exists between these three concepts underscores the argument of my paper that they are all one and the same thing. -/- The concepts of perfection, truth and knowledge are analysed in that order. I analyse perfection and demonstrate the practicalities of my arguments. Truth is then scrutinized and defined to illustrate its intimate relationship with perfection leading to the conclusion that knowledge being ‘truth (...)
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  37. Gabriel Rabin (2011). Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.score: 72.0
    According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience. This claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once (...)
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  38. Melvin Fitting (2009). How True It is = Who Says It's True. Studia Logica 91 (3):335 - 366.score: 72.0
    This is a largely expository paper in which the following simple idea is pursued. Take the truth value of a formula to be the set of agents that accept the formula as true. This means we work with an arbitrary (finite) Boolean algebra as the truth value space. When this is properly formalized, complete modal tableau systems exist, and there are natural versions of bisimulations that behave well from an algebraic point of view. There remain significant problems concerning the (...)
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  39. John Zeleznikow, George Vossos & Daniel Hunter (1993). The IKBALS Project: Multi-Modal Reasoning in Legal Knowledge Based Systems. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (3):169-203.score: 72.0
    In attempting to build intelligent litigation support tools, we have moved beyond first generation, production rule legal expert systems. Our work integrates rule based and case based reasoning with intelligent information retrieval.When using the case based reasoning methodology, or in our case the specialisation of case based retrieval, we need to be aware of how to retrieve relevant experience. Our research, in the legal domain, specifies an approach to the retrieval problem which relies heavily on an extended object oriented/rule based (...)
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  40. Stéphane Demri (1999). A Logic with Relative Knowledge Operators. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (2):167-185.score: 72.0
    We study a knowledge logic that assumes that to each set of agents, an indiscernibility relation is associated and the agents decide the membership of objects or states up to this indiscernibility relation. Its language contains a family of relative knowledge operators. We prove the decidability of the satisfiability problem, we show its EXPTIME-completeness and as a side-effect, we define a complete Hilbert-style axiomatization.
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  41. William J. Rapaport (1988). Review: Christophe Geissler, Kurt Konolige, A Resolution Method for Quantified Modal Logics of Knowledge and Belief. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):668-668.score: 72.0
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  42. Peter Van Inwagen (1998). Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 92:67--84.score: 72.0
    Many important metaphysical arguments validly deduce an actuality from a possibility. For example: Because it is possible for me to exist in the absence of anything material, I am not my body. I argue that there is no reason to suppose that our capacity for modal judgment is equal to the task of determining whether the "possibility" premise of any of these arguments is true. I connect this thesis with Stephen Yablo's recent work on the epistemology of modal (...)
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  43. L. Lismont (1993). Common Knowledge in Modal Logic. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 39 (1):115-130.score: 72.0
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  44. Rosati Riccardo (1999). Reasoning About Minimal Knowledge in Nonmonotonic Modal Logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (2).score: 72.0
     
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  45. Renate A. Schmidt & Dmitry Tishkovsky (2008). On Combinations of Propositional Dynamic Logic and Doxastic Modal Logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (1):109-129.score: 68.0
    We prove completeness and decidability results for a family of combinations of propositional dynamic logic and unimodal doxastic logics in which the modalities may interact. The kind of interactions we consider include three forms of commuting axioms, namely, axioms similar to the axiom of perfect recall and the axiom of no learning from temporal logic, and a Church–Rosser axiom. We investigate the influence of the substitution rule on the properties of these logics and propose a new semantics for the test (...)
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  46. André Fuhrmann (2014). Knowability as Potential Knowledge. Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.score: 66.0
    The thesis that every truth is knowable is usually glossed by decomposing knowability into possibility and knowledge. Under elementary assumptions about possibility and knowledge, considered as modal operators, the thesis collapses the distinction between truth and knowledge (as shown by the so-called Fitch-argument). We show that there is a more plausible interpretation of knowability—one that does not decompose the notion in the usual way—to which the Fitch-argument does not apply. We call this the potential knowledge-interpretation (...)
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  47. Luc Lismont & Philippe Mongin (1994). On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge. Theory and Decision 37 (1):75-106.score: 66.0
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  48. Peter Hawke (2011). Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):351-364.score: 60.0
    In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism, offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen (...)
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  49. Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Modal Scepticism, Unqualified Modality, and Modal Kinds. Philosophia 40 (2):403-409.score: 60.0
    I formulate and defend two sceptical theses on specific parts of our modal knowledge (unqualified and absolute modalities). My main point is that unqualified modal sentences are defective in that they fail to belong unambiguously to specific modal kinds and thus cannot be evaluated; hence, we must be sceptical of beliefs involving them.
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  50. Maja Malec (2004). A Priori Knowledge Contextualised and Benacerraf's Dilemma. Acta Analytica 19 (33):31-44.score: 60.0
    In this article, I discuss Hawthorne'€™s contextualist solution to Benacerraf'€™s dilemma. He wants to find a satisfactory epistemology to go with realist ontology, namely with causally inaccessible mathematical and modal entities. I claim that he is unsuccessful. The contextualist theories of knowledge attributions were primarily developed as a response to the skeptical argument based on the deductive closure principle. Hawthorne uses the same strategy in his attempt to solve the epistemologist puzzle facing the proponents of mathematical and (...) realism, but this problem is of a different nature than the skeptical one. The contextualist theory of knowledge attributions cannot help us with the question about the nature of mathematical and modal reality and how they can be known. I further argue that Hawthorne'€™s account does not say anything about a priori status of mathematical and modal knowledge. Later, Hawthorne adds to his account an implausible claim that in some contexts a gettierized belief counts as knowledge. (shrink)
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