Search results for 'modal knowledge' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  19
    Duško Prelević (2015). Modal Empiricism and Knowledge of De Re Possibilities: A Critique of Roca-Royes' Account. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (4):488–498.
    Accounting for our knowledge of de re modalities is probably the main reason why the proponents of modal empiricism think that their view should be preferred to modal rationalism. In this paper, I address Sonia Roca-Royes' account, which is taken to be a representative modal empiricist view, in order to show that modal empiricism faces serious problems even in explaining our knowledge of possibility de re, something which seems to be the easiest thing to (...)
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  2. Dustin Stokes (2006). Art and Modal Knowledge. In Dominic Lopes & Matthew Kieran (eds.), Knowing Art: Essays in Epistemology and Aesthetics. Springer
  3. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge. Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):537-552.
    The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true. This is something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based account of modal knowledge relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem (...)
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  4.  20
    Bob Fischer (2016). Hale on the Architecture of Modal Knowledge. Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):76-89.
    There are many modal epistemologies available to us. Which should we endorse? According to Bob Hale, we can start to answer this question by examining the architecture of modal knowledge. That is, we can try to decide between the following claims: knowing that p is possible is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that there are no conflicting necessities—a necessity-based approach—and knowing that p is necessary is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that (...)
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  5.  51
    Joachim Horvath (2014). Lowe on Modal Knowledge. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):208-217.
    In recent work, E. J. Lowe presents an essence-based account of our knowledge of metaphysical modality that he claims to be superior to its main competitors. I argue that knowledge of essences alone, without knowledge of a suitable bridge principle, is insufficient for knowing that something is metaphysically necessary or metaphysically possible. Yet given Lowe's other theoretical commitments, he cannot account for our knowledge of the needed bridge principle, and so his essence-based modal epistemology remains (...)
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  6.  24
    L. Lismont (1994). Common Knowledge: Relating Anti-Founded Situation Semantics to Modal Logic Neighbourhood Semantics. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (4):285-302.
    Two approaches for defining common knowledge coexist in the literature: the infinite iteration definition and the circular or fixed point one. In particular, an original modelization of the fixed point definition was proposed by Barwise in the context of a non-well-founded set theory and the infinite iteration approach has been technically analyzed within multi-modal epistemic logic using neighbourhood semantics by Lismont. This paper exhibits a relation between these two ways of modelling common knowledge which seem at first (...)
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  7.  14
    Riccardo Rosati (1999). Reasoning About Minimal Knowledge in Nonmonotonic Modal Logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (2):187-203.
    We study the problem of embedding Halpern and Moses's modal logic of minimal knowledge states into two families of modal formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning, McDermott and Doyle's nonmonotonic modal logics and ground nonmonotonic modal logics. First, we prove that Halpern and Moses's logic can be embedded into all ground logics; moreover, the translation employed allows for establishing a lower bound (3p) for the problem of skeptical reasoning in all ground logics. Then, we show a translation (...)
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  8. Stephen Cade Hetherington (1991). Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. In Tamara Horowitz (ed.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Rowman and Littlefield
    I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true.
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  9.  32
    Albert Casullo (2012). Counterfactuals and Modal Knowledge. In Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification. Oxford University Press 251-270.
    One infl uential argument in support of the existence of a priori knowledge is due to Kant, who claimed that necessity is a criterion of the a priori—that is, that all knowledge of necessary propositions is a priori. Th at claim, together with two others that Kant took to be evident—we know some mathematical propositions and such propositions are necessary—led directly to the conclusion that some knowledge is a priori. Kripke ( 1971 , 1980 ) challenged Kant’s (...)
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  10. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge. Noûs 45 (1):22-49.
    The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.
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  11. M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):364-380.
    The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal (...)
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  12.  49
    M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):364–380.
    The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal (...)
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  13. Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Noûs 46 (1):127 - 158.
    How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemology. When we discover what is possible or what is impossible, we generally exploit important connections between what (...)
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  14. Andrea Sauchelli (2010). Concrete Possible Worlds and Counterfactual Conditionals: Lewis Versus Williamson on Modal Knowledge. Synthese 176 (3):345-359.
    The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.
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  15. Christopher S. Hill (1998). Chalmers on the Apriority of Modal Knowledge. Analysis 58 (1):20-26.
  16.  11
    Rene Woudenberg (2006). Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):210-221.
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  17.  96
    Andrew Chignell (2014). Modal Motivations for Noumenal Ignorance: Knowledge, Cognition, and Coherence. Kant-Studien 105 (4):573-597.
    My goal in this paper is to show that Kant’s prohibition on certain kinds of knowledge of things-in-themselves is motivated less by his anti-soporific encounter with Hume than by his new view of the distinction between “real” and “logical” modality, a view that developed out of his reflection on the rationalist tradition in which he was trained. In brief: at some point in the 1770’s, Kant came to hold that a necessary condition on knowing a proposition is that one (...)
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  18.  29
    Robert William Fischer (2012). Modal Knowledge, in Theory. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):227-235.
    Some philosophers think that a person can justifi ably believe that p is possible even though she has no theory according to which p is possible. They think, for example, that she can justifiably believe that there could be naturally purple elephants even though she lacks (inter alia) a theory about the factors germane to elephant pigmentation. There is a certain optimism about this view: it seems to assume that people are fairly good at ferreting out problems with proposed (...) claims; so, if a person doesn’t detect one, then she’s within her rights to assume that there is no problem to be found. I am suspicious of this optimism, but I do not have space to challenge it here. Instead, I want to outline the more pessimistic alternative. Suppose that a person is not justified in believing that p is possible unless she has a theory according to which p is possible. How might such an account be developed? My aim is to map out this neglected option. (shrink)
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  19. Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2013). Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):605-623.
    Abstract Timothy Williamson has recently proposed to undermine modal skepticism by appealing to the reducibility of modal to counterfactual logic ( Reducibility ). Central to Williamson’s strategy is the claim that use of the same non-deductive mode of inference ( counterfactual development , or CD ) whereby we typically arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals suffices for arriving at knowledge of metaphysical necessity via Reducibility. Granting Reducibility, I ask whether the use of CD plays any essential role (...)
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  20.  36
    Stephen K. McLeod (2009). Rationalism and Modal Knowledge. Critica 41 (122):29-42.
    The article argues against attempts to combine ontological realism about modality with the rejection of modal rationalism and it suggests that modal realism requires (at least a weak form of) modal rationalism. /// El artículo da argumentos en contra de que se intente combinar el realismo ontológico sobre la modalidad con el rechazo del racionalismo modal y sugiere que el realismo modal exige (por lo menos una forma débil de) racionalismo modal.
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  21.  2
    Andrea Sauchelli, Concrete Possible Worlds and Counterfactual Conditionals : Lewis Vs. Williamson on Modal Knowledge.
    The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.
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  22. E. J. Lowe (2012). What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths? Mind 121 (484):919-950.
    There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capacity for modal (...) is just an extension, or by-product, of our general capacity to acquire knowledge of true counterfactual conditionals — a capacity that we deploy ubiquitously in everyday life. Williamson’s account crucially involves a thesis to the effect that modal truths can be explained in terms of counterfactual truths. In this paper, I query Williamson’s account on a number of points, including this thesis. My positive proposal, which owes a debt to the work of Kit Fine on modality and essence, appeals instead to our capacity to grasp essences, understood in a neo-Aristotelian fashion, according to which essences are expressed by ‘real definitions’. (shrink)
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  23. Thomas Kroedel (forthcoming). Modal Knowledge, Evolution, and Counterfactuals. In Robert William Fischer & Felipe Leon (eds.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Dordrecht
  24. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge. In Greg Restall & Gillian Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic. MacMillan
  25. C. S. Jenkins (2008). Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):693-701.
    In recent work Timothy Williamson argues that the epistemology of metaphysical modality is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson has not provided an adequate argument for this controversial claim, and that it is not obvious how what he says should be supplemented in order to derive such an argument. But I suggest that an important moral of his discussion survives this point. The moral is that experience could play an epistemic role which is more (...)
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  26.  19
    Todd M. Stewart (2012). Comments on Robert Fischer's “Modal Knowledge, in Theory”. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):95-99.
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  27.  4
    C. S. Hill (1998). Chalmers on the Apriority of Modal Knowledge. Analysis 58 (1):20-26.
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  28.  39
    René van Woudenberg (2006). Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):210–221.
    This article is a discussion of Hume's maxim Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. First I explain this maxim and distinguish it from the principle Whatever cannot be imagined (conceived), is impossible. Next I argue that Thomas Reid's criticism of the maxim fails and that the arguments by Tamar Szábo Gendler and John Hawthorne for the claim that "it is uncontroversial that there are cases where we are misled" by the maxim are unconvincing. Finally I state the limited but real (...)
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  29.  12
    Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim & Sébastien Motta (2012). On Modal Knowledge. Philosophia Scientiae 16:3-37.
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  30.  3
    Leslie Smith (1994). Modal Knowledge and Transmodularity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):729.
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  31.  1
    Benjamin Jarvis & J. P. Ichikawa, Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge.
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  32. Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim & Sébastien Motta (2012). On Modal Knowledge. Philosophia Scientae 16:3-37.
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  33. Simon Evnine (2008). Modal Epistemology: Our Knowledge of Necessity and Possibility. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):664-684.
    I survey a number of views about how we can obtain knowledge of modal propositions, propositions about necessity and possibility. One major approach is that whether a proposition or state of affairs is conceivable tells us something about whether it is possible. I examine two quite different positions that fall under this rubric, those of Yablo and Chalmers. One problem for this approach is the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and I deal with some of the ways (...)
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  34. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of 'Knowledge'-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315 - 331.
    Jason Stanley has argued recently that Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI) are explanatorily on a par with regard to certain data arising from modal and temporal embeddings of 'knowledge'-ascriptions. This paper argues against Stanley that EC has a clear advantage over SSI in the discussed field and introduces a new type of linguistic datum strongly suggesting the falsity of SSI.
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  35.  72
    Alexander Bird (2008). Remarks on Our Knowledge of Modal Facts. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 43:54--60.
    Can we have a posteriori knowledge of modal facts? And if so, is that knowledge fundamentally a posteriori, or does a priori intuition provide the modal component of what is known? Though the latter view seems more straightforward, there are also reasons for taking the first option seriously.
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  36.  11
    M. J. Winfield, A. Basden & I. Cresswell (1996). Knowledge Elicitation Using a Multi-Modal Approach. World Futures 47 (1):93-101.
    (1996). Knowledge elicitation using a multi‐modal approach. World Futures: Vol. 47, Unity and Diversity in Contemporary Systems Tinking: Systematic Pictures at an Exhibition, pp. 93-101.
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  37.  1
    Vania Costa & Mario Benevides (2005). Formalizing Concurrent Common Knowledge as Product of Modal Logics. Logic Journal of the IGPL 13 (6):665-684.
    This work introduces a two-dimensional modal logic to represent agents' Concurrent Common Knowledge in distributed systems. Unlike Common Knowledge, Concurrent Common Knowledge is a kind of agreement reachable in asynchronous environments. The formalization of such type of knowledge is based on a model for asynchronous systems and on the definition of Concurrent Knowledge introduced before in paper [5]. As a proper semantics, we review our concept of closed sub-product of modal logics which is (...)
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  38. Tuomas E. Tahko (2008). A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis. Metaphysica 9 (2):57-68.
    In this paper I will offer a novel understanding of a priori knowledge. My claim is that the sharp distinction that is usually made between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is groundless. It will be argued that a plausible understanding of a priori and a posteriori knowledge has to acknowledge that they are in a constant bootstrapping relationship. It is also crucial that we distinguish between a priori propositions that hold in the actual world and merely (...)
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  39. Margot Strohminger (2015). Perceptual Knowledge of Nonactual Possibilities. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):363-75.
    It is widely assumed that sense perception cannot deliver knowledge of nonactual (metaphysical) possibilities. We are not supposed to be able to know that a proposition p is necessary or that p is possible (if p is false) by sense perception. This paper aims to establish that the role of sense perception is not so limited. It argues that we can know lots of modal facts by perception. While the most straightforward examples concern possibility and contingency, others concern (...)
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  40.  74
    Joseph Y. Halpern, Dov Samet & Ella Segev (2009). Defining Knowledge in Terms of Belief: The Modal Logic Perspective. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):469-487.
    The question of whether knowledge is definable in terms of belief, which has played an important role in epistemology for the last 50 years, is studied here in the framework of epistemic and doxastic logics. Three notions of definability are considered: explicit definability, implicit definability, and reducibility, where explicit definability is equivalent to the combination of implicit definability and reducibility. It is shown that if knowledge satisfies any set of axioms contained in S5, then it cannot be explicitly (...)
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  41.  24
    Andrew Chignell (2015). Corrigendum To: Modal Motivations for Noumenal Ignorance: Knowledge, Cognition, and Coherence. Kant-Studien.
    Journal Name: Kant-Studien Issue: Ahead of print.
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  42.  14
    Andrew Chignell (2015). Corrigendum To: Modal Motivations for Noumenal Ignorance: Knowledge, Cognition, and Coherence. Kant-Studien.
    Journal Name: Kant-Studien Issue: Ahead of print.
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  43.  5
    Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.
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  44.  18
    John Zeleznikow, George Vossos & Daniel Hunter (1993). The IKBALS Project: Multi-Modal Reasoning in Legal Knowledge Based Systems. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (3):169-203.
    In attempting to build intelligent litigation support tools, we have moved beyond first generation, production rule legal expert systems. Our work integrates rule based and case based reasoning with intelligent information retrieval.When using the case based reasoning methodology, or in our case the specialisation of case based retrieval, we need to be aware of how to retrieve relevant experience. Our research, in the legal domain, specifies an approach to the retrieval problem which relies heavily on an extended object oriented/rule based (...)
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  45.  1
    William J. Rapaport, Christophe Geissler & Kurt Konolige (1988). A Resolution Method for Quantified Modal Logics of Knowledge and Belief. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):668.
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  46.  1
    William J. Rapaport (1988). Geissler Christophe and Konolige Kurt. A Resolution Method for Quantified Modal Logics of Knowledge and Belief. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 Conference, Edited by Halpern Joseph Y., Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos 1986, Pp. 309–324. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):668.
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  47.  1
    William J. Rapaport (1988). Plotkin Gordon and Stirling Colin. A Framework for Intuitionistic Modal Logics. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 Conference, Edited by Halpern Joseph Y., Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos 1986, Pp. 399–406. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):669.
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  48.  3
    William J. Rapaport (1988). Review: Christophe Geissler, Kurt Konolige, A Resolution Method for Quantified Modal Logics of Knowledge and Belief. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):668-668.
  49. L. Lismont (1993). Common Knowledge in Modal Logic. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 39 (1):115-130.
     
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  50. Rosati Riccardo (1999). Reasoning About Minimal Knowledge in Nonmonotonic Modal Logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (2).
     
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