Search results for 'modal status' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tuomas E. Tahko (2015). The Modal Status of Laws: In Defence of a Hybrid View. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):509-528.
    Three popular views regarding the modal status of the laws of nature are discussed: Humean Supervenience, nomic necessitation, and scientific/dispositional essentialism. These views are examined especially with regard to their take on the apparent modal force of laws and their ability to explain that modal force. It will be suggested that none of the three views, at least in their strongest form, can be maintained if some laws are metaphysically necessary, but others are metaphysically contingent. Some (...)
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  2.  35
    Matthew Carey Jordan (2012). Divine Attitudes, Divine Commands, and the Modal Status of Moral Truths. Religious Studies 48 (1):45-60.
    This essay presents a theistic account of deontic properties that can lay claim to many of the advantages of divine command theory but which avoids its flaws. The account, divine attitude theory, asserts that moral properties should be understood in terms of agent-directed divine attitudes, such that it is morally wrong for an agent to perform an action just in case God would be displeased with the agent for performing that action. Among the virtues of this account is its ability (...)
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  3.  4
    Manuel Ppérez Otero (2001). A Fallacy About the Modal Status of Logic. Dialectica 55 (1):9–27.
    In John Etchemendy's book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, several arguments are put forth against the standard model‐theoretic account of logical consequence and logical truth. I argue in this article that crucial parts of Etchemendy's attack depend on a failure to distinguish two senses of logic and two correlative senses of being something a logical question. According to one of these senses, the logic of a language, L, is the set of logical truths of L. In the other sense, logic (...)
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  4.  68
    John Divers (2014). The Modal Status of the Lewisian Analysis of Modality. Mind 123 (491):861-872.
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  5.  84
    Martin Lin (forthcoming). Leibniz on the Modal Status of Absolute Space. Noûs.
  6. Joseph Levine & Kelly Trogdon (2009). The Modal Status of Materialism. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.
    Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian (...)
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  7.  24
    Jussi Haukioja (2001). The Modal Status of Basic Equations. Philosophical Studies 104 (2):115 - 122.
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  8.  4
    Martin Lin (2016). Leibniz on the Modal Status of Absolute Space and Time. Noûs 50 (3):447-464.
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  9.  17
    Martin Lin (2016). Leibniz on the Modal Status of Absolute Space and Time. Noûs 50 (3):447-464.
  10.  34
    Markus Gabriel (2010). Contingency or Necessity? Schelling and Hegel on the Modal Status of Logical Space. Ideas Y Valores 59 (142):5-23.
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  11.  28
    Sven Ove Hansson (2006). The Modal Status of Philosophy. Theoria 72 (3):173-176.
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  12.  28
    Remmel T. Nunn (1979). Psychologism, Functionalism, and the Modal Status of Logical Laws. Inquiry 22 (1-4):343-349.
    In a recent article (Inquiry, Vol. 19 [1976]), J. W. Meiland addresses the issue of psychologism in logic, which holds that logic is a branch of psychology and that logical laws (such as the Principle of Non?Contradiction) are contingent upon the nature of the mind. Meiland examines Husserl's critique of psychologism, argues that Husserl is not convincing, and offers two new objections to the psychologistic thesis. In this paper I attempt to rebut those objections. In question are the acceptable criteria (...)
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  13.  2
    Matthew Carey Jordan (2012). Divine Attitudes, Divine Commands, and the Modal Status of Moral Truths. Religious Studies 48 (1):45-60.
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  14.  1
    Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst (1987). The Modal Status of Antinomies. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 (1):102-105.
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  15.  11
    David DeGrazia (2016). Modal Personhood and Moral Status: A Reply to Kagan's Proposal. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):22-25.
    Kagan argues that human beings who are neither persons nor even potential persons — if their impairment is independent of genetic constitution — are modal persons: individuals who might have been persons. Moreover, he proposes a view according to which both personhood and modal personhood are sufficient for counting more, morally, than nonhuman animals. In response to this proposal, I raise one relatively minor concern about Kagan's reasoning — that he judges too quickly that insentient beings can have (...)
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  16.  36
    David S. Oderberg (1997). Modal Properties, Moral Status, and Identity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):259–276.
  17.  1
    David S. Oderberg (1997). Modal Properties, Moral Status, and Identity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):259-276.
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  18. Pk Moser & Arnold Vander Nat (1988). The Logical Status of Modal Reductionism. Logique Et Analyse 31 (121-122):69-78.
     
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  19. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Essentialism Vis-À-Vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):54-64.
    Pace Necessitism – roughly, the view that existence is not contingent – essential properties provide necessary conditions for the existence of objects. Sufficiency properties, by contrast, provide sufficient conditions, and individual essences provide necessary and sufficient conditions. This paper explains how these kinds of properties can be used to illuminate the ontological status of merely possible objects and to construct a respectable possibilist ontology. The paper also reviews two points of interaction between essentialism and modal logic. First, we (...)
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  20. Thaddeus Metz (2012). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402.
    The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no (...)
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  21. Norman M. Swartz (2004). Foreknowledge and Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will (...)
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  22.  15
    Carlos Lobo, Cleverson Leite Bastos & Carlos Eduardo de Carvalho Vargas (2015). On Essentialism and Existentialism in the Husserlian Platonism: A Reflexion Based on Modal Logic. Axiomathes 25 (3):335-343.
    Departing from modal logic, Jean-Yves Girard, as a logician interested in philosophy, presented a distinction between essentialism and existentialism in logic. Carlos Lobo reflected about the Girard’s concept to reinterpret the Husserlian Platonism in regard of the status of logical modalities. We start rescuing the notion of modal logic in the Edmund Husserl’s works, especially Formal and Transcendental Logic and First Philosophy. Developing this reflexion, we propose a new contribution to this discussion, reinterpreting the platonic influence in (...)
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  23.  5
    Gunnar Declerck (forthcoming). What Could Have Been Done (but Wasn’T). On the Counterfactual Status of Action in Alva Noë’s Theory of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    Alva Noë’s strategy to solve the puzzle of perceptual presence entirely relies on the principle of presence as access. Unaccessed or unattended parts or details of objects are perceptually present insofar as they are accessible, and they are accessible insofar as one possesses sensorimotor skills that can secure their access. In this paper, I consider several arguments that can be opposed to this claim and that are chiefly related to the modal status of action, i.e. the fact that (...)
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  24. Paul Redding (2014). Pragmatism, Idealism and the Modal Menace: Rorty, Brandom and Truths About Photons. The European Legacy 19 (2):174-186.
    In a short exchange published in 2000, Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom differed over the status of “facts” in a world containing no speakers and, hence, no speech acts. While Brandom wanted to retain the meaningfulness of talk of “facts” or “truths” about things—in this case truths about photons —in a world in which there could be no claimings about such things, Rorty denied the existence of any such “worldly items” as “facts.” In this essay the difference between Rorty (...)
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  25.  42
    Gil Sagi (2015). The Modal and Epistemic Arguments Against the Invariance Criterion for Logical Terms. Journal of Philosophy 112 (3):159-167.
    The essay discusses a recurrent criticism of the isomorphism-invariance criterion for logical terms, according to which the criterion pertains only to the extension of logical terms, and neglects the meaning, or the way the extension is fixed. A term, so claim the critics, can be invariant under isomorphisms and yet involve a contingent or a posteriori component in its meaning, thus compromising the necessity or apriority of logical truth and logical consequence. This essay shows that the arguments underlying the criticism (...)
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  26.  97
    Richard Woodward (2008). Why Modal Fictionalism is Not Self-Defeating. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):273 - 288.
    Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of a plurality of worlds. In (...)
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  27.  80
    Dennis Dieks (2007). Probability in Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):292-310.
    Modal interpretations have the ambition to construe quantum mechanics as an objective, man-independent description of physical reality. Their second leading idea is probabilism: quantum mechanics does not completely fix physical reality but yields probabilities. In working out these ideas an important motif is to stay close to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and to refrain from introducing new structure by hand. In this paper we explain how this programme can be made concrete. In particular, we show that the (...)
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  28.  4
    Jonathan Surovell (forthcoming). But for the Grace of God: Abortion and Cognitive Disability, Luck and Moral Status. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-21.
    Many theories of moral status that are intended to ground pro-choice views on abortion tie full moral status to advanced cognitive capabilities. Extant accounts of this kind are inconsistent with the intuition that the profoundly cognitively disabled have full moral status. This paper improves upon these extant accounts by combining an anti-luck condition with Steinbock’s stratification of moral status into two levels. On the resulting view, a being has full moral status if and only if (...)
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  29. Kathrin Glüer (2006). The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or a Posteriori Necessity? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):337 – 359.
    According to Donald Davidson, linguistic meaning is determined by the principle of charity. Because of Davidson's semantic behaviourism, charity's significance is both epistemic and metaphysical: charity not only provides the radical interpreter with a method for constructing a semantic theory on the basis of his data, but it does so because it is the principle metaphysically determining meaning. In this paper, I assume that charity does determine meaning. On this assumption, I investigate both its epistemic and metaphysical status: is (...)
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  30. Joseph G. Moore (2008). A Modal Argument Against Vague Objects. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (12):1-17.
    There has been much discussion of whether there could be objects A and B that are “individuatively vague” in the following way: object A and object B neither determinately stand in the relation of identity to one another, nor do they determinately fail to stand in this relation. If there are objects of this type, then we would have a genuine case of metaphysical vagueness, or “vagueness-in-the-world.” The possibility of vague objects in this sense strikes many as incoherent. The possibility’s (...)
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  31.  5
    Adam James Roberts (2016). Pessimism About Motivating Modal Personism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (2).
    In ‘What's Wrong with Speciesism?’, Shelly Kagan sketches an account on which both actually being a person and possibly being a person are relevant to one's moral status, labelling this view ‘modal personism’ and supporting its conclusions with appeals to intuitions about a range of marginal cases. I tender a pessimistic response to Kagan's concern about motivating modal personism: that is, of being able to ‘go beyond the mere appeal to brute intuition, eventually offering an account of (...)
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  32.  12
    Jeff McMahan (2016). On ‘Modal Personism’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):26-30.
    In this article I present several challenges to the view that Shelly Kagan calls ‘modal personism’. First, there is a plausible account of our identity that, if true, greatly diminishes the scope of Kagan's view. But the scope of the view is already quite limited because the category of modal persons is restricted to those non-persons that had but have lost the potential to become persons. If the category were to include non-persons that retain the potential to become (...)
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  33.  4
    Adam James Roberts (2016). Pessimism About Motivating Modal Personism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (4).
    In ‘What's Wrong with Speciesism?’, Shelly Kagan sketches an account on which both actually being a person and possibly being a person are relevant to one's moral status, labelling this view ‘modal personism’ and supporting its conclusions with appeals to intuitions about a range of marginal cases. I tender a pessimistic response to Kagan's concern about motivating modal personism: that is, of being able to ‘go beyond the mere appeal to brute intuition, eventually offering an account of (...)
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  34. Janet Levin (2007). Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims? Inquiry 50 (3):253 – 269.
    In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that intuitions about what is possible play a limited, but important, role in challenging philosophical theses, counting as evidence against them only if they cannot be reconstrued as intuitions about something else, compatible with the thesis in question. But he doesn't provide clear guidelines for determining when such intuitions have been successfully reconstrued, leading some to question their status as evidence for modal claims. In this paper I focus on some worries, articulated (...)
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  35.  32
    Manuel Perez Otero (1996). Verdad Necesaria Versus Teorema de Lógica Modal (Necessary Truth Versus Theorem of Modal Logic). Theoria 11 (1):185-201.
    En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese (...)
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  36.  53
    Peter K. Schotch (1984). Remarks on the Semantics of Non-Normal Modal Logics. Topoi 3 (1):85-90.
    The standard semantics for sentential modal logics uses a truth condition for necessity which first appeared in the early 1950s. in this paper the status of that condition is investigated and a more general condition is proposed. in addition to meeting certain natural adequacy criteria, the more general condition allows one to capture logics like s1 and s0.9 in a way which brings together the work of segerberg and cresswell.
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  37.  3
    Giorgio Vallortigara & Luca Tommasi (2001). Minimization of Modal Contours: An Instance of an Evolutionary Internalized Geometric Regularity? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):706-707.
    The stratification in depth of chromatically homogeneous overlapping figures depends on a minimization rule which assigns the status of being “in front” to the figure that requires the formation of shorter modal contours. This rule has been proven valid also in birds, whose visual neuroanatomy is radically different from that of other mammals, thus suggesting an example of evolutionary convergence toward a perceptual universal. [Shepard].
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  38.  33
    Simon Hewitt (2012). Modalising Plurals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):853-875.
    There has been very little discussion of the appropriate principles to govern a modal logic of plurals. What debate there has been has accepted a principle I call (Necinc); informally if this is one of those then, necessarily: this is one of those. On this basis Williamson has criticised the Boolosian plural interpretation of monadic second-order logic. I argue against (Necinc), noting that it isn't a theorem of any logic resulting from adding modal axioms to the plural logic (...)
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  39. Sonia Roca-Royes (2006). Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account of Modality: “Flexibility of Origins” Plus S4. Erkenntnis 65 (3):405-426.
    Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of the “flexibility of origins” thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle (MEP), and a set of Constitutive (...)
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  40.  98
    Robert Pargetter (1984). Laws and Modal Realism. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):335-347.
    It is widely agreed that constant conjunction is a necessary condition for a proposit'2on such as 'Every A is a B' being a law) That is each A is also a B (where A and B are kinds of events, objects states of affairs, or whatever) or the property of being an A is always conjoined with the property of being a B. It is also widely agreed that this cannot be the whole story. How can we distinguish accidental generalisations (...)
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  41. John P. Burgess (2003). Which Modal Models Are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)? Theoria 18 (2):145-158.
    Recently it has become almost the received wisdom in certain quarters that Kripke models are appropriate only for something like metaphysical modalities, and not for logical modalities. Here the line of thought leading to Kripke models, and reasons why they are no less appropriate for logical than for other modalities, are explained. It is also indicated where the fallacy in the argument leading to the contrary conclusion lies. The lessons learned are then applied to the question of the status (...)
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  42.  6
    Lloyd Humberstone (2012). Minimally Congruential Contexts: Observations and Questions on Embedding E in K. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (4):581-598.
    Recently, an improvement in respect of simplicity was found by Rohan French over extant translations faithfully embedding the smallest congruential modal logic (E) in the smallest normal modal logic (K). After some preliminaries, we explore the possibility of further simplifying the translation, with various negative findings (but no positive solution). This line of inquiry leads, via a consideration of one candidate simpler translation whose status was left open earlier, to isolating the concept of a minimally congruential context. (...)
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  43.  73
    Christopher Peacocke (2008). Truly Understood. Oxford University Press.
    A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case (...)
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  44. Theodore Sider (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford University Press.
    In order to perfectly describe the world, it is not enough to speak truly. One must also use the right concepts - including the right logical concepts. One must use concepts that "carve at the joints", that give the world's "structure". There is an objectively correct way to "write the book of the world". Much of metaphysics, as traditionally conceived, is about the fundamental nature of reality; in the present terms, this is about the world's structure. Metametaphysics - inquiry into (...)
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  45.  50
    Brian Leftow (2012). God and Necessity. Oxford University Press.
    Modal basics -- Some solutions -- Theist solutions -- The ontology of possibility -- Modal truthmakers -- Modality and the divine nature -- Deity as essential -- Against deity theories -- The role of deity -- The biggest bang -- Divine concepts -- Concepts, syntax, and actualism -- Modality: basic notions -- The genesis of secular modality -- Modal reality -- Essences -- Non-secular modalities -- Theism and modal semantics -- Freedom, preference, and cost -- Explaining (...)
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  46.  74
    Jeffrey Stephen Poland (1994). Physicalism, the Philosophical Foundations. Oxford University Press.
    Physicalism is a program for building a unified system of knowledge about the world on the basis of the view that everything is a manifestation of the physical aspects of existence. Jeffrey Poland presents a systematic and comprehensive exploration of the philosophical foundations of this program. He investigates the core ideas, motivating values, and presuppositions of physicalism; the constraints upon an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine; the epistemological and modal status, the scope, and the methodological roles of physicalist (...)
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  47.  90
    Nathan Wildman (forthcoming). On Shaky Ground? In Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure. Oxford University Press
    The past decade and a half has seen an absolute explosion of literature discussing the structure of reality. One particular focus here has been on the fundamental. However, while there has been extensive discussion, numerous fundamental questions about fundamentality have not been touched upon. In this chapter, I focus on one such lacuna about the modal strength of fundamentality. More specifically, I am interested in exploring the contingent fundamentality thesis - that is, the idea that the fundamentalia are only (...)
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  48. Nora Berenstain (2014). Necessary Laws and Chemical Kinds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):631-647.
    Contingentism, generally contrasted with law necessitarianism, is the view that the laws of nature are contingent. It is often coupled with the claim that their contingency is knowable a priori. This paper considers Bird's [2001, 2002, 2005, 2007] arguments for the thesis that, necessarily, salt dissolves in water; and it defends his view against Beebee's [2001] and Psillos's [2002] contingentist objections. A new contingentist objection is offered and several reasons for scepticism about its success are raised. It is concluded that (...)
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  49. Timothy Williamson (2016). Modal Science. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):453-492.
    This paper explains and defends the idea that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of objective necessity. Plausible closure conditions on the family of objective modalities are shown to entail that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Evidence is provided that some objective modalities are studied in the natural sciences. In particular, the modal assumptions implicit in physical applications of dynamical systems theory are made explicit by using such systems to define models of a modal temporal logic. (...)
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  50. Karen Bennett (2005). Two Axes of Actualism. Philosophical Review 114 (3):297-326.
    Actualists routinely characterize their view by means of the slogan, “Everything is actual.” They say that there aren’t any things that exist but do not actually exist—there aren’t any “mere possibilia.” If there are any things that deserve the label ‘possible world’, they are just actually existing entities of some kind—maximally consistent sets of sentences, or maximal uninstantiated properties, or maximal possible states of affairs, or something along those lines. Possibilists, in contrast, do think that there are mere possibilia, that (...)
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