Search results for 'modal status' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tuomas E. Tahko (2015). The Modal Status of Laws: In Defence of a Hybrid View. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):509-528.
    Three popular views regarding the modal status of the laws of nature are discussed: Humean Supervenience, nomic necessitation, and scientific/dispositional essentialism. These views are examined especially with regard to their take on the apparent modal force of laws and their ability to explain that modal force. It will be suggested that none of the three views, at least in their strongest form, can be maintained if some laws are metaphysically necessary, but others are metaphysically contingent. Some (...)
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  2.  30
    Matthew Carey Jordan (2012). Divine Attitudes, Divine Commands, and the Modal Status of Moral Truths. Religious Studies 48 (1):45-60.
    This essay presents a theistic account of deontic properties that can lay claim to many of the advantages of divine command theory but which avoids its flaws. The account, divine attitude theory, asserts that moral properties should be understood in terms of agent-directed divine attitudes, such that it is morally wrong for an agent to perform an action just in case God would be displeased with the agent for performing that action. Among the virtues of this account is its ability (...)
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  3.  3
    Manuel Ppérez Otero (2001). A Fallacy About the Modal Status of Logic. Dialectica 55 (1):9–27.
    In John Etchemendy's book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, several arguments are put forth against the standard model‐theoretic account of logical consequence and logical truth. I argue in this article that crucial parts of Etchemendy's attack depend on a failure to distinguish two senses of logic and two correlative senses of being something a logical question. According to one of these senses, the logic of a language, L, is the set of logical truths of L. In the other sense, logic (...)
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  4.  56
    John Divers (2014). The Modal Status of the Lewisian Analysis of Modality. Mind 123 (491):861-872.
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  5.  55
    Martin Lin (forthcoming). Leibniz on the Modal Status of Absolute Space. Noûs.
  6. Joseph Levine & Kelly Trogdon (2009). The Modal Status of Materialism. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.
    Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian (...)
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  7.  15
    Jussi Haukioja (2001). The Modal Status of Basic Equations. Philosophical Studies 104 (2):115 - 122.
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  8.  10
    Martin Lin (2015). Leibniz on the Modal Status of Absolute Space and Time. Noûs 50 (2).
  9.  24
    Markus Gabriel (2010). Contingency or Necessity? Schelling and Hegel on the Modal Status of Logical Space. Ideas Y Valores 59 (142):5-23.
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  10.  12
    Sven Ove Hansson (2006). The Modal Status of Philosophy. Theoria 72 (3):173-176.
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  11.  24
    Remmel T. Nunn (1979). I. Psychologism, Functionalism, and the Modal Status of Logical Laws. Inquiry 22 (1-4):343-349.
    In a recent article (Inquiry, Vol. 19 [1976]), J. W. Meiland addresses the issue of psychologism in logic, which holds that logic is a branch of psychology and that logical laws (such as the Principle of Non?Contradiction) are contingent upon the nature of the mind. Meiland examines Husserl's critique of psychologism, argues that Husserl is not convincing, and offers two new objections to the psychologistic thesis. In this paper I attempt to rebut those objections. In question are the acceptable criteria (...)
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  12.  1
    Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst (1987). The Modal Status of Antinomies. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 (1):102-105.
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  13. Matthew Carey Jordan (2012). Divine Attitudes, Divine Commands, and the Modal Status of Moral Truths. Religious Studies 48 (1):45-60.
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  14.  7
    David DeGrazia (2016). Modal Personhood and Moral Status: A Reply to Kagan's Proposal. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):22-25.
    Kagan argues that human beings who are neither persons nor even potential persons — if their impairment is independent of genetic constitution — are modal persons: individuals who might have been persons. Moreover, he proposes a view according to which both personhood and modal personhood are sufficient for counting more, morally, than nonhuman animals. In response to this proposal, I raise one relatively minor concern about Kagan's reasoning — that he judges too quickly that insentient beings can have (...)
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  15.  26
    David S. Oderberg (1997). Modal Properties, Moral Status, and Identity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):259–276.
  16. David S. Oderberg (1997). Modal Properties, Moral Status, and Identity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):259-276.
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  17. Pk Moser & Arnold Vander Nat (1988). The Logical Status of Modal Reductionism. Logique Et Analyse 31 (121-122):69-78.
     
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  18. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Essentialism Vis-À-Vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):54-64.
    Pace Necessitism – roughly, the view that existence is not contingent – essential properties provide necessary conditions for the existence of objects. Sufficiency properties, by contrast, provide sufficient conditions, and individual essences provide necessary and sufficient conditions. This paper explains how these kinds of properties can be used to illuminate the ontological status of merely possible objects and to construct a respectable possibilist ontology. The paper also reviews two points of interaction between essentialism and modal logic. First, we (...)
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  19. Norman M. Swartz, Foreknowledge and Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will (...)
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  20.  14
    Carlos Lobo, Cleverson Leite Bastos & Carlos Eduardo de Carvalho Vargas (2015). On Essentialism and Existentialism in the Husserlian Platonism: A Reflexion Based on Modal Logic. Axiomathes 25 (3):335-343.
    Departing from modal logic, Jean-Yves Girard, as a logician interested in philosophy, presented a distinction between essentialism and existentialism in logic. Carlos Lobo reflected about the Girard’s concept to reinterpret the Husserlian Platonism in regard of the status of logical modalities. We start rescuing the notion of modal logic in the Edmund Husserl’s works, especially Formal and Transcendental Logic and First Philosophy. Developing this reflexion, we propose a new contribution to this discussion, reinterpreting the platonic influence in (...)
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  21.  28
    Gil Sagi (2015). The Modal and Epistemic Arguments Against the Invariance Criterion for Logical Terms. Journal of Philosophy 112 (3):159-167.
    The essay discusses a recurrent criticism of the isomorphism-invariance criterion for logical terms, according to which the criterion pertains only to the extension of logical terms, and neglects the meaning, or the way the extension is fixed. A term, so claim the critics, can be invariant under isomorphisms and yet involve a contingent or a posteriori component in its meaning, thus compromising the necessity or apriority of logical truth and logical consequence. This essay shows that the arguments underlying the criticism (...)
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  22. Paul Redding (2014). Pragmatism, Idealism and the Modal Menace: Rorty, Brandom and Truths About Photons. The European Legacy 19 (2):174-186.
    In a short exchange published in 2000, Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom differed over the status of “facts” in a world containing no speakers and, hence, no speech acts. While Brandom wanted to retain the meaningfulness of talk of “facts” or “truths” about things—in this case truths about photons —in a world in which there could be no claimings about such things, Rorty denied the existence of any such “worldly items” as “facts.” In this essay the difference between Rorty (...)
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  23.  87
    Richard Woodward (2008). Why Modal Fictionalism is Not Self-Defeating. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):273 - 288.
    Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of a plurality of worlds. In (...)
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  24. Kathrin Glüer (2006). The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or a Posteriori Necessity? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):337 – 359.
    According to Donald Davidson, linguistic meaning is determined by the principle of charity. Because of Davidson's semantic behaviourism, charity's significance is both epistemic and metaphysical: charity not only provides the radical interpreter with a method for constructing a semantic theory on the basis of his data, but it does so because it is the principle metaphysically determining meaning. In this paper, I assume that charity does determine meaning. On this assumption, I investigate both its epistemic and metaphysical status: is (...)
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  25.  51
    Dennis Dieks (2007). Probability in Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):292-310.
    Modal interpretations have the ambition to construe quantum mechanics as an objective, man-independent description of physical reality. Their second leading idea is probabilism: quantum mechanics does not completely fix physical reality but yields probabilities. In working out these ideas an important motif is to stay close to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and to refrain from introducing new structure by hand. In this paper we explain how this programme can be made concrete. In particular, we show that the (...)
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  26.  6
    Jeff McMahan (2016). On ‘Modal Personism’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):26-30.
    In this article I present several challenges to the view that Shelly Kagan calls ‘modal personism’. First, there is a plausible account of our identity that, if true, greatly diminishes the scope of Kagan's view. But the scope of the view is already quite limited because the category of modal persons is restricted to those non-persons that had but have lost the potential to become persons. If the category were to include non-persons that retain the potential to become (...)
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  27.  99
    Joseph G. Moore (2008). A Modal Argument Against Vague Objects. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (12):1-17.
    There has been much discussion of whether there could be objects A and B that are “individuatively vague” in the following way: object A and object B neither determinately stand in the relation of identity to one another, nor do they determinately fail to stand in this relation. If there are objects of this type, then we would have a genuine case of metaphysical vagueness, or “vagueness-in-the-world.” The possibility of vague objects in this sense strikes many as incoherent. The possibility’s (...)
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  28.  92
    Janet Levin (2007). Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims? Inquiry 50 (3):253 – 269.
    In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that intuitions about what is possible play a limited, but important, role in challenging philosophical theses, counting as evidence against them only if they cannot be reconstrued as intuitions about something else, compatible with the thesis in question. But he doesn't provide clear guidelines for determining when such intuitions have been successfully reconstrued, leading some to question their status as evidence for modal claims. In this paper I focus on some worries, articulated (...)
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  29.  19
    Manuel Perez Otero (1996). Verdad Necesaria Versus Teorema de Lógica Modal (Necessary Truth Versus Theorem of Modal Logic). Theoria 11 (1):185-201.
    En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese (...)
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  30.  28
    Peter K. Schotch (1984). Remarks on the Semantics of Non-Normal Modal Logics. Topoi 3 (1):85-90.
    The standard semantics for sentential modal logics uses a truth condition for necessity which first appeared in the early 1950s. in this paper the status of that condition is investigated and a more general condition is proposed. in addition to meeting certain natural adequacy criteria, the more general condition allows one to capture logics like s1 and s0.9 in a way which brings together the work of segerberg and cresswell.
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  31.  3
    Giorgio Vallortigara & Luca Tommasi (2001). Minimization of Modal Contours: An Instance of an Evolutionary Internalized Geometric Regularity? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):706-707.
    The stratification in depth of chromatically homogeneous overlapping figures depends on a minimization rule which assigns the status of being “in front” to the figure that requires the formation of shorter modal contours. This rule has been proven valid also in birds, whose visual neuroanatomy is radically different from that of other mammals, thus suggesting an example of evolutionary convergence toward a perceptual universal. [Shepard].
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  32.  20
    Simon Hewitt (2012). Modalising Plurals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):853-875.
    There has been very little discussion of the appropriate principles to govern a modal logic of plurals. What debate there has been has accepted a principle I call (Necinc); informally if this is one of those then, necessarily: this is one of those. On this basis Williamson has criticised the Boolosian plural interpretation of monadic second-order logic. I argue against (Necinc), noting that it isn't a theorem of any logic resulting from adding modal axioms to the plural logic (...)
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  33.  96
    Sonia Roca-Royes (2006). Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account of Modality: “Flexibility of Origins” Plus S4. Erkenntnis 65 (3):405-426.
    Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of the “flexibility of origins” thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle (MEP), and a set of Constitutive (...)
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  34.  97
    Robert Pargetter (1984). Laws and Modal Realism. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):335-347.
    It is widely agreed that constant conjunction is a necessary condition for a proposit'2on such as 'Every A is a B' being a law) That is each A is also a B (where A and B are kinds of events, objects states of affairs, or whatever) or the property of being an A is always conjoined with the property of being a B. It is also widely agreed that this cannot be the whole story. How can we distinguish accidental generalisations (...)
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  35.  5
    Lloyd Humberstone (2012). Minimally Congruential Contexts: Observations and Questions on Embedding E in K. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (4):581-598.
    Recently, an improvement in respect of simplicity was found by Rohan French over extant translations faithfully embedding the smallest congruential modal logic (E) in the smallest normal modal logic (K). After some preliminaries, we explore the possibility of further simplifying the translation, with various negative findings (but no positive solution). This line of inquiry leads, via a consideration of one candidate simpler translation whose status was left open earlier, to isolating the concept of a minimally congruential context. (...)
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  36.  57
    John P. Burgess (2003). Which Modal Models Are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)? Theoria 18 (2):145-158.
    Recently it has become almost the received wisdom in certain quarters that Kripke models are appropriate only for something like metaphysical modalities, and not for logical modalities. Here the line of thought leading to Kripke models, and reasons why they are no less appropriate for logical than for other modalities, are explained. It is also indicated where the fallacy in the argument leading to the contrary conclusion lies. The lessons learned are then applied to the question of the status (...)
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  37.  51
    Nathan Wildman (forthcoming). On Shaky Ground? In Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure. Oxford University Press
    The past decade and a half has seen an absolute explosion of literature discussing the structure of reality. One particular focus here has been on the fundamental. However, while there has been extensive discussion, numerous fundamental questions about fundamentality have not been touched upon. In this chapter, I focus on one such lacuna about the modal strength of fundamentality. More specifically, I am interested in exploring the contingent fundamentality thesis - that is, the idea that the fundamentalia are only (...)
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  38.  63
    Christopher Peacocke (2008). Truly Understood. Oxford University Press.
    A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case (...)
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  39. Theodore Sider (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford University Press.
    In order to perfectly describe the world, it is not enough to speak truly. One must also use the right concepts - including the right logical concepts. One must use concepts that "carve at the joints", that give the world's "structure". There is an objectively correct way to "write the book of the world". Much of metaphysics, as traditionally conceived, is about the fundamental nature of reality; in the present terms, this is about the world's structure. Metametaphysics - inquiry into (...)
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  40.  38
    Brian Leftow (2012). God and Necessity. Oxford University Press.
    Modal basics -- Some solutions -- Theist solutions -- The ontology of possibility -- Modal truthmakers -- Modality and the divine nature -- Deity as essential -- Against deity theories -- The role of deity -- The biggest bang -- Divine concepts -- Concepts, syntax, and actualism -- Modality: basic notions -- The genesis of secular modality -- Modal reality -- Essences -- Non-secular modalities -- Theism and modal semantics -- Freedom, preference, and cost -- Explaining (...)
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  41.  63
    Jeffrey Stephen Poland (1994). Physicalism, the Philosophical Foundations. Oxford University Press.
    Physicalism is a program for building a unified system of knowledge about the world on the basis of the view that everything is a manifestation of the physical aspects of existence. Jeffrey Poland presents a systematic and comprehensive exploration of the philosophical foundations of this program. He investigates the core ideas, motivating values, and presuppositions of physicalism; the constraints upon an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine; the epistemological and modal status, the scope, and the methodological roles of physicalist (...)
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  42. Nora Berenstain (2014). Necessary Laws and Chemical Kinds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):631-647.
    Contingentism, generally contrasted with law necessitarianism, is the view that the laws of nature are contingent. It is often coupled with the claim that their contingency is knowable a priori. This paper considers Bird's [2001, 2002, 2005, 2007] arguments for the thesis that, necessarily, salt dissolves in water; and it defends his view against Beebee's [2001] and Psillos's [2002] contingentist objections. A new contingentist objection is offered and several reasons for scepticism about its success are raised. It is concluded that (...)
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  43. Karen Bennett (2005). Two Axes of Actualism. Philosophical Review 114 (3):297-326.
    Actualists routinely characterize their view by means of the slogan, “Everything is actual.” They say that there aren’t any things that exist but do not actually exist—there aren’t any “mere possibilia.” If there are any things that deserve the label ‘possible world’, they are just actually existing entities of some kind—maximally consistent sets of sentences, or maximal uninstantiated properties, or maximal possible states of affairs, or something along those lines. Possibilists, in contrast, do think that there are mere possibilia, that (...)
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  44.  88
    J. Adam Carter & Martin Peterson (forthcoming). The Modal Account of Luck Revisited. Synthese:1-10.
    According to the canonical formulation of the modal account of luck (e.g. Pritchard (2005, 128)), an event is lucky just when that event occurs in the actual world but not in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where the relevant conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world. This paper argues, with reference to a novel variety of counterexample, that it is a mistake to focus, when assessing a given event for luckiness, on (...)
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  45. Alan Sidelle (2009). Conventionalism and the Contingency of Conventions. Noûs 43 (2):224-241.
    One common objection to Conventionalism about modality is that since it is contingent what our conventions are, the modal facts themselves will thereby be contingent. A standard reply is that Conventionalists can accept this, if they reject the S4 axiom, that what is possibly possible is possible. I first argue that this reply is inadequate, but then continue to argue that it is not needed, because the Conventionalist need not concede that the contingency of our conventions has any bearing (...)
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  46. Jason Stanley (2003). Modality and What is Said. In John Hawthorne (ed.), Language and Mind. Blackwell 321--44.
    If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is necessarily true, then what it says must be so. If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is possible, then what it says could be true. Following natural philosophical usage, it would thus seem clear that in assessing an occurrence of a sentence for possibility or necessity, one is assessing what is said by that occurrence. In this paper, I argue that natural philosophical usage misleads here. In assessing an (...)
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  47.  46
    Benedikt Paul Göcke (2012). Panentheism and Classical Theism. Sophia 52 (1):61-75.
    Panentheism seems to be an attractive alternative to classical theism. It is not clear, though, what exactly panentheism asserts and how it relates to classical theism. By way of clarifying the thesis of panentheism, I argue that panentheism and classical theism differ only as regards the modal status of the world. According to panentheism, the world is an intrinsic property of God – necessarily there is a world – and according to classical theism the (...)
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  48. Alice Drewery (2005). Essentialism and the Necessity of the Laws of Nature. Synthese 144 (3):381-396.
    In this paper I discuss and evaluate different arguments for the view that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I conclude that essentialist arguments from the nature of natural kinds fail to establish that essences are ontologically more basic than laws, and fail to offer an a priori argument for the necessity of all causal laws. Similar considerations carry across to the argument from the dispositionalist view of properties, which may end up placing unreasonable constraints on property identity across (...)
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  49. Daniel Nolan, Hale's Dilemma.
    Bob Hale in Hale 1995b posed a dilemma for modal fictionalism (more specifically, Rosen's version of modal fictionalism). A modal fictionalist who maintains the version outlined in Rosen 1990 believes that the fiction of possible worlds (PW, to use Rosen and Hale's abbreviation) is not literally true. The question arises, however, about its modal status. Is it necessarily false, or contingently false? In either case, Hale argues, the modal fictionalist is in trouble. Should the (...)
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  50.  63
    Neil Tennant (1997). On the Necessary Existence of Numbers. Noûs 31 (3):307-336.
    We examine the arguments on both sides of the recent debate (Hale and Wright v. Field) on the existence, and modal status, of the natural numbers. We formulate precisely, with proper attention to denotational commitments, the analytic conditionals that link talk of numbers with talk of numerosity and with counting. These provide conceptual controls on the concept of number. We argue, against Field, that there is a serious disanalogy between the existence of God and the existence of numbers. (...)
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