Se ha sostenido tradicionalmente que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas son análogos. Pero, ¿qué es la analogía? Varios filósofos han pensado que la analogía debe ser considerada como una forma de ambigüedad. Argumentamos aquí que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas no son ambiguos o vagos. Siguiendo algunas sugerencias de McDaniel, proponemos una concepción de la analogía donde el fenómeno semántico está asociado con el carácter más o menos natural de la propiedad o (...) propiedades que instancian las entidades que satisfacen el predicado análogo. Un predicado "θ" es análogo si y sólo si, la propiedad Θ, que algo instancia, si y sólo si es θ, es menos natural que cualquier propiedad Ξ tal que todo lo que instancie Ξ, instancia Θ. Además, se requiere que las entidades de las cuales el término análogo es predicado deban ser ontológica o epistémicamente dependientes unas de otras. || It has been traditionally sustained that predicates attributed to God and to the creatures are analogical predicates. But, what is analogy? Several philosophers have thought that analogy should be taken as a form of ambiguity. Here we argue that predicates attributed to God and to creatures are neither ambiguous nor vague. Following some suggestions given by McDaniel, we propose a view of analogy in which the semantic phenomenon is associated with the more or less natural character of the property or properties that the entities that satisfy the analogous predicate instantiate. A predicate "θ" is analogous if and only if the property Θ, which something instantiates, if and only if it is θ, is less natural that any property Ξ so that anything that instantiates Ξ, instantiates Θ. Furthermore, it is required that the entities of which the analogous term is predicated should be either ontologically or epistemically dependent on each other. (shrink)

In this article we propose to carry out an examination of the notions of ‘other’ based on the philosophical proposals of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Maurice Blanchot. It seeks to show the common point between both thoughts, from a proposal in which the other is understood as a dislocation, which manifests itself in the way of an opening. For this reason, the notion of opening becomes the central element of this analysis, from which the other manifests itself in an ambiguous way. (...) To this end, the proposals of both authors will be analyzed separately, however, highlighting and relating to each other their respective conceptions of opening and the implications they have regarding the question of the other. (shrink)

If one sits in the stands for awhile at a local sporting contest, whether it is wrestling, soccer, baseball or particularly basketball, before long someone will exclaim toward a referee, ?That was a makeup call. You owe us one.? Everyone knows what this means but if an eight-year old beside you hears this screamed for the first time and asks, ?What does that mean?? An explanation given to her will be something like ?that's when an official makes a call and (...) immediately realizes it was a wrong call so at the first opportunity he can he makes a call against the team that has benefitted from the previous call; he is trying to even things out for his mistake.? The referee or umpire is attempting to be fair by ?giving back? the call with a ?makeup call.? A make-up call can be defined as the act of compensating for a questionable or bad officiating call by making a proportionally even call against the team that was aided by the first call. Usually these are immediate and obvious. They can also be conscious or subconscious, intentional or unintentional. The hope is that the two calls generally offset one another without either team being dramatically harmed. I will argue that the makeup call is prima facie immoral but if one were to attempt to find moral justification for it, this could best be done through a corrective theory of justice. But this presents a number of moral questions and ambiguities, most significantly, is a makeup call just and fair? Is it appropriate to understand the makeup call as an example of two wrongs making a right? A broader philosophic al question about officiating is whether each call in a contest should be viewed by as an independent single call with the goal of the official getting that one immediate call correct or should each call be understood as in a direct relationship with every other call in that game as a type of gestalt thus justifying makeup calls? This work will probe the depths of the highly suspect yet common moral puzzle, the makeup call. (shrink)

This article raises three challenges to Richard McCormick's proportionalism. First, adequately to judge proportionate reason requires the specification of a particular background moral content and metaphysical context. Absent such specification, evaluation of proportionate reason is inherently and deeply ambiguous. Second, to resolve such ambiguity and yet remain Christian, proportionalism must adopt a forthrightly Christian moral content set within a straightforwardly Christian metaphysics. This move will, however, set Christian bioethics off as sectarian—a conclusion McCormick wishes to avoid. Third, (...) even if proportionalism were to adopt a Christian moral content and metaphysics to avoid such ambiguity, its methodology sets aside a key aspect of the Christian life: repentance. Proportionalism does not account for the core reality that repentance plays in one's personal encounter with and knowledge of God. As I will argue, the challenge in part is that moral action cannot be adequately conceptualized, nor can moral theology be properly understood, outside of the authentic practice of the religious life, and repentance is central to that Christian reality. (shrink)

When people seek to overcome discrimination in employment they often appeal to the principle that ‘one should be hired on the basis of qualifications alone’. But do we know what the principle means? And would applying it solve the problems of discrimination in employment? We may take the claim to mean that certain aspects of a person such as her race, religion and attractiveness that are thought to be irrelevant to almost all jobs should not be considered in employment decisions. (...) But in this we would be mistaken. This paper argues that the concept of ‘qualification’, far from being purely descriptive, is morally loaded and a function of an employer’s choices and purposes. As a result, appealing to the principle alone cannot prevent discrimination for issues of discrimination in employment are embedded in the ethical issues of ownership, management and the social responsibilities of a business. (shrink)

Abstract The circumstances in which the decisions to bomb the Abbey and town of Monte Cassino in 1944 were taken were complex and difficult, and complicated by factual uncertainties. It is possible to make a case for excusing the bombing of the Abbey on grounds of military necessity without justifying it. It is not possible to excuse the manner in which the bombing was conducted, which deprived the attack of its intended military utility and had an effect on the Allied (...) cause the reverse of that anticipated. The bombing of the town cannot be challenged on laws of war grounds, but may be criticised because the effects were damaging to the progress of the Allied forces, and foreseeably so. (shrink)

Everyday (mis)uses of deepfakes define prevailing conceptualizations of what they are and the moral stakes in their deployment. But one complication in understanding deepfakes is that they are not photographic yet nonetheless manipulate lens-based recordings with the intent of mimicking photographs. The harmfulness of deepfakes, moreover, significantly depends on their potential to be mistaken for photographs and on the belief that photographs capture actual events, a tenet known as the transparency thesis, which scholars have somewhat ironically attacked by citing (...) digital imaging techniques as counterexamples. Combining these positions, this paper sets out two core points: (1) that conceptions about the nature of photography introduce imperatives about its uses; and (2) that popular cultural understandings of photography imply normative ideas that infuse our encounters with deepfakes. Within this, I further raise the question of what moral ground deepfakes occupy that allows them to have such a potentially devastating effect. I show that answering this question involves reinstating the notion that photographs are popularly conceived of as transparent. The rejoinder to this argument, however, is that to take the sting out of deepfakes we must, once again, become skeptical of the veracity of all images, including photoreal ones. This kind of critical mindedness was warranted before the invention of photography for both pictorial imprints and written accounts from various media sources. Given this, along with the fact that photographic trickery is nothing new, deepfakes need not push us into a post-truth epistemic abyss, for they imply a decidedly old turn. (shrink)

Although precision medicine cuts across a large spectrum of professions, interdisciplinary and cross-sectorial moral deliberation has yet to be widely enacted, let alone formalized in this field. In a recent research project on precision medicine, we designed a dialogical forum (i.e. ‘the Ethics Laboratory’) giving interdisciplinary and cross-sectorial stakeholders an opportunity to discuss their moral conundrums in concert. We organized and carried out four Ethics Laboratories. In this article, we use Simone de Beauvoir’s concept of moral (...) class='Hi'>ambiguity as a lens to frame the participants’ experience with fluid moral boundaries. By framing our approach through this concept we are able to elucidate irremediable moral issues that are collectively underexplored in the practice of precision medicine. Moral ambiguity accentuates an open and free space where different types of perspectives converge and can inform each other. Based on our study, we identified two dilemmas, or thematic interfaces, in the interdisciplinary moral deliberations which unfolded in the Ethics Laboratories: (1) the dilemma between the individual and the collective good; and (2) the dilemma between care and choice. Through our investigation of these dilemmas, we show how Beauvoir’s concept of moral ambiquity not only serves as a fertile catalyst for greater moral awareness but, furthermore, how the concept can become an indispensable part of the practices of and the discourse about precision medicine. (shrink)

The medical practice of declawing has received much political debate over the past few years. Yet, empirical and theoretical research on how this practice is maintained and the ethical positions of those who actually participate in this work is lacking. Drawing from 9 months of ethnographic fieldwork in a feline-specific veterinary hospital and open-ended interviews with veterinarians and staff, this study examines veterinary staff members' attitudes toward, and strategies for, dealing with the medical practice of declawing. Specifically, findings show that (...) a number of staff felt uncomfortable with their participation in onychectomy and relied heavily on organizational support structures to cope both with these feelings and the moral ambiguity about the practice. Relying on these structures, the veterinarians and their staff are able simultaneously to define felines as subjects worthy of respect for their quality of life, protect their own self-identity as people who work toward the best interest of animals, and paradoxically support action toward felines that they find morally objectionable. (shrink)

Building on the emerging literature on the ethics of social enterprises (SEs), this paper advances the underexplored role of frontline workers (FLWs) as embedded agents at the interface between communities and SEs. Specifically, we uncover the subjectivity of FLWs as they navigate moral ambiguities while performing their professional roles, dealing with rules and regulations within the organizational hierarchy and living as members of local communities. Based on an inductive case study of a microfinance organization in Cameroon, we find that (...) FLWs engage in three rationalization strategies: cautious disengaging, safeguarding self-interest, and justifying relevance. Our findings offer a better understanding of the ethics of SEs by unpacking the subjectivity of FLWs. We highlight a bottom-up account of caring SEs, identify a boundary condition to subjectivity, and present a nuanced view of FLWs in embedded organizations. We also discuss the practical implications for SEs to improve their compassion and cater for the mental wellbeing of FLWs. (shrink)

Innovation in fisheries is a global development that focuses on a broad range of aims. One example is a project that aims to develop technology for key phases of the demersal fishery operation to improve product quality and safeguard fish welfare. As this step to include welfare is novel, it raises questions associated with stakeholder acceptance in a wider aim for responsible innovation. How do stakeholders (a) value fish and their welfare and (b) consider the relation between welfare and other (...) relevant values? To address these questions, an approach combining desk research with an empirical study was used. The desk study analysed the ethical and biological arguments for whether fish welfare should be accounted for in this context. The empirical study explored how fish and their welfare are perceived by Norwegian professionals in this industry, by conducting semi-structured interviews and subsequently analysing the results based on a labelling method we developed. The desk study showed a consensus that welfare should be considered in its own right, while at face value the interviews presented a rather instrumental view on this theme. However, analysis of the interview results leads to a more nuanced picture, where fish and their welfare are viewed from the perspective of respect for nature. Despite the apparent divergence between stakeholder opinions and the literature on the importance of welfare, we present three steps that enables professionals to be responsive to both the (moral) views of stakeholders and accounting for welfare in the innovation process fisheries. (shrink)

There is something mysterious about what explains the foundations or grounding for professional responsibility. What grounds the distinct professional responsibility that an engineer, doctor, or lawyer has that is separate from their moral duties and legal requirements? I argue that professional responsibility can derive from a systematic response to ambiguities that occur within moral issues that arise for given professions. Moral problems can often be solved in different ways that are equally permissible, which I will say provides (...) a “moral ambiguity.” Sometimes these moral ambiguities in professional settings require the same solutions across the profession because of the public’s legitimate expectations for uniformity. In such cases, professional organizations set professional responsibilities to provide a uniform set of duties to establish a necessary and predictable order. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 215 Seiten: 325-339.

There is something mysterious about what explains the foundations or grounding for professional responsibility. What grounds the distinct professional responsibility that an engineer, doctor, or lawyer has that is separate from their moral duties and legal requirements? I argue that professional responsibility can derive from a systematic response to ambiguities that occur within moral issues that arise for given professions. Moral problems can often be solved in different ways that are equally permissible, which I will say provides (...) a “moral ambiguity.” Sometimes these moral ambiguities in professional settings require the same solutions across the profession because of the public’s legitimate expectations for uniformity. In such cases, professional organizations set professional responsibilities to provide a uniform set of duties to establish a necessary and predictable order. (shrink)

In 1984, a number of US cyclists used blood transfusions to boost their performance at the Los Angeles Olympic Games. The cyclists broke no rules and dominated the Games, yet were later maligned as cheaters and dopers?they had, it seemed, violated some important norm, albeit one which was neither an official rule nor otherwise easily identifiable. Their case illustrates the moral ambiguity that arises when a performance enhancement is employed in a sport that has not addressed it. This (...) article takes up the crucial question posed by such moral ambiguity: is it ethical to enhance performance through a substance or technology when no rules exist to prohibit it? We first examine ordinary ethical obligations that athletes carry based on their status as moral agents. We conclude that such obligations provide some guidance, but cannot resolve the issue. We then examine arguments that take sport as a unique social practice that presents its own moral obligation not to use performance enhancers. We argue that these ?spirit of sport? arguments, developed by McNamee and Loland and Hoppeler cannot resolve the issue either. We conclude that when the rules governing sport are silent on the issue of performance enhancement the constraints on its ethical use are limited at best. (shrink)

The case presented here is tragic, not just in the sense of being a sad story, but in the dramatic meaning of tragedy. It presents us with a situation where there is no clear path, where moral ambiguity exists, and where no possible solution could unequivocally be declared the right or good one. Ethical deliberation can help here, but only as a way of clarifying the issues and offering reasonable solutions. It cannot show us the one right way.Baby (...) G has profound medical conditions, including respiratory failure, a chest wall deformity that will require surgery, and profound neurodevelopmental disability. Even a best case scenario portends a shortened lifespan and.. (shrink)

This paper explores the ambiguous impact of new information and communications technologies on the cultivation of moral skills in human beings. Just as twentieth century advances in machine automation resulted in the economic devaluation of practical knowledge and skillsets historically cultivated by machinists, artisans, and other highly trained workers , while also driving the cultivation of new skills in a variety of engineering and white collar occupations, ICTs are also recognized as potential causes of a complex pattern of economic (...) deskilling, reskilling, and upskilling. In this paper, I adapt the conceptual apparatus of sociological debates over economic deskilling to illuminate a different potential for technological deskilling/upskilling, namely the ability of ICTs to contribute to the moral deskilling of human users, a potential that exists alongside rich but currently underrealized possibilities for moral reskilling and/or upskilling. I flesh out this general hypothesis by means of examples involving automated weapons technology, new media practices, and social robotics. I conclude that since moral skills are essential prerequisites for the effective development of practical wisdom and virtuous character, and since market and cultural forces are not presently aligned to bring about the more salutary of the ambiguous potentials presented here, the future shape of these developments warrants our close attention—and perhaps active intervention. (shrink)

I sometimes like to daydream that if we were all somehow simultaneously outed as lechers and perverts and sentimental slobs, it might be, after the initial shock of disillusionment, liberating. It might be a relief to quit maintaining this rigid pose of normalcy and own up to the outlaws and monsters we are.

This response draws on Saba Mahmood's work on Muslim subjectivities in order to consider how Stalnaker's conceptualization of virtue might be applied to non-Confucian sources. I argue that when applied cross-culturally, Stalnaker's revised definition of “skillful virtue” raises normative and metaethical questions about what counts as a skill versus a mere bodily practice, the process by how skill is acquired, and how we can both allow for the ambiguity of skills and continue to make constructive arguments about them.

This paper challenges the accepted interpretation of Oedipus Rex, which takes Oedipus’ ignorance of the relevant facts to be an established matter. I argue that Oedipus’ epistemic state is ambiguous, and that this in turn generates a moral ambiguity with respect to his actions. Because ignorance serves as a moral excuse, my demonstration that Oedipus was not ignorant bears significantly on the moral meaning of the play. I next propose to anchor this ambiguity in the (...) Freudian notion of the unconscious, by presenting an interpretation that treats Oedipus’ knowledge as unconscious. I discuss the moral status of an agent acting from unconscious knowledge and find it to be genuinely indeterminate, thus supporting my claim that the play is epistemically and morally ambiguous. (shrink)

Previous research on moral dilemmas has mainly focused on decisions made under conditions of probabilistic certainty. We investigated the impact of uncertainty on the preference for action (killing one individual to save five people) and inaction (saving one but allowing five people to die) in moral dilemmas. We reported two experimental studies that varied the framing (gain vs loss), levels of risk (probability of gain and loss) and levels of ambiguity (imprecise probability information) in the choice to (...) save five individuals by sacrificing one. We found that participants preferred actions with uncertainty (risk/ambiguity) over inaction. Specifically, we found that participants preferred actions with precise probability information (risk) over inaction, and they preferred actions with modest or high levels of ambiguity over actions with precise probabilities, especially when moral dilemmas had a loss frame. We also observed commission bias in Study 2. We discussed the implications for research in moral decision-making. (shrink)

While a number of philosophers have argued recently that it is through our emotional response to certain literary works that we might achieve particular moral understanding, what has not been discussed in detail in this connection are works which generate conflicting responses in the reader; which is to say literary works in which there is significant element of ambiguity. Consider Joseph Conrad's novel Lord Jim. I argue that in making sense of our potentially conflicting responses to this novel, (...) and specifically to its central character Jim, we may gain a richer sense of the ways in which literature may contribute to moral understanding – in this case by contributing to an understanding of our own character, its blind spots and its limitations. (shrink)

It is often assumed that the central problem in a medical ethics issue is determining which course of action is morally correct. There are some aspects of ethical issues that will yield to such analysis. However, at the core of important medical moral problems is an irreducible dilemma in which all possible courses of action, including inaction, seem ethically unsatisfactory. When facing these issues ethical behaviour depends upon an individual's understanding and acceptance of this painful dilemma without recourse to (...) external moral authority. (shrink)

Moral distress is a phenomenon that has been receiving increasing attention in nursing and other health care disciplines. Moral distress is a concept that entered the nursing literature – and subsequently the health care ethics lexicon – in 1984 as a result of the work done by American philosopher and bioethicist Andrew Jameton. Over the past decade, research into moral distress has extended beyond the profession of nursing as other health care disciplines have come to question the (...) impact of moral constraint on individual practitioners, professional practice, and patient outcomes. Along with increased interest in the phenomenon of moral distress have come increasing critiques – critiques that in their essence point to a serious lack of conceptual clarity in the definition, study, and application of the concept. Foundational to gaining conceptual clarity in moral distress in order to develop strategies to prevent and ameliorate the experience is a careful revisiting of the epistemological assumptions underpinning our knowledge and use of the concept of moral distress. It is our contention that the conceptual challenges reveal flaws in the original understanding of moral distress that are based on an epistemological stance that holds a linear conception of cause and effect coupled with a simplistic perspective of ‘constraint’ and ‘agency’. We need a more nuanced approach to our study of moral distress such that our ontological and epistemological stances help us to better appreciate the complexity of moral agents acting in organizational contexts. We believe that critical realism offers such a nuanced approach. (shrink)

When faced with an ambiguous pronoun, comprehenders use both multimodal cues and linguistic cues to identify the antecedent. While research has shown that gestures facilitate language comprehension, improve reference tracking, and influence the interpretation of ambiguous pronouns, literature on reference resolution suggests that a wide set of linguistic constraints influences the successful resolution of ambiguous pronouns and that linguistic cues are more powerful than some multimodal cues. To address the outstanding question of the importance of gesture as a cue in (...) reference resolution relative to cues in the speech signal, we have previously investigated the comprehension of contrastive gestures that indexed abstract referents – in this case expressions of personal preference – and found that such gestures did facilitate the resolution of ambiguous statements of preference. In this study, we extend this work to investigate whether the effect of gesture on resolution is diminished when the gesture indexes a statement that is less likely to be interpreted as the correct referent. Participants watched videos in which a speaker contrasted two ideas that were either neutral or moral acceptable). A gesture to the left or right side co-occurred with speech expressing each position. In gesture-disambiguating trials, an ambiguous phrase was accompanied by a gesture to one side or the other. In gesture non-disambiguating trials, no third gesture occurred with the ambiguous phrase. Participants were more likely to choose the idea accompanied by gesture as the stimulus speaker’s preference. We found no effect of scenario type. Regardless of whether the linguistic cue expressed a view that was morally charged or neutral, observers used gesture to understand the speaker’s opinion. This finding contributes to our understanding of the strength and range of cues, both linguistic and multimodal, that listeners use to resolve ambiguous references. (shrink)

The literature has shown that different types of moral dilemmas elicit discrepant decision patterns. The present research investigated the role of uncertainty in contributing to these decision patterns. Two studies were conducted to examine participants' choices in commonly used dilemmas. Study 1 showed that participants’ perceived outcome probabilities were significantly associated with their moral choices, and that these associations were independent from the dilemma type. Study 2 revealed that participants had significantly less preference for killing the individual when (...) the outcome probabilities were stated using the modal verb ‘will’ than when they were stated using the numerical phrasing of ‘100%’. Our findings illustrate a discord between experimenter and participant in the interpretation of task instructions. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that some of the most basic commitments of Kantian ethics can be understood as grounded in the dynamic of sense that Merleau-Ponty describes in his Phenomenology of Perception. Specifically, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account supports the importance of universalizability as a test for the moral permissibility of particular acts as well as the idea that the binding character of the moral law is given as something like a fact of reason. But I also (...) argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account of reversibility suggests an important dimension of moral experience that is given in the experience of contact and that is underthematized in moral philosophies like Kant’s that emphasize the role of universalizability. Finally, I advance a positive account of moral experience that is centered on the idea of tact as ambiguous imperative. (shrink)

This paper offers a comparative account of the relationship between freedom and morality in the thought of William James and Simone de Beauvoir. By combining elements of the thought of each, a compelling--albeit tragic--notion of the relationship between freedom and morality is derived.

The religious ambiguity of the world has many aspects, one of which is the hiddenness of God. Theists have proposed a number of explanations of God's hiddenness. Some putative explanations contend that the advantages of God's hiddenness outweigh whatever benefits would result if God's existence and nature were clear to us. Goods of mystery that have received a lot of discussion include human moral autonomy and the ability on our part to exercise control over whether we believe in (...) the existence of God. The extent of the ambiguity that surrounds God's existence, and indeed all important religious matters, combined with our lack of an obviously correct and adequate explanation of this lack, suggest that, even if God exists, it is not important that people believe in God. Another central theme in the book is the significance of religious diversity for religious belief. The character of this diversity is such that it provides people who take a position on religious matters with reason to adopt the "Critical Stance" -- which requires people in all the religious traditions to subject their religious beliefs to critical scrutiny and hold those beliefs in a tentative way.Some contend that religious faith requires complete confidence in what is believed but tentative belief actually is sufficient to sustain many forms of religious commitment. (shrink)

Ever since it was first published 1930, William Empson's "Seven Types of Ambiguity" has been perceived as a milestone in literary criticism - far from being an impediment to communication, ambiguity now seemed an index of poetic richness and expressive power. Little, however, has been written on the broader trajectory of Western thought about ambiguity before Empson; as a result, the nature of his innovation has been poorly understood. This book remedies this omission. Starting with classical grammar (...) and rhetoric, and moving on to moral theology, law, biblical exegesis, German philosophy, and literary criticism, the author explores the many ways in which readers and theorists posited, denied, conceptualized, and argued over the existence of multiple meanings in texts between antiquity and the twentieth century. This process took on a variety of interconnected forms, from the Renaissance delight in the "elegance" of ambiguities in Horace, through the extraordinary Catholic claim that Scripture could contain multiple literal - and not just allegorical - senses, to the theory of dramatic irony developed int he nineteenth century, a theory intertwined with discoveries of the double meanings in Greek tragedy. Such narratives are not merely of antiquarian interest: rather, they provide an insight into the foundations of modern criticism, revealing deep resonances between acts of interpretation in disparate eras and contexts. This book lays bare the long tradition of efforts to liberate language, and even a poet's intention, from the strictures of a single meaning. (shrink)

The Ladies of Besiktas are a discrete group of followers of Turkey's Besiktas FC. They propose a different ethos from that of the dominant fan culture. They refuse to downplay their femininity, they wear natty black-and-white garb to games, they make breezy videos and they blow whistles when they hear Besiktas fans express foul or insulting sentiments during matches. It seems that the Ladies have motivated most of the offending Besiktas fans to moderate their behaviour in their presence. This discussion (...) paper argues that, while the Ladies are genuinely oppositional and should be affirmed, critical facets of gender introduce a moral and ideological ambiguity, a result of which is the possible reinforcement of masculine hegemony. The discussion concludes with the recommendation that the Ladies elevate, alongside their femininity, elements of their identities that are not identifiably feminine. (shrink)

We argue in this essay that (1) the embryo is an irredeemably ambiguous entity and its ambiguity casts serious doubt on the arguments claiming its full protection or, at least, its protection against its use as a means fo research, (2) those who claim the embryo should be protected as "one of us" are committed to a position even they do not uphold in their practices, (3) views that defend the protection of the embryo in virtue of its potentiality (...) to become a person fail, and (4) the embryo does not have any rights or interests to be protected. Given that many are willing to treat the embryo as a means in other practices, and that human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research holds the potential to benefit many people, one cannot but conclude that hESC research is permissible and, because of its immense promise for alleviating human even obligatory. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to resolve the tension between Kant’s doctrine of the highest good and his entire philosophical system. The concept of the highest good is the first major ambiguity of the doctrine. There are three pairs of ambiguities: immanent-transcendent; justice-perfection; and individual-community. They are able to form eight combinations. Corresponding to the various combinations and conceptions of the highest good, interpreters also conceive different reasons for the necessity of the doctrine as well as various conditions (...) of its applicability. For example, some emphasize its religious dimension, whereas others understand it in the political sense. In this paper, I adopt a different approach in understanding the highest good’s systematic meaning as the moral confirmation, and suggest that only a transcendent, perfect and communal concept of the highest good can provide the most consistent doctrine. Additionally, it explains the importance of the different branches (such as philosophies of religion and of politics) of Kant’s system. (shrink)

The spiritual situation at the turn of the millennium can be interpreted through Paul Tillich's appropriation of modernity, by analysis of the determinative structures and decisive trends of our age. The methods and organization of industry determine modern society. Spiritually, this situation results in the proliferation of means without ends, the objectification of natural structures, and the reduction of persons to things. Extrapolating from Tillich's analysis, the spiritual situation at the turn of the millennium can be understood as a quasi‐religious (...) struggle between the movements of liberal individualism and multiculturalism, both of which lose the sense of ambiguity. The communitarian movement and related interpretations remain the minority voice offering a mediating position. (shrink)