Search results for 'moral anti-realism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Patrick Clipsham (2013). In Defense of Anti‐Archimedean Moral Realism: A Response to Recent Critics. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):470-484.score: 132.0
    Ronald Dworkin famously argued that many putatively nonmoral metaethical theories can only be understood as being internal to the moral domain. If correct, this position, referred to as anti-archimedeanism, has profound implications for the methodology of metaethics. This is particularly true for skeptical metaethical theories. This article defends a version of anti-archimedeanism that is true to the spirit rather than the letter of Dworkin's original thesis from several recent objections. First, it addresses Kenneth Ehrenberg's recent attempt to demonstrate how (...)
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  2. Richard Joyce, Moral Anti-Realism.score: 120.0
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that following (...)
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  3. Joel J. Kupperman (1987). Moral Realism and Metaphysical Anti-Realism. Metaphilosophy 18 (2):95–107.score: 116.0
    The essay has two purposes. One is to point out connections and parallels between, On one hand, The debates of metaphysical realists and anti-Realists, And on the other hand, The debates surrounding moral realism. The second is to provide the outlines of a case for a kind of position that would generally be classified as moral realism. One feature of this position is that it emerges as parallel to, And compatible with, A metaphysical position that would generally be (...)
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  4. Gordon Fraser Davis (2013). Moral Realism and Anti-Realism Outside the West: A Meta-Ethical Turn in Buddhist Ethics. Comparative Philosophy 4 (2).score: 116.0
    In recent years, discussions of Buddhist ethics have increasingly drawn upon the concepts and tools of modern ethical theory, not only to compare Buddhist perspectives with Western moral theories, but also to assess the meta-ethical implications of Buddhist texts and their philosophical context. Philosophers aiming to defend the Madhyamaka framework in particular – its ethics and soteriology along with its logic and epistemology – have recently attempted to explain its combination of moral commitment and philosophical scepticism by appealing (...)
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  5. Christian Miller (forthcoming). Moral Realism and Anti-Realism. In Jerome Gellman (ed.), The History of Evil. Acumen Press.score: 105.0
    This chapter surveys work in meta-ethics in the past fifty years which explicitly deals with issues associated with evil. It discusses two examples from secular discussions: the argument developed by Gilbert Harman on the explanatory role of moral facts, and the argument developed by Gilbert Harman and John Doris on the empirical inadequacy of the virtues. The chapter then turns to two topics related to theistic meta-ethics: the problem of evil and moral realism, and theological voluntarism and evil.
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  6. Frederick Rauscher (2002). Kant's Moral Anti-Realism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (4):477-499.score: 102.0
    I defend the claim that Kant is a moral antirealist, or (as he would state it) moral idealist. I first define moral realism and moral idealism, concluding that moral idealism requires that every moral property depend upon the minds of moral agents. Kant's metaethical theory is idealist regarding the nature of value, since it depends upon the voluntary choices of moral agents in pursuing particular ends, the nature of right, since the categorical (...)
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  7. Abraham Graber (2012). Medusa's Gaze Reflected: A Darwinian Dilemma for Anti-Realist Theories of Value. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):589-601.score: 98.0
    Abstract Street has argued that the meta-ethical realist is faced with a dilemma. Either evolutionary forces have had a distorting influenced on our ability to track moral properties or evolutionary forces influenced our beliefs in the direction of tracking moral properties. Street argues that if the realist accepts the first horn of the dilemma, the realist must accept implausible skepticism regarding moral beliefs. If the realist accepts the second horn of the dilemma, the realist owes an explanation (...)
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  8. Richard Garner (2007). Abolishing Morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):499 - 513.score: 96.0
    Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first (...)
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  9. Shin Kim, Moral Realism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 94.0
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  10. Stacie Friend (2008). Hermeneutic Moral Fictionalism as an Anti-Realist Strategy. Philosophical Books 49 (1):14-22.score: 93.0
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  11. Michael Rubin (forthcoming). The Promise and Perils of Hybrid Moral Semantics for Naturalistic Moral Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-20.score: 93.0
    In recent years, several philosophers have recommended to moral realists that they adopt a hybrid cognitivist–expressivist moral semantics. Adopting a hybrid semantics enables the realist to account for the action-guiding character of moral discourse, and to account for the possibility of moral (dis)agreement between speakers whose moral sentences express different cognitive contents. I argue that realists should resist the temptation to embrace a hybrid moral semantics. In granting that moral judgments are partly constituted (...)
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  12. Deborah C. Smith (2001). Moral Realism, Skepticism and Anti-Realism: A Critical Analysis of the Criteria for Moral Realism. Disputatio 11:1 - 10.score: 87.0
  13. Kristján Kristjánsson (2009). Realist Versus Anti‐Realist Moral Selves—and the Irrelevance of Narrativism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (2):167-187.score: 87.0
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  14. Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose (2009). The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.score: 84.0
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for metaphysics (...)
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  15. Imogen Dickie (2010). Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.score: 84.0
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to (...)
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  16. W. J. Mander (2013). On Arguing for the Existence of God as a Synthesis Between Realism and Anti-Realism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):99-115.score: 84.0
    This article examines a somewhat neglected argument for the existence of God which appeals to the divine perspective as a way of reconciling the conflicting claims of realism and anti-realism. Six representative examples are set out (Berkeley, Ferrier, T. H. Green, Josiah Royce, Gordon Clark and Michael Dummett), reasons are considered why this argument has received less attention than it might, and a brief sketch given of the most promising way in which it might be developed.
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  17. Feng Ye (2010). What Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics Must Offer. Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31.score: 84.0
    This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. (...)
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  18. Mathieu Marion (2009). Radical Anti-Realism, Wittgenstein and the Length of Proofs. Synthese 171 (3):419 - 432.score: 84.0
    After sketching an argument for radical anti-realism that does not appeal to human limitations but polynomial-time computability in its definition of feasibility, I revisit an argument by Wittgenstein on the surveyability of proofs, and then examine the consequences of its application to the notion of canonical proof in contemporary proof-theoretical-semantics.
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  19. Robert G. Hudson (2009). Faint-Hearted Anti-Realism and Knowability. Philosophia 37 (3):511-523.score: 84.0
    It is often claimed that anti-realists are compelled to reject the inference of the knowability paradox, that there are no unknown truths. I call those anti-realists who feel so compelled ‘faint-hearted’, and argue in turn that anti-realists should affirm this inference, if it is to be consistent. A major part of my strategy in defending anti-realism is to formulate an anti-realist definition of truth according to which a statement is true only if it is verified by someone, at some (...)
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  20. Antti Keskinen (2012). Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism? Theoria 78 (2):128-145.score: 84.0
    W. V. Quine describes himself as a “robust realist” about physical objects in the external world. This realism about objects is due to Quine's naturalism. On the other hand, Quine's naturalistic epistemology involves a conception of objects as posits that we introduce in our theories about the world. This conception of objects can be seen as anti-realist rather than realist. In this article, I discuss the questions whether there is a tension between Quine's realism and his epistemological conception of objects, (...)
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  21. Jesse M. Mulder (2012). What Generates the Realism/Anti-Realism Dichotomy? Philosophica 84 (1):53-84.score: 84.0
    The most basic divide amongst analytic metaphysicians separates realists from anti-realists. By examining certain characteristic and problematic features of these two families of views, we uncover their underlying metametaphysicalorientations, which turn out to coincide. This shared philosophical picture that underlies both the realist and the anti-realist project we call the Modern Picture. It rests on a crucial distinction between reality as it is for us and reality as it is in itself. It is argued that this distinction indeed generates the (...)
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  22. K. Brad Wray (2013). Success and Truth in the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.score: 82.7
    I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...)
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  23. Feng Ye (2007). Indispensability Argument and Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):614-628.score: 76.7
    The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly: first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical (...)
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  24. Russ Shafer-Landau (2007). Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329.score: 75.0
    There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of (...)
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  25. Daniel Kodaj (2013). Open Future and Modal Anti-Realism. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):1-22.score: 73.0
    Open future is incompatible with realism about possible worlds. Since realistically conceived (concrete or abstract) possible worlds are maximal in the sense that they contain/represent the full history of a possible spacetime, past and future included, if such a world is actual now, the future is fully settled now, which rules out openness. The kind of metaphysical indeterminacy required for open future is incompatible with the kind of maximality which is built into the concept of possible worlds. The paper discusses (...)
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  26. David Enoch (2009). How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15 - 50.score: 72.0
    Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with a challenge to (...)
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  27. Caj Strandberg (2004). Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism. Lund University.score: 72.0
    The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that (1) moral sentences have truth-value (cognitivism), (2) there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true (success-theory), and (3) moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties (non-reductionism). Realism is contrasted with non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism, which, in brief, deny (1), (2) and (3), respectively. In the (...)
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  28. Russ Shafer-Landau (2003/2005). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.score: 72.0
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
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  29. Knut Olav Skarsaune (2011). Darwin and Moral Realism: Survival of the Iffiest. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.score: 72.0
    This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.
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  30. Steven Ross (2009). The End of Moral Realism? Acta Analytica 24 (1):43-61.score: 72.0
    The author considers how constructivism, presently known to us essentially as a theory for generating rules of social cooperation, embodies a certain conception of justification that in turn may be thought of as a general theory. It is argued that moral realism and projectivism are by turns platitudinous and unsatisfactory as conceptions of justification; by contrast the general conception of justification in constructivism makes sense of reason giving and coherent rivalry. The author argues that once the right picture of (...)
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  31. Jason Kawall (2005). Moral Realism and Arbitrariness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):109-129.score: 72.0
    In this paper I argue (i) that choosing to abide by realist moral norms would be as arbitrary as choosing to abide by the mere preferences of a God (a difficulty akin to the Euthyphro dilemma raised for divine command theorists); in both cases we would lack reason to prefer these standards to alternative codes of conduct. I further develop this general line of thought by arguing in particular (ii) that we would lack any noncircular justification to concern ourselves (...)
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  32. Andrew Sneddon (2009). Normative Ethics and the Prospects of an Empirical Contribution to Assessment of Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):447-455.score: 72.0
    The familiar argument from disagreement has been an important focal point of discussion in contemporary meta-ethics. Over the past decade, there has been an explosion of interdisciplinary work between philosophers and psychologists about moral psychology. Working within this trend, John Doris and Alexandra Plakias have made a tentative version of the argument from disagreement on empirical grounds. Doris and Plakias present empirical evidence in support of premise 4, that ethics is beset by fundamental disagreement. They examine Richard Brandt on (...)
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  33. Terence Cuneo (2007). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford University Press.score: 72.0
    Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.
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  34. John Collier & Michael Stingl (2013). Evolutionary Moral Realism. Biological Theory 7 (3):218-226.score: 72.0
    Evolutionary moral realism is the view that there are moral values with roots in evolution that are both specifically moral and exist independently of human belief systems. In beginning to sketch the outlines of such a view, we examine moral goods like fairness and empathetic caring as valuable and real aspects of the environments of species that are intelligent and social, or at least developing along an evolutionary trajectory that could lead to a level of intelligence (...)
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  35. Paul Formosa (2013). Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist? European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):170-196.score: 72.0
    : The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence (...)
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  36. Simon Fitzpatrick (2014). Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology. Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190.score: 72.0
    (2014). Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 161-190.
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  37. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.) (1988). Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press.score: 72.0
    Introduction The Many Moral Realisms Geoffrey Sayre-McCord I. Introduction Recognizing the startling resurgence in realism, ...
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  38. Neil Sinclair (2012). Moral Realism, Face-Values and Presumptions. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.score: 72.0
    Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that face-value. Case (...)
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  39. Elizabeth Tropman (2012). Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge? Theoria 78 (1):26-46.score: 72.0
    This article raises a problem for Cornell varieties of moral realism. According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts just as we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. If this is so, it would remove any special mystery that is supposed to attach to our knowledge of objective moral facts. After clarifying the ways in which moral knowledge is to be similar to scientific knowledge, I claim that the analogy fails, (...)
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  40. William F. Harms (2000). Adaptation and Moral Realism. Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):699-712.score: 72.0
    Conventional wisdom has it that evolution makes a sham of morality, even if morality is an adaptation. I disagree. I argue that our best current adaptationist theory of meaning offers objective truth conditionsfor signaling systems of all sorts. The objectivity is, however, relative to species – specifically to the adaptive history of the signaling system in question. While evolution may not provide the kind of species independent objective standards that (e.g.) Kantians desire, this should be enough for the practical work (...)
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  41. Robert Heinaman (ed.) (1995). Aristotle and Moral Realism. Westview Press.score: 72.0
    The question of moral realism—whether our ethical beliefs rest on some objective foundation—is one that mattered as much to Aristotle as it does to us today, and his writings on this topic continue to provide inspiration for the contemporary debate. This volume of essays expands the fruitful conversation among scholars of ancient philosophy and contemporary ethical theorists on this question and related issues such as the virtues, justice, and Aristotle’s theory of tragedy.The distinguished contributors to this volume enrich and (...)
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  42. Mark Hanin (2012). Naturalistic Moral Realism and Moral Disagreement: David Copp's Account. Res Publica 18 (4):283-301.score: 72.0
    To enhance the plausibility of naturalistic moral realism, David Copp develops an argument from epistemic defeaters aiming to show that strongly a priori synthetic moral truths do not exist. In making a case for the non-naturalistic position, I locate Copp’s account within the wider literature on peer disagreement; I identify key points of divergence between Copp’s doctrine and conciliatorist doctrines; I introduce the notion of ‘minimal moral competence’; I contend that some plausible benchmarks for minimal moral (...)
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  43. Elizabeth Tropman (2014). Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge. Theoria 80 (2):184-190.score: 72.0
    According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts in much the same way that we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. In “Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” (2012), I argue that this positive comparison to scientific knowledge hurts, rather than helps, the moral realist position. Joseph Long has recently defended Cornell moral realism against my concerns. In this article, I respond to Long's arguments and clarify (...)
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  44. Pavlos Kontos (2011). Aristotle's Moral Realism Reconsidered: Phenomenological Ethics. Routledge.score: 72.0
    This book elaborates a moral realism of phenomenological inspiration by introducing the idea that moral experience, primordially, constitutes a perceptual grasp of actions and of their solid traces in the world. The main thesis is that, before any reference to values or to criteria about good and evil—that is, before any reference to specific ethical outlooks—one should explain the very materiality of what necessarily constitutes the ‘moral world’. These claims are substantiated by means of a text- centered (...)
     
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  45. Elizabeth Tropman (2013). Making Sense of Explanatory Objections to Moral Realism. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):37-50.score: 72.0
    Many commentators suppose that morality, objectively construed, must possess a minimal sort of explanatory relevance if moral realism is to be plausible. To the extent that moral realists are unable to secure explanatory relevance for moral facts, moral realism faces a problem. Call this general objection an “explanatory objection” to moral realism. Despite the prevalence of explanatory objections in the literature, the connection between morality’s explanatory powers and moral realism’s truth is not clear. This (...)
     
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  46. David J. Chalmers (2009). Ontological Anti-Realism. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.score: 71.3
    The basic question of ontology is “What exists?”. The basic question of metaontology is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ontology? Here ontological realists say yes, and ontological anti-realists say no. (Compare: The basic question of ethics is “What is right?”. The basic question of metaethics is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ethics? Here moral realists say yes, and moral anti-realists say no.) For example, the ontologist may ask: Do numbers exist? (...)
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  47. Ruben Berrios, Anti-Realism and Aesthetic Cognition.score: 71.0
    Ruben Berrios Queen’s University Belfast Anti-realism and Aesthetic Cognition Abstract At the core of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is the question of the relation between scientific theory and the world. The realist possesses a mimetic conception of the relation between theory and reality. For the realist, scientific theories represent reality. The anti-realist, in contrast, seeks to understand the relations between theory and world in non-mimetic terms. We will examine Cartwright’s simulacrum account of explanation in order (...)
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  48. Patrick Kain (2006). Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant's Second Critique. Philosophy Compass 1 (5):449–465.score: 71.0
    This critical survey of recent work on Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates (of freedom, God, and immortality) assesses the implications of these doctrines for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations from the first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I argue that recent work on the role, content, "factual" nature, and epistemic status of the fact of reason does not (...)
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  49. Anthony Wrigley (2007). Realism and Anti-Realism About Mental Illness. Philosophical Papers 36 (3):371-397.score: 71.0
    In this paper I provide an account of the metaphysical foundations of mental illness in terms of a realism debate. I motivate the importance of such metaphysical analysis as a means of avoiding some intractable problems that beset discussion of the concept of mental illness. I apply aspects of the framework developed by Crispin Wright for realism debates in order to examine the ontological commitments to mental illness as a property that humans may exhibit and to examine the various arguments (...)
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  50. Karen Green (2005). The Context Principle and Dummett's Argument for Anti-Realism. Theoria 71 (2):92-117.score: 70.0
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