Search results for 'moral emotions' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  66
    Kristján Kristjánsson (2010). Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A False Dichotomy? Educational Philosophy and Theory 42 (4):397-409.
    In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a 'moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as 'identity', and I dissect its limitations. In (...)
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  2.  23
    Tina Malti & Sebastian P. Dys (2015). A Developmental Perspective on Moral Emotions. Topoi 34 (2):453-459.
    This article outlines a developmental approach to the study of moral emotions. Specifically, we describe our developmental model on moral emotions, one in which emotions and cognitions about morality get increasingly integrated and coordinated with development, while acknowledging inter-individual variation in developmental trajectories across the lifespan. We begin with a conceptual clarification of the concept of moral emotions. After a brief review of our own developmental approach to the study of moral (...), we provide a selective summary of the developmental literature on negatively and positively valenced moral emotions, and describe a recent line of developmental research on the anticipation of negatively and positively valenced moral emotions in multifaceted contexts of social exclusion and inclusion. Next, we describe what it means to take a developmental perspective on moral emotions. Finally, we provide some preliminary conclusions and recommendations for future work to the developmental study of moral emotions. (shrink)
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  3.  80
    Jeffrey Blustein (2010). Forgiveness, Commemoration, and Restorative Justice: The Role of Moral Emotions. Metaphilosophy 41 (4):582-617.
    Abstract: Forgiveness of wrongdoing in response to public apology and amends making seems, on the face of it, to leave little room for the continued commemoration of wrongdoing. This rests on a misunderstanding of forgiveness, however, and we can explain why there need be no incompatibility between them. To do this, I emphasize the role of what I call nonangry negative moral emotions in constituting memories of wrongdoing. Memories so constituted can persist after forgiveness and have important (...) functions, and commemorations can elicit these emotions to preserve memories of this sort. Moreover, commemorations can be a restorative justice practice that promotes reconciliation, but only on condition that the memories they preserve are constituted by nonangry negative, not retributive, emotions. (shrink)
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  4. Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment (...)
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  5.  43
    Florian Cova, Julien Deonna & David Sander (2015). Introduction: Moral Emotions. Topoi 34 (2):397-400.
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  6. Thomas Pölzler (2015). Moral Judgments and Emotions: A Less Intimate Relationship Than Recently Claimed. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35 (3):177-195.
    It has long been claimed that moral judgements are dominated by reason. In recent years, however, the tide has turned. Many psychologists and philosophers now hold the view that there is a close empirical association between moral judgements and emotions. In particular, they claim that emotions (1) co-occur with moral judgements, (2) causally influence moral judgements, (3) are causally sufficient for moral judgements, and (4) are causally necessary for moral judgements. At first (...)
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  7. Wayne Christensen & John Sutton (2012). Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press 327-347.
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of (...)
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  8. Ronald de Sousa (2001). Moral Emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on (...)
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  9. Roger Giner-Sorolla (2012). Judging Passions: Moral Emotions in Persons and Groups. Psychology Press.
     
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  10.  27
    Bruce Maxwell & Roland Reichenbach (2007). Educating Moral Emotions: A Praxiological Analysis. [REVIEW] Studies in Philosophy and Education 26 (2):147-163.
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  11.  68
    Maria Antonaccio (2001). Picturing the Soul: Moral Psychology and the Recovery of the Emotions. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):127-141.
    This paper draws from the resources of Iris Murdoch''s moral philosophy to analyze the ethical status of the emotions at two related levels of reflection. Methodologically, it argues that a recovery of the emotions requires a revised notion of moral theory which affirms the basic orientation of consciousness to some notion of value or the good. Such a theory challenges many of the rationalist premises which in the past have led moral theory to reject the (...)
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  12.  28
    Jae-Eun Kim & Kim K. P. Johnson (2013). The Impact of Moral Emotions on Cause-Related Marketing Campaigns: A Cross-Cultural Examination. Journal of Business Ethics 112 (1):79-90.
    This research was focused on investigating why some consumers might support cause-related marketing campaigns for reasons other than personal benefit by examining the influence of moral emotions and cultural orientation. The authors investigated the extent to which moral emotions operate differently across a cultural variable (US versus Korea) and an individual difference variable (self-construal). A survey method was utilised. Data were collected from a convenience sample of US ( n = 180) and Korean ( n = (...)
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  13.  32
    Bert Molewijk, Dick Kleinlugtenbelt, Scott Pugh & Guy Widdershoven (2011). Emotions and Clinical Ethics Support. A Moral Inquiry Into Emotions in Moral Case Deliberation. HEC Forum 23 (4):257-268.
    Emotions play an important part in moral life. Within clinical ethics support (CES), one should take into account the crucial role of emotions in moral cases in clinical practice. In this paper, we present an Aristotelian approach to emotions. We argue that CES can help participants deal with emotions by fostering a joint process of investigation of the role of emotions in a case. This investigation goes beyond empathy with and moral judgment (...)
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  14.  40
    Bert Molewijk, Dick Kleinlugtenbelt & Guy Widdershoven (2011). The Role of Emotions in Moral Case Deliberation: Theory, Practice, and Methodology. Bioethics 25 (7):383-393.
    In clinical moral decision making, emotions often play an important role. However, many clinical ethicists are ignorant, suspicious or even critical of the role of emotions in making moral decisions and in reflecting on them. This raises practical and theoretical questions about the understanding and use of emotions in clinical ethics support services. This paper presents an Aristotelian view on emotions and describes its application in the practice of moral case deliberation.According to Aristotle, (...)
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  15.  21
    Bruce Maxwell & Roland Reichenbach (2005). Imitation, Imagination and Re‐Appraisal: Educating the Moral Emotions. Journal of Moral Education 34 (3):291-307.
    No observer of research currents in the human sciences can fail to detect a new appreciation for the contribution of emotions to descriptions of such wide?ranging psychological phenomena as moral judgement, personal and social development and learning. Despite this, we claim that educating the emotions as a dimension of moral education remains something of a taboo subject. As evidence for this, we present three categories of interventions that fit unmistakably into the category of the education of (...)
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  16.  29
    Jeffrie G. Murphy (2012). Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion. OUP Usa.
    The essays in this collection explore, from philosophical and religious perspectives, a variety of moral emotions and their relationship to punishment and condemnation or to decisions to lessen punishment or condemnation.
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  17.  6
    Tracy L. Spinrad, Sandra H. Losoya, Nancy Eisenberg, Richard A. Fabes, Stephanie A. Shepard, Amanda Cumberland, Ivanna K. Guthrie & Bridget C. Murphy (1999). The Relations of Parental Affect and Encouragement to Children's Moral Emotions and Behaviour. Journal of Moral Education 28 (3):323-337.
    Although researchers have been concerned with the effects of parental socialisation on children's outcomes, there has been surprisingly little work on the socialisation of children's moral emotions and behaviour. The purpose of this study was to explore the role of observed parental affect and encouragement in children's empathy-related responding and moral behaviour (i.e. cheating). Moreover, the moderating influence of children's characteristics (i.e. sex) on this relationship was investigated. Ninety-seven girls and 119 boys (mean age = 73 months) (...)
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  18.  25
    Ronald De Sousa (2001). Moral Emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109 - 126.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on (...)
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  19.  14
    Ben Spiecker (1988). Psychopathy: The Incapacity to Have Moral Emotions. Journal of Moral Education 17 (2):98-104.
    Abstract ?Lovelessness? and ?guiltlessness? are often seen as the distinctive features of the psychopath. These characteristics can be interpreted as a failure to have two sub?classes of moral emotions, the (moral) rule?emotions and the altruistic emotions. For a better understanding of this moral defect, a more detailed analysis of these types of moral emotions is given. The analysis indicates that the disorder is caused by the absence of the second component of both (...)
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  20.  19
    Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner (2011). Dimensions of Moral Emotions. Emotion Review 3 (3):258-260.
    Anger, disgust, elevation, sympathy, relief. If the subjective experience of each of these emotions is the same whether elicited by moral or nonmoral events, then what makes moral emotions unique? We suggest that the configuration of moral emotions is special—a configuration given by the underlying structure of morality. Research suggests that people divide the moral world along the two dimensions of valence (help/harm) and moral type (agent/patient). The intersection of these two dimensions (...)
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  21. Sana Sheikh & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman (2010). Tracing the Self-Regulatory Bases of Moral Emotions. Emotion Review 2 (4):386-396.
    In this article we explore a self-regulatory perspective on the self-evaluative moral emotions, shame and guilt. Broadly conceived, self-regulation distinguishes between two types of motivation: approach/activation and avoidance/inhibition. We use this distinction to conceptually understand the socialization dimensions (parental restrictiveness versus nurturance), associated emotions (anxiety versus empathy), and forms of morality (proscriptive versus prescriptive) that serve as precursors to each self-evaluative moral emotion. We then examine the components of shame and guilt experiences in greater detail and (...)
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  22. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
    The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are (...) emotions. (shrink)
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  23. Anthony J. Steinbock (2014). Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart. Northwestern University Press.
    Moral Emotions builds upon the philosophical theory of persons begun in _Phenomenology and Mysticism _and marks a new stage of phenomenology. Author Anthony J. Steinbock finds personhood analyzing key emotions, called moral emotions. _Moral Emotions _offers a systematic account of the moral emotions, described here as pride, shame, and guilt as emotions of self-givenness; repentance, hope, and despair as emotions of possibility; and trusting, loving, and humility as emotions of (...)
     
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  24.  12
    Fiery A. Cushman (2011). Moral Emotions From the Frog’s Eye View. Emotion Review 3 (3):261-263.
    To understand the structure of moral emotions poses a difficult challenge. For instance, why do liberals and conservatives see some moral issues similarly, but others starkly differently? Or, why does punishment depend on accidental variation in the severity of a harmful outcome, while judgments of wrongfulness or character do not? To resolve the complex design of morality, it helps to think in functional terms. Whether through learning, cultural evolution or natural selection, moral emotions will tend (...)
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  25.  32
    Sabine Roeser (2009). Reid and Moral Emotions. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):177-192.
    The name of Thomas Reid rarely appears in discussions of the history of moral thought. This is a pity, since Reid has a lot of interesting ideas that can contribute to the current discussions in meta-ethics. Reid can be understood as an ethical intuitionist. What makes his account especially interesting is the role affective states play in his intuitionist theory. Reid defends a cognitive theory of moral emotions. According to Reid, there are moral feelings that are (...)
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  26.  53
    Susan Stark (2004). A Change of Heart: Moral Emotions, Transformation, and Moral Virtue. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):31-50.
    Inspired in part by a renewed attention to Aristotle's moral philosophy, philosophers have acknowledged the important role of the emotions in morality. Nonetheless, precisely how emotions matter to morality has remained contentious. Aristotelians claim that moral virtue is constituted by correct action and correct emotion. But Kantians seem to require solely that agents do morally correct actions out of respect for the moral law. There is a crucial philosophical disagreement between the Aristotelian and Kantian (...) outlooks: namely, is feeling the correct emotions necessary to virtue or is it an optional extra, which is permitted but not required. I argue that there are good reasons for siding with the Aristotelians: virtuous agents must experience the emotions appropriate to their situations. Moral virtue requires a change of heart. (shrink)
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  27. Kevin Mulligan, Moral Emotions.
    Emotions are said to be moral, as opposed to non- moral, in virtue of their objects. They are also said to be moral, for example morally good, as opposed to immoral, for example morally bad or evil, in virtue of their objects, nature, motives, functions or effects. The definition and content of moral matters are even more contested and contestable than the nature of emotions and of other affective phenomena. At the very least we (...)
     
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  28.  23
    Sunny Yang (2008). Moral Emotions and Thick Ethical Concepts. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:469-479.
    My aim in this paper is to illuminate the limitations of adopting thick ethical concepts to support the rationality of moral emotion. To this end, I shall first of all concentrate on whether emotions, especially moral emotions are thick concepts and can be analysed into both evaluative and descriptive components. Secondly,I shall examine Gibbard’s thesis that to judge an act wrong is to think guilt and anger warranted. I then raise the following question. If we identify (...)
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  29.  3
    Bert Roebben (1995). Catching a Glimpse of the Palace of Reason: The Education of Moral Emotions. Journal of Moral Education 24 (2):185-197.
    Abstract The main issue of this paper concerns how the education of emotions can contribute to moral education. This reflection starts from the intuition that a mere cognitive?developmental approach is insufficient to understand the phenomenon of moral growth as a whole. Moral education can be cold and ineffective without any real commitment to the emotional stratum of the human person. Therefore, a theory on the appropriateness and reasonableness of emotions is presented from which conclusions are (...)
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  30.  3
    Kai Marchal (2013). Moral Emotions, Awareness, and Spiritual Freedom in the Thought of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Asian Philosophy 23 (3):1-22.
    It is well known that the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (1130?1200) particularly emphasizes the role of emotions in human life. This paper shows that the four ?moral emotions? (e.g. feelings like ?compassion? and ?disdain? as described in the Mencius) are central to Zhu's thinking, insofar as only their genuine actualization enables the individual to achieve spiritual freedom. Moreover, I discuss the crucial notions of ?awareness?/?perception? (zh?jué) and ?knowledge?/?wisdom? (zh?), in order to reveal the complex dynamic that (...) emotions are said to create in the moral agent. I also analyse two important passages from the Mencius (1A/7 and 2A/6) and examine how Zhu Xi, in his exegetical glosses, defines the conditions of virtuous agency as based on the moral emotions. Finally, I explain the reasons why Neo-Confucians like Zhu Xi have sometimes been described as Kantian thinkers avant la lettre. (shrink)
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  31. Jeffrie G. Murphy (2014). Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion. Oxford University Press Usa.
    This collection of essays presents Jeffrie G. Murphy's most recent ideas on punishment, forgiveness, and the emotions of resentment, shame, guilt, remorse, love, and jealousy. In Murphy's view, conscious rationales of principle -- such as crime control or giving others what in justice they deserve -- do not always drive our decisions to punish or condemn others for wrongdoing. Sometimes our decisions are in fact driven by powerful and rather base emotions such as malice, spite, envy, and cruelty. (...)
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  32. Jeffrie G. Murphy (2014). Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion. OUP Usa.
    The essays in this collection explore, from philosophical and religious perspectives, a variety of moral emotions and their relationship to punishment and condemnation or to decisions to lessen punishment or condemnation.
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  33.  30
    Hanno Sauer (2011). The Appropriateness of Emotions. Moral Judgment, Moral Emotions, and the Conflation Problem. Ethical Perspectives 18 (1):107-140.
    What is the connection between emotions and moral judgments? Neo-sentimentalism maintains that to say that something is morally wrong is to think it appropriate to resent other people for doing it or to feel guilty upon doing it oneself. But intuitively, it seems that there is no way to characterize the content of guilt and resentment independent from the fact that these emotions respond to morally wrong actions. In response to this problem of circularity, modern forms of (...)
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  34.  10
    Piercarlo Valdesolo & David DeSteno (2011). The Virtue in Vice: Short-Sightedness in the Study of Moral Emotions. Emotion Review 3 (3):276-277.
    Emotions that are motivated by self-interest, such as jealousy, pride, and revenge, are considered to be vices. We examine the long-term consequences of such states, and suggest that, in addition to promoting immediate individual rewards, they may ultimately function to enhance collective well-being and, as such, contribute importantly to the stability of moral systems.
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  35.  23
    Michael Lacewing (2004). Book Review of Roberts, R., "Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology". [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 1:105-8.
  36.  5
    Doris Mcilwain, Jess Evans, Eleni Caldis, Fred Cicchini, Avi Aronstan, Adam Wright & Alan Taylor (2012). Strange Moralities Vicarious Emotion and Moral Emotions in Machiavellian and Psychopathic Personality Styles. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press
  37.  7
    Robert Campbell Roberts (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
    Life, on a day to day basis, is a sequence of emotional states: hope, disappointment, irritation, anger, affection, envy, pride, embarrassment, joy, sadness and many more. We know intuitively that these states express deep things about our character and our view of the world. But what are emotions and why are they so important to us? In one of the most extensive investigations of the emotions ever published, Robert Roberts develops a novel conception of what emotions are (...)
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  38.  42
    Taya R. Cohen (2010). Moral Emotions and Unethical Bargaining: The Differential Effects of Empathy and Perspective Taking in Deterring Deceitful Negotiation. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 94 (4):569-579.
    Two correlational studies tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking differentially relate to disapproval of unethical negotiation strategies, such as lies and bribes. Across both studies, empathy, but not perspective taking, discouraged attacking opponents' networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and feigning emotions to manipulate opponents. These results suggest that unethical bargaining is more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in guilt proneness and shame proneness inhibited the (...)
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  39. Mark Coeckelbergh (2010). Moral Appearances: Emotions, Robots, and Human Morality. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 12 (3):235-241.
    Can we build ‘moral robots’? If morality depends on emotions, the answer seems negative. Current robots do not meet standard necessary conditions for having emotions: they lack consciousness, mental states, and feelings. Moreover, it is not even clear how we might ever establish whether robots satisfy these conditions. Thus, at most, robots could be programmed to follow rules, but it would seem that such ‘psychopathic’ robots would be dangerous since they would lack full moral agency. However, (...)
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  40.  66
    Bryce Huebner (2015). Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition? Topoi 34 (2):427-440.
    Recent behavioral experiments, along with imaging experiments and neuropsychological studies appear to support the hypothesis that emotions play a causal or constitutive role in moral judgment. Those who resist this hypothesis tend to suggest that affective mechanisms are better suited to play a modulatory role in moral cognition. But I argue that claims about the role of emotion in moral cognition frame the debate in ways that divert attention away from other plausible hypotheses. I suggest that (...)
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  41. Christine Tappolet (2006). Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Ethics 117 (1):143-147.
    A critical review of Robert C. Roberts' "Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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  42. Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols (2010). Moral Emotions. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press 111.
  43.  42
    Stephen Chanderbhan (2013). The Shifting Prominence of Emotions in the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Diametros 38:62-85.
    In this article, I claim that emotions, as we understand the term today, have a more prominent role in the moral life described by Thomas Aquinas than has been traditionally thought. First, clarity is needed about what exactly the emotions are in Aquinas. Second, clarity is needed about true virtue: specifically, about the relationship of acquired virtue to infused, supernatural virtues. Given a fuller understanding of both these things, I claim that emotions are not only auxiliary (...)
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  44.  3
    Jessy E. G. Jordan (2013). Sabine Roeser, Moral Emotions and Intuitions. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):237-240.
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  45. Margaret R. Holmgren (2014). Book Review: Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion, Written by Jeffrie G. Murphy. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (5):673-676.
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  46. Robert C. Roberts (2013). Emotions in the Moral Life. Cambridge University Press.
    Robert C. Roberts first presented his vivid account of emotions as 'concern-based construals' in his book Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. In this new book he extends that account to the moral life. He explores the ways in which emotions can be a basis for moral judgments, how they account for the deeper moral identity of actions we perform, how they are constitutive of morally toned personal relationships like friendship, enmity, (...)
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  47.  5
    Jared Piazza, Pascale Sophie Russell & Paulo Sousa (2013). Moral Emotions and the Envisaging of Mitigating Circumstances for Wrongdoing. Cognition and Emotion 27 (4):707-722.
  48.  9
    Sean M. Laurent, Brian A. M. Clark, Stephannie Walker & Kimberly D. Wiseman (2014). Punishing Hypocrisy: The Roles of Hypocrisy and Moral Emotions in Deciding Culpability and Punishment of Criminal and Civil Moral Transgressors. Cognition and Emotion 28 (1):59-83.
  49. Noël Carroll (2010). Movies, the Moral Emotions, and Sympathy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):1-19.
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  50. Patricia Greenspan (2011). Craving the Right: Emotions and Moral Reasons. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press 39.
    I first began working on emotions as a project in philosophy of action, without particular reference to moral philosophy. My thought was that emotions have a distinctive role to play in rationality that tends to be underappreciated by philosophers. Bringing this out was meant to counter a widespread tendency to treat emotions as “blind” causes of action (for the general picture, see Greenspan 2009.) Instead, I thought that emotions could be seen as providing reasons. I (...)
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