Search results for 'moral error theory' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Richard Rowland (2013). Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when (...)
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  2.  77
    Wouter Floris Kalf (2013). Moral Error Theory, Entailment and Presupposition. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):923-937.
    According to moral error theory, moral discourse is error-ridden. Establishing error theory requires establishing two claims. These are that moral discourse carries a non-negotiable commitment to there being a moral reality and that there is no such reality. This paper concerns the first and so-called non-negotiable commitment claim. It starts by identifying the two existing argumentative strategies for settling that claim. The standard strategy is to argue for a relation of conceptual (...)
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  3.  44
    Daan Evers (forthcoming). Jonas Olson's Evidence for Moral Error Theory. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in (2014). I will first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I will then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion).
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  4.  2
    Jonas Olson (2016). Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):397-402.
    _ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 397 - 402 Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary (...) beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. _Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence_ examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This précis is a brief summary of the book’s content. (shrink)
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  5. Toby Svoboda (2011). Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.
    Philosophers should consider a hybrid meta-ethical theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral error theory. Proponents of such an expressivist-error theory hold that all moral utterances are either expressions of attitudes or expressions of false beliefs. Such a hybrid theory has two advantages over pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express beliefs, and (...)
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  6.  81
    Ragnar Francén Olinder (2013). Moral Relativism, Error-Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes. Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):564-580.
    Moral error-theorists and relativists agree that there are no absolute moral facts, but disagree whether that makes all moral judgments false. Who is right? This paper examines a type of objection used by moral error-theorists against relativists, and vice versa: objections from implausible ascriptions of mistakes. Relativists (and others) object to error-theory that it implausibly implies that people, in having moral beliefs, are systematically mistaken about what exists. Error-theorists (and others) (...)
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  7. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory. Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.
    The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown (...)
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  8.  15
    David Kaspar (2015). Jonas Olson, Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 35 (3):159-161.
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  9.  42
    Jonas Olson (2014). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. OUP Oxford.
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
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  10.  34
    A. Fisher (2015). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique and Defence by Jonas Olson. Analysis 75 (2):355-356.
    A review of Jonas Olson's "Moral Error Theory: History, critique and defence".
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  11.  42
    Paul Barry (2014). In Defence of Morality: A Response to a Moral Error Theory. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):63-85.
    This paper responds to Richard Joyce’s argument for a moral error theory. Joyce claims that our moral discourse purports to speak of something objective in that it presupposes the existence of non-institutional, categorical reasons for action. Given this, he argues that a proper vindication of our moral discourse would be one carried out from a point of view that is objective inasmuch as it is external to the ‘institution of morality’. And since our moral (...)
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  12.  8
    Simon Kirchin (2010). A Tension in the Moral Error Theory. In Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory.
    I highlight a tension within the moral error theoretic stance. Although I do not show that it is fatal, I believe the tension is problematic. In stating the tension I outline a conception of the common moral background against which it arises. I also discuss aspects of the similar error theories developed by John Mackie and Richard Joyce in order to show the tension at work.
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  13. Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Moral Error Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93–109.
    The paper explores the consequences of adopting a moral error theory targeted at the notion of reasonable convergence. I examine the prospects of two ways of combining acceptance of such a theory with continued acceptance of moral judgements in some form. On the first model, moral judgements are accepted as a pragmatically intelligible fiction. On the second model, moral judgements are made relative to a framework of assumptions with no claim to reasonable convergence (...)
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  14.  46
    Stephen Ingram (2015). After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.
    Moral abolitionists recommend that we get rid of moral discourse and moral judgement. At first glance this seems repugnant, but abolitionists think that we have overestimated the practical value of our moral framework and that eliminating it would be in our interests. I argue that abolitionism has a surprising amount going for it. Traditionally, abolitionism has been treated as an option available to moral error theorists. Error theorists say that moral discourse and (...)
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  15.  2
    Jussi Suikkanen (2013). Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 8. Oxford University Press 168-194.
    Moral error theories claim that (i) moral utterances express moral beliefs, that (ii) moral beliefs ascribe moral properties, and that (iii) moral properties are not instantiated. Thus, according to these views, there seems to be conclusive evidence against the truth of our ordinary moral beliefs. Furthermore, many error theorists claim that, even if we accepted moral error theory, we could still in principle keep our first-order moral beliefs. (...)
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  16. Chris Daly (2009). Moral Error Theory and the Problem of Evil. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2):89 - 105.
    Moral error theory claims that no moral sentence is (nonvacuously) true. Atheism claims that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with, or makes improbable, the existence of God. Is moral error theory compatible with atheism? This paper defends the thesis that it is compatible against criticisms by Nicholas Sturgeon.
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  17.  16
    S. T. Kirchin, A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory.
    What kind of properties are moral qualities, such as rightness, badness, etc? Some ethicists doubt that there are any such properties; they maintain that thinking that something is morally wrong (for example) is comparable to thinking that something is a unicorn or a ghost. These "moral error theorists" argue that the world simply does not contain the kind of properties or objects necessary to render our moral judgments true. This radical form of moral skepticism was (...)
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  18.  58
    Bart Streumer, Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.
    According to Jonas Olson, "a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity". I agree. But unlike Olson, I think that we cannot believe this error theory. I first argue that Olson is wrong to think that reasons for belief need not be irreducibly normative. I then argue that if reasons for belief are irreducibly normative, we cannot believe an error theory about all irreducible normativity. I (...)
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  19. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists. Ratio 26 (3):373-390.
    This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice.
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  20. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). Constructivism and the Error Theory. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory.
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  21. Jonas Olson (2011). In Defense of Moral Error Theory. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan
     
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  22. Diego E. Machuca (2011). Review of R. Joyce & S. Kirchin (Eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010). [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 31 (5):354-358.
  23.  8
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Written by Jonas Olson. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  24.  16
    Matt Lutz & Stephen Finlay (2015). Review: Jonas Olson, Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. [REVIEW] Ethics 125 (4):1219-1225.
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  25.  3
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence_, _written by Jonas Olson. Brill.
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  26.  33
    Daan Evers (2014). Review of Moral Error Theory, by Jonas Olson. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  27.  5
    Folke Tersman (2015). A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):333-337.
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  28.  71
    Fritz Allhoff (2011). A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory – Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin (Eds). Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):429-431.
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  29.  21
    Emma Wood (2014). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, by Jonas Olson. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):410-411.
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  30.  5
    Folke Tersman (forthcoming). A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory_, _edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  31.  4
    Folke Tersman (forthcoming). A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory_, _edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin. Brill.
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  32.  6
    Review by: Matt Lutz and Stephen Finlay (2015). Review: Jonas Olson, Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. [REVIEW] Ethics 125 (4):1219-1225,.
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  33.  3
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence_, _written by Jonas Olson. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  34.  3
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence_, _written by Jonas Olson. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  35.  18
    Mark Hanin (2013). Ethical Anti-Archimedeanism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (4):359-374.
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  36.  25
    Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Review of Richard Joyce, Simon Kirchin (Eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7).
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  37.  2
    Félix Aubé Beaudoin (2015). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence Jonas Olson Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; VIII + 214 Pp.; $49.46. [REVIEW] Dialogue 54 (3):594-596.
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  38.  58
    Christopher Cowie (2015). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):115-130.
    Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are (...)
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  39.  41
    François Jaquet & Hichem Naar (2016). Moral Beliefs for the Error Theorist? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19:193-207.
    The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should (...)
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  40.  83
    Matt Lutz (2014). The 'Now What' Problem for Error Theory. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):351-371.
    Error theorists hold that, although our first-order moral thought and discourse commits us to the existence of moral truths, there are no such truths. Holding this position in metaethics puts the error theorist in an uncomfortable position regarding first-order morality. When it comes to our pre-theoretic moral commitments, what should the error theorist think? What should she say? What should she do? I call this the ‘Now What’ Problem for error theory. This (...)
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  41. Nadeem Hussain (2010). Error Theory and Fictionalism. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge
    This paper surveys contemporary accounts of error theory and fictionalism. It introduces these categories to those new to metaethics by beginning with moral nihilism, the view that nothing really is right or wrong. One main motivation is that the scientific worldview seems to have no place for rightness or wrongness. Within contemporary metaethics there is a family of theories that makes similar claims. These are the theories that are usually classified as forms of error theory (...)
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  42.  84
    Paul Bloomfield (2013). Error Theory and the Concept of Morality. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):451-469.
    Error theories about morality often take as their starting point the supposed queerness of morality, and those resisting these arguments often try to argue by analogy that morality is no more queer than other unproblematic subject matters. Here, error theory (as exemplified primarily by the work of Richard Joyce) is resisted first by arguing that it assumes a common, modern, and peculiarly social conception of morality. Then error theorists point out that the social nature of morality (...)
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  43.  33
    Bo Petersson (2011). Axel Hägerström and His Early Version of Error Theory. Theoria 77 (1):55-70.
    In 1910–11 Axel Hägerström introduced an emotive theory of ethics asserting moral propositions and valuations in general to be neither true nor false. However, it is less well known that he modified his theory in the following year, now making a distinction between what he called primary and secondary valuations. From 1912 onwards, he restricted his emotive theory to primary valuations only, and applied an error theory to secondary ones. According to Hägerström, secondary valuations (...)
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  44.  39
    James A. Ryan (1997). Taking the 'Error' Out of Ruse's Error Theory. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):385-397.
    Michael Ruses Darwinian metaethics has come under just criticism from Peter Woolcock (1993). But with modification it remains defensible. Ruse (1986) holds that people ordinarily have a false belief that there are objective moral obligations. He argues that the evolutionary story should be taken as an error theory, i.e., as a theory which explains the belief that there are obligations as arising from non-rational causes, rather than from inference or evidential reasons. Woolcock quite rightly objects that (...)
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  45.  65
    Hallvard Lillehammer & Niklas Möller (2015). We Can Believe the Error Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):453-459.
    Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by ‘error theory’ he means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible to believe the error theory. First, we suggest a critical improvement to Streumer’s argument. As it stands, one crucial premise of that argument—that (...)
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  46.  6
    Andrew T. Forcehimes & Robert B. Talisse (forthcoming). Belief and the Error Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-8.
    A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.
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  47.  54
    Toby Svoboda (2015). Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists. Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-25.
    Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality, adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality, and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged. I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism (...)
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  48.  5
    Toby Svoboda (forthcoming). Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists. New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    _ Source: _Page Count 25 Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality, adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality, and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged. I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are (...)
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  49.  79
    Ben Fraser (2013). Moral Error Theories and Folk Metaethics. Philosophical Psychology 6 (6):1-18.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth ; the other in terms of justification. I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.
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  50. Stephen Finlay (2008). The Error in the Error Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):347-369.
    Moral error theory of the kind defended by J. L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the (...)
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