Search results for 'moral facts' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  18
    Brian Rosebury (2011). Moore's Moral Facts and the Gap in the Retributive Theory. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):361-376.
    The purely retributive moral justification of punishment has a gap at its centre. It fails to explain why the offender should not be protected from punishment by the intuitively powerful moral idea that afflicting another person (other than to avoid a greater harm) is always wrong. Attempts to close the gap have taken several different forms, and only one is discussed in this paper. This is the attempt to push aside the ‘protecting’ intuition, using some more powerful intuition (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Brian Leiter (2001). Moral Facts and Best Explanations. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):79.
    Do moral properties figure in the best explanatory account of the world? According to a popular realist argument, if they do, then they earn their ontological rights, for only properties that figure in the best explanation of experience are real properties. Although this realist strategy has been widely influential—not just in metaethics, but also in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science—no one has actually made the case that moral realism requires: namely, that moral facts really (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  3.  66
    Terence Cuneo (2006). Moral Facts as Configuring Causes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.
    The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  4.  17
    Stefan Sencerz (1995). Personal Goodness and Moral Facts. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:481-498.
    Peter Railton argues that normative realism is justified because the non-moral goodness of an individual has explanatory uses. After having equated moral rightness with a kind of impersonal social rationality, he argues that rightness, so defined, helps to explain various social phenomena. If he is right, then moral realism would be justified, too. Railton’s argument fails, however, on both counts. Several crucial steps in his reasoning are unsupported and are likely to be false. The explanations he proposes (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  36
    Andrew McGonigal (2005). Moral Facts and Suitably Informed Subjects: A Reply to Denham. Ratio 18 (1):82–92.
    The nature of moral facts, and their relationship to rationality, imagination and sentiment, have been central and pressing issues in recent moral philosophy. In this paper, I discuss and criticise a meta-ethical theory put forward by Alison Denham, which views moral facts as being constituted by the responses of ideal, empathetic agents. I argue that Denham’s account is radically unstable, in that she has given us an account of the nature of such agents which is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  11
    C. Skirke (2008). Do Our Actions Make Any Difference in Wrong Life?: Adorno on Moral Facts and Moral Dilemmas. Philosophy and Social Criticism 34 (7):737-758.
    Adorno's moral philosophy has often been accused of making aporetic prescriptions that are too taxing for moral agents. In this article, I defend his approach in terms of a theory of moral dilemmas. My guideline is Adorno's famous sentence that wrong life cannot be lived rightly. I argue that this claim is not distinctly prescriptive, as most of Adorno's critics believe, but is a claim about moral reality. Emphasizing realist aspects of his moral theory, I (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Stefan S. Sencerz (1992). Moral Intuitions, Moral Facts, and Justification in Ethics. Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    A central and fundamental problem in moral philosophy is that of understanding how moral principles and theories can be justified. It involves finding rational solutions to both theoretical problems and to substantial moral questions . According to Moral Intuitionism, some normative judgments, usually called moral intuitions, justify moral principles and theories. Typically, moral intuitionists promise a method that is supposed to yield progress toward finding the answers to ethical disputes and controversies. ;I argue, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  56
    Brian Edward Zamulinski (2007). Evolutionary Intuitionism: A Theory of the Origin and Nature of Moral Facts. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    It seems impossible that organisms selected to maximize their genetic legacy could also be moral agents in a world in which taking risks for strangers is sometimes morally laudable. Brian Zamulinski argues that it is possible if morality is an evolutionary by-product rather than an adaptation.Evolutionary Intuitionism presents a new evolutionary theory of human morality. Zamulinski explains the evolution of foundational attitudes, whose relationships to acts constitute moral facts. With foundational attitudes and the resulting moral (...) in place, he shows how they ground a plausible normative morality, give answers to meta-ethical questions, and provide an account of moral motivation. He explains the nature of moral intuitions and, thus, of our access to the moral facts. He shows that the theory makes confirmed empirical predictions, including the observable variation in moral views. The combination of intuitionism and evolutionary ethics enables Zamulinski to overcome the standard objections to both.Evolutionary Intuitionism is a unified theory of human morality that explains how an objective morality could develop naturally in a physical world like ours, among organisms like us. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Sociology of Moral Durkheim’S. (1993). 8 Durkheim's Sociology of Moral Facts. In Stephen P. Turner (ed.), Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Moralist. Routledge
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  18
    Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2006). Morality Without Moral Facts. In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell Pub. 6--220.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11.  67
    John H. Dreher (2002). Can There Be Brute, Contingent Moral Facts. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):23 - 30.
    In this paper I argue that whether or not a world is good can be a contingent fact about the world that is not dependent upon that world's natural facts, or, indeed, upon anyother facts. If so, the property, good, does not supervene upon the facts of nature (or upon any other facts). My argument for this claimis that it is possible to view the very world in which we live (viz. the natural facts that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  6
    Peter Remnant (1957). Moral Facts. Philosophy 32 (121):148 - 157.
    An important part of ethics consists in the attempt to find a theoretical framework for the sincere moral discourse of ordinary people; to present, if possible, a consistent account of the ways in which such terms as “good,” “right,” “duty,” “obligation” are used in moral contexts. It is surprising that it should ever have been thought possible to account for such utterances as expressions of emotion. For the most part nothing could be less like the sighs, groans, shouts, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. William Casebeer (2003). Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. MIT Press.
    In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  14.  48
    William G. Lycan (1986). Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):79-94.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  15. Christopher B. Kulp (2011). Moral Facts and the Centrality of Intuitions. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism. 48--66.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  35
    Stefan Sencerz (1995). Moral Facts and the Problem of Justification in Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):368 – 388.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  19
    Bob Harrison (2000). Are There Any Moral Facts? Philosophy Now 26:18-20.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  8
    Stefan Sencerz (1995). Moral Conversions, Moral Feelings, and Evidence for Moral Facts. Journal of Social Philosophy 26 (2):157-169.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19.  21
    Amy Lara (2008). Virtue Theory and Moral Facts. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):331-352.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  3
    Counterfactual Dependence (1995). Moral Facts and the Problem of Justification in Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  3
    Titno Airaksinen (1998). Moral Facts and Objective Values. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 64:27-35.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  2
    Christian Smith (2009). Iwant in This Chapter to Consider the Kind of Morality We Would Have Reason to Believe If It Were the Case That We Inhabit a Naturalistic Universe. In Particular, I Want to Consider Whether in a Naturalistic Cosmos We Would Have Reason to Believe—as Very Many Modern People in Fact Do—in Universal Benevolence and Human Rights as Moral Facts and Imperatives. In Jeffrey Schloss & Michael J. Murray (eds.), The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion. Oxford University Press 292.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Georg Gasser (2011). Moral Facts Sui Generis For Non-Naturalistic Metaphysics of Moral Realism. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 118 (2):232-250.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. S. Ross (1991). The Nature of Moral Facts. Philosophical Forum 22 (3):243-269.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Brian Zamulinski (2007). Evolutionary Intuitionism: A Theory of the Origin and Nature of Moral Facts. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Brian Zamulinski (2007). Evolutionary Intuitionism: A Theory of the Origin and Nature of Moral Facts. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  3
    R. Ferber (1994). Moral Judgments as Descriptions of Institutional Facts. In Ulla Wessels & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen / Analyomen: Proceedings of the 1st Conference "Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy". De Gruyter 719-729.
    This is the abbreviated and slightly revised English version of my paper “Moralische Urteile als Beschreibungen institutioneller Tatsachen. Unterwegs zu einer Theorie moralischer Urteile“, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 79, 1993, 372-392. It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  13
    David Archard (1992). Rights, Moral Values and Natural Facts: A Reply to Mary Midgley on the Problem of Child-Abuse. Journal of Applied Philosophy 9 (1):99-104.
    Mary Midgley asserts that my argument concerning the problem of child-abuse was inappropriately framed in the language of rights, and neglected certain pertinent natural facts. I defend the view that the use of rights-talk was both apposite and did not misrepresent the moral problem in question. I assess the status and character of the natural facts Midgley adduces in criticism of my case, concluding that they do not obviously establish the conclusions she believes they do. Finally I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. William D. Casebeer (2003). Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. A Bradford Book.
    In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. William D. Casebeer (2005). Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. A Bradford Book.
    In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  7
    Richard Wightman Fox & Robert B. Westbrook (eds.) (1998). In Face of the Facts: Moral Inquiry in American Scholarship. Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
    Recently there has been a renewed interest in moral inquiry among American scholars in a variety of disciplines. This collection of accessible essays by scholars in philosophy, political theory, psychology, history, literary studies, sociology, religious studies, anthropology, and legal studies affords a view of the current state of moral inquiry in the American academy, and it offers fresh departures for ethically informed, interdisciplinary scholarship. Seeking neither to reduce values to facts nor facts to values, these essays (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Russ Shafer-Landau (2007). Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329.
    There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33.  4
    L. S. Jacyna (2003). Moral Fibre: The Negotiation of Microscopic Facts in Victorian Britain. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 36 (1):39 - 85.
    During the 1840s and 1850s the British embryologist and histologist Martin Barry (1802-1855) propounded a bold and original thesis about the microscopic structure of animal and vegetable tissue. He maintained that minute double spirals were virtually ubiquitous in the makeup of a wide range of structures. This paper considers how a claim of this kind was consonant with a romantic image of scientific creativity with which Barry identified. It describes his partially successful strategies to convince contemporaries of the veracity of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Gilbert Harman (1986). Moral Explanations of Natural Facts-Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):57-68.
  35. Richard T. Garner (1990). On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):137 – 146.
  36. Nicholas L. Sturgeon (1986). Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):69-78.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  37. Toby Svoboda (2011). Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.
    Philosophers should consider a hybrid meta-ethical theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral error theory. Proponents of such an expressivist-error theory hold that all moral utterances are either expressions of attitudes or expressions of false beliefs. Such a hybrid theory has two advantages over pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express beliefs, and hybrid theorists can provide a simpler (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  12
    Samuel Freeman (2009). Constructivism, Facts, and Moral Justification. In Thomas Christiano & John Philip Christman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell 17--41.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39.  28
    David Copp (1991). Review: Moral Realism: Facts and Norms. [REVIEW] Ethics 101 (3):610 - 624.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  40.  4
    Massimo Reichlin (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 127-144.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  26
    Christian Miller (forthcoming). Moral Realism and Anti-Realism. In Jerome Gellman (ed.), The History of Evil. Acumen Press
    This chapter surveys work in meta-ethics in the past fifty years which explicitly deals with issues associated with evil. It discusses two examples from secular discussions: the argument developed by Gilbert Harman on the explanatory role of moral facts, and the argument developed by Gilbert Harman and John Doris on the empirical inadequacy of the virtues. The chapter then turns to two topics related to theistic meta-ethics: the problem of evil and moral realism, and theological voluntarism and (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  2
    Antonella Corradini (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 145-162.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  2
    Michael Pauen (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 45-62.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  2
    Maureen Sie (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 165-192.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  7
    Sharon Lamb (2013). Just the Facts? The Separation of Sex Education From Moral Education. Educational Theory 63 (5):443-460.
    In this essay Sharon Lamb considers how progressives have begun to win the longstanding battle to shape sex education and what they have had to give up in the process. After framing the battle in historical context, Lamb uses discourse analysis to explore the hidden values in the “evidence-based” (EB) curricula that progressives currently favor and that pass for neutral today. As her analysis reveals, EB curricula privilege three discourses — a discourse of science, a discourse of healthy choices (with (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  12
    Michael Stocker (1970). Moral Duties, Institutions, and Natural Facts. The Monist 54 (4):602-624.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  1
    Arnaldo Benini (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 195-202.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  1
    Christoph Lumer (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 3-42.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  9
    Donald X. Burt (1988). Facts, Fables, and Moral Rules. New Scholasticism 62 (4):400-411.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  8
    Alexander Sager (2005). Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. Dialogue 44 (4):820-824.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000