Search results for 'moral justification of punishment' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  11
    François Tanguay-Renaud (2013). Victor's Justice: The Next Best Moral Theory of Criminal Punishment? [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 32 (1):129-157.
    In this essay, I address one methodological aspect of Victor Tadros's The Ends of Harm-­-­namely, the moral character of the theory of criminal punishment it defends. First, I offer a brief reconstruction of this dimension of the argument, highlighting some of its distinctive strengths while drawing attention to particular inconsistencies. I then argue that Tadros ought to refrain from developing this approach in terms of an overly narrow understanding of the morality of harming as fully unified and reconciled (...)
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  2.  8
    John Wilson (1972). A Comment on the Article ' Wilson on the Justification of Punishment' by Mark Fisher and Grenville Wall inJournal of Moral Education,Vol 1, No 3, P 203. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Education 1 (3):245-246.
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  3.  44
    Thom Brooks, Moral Sentiments and the Justification of Punishment.
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  4.  12
    Stephen Kershnar (1995). The Justification of Deserved Punishment Via General Moral Principles. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):461-484.
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  5.  46
    Kevin Magill (1998). The Idea of a Justification for Punishment. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (1):86-101.
    The argument between retributivists and consequentialists about what morally justifies the punishment of offenders is incoherent. If we were to discover that all of the contending justifications were mistaken, there is no realistic prospect that this would lead us to abandon legal punishment. Justification of words, beliefs and deeds, can only be intelligible on the assumption that if one's justification were found to be invalid and there were no alternative justification, one would be prepared to (...)
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  6. Stephen Kershnar (1995). The Justification of Deserved Punishment. Dissertation, The University of Nebraska - Lincoln
    A punitive desert-claim should be understood as a claim about the intrinsic value of punishment, where this value is grounded in an act or feature of the person to be punished. The purpose of my project is to explore the structure and justification of such punitive desert-claims. ;I argue that a true punitive desert-claim takes the form and , and that belief in these principles is justified on the basis of our considered moral judgments. The Principle of (...)
     
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  7.  16
    Ido Weijers (2000). Punishment and Upbringing: Considerations for an Educative Justification of Punishment. Journal of Moral Education 29 (1):61-73.
    Punishment seems taboo both in modern education and in theory. In so far as philosophers of education engage with this problem they follow the pattern of the philosophy of law: consequentialism or deontology. This article starts from another perspective. Its starting point is that punishment in education and upbringing must be seen as an interactive moral process. Two conditions are considered which have to be fulfilled before one can speak of educative punishment: punishment assumes a (...)
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  8.  12
    Federico Picinali (2013). A Retributive Justification for Not Punishing Bare Intentions Or: On the Moral Relevance of the 'Now-Belief'. Law and Philosophy 32 (4):385-403.
    According to criminal law a person should not be punished for a bare intention to commit a crime. While theorists have provided consequentialist and epistemic justifications of this tenet, no convincing retributive justification thereof has yet been advanced. The present paper attempts to fill this lacuna through arguing that there is an important moral difference between a future-directed and a present-directed intention to act wrongfully. Such difference is due to the restraining influence exercised in the decisional process by (...)
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  9.  0
    Frances E. Gill (2003). The Moral Benefit of Punishment: Self-Determination as a Goal of Correctional Counseling. Lexington Books.
    In this provocative work, Frances E. Gill argues that self-determination is a universal goal of correctional counseling. Gill leads the reader through a rigorous philosophical justification of the paternalism of state punishment in service of this goal.
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  10.  81
    Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2005). Punishment and the Strategic Structure of Moral Systems. Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):767–789.
    The problem of moral compliance is the problem of explaining how moral norms are sustained over extented stretches of time despite the existence of selfish evolutionary incentives that favor their violation. There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of solutions that have been offered to the problem of moral compliance, the reciprocity-based account and the punishment-based account. In this paper, I argue that though the reciprocity-based account has been widely endorsed by evolutionary theorists, the account is in (...)
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  11.  63
    Jane Johnson (2008). Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of Punishment. Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):291-307.
    The standard view of Kant’s retributivism, as well as its more recent reworking in the ‘limited’ or ‘partial’ retributivist reading are, it is argued here, inadequate accounts of Kant on punishment. In the case of the former, the view is too limited and superficial, and in the latter it is simply inaccurate as an interpretation of Kant. Instead, this paper argues that a more sophisticated and accurate rendering of Kant on punishment can be obtained by looking to his (...)
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  12.  1
    Mark Fisher & Grenville Wall (1972). Wilson on the Justification of Punishment. Journal of Moral Education 1 (3):203-204.
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  13.  65
    Antony Flew (1954). The Justification of Punishment. Philosophy 29 (111):291 - 307.
    I want to discuss philosophically, to glance at the logic of, the parts of this expression “the justification of punishment” and then to draw from this discussion one or two morals for discussions of the justification of punishment. This paper is based on one originally given to the Scots Philosophy Club at its Aberdeen meeting in 1953, as the third part of a symposium on The Justification of Punishment.
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  14.  32
    Alison M. Jaggar & Theresa W. Tobin (2013). Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):383-408.
    This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with (...)
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  15.  65
    Victor Tadros (2011). The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a critical examination of those theories and advances a new argument for punishment's justification, calling it the 'duty view'.
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  16.  26
    Theresa W. Tobin & Alison M. Jaggar (2013). Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):409-439.
    The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all-purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively (...)
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  17.  11
    Stefano Paoli & Aphra Kerr (2012). On Crimes and Punishments in Virtual Worlds: Bots, the Failure of Punishment and Players as Moral Entrepreneurs. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 14 (2):73-87.
    This paper focuses on the role of punishment as a critical social mechanism for cheating prevention in MMORPGs. The role of punishment is empirically investigated in a case study of the MMORPG Tibia (Cipsoft 1997–2011 ) ( http://www.tibia.com ) and by focusing on the use of bots to cheat. We describe the failure of punishment in Tibia, which is perceived by players as one of the elements facilitating the proliferation of bots. In this process some players act (...)
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  18.  42
    Bill Wringe (2010). War Crimes and Expressive Theories of Punishment: Communication or Denunciation? Res Publica 16 (2):119-133.
    In a paper published in 2006, I argued that the best way of defending something like our current practices of punishing war criminals would be to base the justification of this practice on an expressive theory of punishment. I considered two forms that such a justification could take—a ‘denunciatory’ account, on which the purpose of punishment is supposed to communicate a commitment to certain kinds of standard to individuals other than the criminal and a ‘communicative’ account, (...)
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  19.  87
    Fiery Cushman (2008). Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states (...)
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  20.  4
    Zachary Hoskins (2014). The Moral Permissibility of Punishment. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Moral Permissibility of Punishment The legal institution of punishment presents a distinctive moral challenge because it involves a state’s infliction of intentionally harsh, or burdensome, treatment on some of its members—treatment that typically would be considered morally impermissible. Most of us would agree, for instance, that it is typically impermissible to imprison people, to […].
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  21.  23
    Mark Coeckelbergh (2010). Robot Rights? Towards a Social-Relational Justification of Moral Consideration. Ethics and Information Technology 12 (3):209-221.
    Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to grant some degree of (...) consideration to some intelligent social robots: it sketches a novel argument for moral consideration based on social relations. It is shown that to further develop this argument we need to revise our existing ontological and social-political frameworks. It is suggested that we need a social ecology, which may be developed by engaging with Western ecology and Eastern worldviews. Although this relational turn raises many difficult issues and requires more work, this paper provides a rough outline of an alternative approach to moral consideration that can assist us in shaping our relations to intelligent robots and, by extension, to all artificial and biological entities that appear to us as more than instruments for our human purposes. (shrink)
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  22.  16
    James D. Marshall (1989). The Incompatibility of Punishment and Moral Education: A Reply to Peter Hobson. Journal of Moral Education 18 (2):144-147.
    Abstract In his paper ?The compatibility of punishment and moral education?, Hobson (1986) attempts to refute arguments which I had advanced (Marshall, 1984) to the effect that there were incompatibilities between claims to be morally educating children and to be punishing them. I wish to point out in Hobson's paper some questionable interpretations of the punishment literature and a serious flaw in the argument. More importantly, I wish to advance the debate by recourse to historical material and (...)
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  23.  44
    Morris J. Fish (2008). An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (1):57-71.
    The lex talionis of the Old Testament has been widely perceived—understandably, but mistakenly—as a barbaric law of retribution in kind. It is better understood as a seminal expression of restraint and proportionality as moral principles of punishment. This has been recognized from the earliest times. Over the intervening centuries, the lex talionis has lost neither its moral significance nor its penal relevance. This is reflected in H.L.A. Hart's synthesis of modern retributivist and utilitarian theories of punishment (...)
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  24.  3
    David Wood (2002). Retribution, Crime Reduction and the Justification of Punishment. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 22 (2):301-321.
    The ‘dualist project’ in the philosophy of punishment is to show how retributivist and reductivist (utilitarian) considerations can be combined to provide an adequate justification of punishment. Three types of dualist theories can be distinguished—‘split‐level’, ‘integrated’ and ‘mere conjunction’. Split‐level theories (e.g. Hart, Rawls) must be rejected, as they relegate retributivist considerations to a lesser role. An attempted integrated theory is put forward, appealing to the reductivist means of deterrence. However, it cannot explain how the two types (...)
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  25. Fritz Allhoff (2006). A Defense of Torture: Separation of Cases, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Moral Justification. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):243-264.
    In this paper, I argue for the permissibility of torture in idealized cases by application of separation of cases: if torture is permissible given any of the dominant moral theories (and if one of those is correct), then torture is permissible simpliciter and I can discharge the tricky business of trying to adjudicate among conflicting moral views. To be sure, torture is not permissible on all the dominant moral theories as at least Kantianism will prove especially recalcitrant (...)
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  26.  27
    Leland F. Saunders (2009). Reason and Intuition in the Moral Life: A Dual-Process Account of Moral Justification. In Jonathan Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press 335--354.
    This chapter explores how morality can be rational if moral intuitions are resistant to rational reflection. There are two parts to this question. The normative problem is whether there is a model of moral justification which can show that morality is a rational enterprise given the facts of moral dumbfounding. Appealing to the model of reflective equilibrium for the rational justification of moral intuitions solves this problem. Reflective equilibrium views the rational justification of (...)
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  27.  58
    Joseph B. R. Gaie (2004). The Ethics of Medical Involvement in Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Discussion. Kluwer Academic.
    This book examines the extremely important issue of the consistency of medical involvement in ending lives in medicine, law and war. It uses philosophical theory to show why medical doctors may be involved at different stages of the capital punishment process. The author uses the theories of Emmanuel Kant and John S. Mill, combined with Gerwith's principle of generic consistency, to concretize ethics in capital punishment practice. This book does not discuss the moral justification of capital (...)
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  28.  20
    Kristján Kristjánsson (2000). Utilitarian Naturalism and the Moral Justification of Emotions. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1):43-58.
    The virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse has recently admitted that the commonly supposed link between a belief in the moral significance of human emotions and an adherence to virtue ethics may rest on a “historical accident,” and that utilitarians could, for instance, be equally concerned with emotions. The present essay takes up Hursthouse’s challenge and explores both what utilitarians have said and what they should say about the moral justification of emotions. Mill’s classical utilitarianism is rehearsed and applied (...)
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  29.  0
    Camilla Boisen (2012). The Changing Moral Justification of Empire: From the Right to Colonise to the Obligation to Civilise. History of European Ideas 39 (3):335-353.
    This paper argues that the moral legitimating reasoning of terra nullius assumed an under-recognised, different guise in the later years of colonial justification in the form of trusteeship. The idea of terra nullius has a central place in the political thought of thinkers such as Grotius and Locke. Although terra nullius, consolidated in European colonial thought in the early modern period, differed conceptually from the doctrine of trusteeship as the colonial legitimation for Africa, both instituted a moral (...)
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  30.  56
    Michael Philips (1986). The Justification of Punishment and the Justification of Political Authority. Law and Philosophy 5 (3):393 - 416.
    Philosophical accounts of punishment are primarily concerned with punishment by the (or: a) state. More specifically, they attempt to explain why the (a) state may justifiably penalize those who are judged to violate its laws and the conditions under which it is entitled to do so. But any full account of these matters must surely be grounded in an account of the nature and purpose of the state and the justification of state authority. Because they are not (...)
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  31.  6
    Iep Author, Moral Permissibility of Punishment.
    The Moral Permissibility of Punishment The legal institution of punishment presents a distinctive moral challenge because it involves a state’s infliction of intentionally harsh, or burdensome, treatment on some of its members—treatment that typically would be considered morally impermissible. Most of us would agree, for instance, that it is typically impermissible to imprison people, to […].
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  32.  28
    Cécile Lavergne (2011). Questioning the Moral Justification of Political Violence: Recognition Conflicts, Identities and Emancipation. Critical Horizons 12 (2):211-231.
    Basing its understanding on the two uses of the notion of violence in Honneth’s theory of recognition, this paper aims at developing a framework for the analysis of the thesis of the moral justification of political violence, whenever forms of political violence can be defined as legitimate struggles of recognition. Its contention is that the requalification of some forms of collective violence as recognition conflicts makes it possible to establish a hierarchy of justification for forms of violence (...)
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  33.  9
    Cordelia Fine & Jeanette Kennett (2004). Mental Impairment, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility: Psychopathy and the Purposes of Punishment. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):425-443.
    We have argued here that to attribute criminal responsibility to psychopathic individuals is to ignore substantial and growing evidence that psychopathic individuals are significantly impaired in moral understanding. They do not appear to know why moral transgressions are wrong in the full sense required by the law. As morally blameless offenders, punishment as a basis for detention cannot be justified. Moreover, as there are currently no successful treatment programs for psychopathy, nor can detention be justified on grounds (...)
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  34.  21
    James R. Flynn (1974). Do We Really Want a Moral Justification of Our Basic Ideals? Inquiry 17 (1-4):151 – 173.
    It is commonly held that when there is a conflict of basic ideals, e.g. a humane man v. an elitist or a Social Darwinist or someone who holds a revenge ethic, no moral justification is possible. This paper attempts to go further and show that such a justification would be undesirable, would carry a price few would be willing to pay. The thesis is developed to shed light not only on classical thinkers (Plato, Locke, Kant) but also (...)
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  35.  1
    Friderik Klampfer (2005). Contextualism and Moral Justification: A Discussion of Mark Timmons, Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):569-582.
    In his insightful and stimulating book Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism, Mark Timmons presents a strong case for embracing contextualism as a vibrant alternative to the two rival accounts that used to dominate moral epistemology in the past, foundationalism and coherentism. His sophisticated version of contextualist moral epistemology comprises of several intriguing and mind-boggling theses: moral beliefs that lack Justification altogether can nevertheless be held in an epistemically responsible way; such unjustified beliefs can (...)
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  36.  57
    Mylan Engel Jr (2012). Coherentism and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Beliefs: A Case Study in How to Do Practical Ethics Without Appeal to a Moral Theory. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):50-74.
    This paper defends a coherentist approach to moral epistemology. In “The Immorality of Eating Meat” (2000), I offer a coherentist consistency argument to show that our own beliefs rationally commit us to the immorality of eating meat. Elsewhere, I use our own beliefs as premises to argue that we have positive duties to assist the poor (2004) and to argue that biomedical animal experimentation is wrong (2012). The present paper explores whether this consistency-based coherentist approach of grounding particular (...) judgments on beliefs we already hold, with no appeal to moral theory, is a legitimate way of doing practical ethics. I argue (i) that grounding particular moral judgments on our core moral convictions and other core nonmoral beliefs is a legitimate way to justify moral judgments, (ii) that these moral judgments possess as much epistemic justification and have as much claim to objectivity as moral judgments grounded on particular ethical theories, and (iii) that this internalistic coherentist method of grounding moral judgments is more likely to result in behavioral guidance than traditional theory-based approaches to practical ethics. By way of illustrating the approach, I briefly recapitulate my consistency-based argument for ethical vegetarianism. I then defend the coherentist approach implicit in the argument against a number of potentially fatal metatheoretical attacks. (shrink)
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  37. Michael Pace (2011). The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'. Noûs 45 (2):239-268.
    A moral-pragmatic argument for a proposition is an argument intended to establish that believing the proposition would be morally beneficial. Since such arguments do not adduce epistemic reasons, i.e., reasons that support the truth of a proposition, they can seem at best to be irrelevant epistemically. At worst, believing on the basis of such reasoning can seem to involve wishful thinking and intellectual dishonesty of a sort that that precludes such beliefs from being epistemically unjustified. Inspired by an argument (...)
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  38.  13
    Shaul Kimhi & Shifra Sagy (2008). Moral Justification and Feelings of Adjustment to Military Law-Enforcement Situation: The Case of Israeli Soldiers Serving at Army Roadblocks. Mind and Society 7 (2):177-191.
    The research examined the use of moral justification as a mediating mechanism of stress, used by compulsory Israeli soldiers who had served at army roadblocks in the West Bank. Employing Bandura’s model of moral disengagement, we expected that the greater the justification of army roadblocks by the soldier, the more he would feel adjusted to army demands. Feelings of adjustment to this situation were examined using three components: cognitive, affective and behavioral. The sample was composed of (...)
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  39.  10
    Theresa Weynand Tobin (2011). The Relevance of Trust for Moral Justification. Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):599-628.
    In this paper, I argue that relationships of trust are often necessary for moral justification. Even if a moral claim is likely to be true, it may not be adequately justified, and thus may not have normative force, unless those who are to accept the claim have good reason to believe that the one entering the claim is a trustworthy moral interlocutor. The complexity of moral knowledge coupled with differences among people in moral experience, (...)
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  40.  1
    Paul Ott (2011). Moral Pluralism, Moral Motivation, and Democracy: A Critique of Talisse's Epistemic Justification of Democracy. Contemporary Pragmatism 8 (2):145-162.
    In Democracy and Moral Conflict, Robert Talisse defends a folk epistemological justification of democracy. This is a universalist and non-moral justification that he deems necessary to accommodate moral pluralism. In contrast, I argue that this attempt fails to justify democracy, on three grounds. First, democracy cannot accommodate moral pluralism, as Talisse understands it. Second, Talisse's own conception of democracy is inconsistent with moral pluralism. And third, democracy requires moral justification and motivation, (...)
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  41.  0
    Anton Leist (1994). Some Problems in the Justification of Moral Rights. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 2:43-55.
    “Having a moral right” in private and public debates probably is one of the most important arguments to bring some foundation to one’s claims. Within international law and politics, for example, one easily falls back on universal “human rights”, especially if neither a more subtle moral argument nor prudential reasons find a hold. But in some contrast to this agreement on the strong practical relevance of rights, both the conceptual analysis and normative justification of rights are rather (...)
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  42.  3
    Malin Masterton, Gert Helgesson, Anna T. Höglund & Mats G. Hansson (2007). Queen Christina's Moral Claim on the Living: Justification of a Tenacious Moral Intuition. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (3):321-327.
    In the long-running debate on the interest of the dead, Joan C. Callahan argues against such interests and although Søren Holm for practical reasons is prepared to consider posthumous interests, he does not see any moral basis to support such interests. He argues that the whole question is irresolvable, yet finds privacy interests where Tutankhamen is concerned. Callahan argues that there can be reasons to hold on to the fiction that there are posthumous interests, namely if it is comforting (...)
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  43.  5
    Zachary Hoskins (2013). ''Punishment, Contempt, and the Prospect of Moral Reform''. Criminal Justice Ethics 32 (1):1-18.
    This paper objects to certain forms of punishments, such as supermax confinement, on grounds that they are inappropriately contemptuous. Building on discussions in Kant and elsewhere, I flesh out what I take to be salient features of contempt, features that make contempt especially troubling as a form of moral regard and treatment. As problematic as contempt may be in the interpersonal context, I contend that it is especially troubling when a person is treated contemptuously by her political community’s institutions (...)
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  44.  24
    Peter Königs (2013). The Expressivist Account of Punishment, Retribution, and the Emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1029-1047.
    This paper provides a discussion of the role that emotions may play in the justification of punishment. On the expressivist account of punishment, punishment has the purpose of expressing appropriate emotional reactions to wrongdoing, such as indignation, resentment or guilt. I will argue that this expressivist approach fails as these emotions can be expressed other than through the infliction of punishment. Another argument for hard treatment put forward by expressivists states that punitive sanctions are necessary (...)
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  45.  2
    Leo Zaibert (forthcoming). Of Normal Human Sympathies and Clear Consciences: Comments on Hyman Gross's Crime and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-18.
    Contemporary criminal justice systems are extraordinarily unfair. Focusing on Hyman Gross’s Crimes and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique, however, I identify ways in which scholarly criticisms of these criminal justice systems tend to miss their target. In particular, I argue against the assumption that in order to criticize these criminal justice systems we need to cast doubt on the very practice of blaming people and on the notion of desert, or that we need to reject wholesale retributive rationales (...)
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  46.  17
    R. J. Royce (1983). R.S. Peters and Moral Education, 1: The Justification of Procedural Principles. Journal of Moral Education 12 (3):174-181.
    Abstract In this article, which is the first of two to examine the ideas of R. S. Peters on moral education, consideration is given to his justificatory arguments found in Ethics and Education. Here he employs presupposition arguments to show to what anyone engaging in moral discourse is committed. The result is a group of procedural principles which are recommended to be employed in moral education. This article is an attempt to examine the presupposition arguments Peters employs, (...)
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  47.  15
    Peter Hobson (1986). The Compatibility of Punishment and Moral Education. Journal of Moral Education 15 (3):221-228.
    Abstract This paper argues that punishment and moral education are compatible and attempts to refute the arguments put forward by J. D. Marshall in an earlier article in this journal to the effect that they are not. It is also argued here that punishment can assist moral education by providing necessary pre?conditions for its success and can on occasion actually teach the child morally relevant information.
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  48.  7
    Stefano De Paoli & Aphra Kerr (2012). On Crimes and Punishments in Virtual Worlds: Bots, the Failure of Punishment and Players as Moral Entrepreneurs. Ethics and Information Technology 14 (2):73-87.
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  49.  5
    A. T. Nuyen (2008). Moral Luck and the Punishment of Attempts. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:499-505.
    In most countries, failed criminal attempts are punished less severely than those that succeed. Many philosophers, including myself, have argued that differential punishment can be justified. However, in a recent paper, Hanna raises objections to defenses of differential punishments, claiming that such policy goes against our “desert intuitions” and also cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds. I argue in this paper that Hanna’s desert-based and utilitarian objections can be undermined. Further, they are valid only within moral theories that (...)
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  50.  4
    A. T. Nuyen (2008). Moral Luck, Role-Based Ethics and the Punishment of Attempts. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):59-69.
    In most countries, failed criminal attempts are punished less severely than those that succeed. Many philosophers, including myself, have argued that differential punishment can be justified. However, in a recent paper, Hanna raises objections to defenses of differential punishment, claiming that such policy goes against our “desert intuitions” and also cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds. I argue in this paper that Hanna’s desert-based and utilitarian objections can be undermined. Further, they are valid only within moral theories (...)
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