Search results for 'moral motivation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation. In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism.score: 93.0
    It seems to many that moral opinions must make a difference to what we’re motivated to do, at least in suitable conditions. For others, it seems that it is possible to have genuine moral opinions that make no motivational difference. Both sides – internalists and externalists about moral motivation – can tell persuasive stories of actual and hypothetical cases. My proposal for a kind of reconciliation is to distinguish between two kinds of psychological states with (...) content. There are both moral thoughts or opinions that intrinsically motivate, and moral thoughts or opinions that don’t. The thoughts that intrinsically motivate are moral intuitions – spontaneous and compelling non-doxastic appearances of right or wrong that both attract assent and incline us to act or react. I argue that there is good reason to think that these intuitions, but not moral judgments, are constituted by manifestations of moral sentiments. The moral thoughts that do not intrinsically motivate are moral beliefs, which are in themselves as inert as any ordinary beliefs. Thus, roughly, internalism is true about intuitions and externalism is true about beliefs or judgments. (shrink)
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  2. Ragnar Francén (2010). Moral Motivation Pluralism. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.score: 90.0
    Motivational externalists and internalists of various sorts disagree about the circumstances under which it is conceptually possible to have moral opinions but lack moral motivation. Typically, the evidence referred to are intuitions about whether people in certain scenarios who lack moral motivation count as having moral opinions. People’s intuitions about such scenarios diverge, however. I argue that the nature of this diversity is such that, for each of the internalist and externalist theses, there is (...)
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  3. A. T. Nuyen (2009). Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation in Confucian Role-Based Ethics. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 8 (1):1-11.score: 90.0
    How is the Confucian moral agent motivated to do what he or she judges to be right or good? In western philosophy, the answer to a question such as this depends on whether one is an internalist or externalist concerning moral motivation. In this article, I will first interpret Confucian ethics as role-based ethics and then argue that we can attribute to Confucianism a position on moral motivation that is neither internalist nor externalist but somewhere (...)
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  4. Eve Garrard & David McNaughton (1998). Mapping Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):45-59.score: 90.0
    In this paper we defend a version of moral internalism and a cognitivist account of motivation against recent criticisms. The internalist thesis we espouse claims that, if an agent believes she has reason to A, then she is motivated to A. Discussion of counter-examples has been clouded by the absence of a clear account of the nature of motivation. While we can only begin to provide such an account in this paper, we do enough to show that (...)
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  5. Joseph Heath (2008). Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4):595 - 614.score: 90.0
    The prevalence of white-collar crime casts a long shadow over discussions in business ethics. One of the effects that has been the development of a strong emphasis upon questions of moral motivation within the field. Often in business ethics, there is no real dispute about the content of our moral obligations, the question is rather how to motivate people to respect them. This is a question that has been studied quite extensively by criminologists as well, yet their (...)
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  6. Owen Ware (forthcoming). Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation. Journal of the History of Philosophy.score: 90.0
    Despite Kant's lasting influence on philosophical accounts of moral motivation, many details of his own position remain elusive. In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant argues that our recognition of the moral law’s authority must elicit both painful and pleasurable feelings in us. On reflection, however, it is unclear how these effects could motivate us to act from duty. As a result, Kant’s theory of moral sensibility comes under a skeptical threat: the possibility of (...)
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  7. Caj Strandberg (2011). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation. Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.score: 87.0
    One of the most prevalent and influential assumptions in metaethics is that our conception of the relation between moral language and motivation provides strong support to internalism about moral judgments. In the present paper, I argue that this supposition is unfounded. Our responses to the type of thought experiments that internalists employ do not lend confirmation to this view to the extent they are assumed to do. In particular, they are as readily explained by an externalist view (...)
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  8. Michael Cholbi (2009). Moore's Paradox and Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.score: 84.0
    Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can (...)
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  9. Caj Strandberg (2007). Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation. Philosophia 35 (2):249-260.score: 84.0
    In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of (...) motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses. (shrink)
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  10. Sergio Tenenbaum (2011). Externalism, Motivation, and Moral Knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.score: 81.0
    For non-analytic ethical naturalists, externalism about moral motivation is an attractive option: it allows naturalists to embrace a Humean theory of motivation while holding that moral properties are real, natural properties. However, Michael Smith has mounted an important objection to this view. Smith observes that virtuous agents must have non-derivative motivation to pursue specific ends that they believe to be morally right; he then argues that this externalist view ascribes to the virtuous agent only a (...)
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  11. Christine Clavien (2010). An Affective Approach to Moral Motivation. Journal of Cognitive Science 11 (2):129-160.score: 81.0
    Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called “moral psychology”, which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an “affective picture”: ‘picture’ because it remains strictly at the descriptive (...)
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  12. Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri, In the Thick of Moral Motivation.score: 81.0
    We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we expose the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology as a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.
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  13. Elise Springer (2008). Moral Feedback and Motivation: Revisiting the Undermining Effect. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):407 - 423.score: 81.0
    Social psychologists have evidence that evaluative feedback on others’ choices sometimes has unwelcome negative effects on hearers’ motivation. Holroyd’s article (Holroyd J. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 10:267–278, 2007) draws attention to one such result, the undermining effect, that should help to challenge moral philosophers’ complacency about blame and praise. The cause for concern is actually greater than she indicates, both because there are multiple kinds of negative effect on hearer motivation, and because these are not, as (...)
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  14. Triantafyllos Gkouvas (2011). The Practicality of Pure Reason. A Normative Defence of Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation. Eidos 14:152-191.score: 78.0
    El propósito de este trabajo es defender la opinión que Kant ha propuesto sobre la teoría internalista de la motivación moral. En particular, argumentaré que la adopción de Kant de internalismo se evidencia en su afirmación de que la relación de la razón pura de la voluntad se basa en una práctica una proposición sintética a priori. Lo que se pretende demostrar es que Kant trata la sinteticidad práctica como un concepto fundamental para su relato de lo que significa (...)
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  15. Marion Hourdequin (2012). Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.score: 75.0
    Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular desires, interests, and commitments they have, then we may be forced to conclude that moral reasons are incoherent. Richard Joyce (...)
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  16. John Eriksson (2014). Elaborating Expressivism: Moral Judgments, Desires and Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.score: 75.0
    According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In (...)
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  17. Charles R. Pigden (2007). Hume, Motivation and “the Moral Problem”. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 62 (3):199-221.score: 72.0
    Hume is widely regarded as the grandfather of emotivism and indeed of non-cognitivism in general. For the chief argument for emotivism - the Argument from Motivation - is derived from him. In my opinion Hume was not an emotivist or proto-emotivist but a moral realist in the modern ‘response-dependent’ style. But my interest in this paper is not the historical Hume but the Hume of legend since the legendary Hume is one of the most influential philosophers of the (...)
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  18. Andrew Jordan (forthcoming). Whole-Hearted Motivation and Relevant Alternatives: A Problem for the Contrastivist Account of Moral Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-11.score: 72.0
    Recently, Walter Sinott-Armstrong and Justin Snedegar have argued for a general contrastivist theory of reasons. According to the contrastivist account of reasons, all reasons claims should be understood as a relation with an additional place for a contrast class. For example, rather than X being a reason for A to P simpliciter, the contrastivist claims that X is a reason for A to P out of {P,Q,R…}. The main goal of this paper is to argue that the contrastivist account of (...)
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  19. C. Daniel Batson (2008). Moral Masquerades: Experimental Exploration of the Nature of Moral Motivation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):51-66.score: 66.0
    Why do people act morally – when they do? Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that acting morally in the absence of incentives or sanctions is a product of a desire to uphold one or another moral principle (e.g., fairness). This form of motivation might be called moral integrity because the goal is to actually be moral. In a series of experiments designed to explore the nature of moral motivation, colleagues and I have (...)
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  20. Xiaomei Yang (2006). Categorical Imperatives, Moral Requirements, and Moral Motivation. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):112–129.score: 66.0
    Kant has argued that moral requirements are categorical. Kant's claim has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers; this article defends Kant's doctrine. I argue that Kant's claim captures the unique feature of moral requirements. The main arguments against Kant's claim focus on one condition that a categorical imperative must meet: to be independent of desires. I argue that there is another important, but often ignored, condition that a categorical imperative must meet, and this second condition is crucial to (...)
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  21. Timothy Schroeder, Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols (2010). Moral Motivation. In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.score: 63.0
    In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of motivation itself, and use that discussion to sketch four possible theories of distinctively moral motivation: caricature versions of familiar instrumentalist, cognitivist, sentimentalist, and personalist theories about morally worthy motivation. To test these theories, we turn to a wealth of scientific, particularly neuroscientific, evidence. Our conclusions are that (1) although the scientific evidence does not at present mandate a unique philosophical conclusion, it does present formidable obstacles to a (...)
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  22. Michael Cholbi (2011). Depression, Listlessness, and Moral Motivation. Ratio 24 (1):28-45.score: 63.0
    Motivational internalism (MI) holds that, necessarily, if an agent judges that she is morally obligated to ø, then, that agent is, to at least some minimal extent, motivated to ø. Opponents of MI sometimes invoke depression as a counterexample on the grounds that depressed individuals appear to sincerely affirm moral judgments but are ‘listless’ and unmotivated by such judgments. Such listlessness is a credible counterexample to MI, I argue, only if the actual clinical disorder of depression, rather than a (...)
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  23. Aristophanes Koutoungos (2005). Moral Coherence, Moral Worth and Explanations of Moral Motivation. Acta Analytica 20 (3):59-79.score: 63.0
    Moral internalism and moral externalism compete over the best explanation of the link between judgment and relevant motivation but, it is argued, they differ at best only verbally. The internalist rational-conceptual nature of the link’ as accounted by M. Smith in The Moral Problem is contrasted to the externalist, also rational, link that requires in addition support from the agent’s psychological-dispositional profile; the internalist link, however, is found to depend crucially on a, similarly to the externalist, (...)
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  24. Kelly Morton, Joanna Worthley, John Testerman & Marita Mahoney (2006). Defining Features of Moral Sensitivity and Moral Motivation: Pathways to Moral Reasoning in Medical Students. Journal of Moral Education 35 (3):387-406.score: 63.0
    Kohlberg's theory of moral development explores the roles of cognition and emotion but focuses primarily on cognition. Contemporary post?formal theories lead to the conclusion that skills resulting from cognitive?affective integration facilitate consistency between moral judgement and moral behaviour. Rest's four?component model of moral development delineates these skills specifically. The components, moral motivation, moral sensitivity, moral reasoning and moral character, operate as multidimensional processes that facilitate moral development and subsequently promote (...) behaviour. The relationships between these components have been relatively unexplored, thereby missing the opportunity to unpack the processes underlying moral growth and development. In this study, moral motivation (spirituality), moral sensitivity (post?formal skills) and moral reasoning are operationalized to examine the mediational effects of moral sensitivity of medical students. In the complex moral environment of medical students opportunities arise to question values and develop cognitive?affective skills, among them spirituality and post?formal thinking which are linked to increases in post?conventional moral reasoning. The models tested indicate that moral sensitivity mediates the relationship between moral motivation and moral reasoning. (shrink)
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  25. Kenneth Pahel (1976). Moral Motivation. Journal of Moral Education 5 (3):223-230.score: 63.0
    Abstract: It is claimed that there is a highly contingent and often misleading relationship between (a) giving reasons on a questionnaire and (b) genuine moral understanding. Also, many of the causal factors in shaping moral attitudes are irrelevant to their rational?moral justification, thus creating a lack of harmony between the two. The solution is a balanced programme that gives equal stress to moral reasoning and to opportunities for relevant emotive and evaluative experience. Aspects of Kant and (...)
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  26. David O. Brink, Handout #2: Moral Motivation and Rationalism.score: 60.0
    We have looked at worries about expressivism and other forms of noncognitivism. The externalist solution may also seem to be a solution of last resort, because it may seem to deny the platitude that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious. For this reason, we might look seriously at rationalist theories of moral motivation, because they promise to represent moral judgments as intrinsically motivational without giving up cognitivism.
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  27. David O. Brink, A Puzzle About Moral Motivation.score: 60.0
    Our puzzle about moral motivation can be seen as a tension that we encounter when we try to reconcile intellectual and practical aspects of morality. Cognitivists interpret moral judgments as expressing cognitive attitudes, such as belief. Moral judgments ascribe properties – axiological, deontic, and aretaic – to persons, actions, institutions, and policies. Internalists believe that moral judgments necessarily engage the will and motivate. We expect people to be motivated to act in accord with their (...) judgments and would find it odd for people to be systematically indifferent to what they judge morally significant. It is also a common view that motivation involves pro-attitudes, such as desires. We explain intentional action as the product of informational states, such as beliefs, and practical states, such as desires. But beliefs and desires are logically independent states; no belief entails any particular desire. These assumptions are in tension. (shrink)
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  28. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.score: 60.0
    In a series of publications, Tamar Gendler has argued for a distinction between belief and what she calls ?alief?. Gendler's argument for the distinction is a serviceability argument: the distinction is indispensable for explaining a whole slew of phenomena, typically involving ?belief-behaviour mismatch?. After embedding Gendler's distinction in a dual-process model of moral cognition, I argue here that the distinction also suggests a possible (dis)solution of what is perhaps the organizing problem of contemporary moral psychology: the apparent tension (...)
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  29. Nick Zangwill (2003). Externalist Moral Motivation. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2):143-154.score: 60.0
    “Motivational externalism” is the externalism until they see more of what view that moral judgements have no motisuch a theory would be like. The mere posvational efficacy in themselves, and that sibility of such a theory is not sufficiently when they motivate us, the source of motireassuring, even given strong arguments vation lies outside the moral judgement in against the opposite position. For there may a separate desire. Motivational externalism also be objections to externalism. contrasts with “motivational internalism,” (...)
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  30. John Cottingham (2000). Caring at a Distance: (Im)Partiality, Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Representation - Partiality, Distance and Moral Obligation. Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (3):309 – 313.score: 60.0
    (2000). Caring at a Distance: (Im)partiality, Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Representation - Partiality, Distance and Moral Obligation. Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 309-313. doi: 10.1080/713665894.
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  31. Simone De Colle & Patricia H. Werhane (2008). Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories: What Can We Learn for Designing Corporate Ethics Programs? Journal of Business Ethics 81 (4):751 - 764.score: 60.0
    In this article we discuss what are the implications for improving the design of corporate ethics programs, if we focus on the moral motivation accounts offered by main ethical theories. Virtue ethics, deontological ethics and utilitarianism offer different criteria of judgment to face moral dilemmas: Aristotle's virtues of character, Kant's categorical imperative, and Mill's greatest happiness principle are, respectively, their criteria to answer the question "What is the right thing to do?" We look at ethical theories from (...)
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  32. Connie S. Rosati, Moral Motivation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
    In our everyday lives, we confront a host of moral issues. Once we have deliberated and formed judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, these judgments tend to have a marked hold on us. Although in the end, we do not always behave as we think we ought, our moral judgments typically motivate us, at least to some degree, to act in accordance with them. When philosophers talk about moral motivation, this is the (...)
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  33. John Hare (2011). Kant, The Passions, and The Structure of Moral Motivation. Faith and Philosophy 28 (1):54-70.score: 60.0
    This paper is an account of Kant’s view of the passions, and their place in the structure of moral motivation. The paper lays out the relations Kant sees be­tween feelings, inclinations, affects and passions, by looking at texts in Metaphysics of Morals, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Anthropology, and Lectures on Education. Then it discusses a famous passage in Groundwork about sympathetic inclination, and ends by proposing two ways in which Kant thinks feelings and inclinations enter (...)
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  34. Terence Cuneo (2008). Intuitionism's Burden: Thomas Reid on the Problem of Moral Motivation. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):21-44.score: 60.0
    Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable.1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely (...)
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  35. Samuel Freeman (1991). Contractualism, Moral Motivation, and Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophy 88 (6):281-303.score: 60.0
    A discussion of T M Scanlon's contractualism as a foundational account of the nature of morality. The article discusses how contractualism provides an account of moral truth and objectivity that is based in an idealization of moral reasoning. It then develops contractualism's account of moral motivation to show how it provides a way to understand obscure but central aspects of Kantian views: the claims that moral reasons are of a special kind, and that moral (...)
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  36. John Silk (2000). Caring at a Distance: (Im)Partiality, Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Representation - Introduction. Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (3):303 – 309.score: 60.0
    (2000). Caring at a Distance: (Im)partiality, Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Representation - Introduction. Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 303-309. doi: 10.1080/713665900.
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  37. R. Jay Wallace, Moral Motivation. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
    Questions about the possibility and nature of moral motivation occupy a central place in the history of ethics. Philosophers disagree, however, about the role that motivational investigations should play within the larger subject of ethical theory. These disagreements surface in the dispute about whether moral thought is necessarily motivating – ‘internalists’ affirming that it is,‘externalists’ denying this. [...] There are also important questions about the content of moral motivations. A moral theory should help us to (...)
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  38. Mike W. Martin (2005). Paradoxes of Moral Motivation. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3-4):299-308.score: 60.0
    In suggesting that “philanthropy is almost the only virtuewhich is sufficiently appreciated by mankind,” Thoreau did not wish to denigrate charity, but he took offense when even minor Christian leaders were ranked above Newton, Shakespeare, and other creative individuals “who by their lives and works are a blessing to mankind.”1 Such individuals might be motivated primarily by caring for nonmoral goods, such as scientific truth, aesthetic appreciation, or creative achievement. Yet, paradoxically, they often benefit humanity far more than they could (...)
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  39. David Shoemaker (2000). Reductionist Contractualism: Moral Motivation and the Expanding Self. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):343-370.score: 60.0
    According to a popular contemporary contractualist account of moral motivation, the most plausible explanation for why those who are concerned with morality take moral reasons seriously — why these reasons strike those who are moved by them with a particular inescapability — is that they stem from, and are grounded by, a desire to be able to justify one’s actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject.1 My.
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  40. Daniel Hartner, From Desire to Subjective Value: On the Neural Mechanisms of Moral Motivation.score: 60.0
    Increasingly, empirically minded moral philosophers are using data from cognitive science and neuroscience to resolve some longstanding philosophical questions about moral motivation, such as whether moral beliefs require the presence of a desire to motivate (Humeanism). These empirical approaches are implicitly committed to the existence of folk psychological (FP) mental states like beliefs and desires. However, data from the neuroscience of decision-making, particularly cellular-level work in neuroeconomics, is now converging with data from cognitive and social neuroscience (...)
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  41. Patrick Gilkes (2000). Caring at a Distance: (Im)Partiality, Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Representation - Manipulation and Exploitation? Western Media and the Third World. Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (3):317 – 319.score: 60.0
    (2000). Caring at a Distance: (Im)partiality, Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Representation - Manipulation and Exploitation? Western Media and the Third World. Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 317-319. doi: 10.1080/713665895.
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  42. Mark Timmons (1985). Kant and the Possibility of Moral Motivation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):377-398.score: 60.0
    This paper is divided into three major sections. In section 1, I explain why it is that kant's theory of moral motivation is crucial in developing a certain sort of moral theory in opposition to both the ethical empiricist and the rationalist--A theory of moral reasons I characterize as a "rationalist internalism." in section 2, I present some of the detail of kant's theory of moral motivation, And in particular, The reasons why kant was (...)
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  43. Richard H. Toenjes (2002). Why Be Moral in Business? A Rawlsian Approach to Moral Motivation. Business Ethics Quarterly 12 (1):57-72.score: 60.0
    Abstract: This article puts forth the thesis that the contractualist account of moral justification affords a powerful reply in business contexts to the question why a business person should put ethics above immediate business interests. A brief survey of traditional theories of business ethics and their approaches to moral motivation is presented. These approaches are criticized. A contractualist conception of ethics in the business world is developed, based on the work of John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon. The (...)
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  44. Alan H. Goldman (2010). Is Moral Motivation Rationally Required? Journal of Ethics 14 (1):1 - 16.score: 58.0
    The answer to the title question is “No.” The first section argues, using the example of Huckleberry Finn, that rational agents need not be motivated by their explicit judgments of rightness and wrongness. Section II rejects a plausible argument to the conclusion that rational agents must have some moral concerns. The third section clarifies the relevant concept of irrationality and argues that moral incoherence does not equate with this common relevant concept. Section IV questions a rational requirement for (...)
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  45. Heidi Maibom, Feeling for Others: Empathy and Sympathy as Sources of Moral Motivation.score: 58.0
    According to the Humean theory of motivation, we only have a reason to act if we have both a belief and a pro-attitude. When it comes to moral reasons, it matters a great deal what that pro-attitude is; pure self-interest cannot combine with a belief to form a moral reason. A long tradition regards empathy and sympathy as moral motivators, and recent psychological evidence supports this view. I examine what I take to be the most plausible (...)
     
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  46. Augusto Blasi (1999). Emotions and Moral Motivation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (1):1–19.score: 57.0
    One question in moral psychology concerns the role of emotions to motivate moral action. This question has recently become more urgent, because it is now clearer that cognitive developmental theories cannot offer a complete explanation of moral functioning. This paper suggests that emotion, as is typically understood in psychology, cannot be seen as the basis for an acceptable explanation of moral behaviour and motivation. However, it is argued that it is possible to understand emotions as (...)
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  47. Ryan Nichols (2004). Moral Motivation and Christian Theism. Faith and Philosophy 21 (2):175-194.score: 57.0
    John Hare’s central objections to secular theories of motivation arise via his ‘hateful nephew’ example, which, I argue, obscures important issues of scope:Who must be motivated (some/all)?How frequently must they be motivated (most/all of the time)?What is the extent of their motivation (act/tend to act)?Hare must adopt the stronger readings of these questions if his case against secular accounts of motivation is to succeed. But holding any account of motivationto such standards is misguided. Furthermore, Hare’s own theistic (...)
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  48. Jason Kawall (2004). Moral Response-Dependence, Ideal Observers, and the Motive of Duty: Responding to Zangwill. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 60 (3):357-369.score: 54.0
    Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the reactions of certain classes of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that such theories are flawed: they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty. That is, they are unable to provide a suitable reason for anyone to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various approvals, and various individuals, and that moral response-dependent theories can accommodate (...)
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  49. Aleksey Martynov (2009). Agents or Stewards? Linking Managerial Behavior and Moral Development. Journal of Business Ethics 90 (2):239 - 249.score: 54.0
    The goal of this paper is to connect managerial behavior on the “agent-steward” scale to managerial moral development and motivation. I introduce agent- and steward-like behavior: the former is self-serving while the latter is others-serving. I suggest that managerial moral development and motivation may be two of the factors that may predict the tendency of managers to behave in a self-serving way (like agents) or to serve the interests of the organization (like stewards). Managers at low (...)
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  50. Andrew Jordan (2014). On Reasons, Evidence of Oughts, and Morally Fitting Motives. Philosophia 42 (2):391-403.score: 54.0
    In a series of papers, Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star defend the following general account of reasons: R: Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to Φ iff F is evidence that an agent ought to Φ.In this paper, I argue that the reasons as evidence view will run afoul of a motivational constraint on moral reasons, and that this is a powerful reason to reject the reasons as evidence view. The motivational constraint is as (...)
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