Search results for 'moral nihilism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Joshua May (2013). Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.score: 48.0
    Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven’t argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes’ deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general (...)
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  2. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2000). From 'Is' to 'Ought' in Moral Epistemology. Argumentation 14 (2):159-74.score: 48.0
    Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine:All of Dahlia's beliefs are true.Dahlia believes that Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.―∴ Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.I argue that Nelson's universal premise has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I (...)
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  3. Michael Almeida (2010). Two Challenges to Moral Nihilism. The Monist 93 (1):96-105.score: 45.0
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  4. Nigel Blake (ed.) (2000). Education in an Age of Nihilism. Routledge/Falmer.score: 45.0
    This timely book addresses concerns about educational and moral standards in a world characterised by a growing nihilism.
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  5. Neil Cooper (1973). Moral Nihilism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:75 - 90.score: 45.0
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  6. Quentin Smith (2003). Moral Realism and Infinite Spacetime Imply Moral Nihilism. In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 43--54.score: 45.0
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  7. Jesse Kalin (1977). Philosophy Needs Literature: John Barth and Moral Nihilism. Philosophy and Literature 1 (2):170-182.score: 45.0
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  8. Deborah Brown (2008). Gary Steiner. Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, Nihilism. JHP Book Series. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2004. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):173-175.score: 45.0
    Finding inspiration in Heidegger's lament, "In what soil do the roots of (Descartes's) tree of philosophy find their support?" (and not allowing that the tree might be hydroponic), Steiner proceeds to ground the "concrete content and absolute authority" of Descartes's moral principles in his Christian faith (13). Caught between the two, Descartes's thinking is pulled in opposing directions, towards the "earthly ethos" and its twin ideals of technological mastery over nature and the autonomy of reason, and the "angelic ideal"-a (...)
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  9. Jamie Dreier (2006). Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism. In David Copp (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.score: 45.0
     
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  10. Louis Pojman (1993). Do Animal Rights Entail Moral Nihilism? Public Affairs Quarterly 7 (2):165-185.score: 45.0
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  11. Anthony F. Beavers (forthcoming). Moral Machines and the Threat of Ethical Nihilism. In Patrick Lin, George Bekey & Keith Abney (eds.), Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implication of Robotics.score: 39.0
    In his famous 1950 paper where he presents what became the benchmark for success in artificial intelligence, Turing notes that "at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted" (Turing 1950, 442). Kurzweil (1990) suggests that Turing's prediction was correct, even if no machine has yet to pass the Turing Test. In the wake of the (...)
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  12. Christian Coons (2011). How to Prove That Some Acts Are Wrong (Without Using Substantive Moral Premises). Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83–98.score: 36.0
    I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: x-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If x-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then x-ing is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; (...)
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  13. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1995). Nihilism and Scepticism About Moral Obligations. Utilitas 7 (02):228-236.score: 36.0
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  14. Jorge Secada (2007). Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, and Nihilism—Gary Steiner. International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):113-114.score: 36.0
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  15. Deborah Jean Brown (2008). Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, Nihilism (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):173-175.score: 36.0
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  16. Frederick P. Van De Pitte (2006). Gary Steiner, Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, Nihilism Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 26 (1):64-66.score: 36.0
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  17. Vicente Serrano (2013). Vida, naturaleza, y nihilismo afectivo en Fichte. Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 30 (1):91-106.score: 36.0
    This paper considers Fichte’s philosophy from the standpoint of the concept of nihilism: I contend that Fichte subordinates the emotional life to the moral imperative. After leaving Jena, Fichte would have tried to answer Jacobi’s objections, making the concept of life his central philosophical concern. This attempt at reconciling the primacy of the moral imperative and a relevant concept of life (in response to Jacobi) would allow us to understand Fichte’s philosophy in the Berlin period and, in (...)
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  18. David Phillips (2014). Sympathy for the Error Theorist: Parfit and Mackie. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):559-566.score: 33.0
    Derek Parfit claims that “Williams and Mackie…do not use the normative concepts that I and other Non-Naturalists use.” Whatever we think of Parfit’s interpretation of Williams, his interpretation of Mackie should be rejected. For understandable historical reasons, Mackie’s texts are ambiguous. But if we apply to the interpretation of Mackie the same principle of charity Parfit employs in interpreting Williams, we find decisive reason to interpret Mackie as using the same normative concepts as Non-Naturalists.
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  19. Michael Wreen (1998). Nihilism, Relativism, and Engelhardt. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 19 (1):73-88.score: 33.0
    This paper is a critical analysis of Tristram Engelhardt''s attempts to avoid unrestricted nihilism and relativism. The focus of attention is his recent book, The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 1996). No substantive or content-full bioethics (e.g., that of Roman Catholicism or the Samurai) has an intersubjectively verifiable and universally binding foundation, Engelhardt thinks, for unaided secular reason cannot show that any particular substantive morality (or moral code) is correct. He thus seems to be committed to either (...)
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  20. Robert P. Lovering (2004). Divine Hiddenness and Inculpable Ignorance. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2/3):89 - 107.score: 31.0
    J. L. Schellenberg claims that the weakness of evidence for God’s existence is not merely a sign that God is hidden, “it is a revelation that God does not exist.” In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Michael J. Murray provides a “soul-making” defense of God’s hiddenness, arguing that if God were not hidden, then some of us would lose what many theists deem a (very) good thing: the ability to develop morally significant characters. In this paper, I argue that Murray’s soul-making (...)
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  21. Charles R. Pigden (2007). Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):441 - 456.score: 30.0
    Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht’s exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (...)
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  22. Joel Marks (2010). An Amoral Manifesto Part I. Philosophy Now (80):30-33.score: 30.0
  23. Joel Marks (2011). Atheism, Amorality, and Animals. The New York Times.score: 30.0
  24. Joel Marks (2010). An Amoral Manifesto Part II. Philosophy Now (81):23-26.score: 30.0
  25. Joel Marks (2011). Confessions of an Ex-Moralist. The New York Times.score: 30.0
  26. Terence Cuneo (2007). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford University Press.score: 27.0
    Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.
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  27. Jon Fennell (1999). Bloom and His Critics: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Aims of Education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 18 (6):405-434.score: 27.0
    The central questions raised by Allan Bloom's The Closing of theAmerican Mind are often overlooked. Among the most important ofBloom's themes is the impact of nihilism upon education. Bloom condemnsnihilism. Interestingly, we find among his critics two alternativejudgments. Richard Schacht, citing Nietzsche, asserts that nihilism,while fruitless in and of itself, is a necessary prerequisite tosomething higher. Harry Neumann, affirming the accuracy of nihilism,declares that both Bloom and Nietzsche reject nihilism out of ignoranceborn of weakness. All three (...)
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  28. Nicholas Capaldi (1995). Scientism, Deconstruction, and Nihilism. Argumentation 9 (4):563-575.score: 27.0
    I show how scientism leads to deconstruction and both, in turn, lead to nihilism. Nihilism constitutes a denial both of the existence of fallacious moral reasoning and the existence of a moral dimension to fallacious reasoning. I argue against all of these positions by maintaining that (1) there is a pre-theoretical framework of norms within which technical thinking function, (2) the pre-theoretical framework cannot itself be technically conceptualized, and (3) the explication of this framework permits us (...)
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  29. Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.score: 24.0
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather (...)
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  30. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). Moral Skepticisms. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These (...)
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  31. Stephen Maitzen (2006). The Impossibility of Local Skepticism. Philosophia 34 (4):453-464.score: 24.0
    According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they (...)
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  32. Richard Joyce, Nihilism.score: 24.0
    Nihilism” (from the Latin “nihil” meaning nothing) is not a well-defined term. One can be a nihilist about just about anything: A philosopher who does not believe in the existence of knowledge, for example, might be called an “epistemological nihilist”; an atheist might be called a “religious nihilist.” In the vicinity of ethics, one should take care to distinguish moral nihilism from political nihilism and from existential nihilism. These last two will be briefly discussed below, (...)
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  33. Stephen Maitzen (2008). Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill. Philosophia 36 (4):567-574.score: 24.0
    In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different answers.
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  34. Lawrence Vogel (1995). Hans Jonas's Diagnosis of Nihilism: The Case of Heidegger. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):55 – 72.score: 24.0
    I show how Hans Jonas, one of Heidegger's most distinguished Jewish students, traces his mentor's susceptibility to Nazism to a moral nihilism at the heart of Heidegger's teaching in "Being and Time". I then demonstrate how Jonas's own "existential interpretation of the biological facts" and metaphysical grounding of "an imperative of responsibility" provide one of the most systematic and challenging rejoinders to the moral failings of Heidegger's thought.
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  35. Paul Standish (2001). Ethics Before Equality: Moral Education After Levinas. Journal of Moral Education 30 (4):339-347.score: 24.0
    Emptiness, indeed nihilism, is a characteristic of so much contemporary discourse regarding morality and moral education. This is found in facile notions of teaching right and wrong but also in the prevalence of rights-talk, with its sacrosanct assumptions about equality. This article examines this discourse in the light of Levinas' account of the primacy of ethics - of my absolute responsibility in the face of the other, of the asymmetry of my relation to the other. It seeks an (...)
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  36. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1999). Explanation and Justification in Moral Epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:117-127.score: 24.0
    Recent exchanges among Harman, Thomson, and their critics about moral explanations have done much to clarify this two-decades-old debate. I discuss some points in these exchanges along with five different kinds of moral explanations that have been proposed. I conclude that moral explanations cannot provide evidence within an unlimited contrast class that includes moral nihilism, but some moral explanations can still provide evidence within limited contrast classes where all competitors accept the necessary presuppositions. This (...)
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  37. Andrew Stables (2005). Multiculturalism and Moral Education: Individual Positioning, Dialogue and Cultural Practice. Journal of Moral Education 34 (2):185-197.score: 24.0
    Multicultural education can be seen as generally premised on two assumptions. The first is often made explicit: that children should learn not to discriminate unfairly on grounds of ethnicity or culture. To this degree, multiculturalism is clearly morally educative, encouraging children to see others in terms of their common humanity rather than their cultural differences. The second is more implicit and diffuse: that sensitivity to cultural and ethnic difference ipso facto promotes social justice and/or harmony between people(s) and thus is (...)
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  38. J. T. Hyland (1986). Instruction, Rationality and Learning to Be Moral. Journal of Moral Education 15 (2):127-138.score: 24.0
    Abstract Moral education programmes which concentrate exclusively on the process of developing critical thinking skills are criticized for their one?sided and incomplete conception of the rational enterprise. Rational moral thinking calls for both criticism and conformity to standards, and critical thinking is vacuous and impotent until it is linked with the prima?facie intuitions which constitute a moral way of life. The fostering of rational moral behaviour, therefore, requires, in addition to the development of critical skills, an (...)
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  39. Manuel Salguero (2011). El debilitamiento del vínculo social. Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez 45:363 - 382.score: 24.0
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  40. Uri D. Leibowitz (2014). Explaining Moral Knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):35-56.score: 21.0
    In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that (...)
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  41. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265 - 276.score: 21.0
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon (...)
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  42. Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.score: 21.0
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we (...)
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  43. Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.score: 21.0
    Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those (...)
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  44. Daniel Jacobson (2005). Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387 - 409.score: 21.0
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such (...)
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  45. Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation. In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism.score: 21.0
    It seems to many that moral opinions must make a difference to what we’re motivated to do, at least in suitable conditions. For others, it seems that it is possible to have genuine moral opinions that make no motivational difference. Both sides – internalists and externalists about moral motivation – can tell persuasive stories of actual and hypothetical cases. My proposal for a kind of reconciliation is to distinguish between two kinds of psychological states with moral (...)
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  46. Mark Silcox (2006). Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.score: 21.0
    Thomas Nagel has proposed that the existence of moral luck mandates a general attitude of skepticism in ethics. One popular way of arguing against Nagel’s claim is to insist that the phenomenon of moral luck itself is an illusion , in the sense that situations in which it seems to occur may be plausibly re-described so as to show that agents need not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions. Here I argue that this strategy (...)
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  47. Christopher Grau (2010). Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96.score: 21.0
    This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical basis of (...)
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  48. Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.score: 21.0
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can (...)
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  49. Jonathan Smith (2010). On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75 - 88.score: 21.0
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) (...)
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