Search results for 'moral nihilism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  29
    Thomas Pölzler (2015). Climate Change Inaction and Moral Nihilism. Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (2):202-214.
    The effects of anthropogenic climate change may be devastating. Nevertheless, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did. What can we do to overcome this collective apathy? In order to be able to develop effective measures, we must first get clear about the causes of climate change inaction. In this paper I ask whether moral (...) is a significant cause of climate change inaction. The answer to this question depends mainly on the extent to which being a moral nihilist reduces one's likelihood of taking action against climate change. At first sight, the extent seems to be considerable. I argue, however, that this assumption is false. Only slightly more non-nihilists than nihilists are led to climate-friendly actions by moral considerations. And in absolute terms, morality plays such a minor role in leading people to act that the difference is barely noticeable. (shrink)
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  2.  37
    Thomas Pölzler, How Does Moral Nihilism Affect Our Taking Action Against Climate Change? Proceedings of the 13. International Conference of ISSEI.
    The effects of anthropogenic climate change will be devastating. Nevertheless, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did. What can we do to overcome this collective apathy? In order to be able to develop effective measures, we must first get clear about the causes of climate change inaction. In this paper I ask whether moral (...) (the denial of moral truths) is a significant cause of climate change inaction. The answer to this question depends mainly on the extent to which being a moral nihilist reduces one’s likelihood of taking action against climate change. At first sight, the extent seems to be considerable. I will argue, however, that this assumption is false. Only slightly more non-nihilists than nihilists are led to climate-friendly actions by moral considerations. And in absolute terms, morality plays such a minor role in leading people to act that the difference is barely noticeable. (shrink)
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  3. Jamie Dreier (2006). Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism. In David Copp (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press
  4.  31
    Quentin Smith (2003). Moral Realism and Infinite Spacetime Imply Moral Nihilism. In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers 43--54.
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  5.  52
    Michael Almeida (2010). Two Challenges to Moral Nihilism. The Monist 93 (1):96-105.
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  6.  16
    Neil Cooper (1973). Moral Nihilism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:75 - 90.
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  7.  4
    Jesse Kalin (1977). Philosophy Needs Literature: John Barth and Moral Nihilism. Philosophy and Literature 1 (2):170-182.
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  8.  2
    Louis Pojman (1993). Do Animal Rights Entail Moral Nihilism? Public Affairs Quarterly 7 (2):165-185.
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  9.  4
    Deborah Jean Brown (2008). Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, Nihilism (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):173-175.
    Deborah J. Brown - Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, Nihilism - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 46.1 173-175 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Deborah Brown University of Queensland Gary Steiner. Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, Nihilism. JHP Book Series. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2004. Pp. 352. Cloth, $60.00. This work takes as its starting point the need to ground Descartes's moral (...)
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  10. Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith & Paul Standish (2001). Education in an Age of Nihilism: Education and Moral Standards. Routledge.
    This book addresses concerns about educational and moral standards in a world increasingly characterised by nihilism. On the one hand there is widespread anxiety that standards are falling; on the other, new machinery of accountability and inspection to show that they are not. The authors in this book state that we cannot avoid nihilism if we are simply _laissez-faire_ about values, neither can we reduce them to standards of performance, nor must we return to traditional values. They (...)
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  11.  4
    Deborah Brown (2008). Gary Steiner. Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, Nihilism. JHP Book Series. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2004. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):173-175.
    Finding inspiration in Heidegger's lament, "In what soil do the roots of (Descartes's) tree of philosophy find their support?" (and not allowing that the tree might be hydroponic), Steiner proceeds to ground the "concrete content and absolute authority" of Descartes's moral principles in his Christian faith (13). Caught between the two, Descartes's thinking is pulled in opposing directions, towards the "earthly ethos" and its twin ideals of technological mastery over nature and the autonomy of reason, and the "angelic ideal"-a (...)
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  12.  61
    Anthony F. Beavers (forthcoming). Moral Machines and the Threat of Ethical Nihilism. In Patrick Lin, George Bekey & Keith Abney (eds.), Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implication of Robotics.
    In his famous 1950 paper where he presents what became the benchmark for success in artificial intelligence, Turing notes that "at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted" (Turing 1950, 442). Kurzweil (1990) suggests that Turing's prediction was correct, even if no machine has yet to pass the Turing Test. In the wake of the (...)
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  13.  33
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1995). Nihilism and Scepticism About Moral Obligations. Utilitas 7 (2):228-236.
    There are many disagreements about what people have moral obligations to do, but almost everyone believes that some people have some moral obligations. Moreover, there are some moral obligations in which almost everyone believes. For example, if I promise to give a talk at this conference, I have a moral obligation to do so. Of course, my obligation might be overridden. Moreover, even if my obligation were overridden, I would still have a moral obligation to (...)
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  14.  10
    Jorge Secada (2007). Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, and Nihilism—Gary Steiner. International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):113-114.
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  15. Frederick P. Van De Pitte (2006). Gary Steiner, Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, Nihilism Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 26 (1):64-66.
     
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  16.  87
    Joshua May (2013). Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.
    Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven’t argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes’ deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general (...)
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  17.  15
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2000). From 'Is' to 'Ought' in Moral Epistemology. Argumentation 14 (2):159-74.
    Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine:All of Dahlia's beliefs are true.Dahlia believes that Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.―∴ Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.I argue that Nelson's universal premise has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I (...)
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  18.  29
    Nigel Blake (ed.) (2000). Education in an Age of Nihilism. Routledge/Falmer.
    This timely book addresses concerns about educational and moral standards in a world characterised by a growing nihilism.
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  19.  44
    Max Harris Siegel (2015). On Herbert J. Phillips’s “Why Be Rational?”. Ethics 125 (3):826-828,.
    In recent metaethics, moral realists have advanced a companions-in-guilt argument against moral nihilism. Proponents of this argument hold that the conclusion that there are no categorical normative reasons implies that there are no epistemic reasons. However, if there are no epistemic reasons, there are no epistemic reasons to believe nihilism. Therefore, nihilism is false or no one has epistemic reasons to believe it. While this argument is normally presented as a reply to Mackie, who introduced (...)
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  20. Christian Coons (2011). How to Prove That Some Acts Are Wrong (Without Using Substantive Moral Premises). Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83–98.
    I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: x-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If x-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then x-ing is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; (...)
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  21.  48
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2000). From 'Is' to 'Ought' in Moral Epistemology. Argumentation 14 (2):159-174.
    Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine.
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  22. Terence Cuneo (2007). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.
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  23. Charles R. Pigden (2007). Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):441 - 456.
    Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht’s exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (...)
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  24.  4
    Vicente Serrano (2013). Vida, naturaleza, y nihilismo afectivo en Fichte. Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 30 (1):91-106.
    This paper considers Fichte’s philosophy from the standpoint of the concept of nihilism: I contend that Fichte subordinates the emotional life to the moral imperative. After leaving Jena, Fichte would have tried to answer Jacobi’s objections, making the concept of life his central philosophical concern. This attempt at reconciling the primacy of the moral imperative and a relevant concept of life (in response to Jacobi) would allow us to understand Fichte’s philosophy in the Berlin period and, in (...)
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  25. Gregg Caruso (2014). (Un)Just Deserts: The Dark Side of Moral Responsibility. Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):27-38.
    What would be the consequence of embracing skepticism about free will and/or desert-based moral responsibility? What if we came to disbelieve in moral responsibility? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some maintain? Or perhaps increase anti-social behavior as some recent studies have suggested (Vohs and Schooler 2008; Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall 2009)? Or (...)
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  26. Guy Kahane (forthcoming). If Nothing Matters. Noûs.
    The possibility that nothing really matters can cause much anxiety, but what would it mean for that to be true? Since it couldn’t be bad that nothing matters, fearing nihilism makes little sense. However, the consequences of belief in nihilism will be far more dramatic than often thought. Many metaethicists assume that even if nothing matters, we should, and would, go on more or less as before. But if nihilism is true in an unqualified way, it can’t (...)
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  27.  89
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). Moral Skepticisms. Oxford University Press.
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These (...)
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  28.  81
    Jeffrey White, Autonomous Reboot: The Challenges of Artificial Moral Agency and the Ends of Machine Ethics.
    Ryan Tonkens (2009) has issued a seemingly impossible challenge, to articulate a comprehensive ethical framework within which artificial moral agents (AMAs) satisfy a Kantian inspired recipe - both "rational" and "free" - while also satisfying perceived prerogatives of Machine Ethics to create AMAs that are perfectly, not merely reliably, ethical. Challenges for machine ethicists have also been presented by Anthony Beavers and Wendell Wallach, who have pushed for the reinvention of traditional ethics in order to avoid "ethical nihilism" (...)
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  29.  27
    David Phillips (2014). Sympathy for the Error Theorist: Parfit and Mackie. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):559-566.
    Derek Parfit claims that “Williams and Mackie…do not use the normative concepts that I and other Non-Naturalists use.” Whatever we think of Parfit’s interpretation of Williams, his interpretation of Mackie should be rejected. For understandable historical reasons, Mackie’s texts are ambiguous. But if we apply to the interpretation of Mackie the same principle of charity Parfit employs in interpreting Williams, we find decisive reason to interpret Mackie as using the same normative concepts as Non-Naturalists.
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  30.  32
    Michael Wreen (1998). Nihilism, Relativism, and Engelhardt. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 19 (1):73-88.
    This paper is a critical analysis of Tristram Engelhardt''s attempts to avoid unrestricted nihilism and relativism. The focus of attention is his recent book, The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 1996). No substantive or content-full bioethics (e.g., that of Roman Catholicism or the Samurai) has an intersubjectively verifiable and universally binding foundation, Engelhardt thinks, for unaided secular reason cannot show that any particular substantive morality (or moral code) is correct. He thus seems to be committed to either (...)
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  31.  18
    Jon Fennell (1999). Bloom and His Critics: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Aims of Education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 18 (6):405-434.
    The central questions raised by Allan Bloom's The Closing of theAmerican Mind are often overlooked. Among the most important ofBloom's themes is the impact of nihilism upon education. Bloom condemnsnihilism. Interestingly, we find among his critics two alternativejudgments. Richard Schacht, citing Nietzsche, asserts that nihilism,while fruitless in and of itself, is a necessary prerequisite tosomething higher. Harry Neumann, affirming the accuracy of nihilism,declares that both Bloom and Nietzsche reject nihilism out of ignoranceborn of weakness. All (...)
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  32.  7
    Nicholas Capaldi (1995). Scientism, Deconstruction, and Nihilism. Argumentation 9 (4):563-575.
    I show how scientism leads to deconstruction and both, in turn, lead to nihilism. Nihilism constitutes a denial both of the existence of fallacious moral reasoning and the existence of a moral dimension to fallacious reasoning. I argue against all of these positions by maintaining that (1) there is a pre-theoretical framework of norms within which technical thinking function, (2) the pre-theoretical framework cannot itself be technically conceptualized, and (3) the explication of this framework permits us (...)
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  33.  19
    Geoffrey Roche (2010). Much Sense the Starkest Madness. Angelaki 15 (1):45-59.
    Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, in Dialectic of Enlightenment [Dialektik der Aufklärung, first published in 1944], argue that Donatien-Alphonse-François, the Marquis de Sade (1740–1814), and Friedrich Nietzsche have brought the Enlightenment project of grounding morality in reason to an end. For Adorno and Horkheimer, Sade has revealed philosophy’s moral impotency, in particular “the impossibility of deriving from reason any fundamental argument against murder [...].”1 Marcel Hénaff, Susan Neiman, and Annie Le Brun have similarly suggested that Sade has demonstrated that (...)
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  34. Robert P. Lovering (2004). Divine Hiddenness and Inculpable Ignorance. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2/3):89-107.
    J. L. Schellenberg claims that the weakness of evidence for God’s existence is not merely a sign that God is hidden, “it is a revelation that God does not exist.” In Divine Hiddenness : New Essays, Michael J. Murray provides a “soul-making” defense of God’s hiddenness, arguing that if God were not hidden, then some of us would lose what many theists deem a good thing: the ability to develop morally significant characters. In this paper, I argue that Murray’s soul-making (...)
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  35.  25
    Manuel Vargas (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Part I: Building blocks. 1. Folk convictions -- 2. Doubts about libertarianism -- 3. Nihilism and revisionism -- 4. Building a better theory -- Part II. A theory of moral responsibility. 5. The primacy of reasons -- 6. Justifying the practice -- 7. Responsible agency -- 8. Blame and desert -- 9. History and manipulation --10. Some conclusions.
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  36. Joel Marks (2010). An Amoral Manifesto Part I. Philosophy Now (80):30-33.
  37.  24
    Paul Standish (2001). Ethics Before Equality: Moral Education After Levinas. Journal of Moral Education 30 (4):339-347.
    Emptiness, indeed nihilism, is a characteristic of so much contemporary discourse regarding morality and moral education. This is found in facile notions of teaching right and wrong but also in the prevalence of rights-talk, with its sacrosanct assumptions about equality. This article examines this discourse in the light of Levinas' account of the primacy of ethics - of my absolute responsibility in the face of the other, of the asymmetry of my relation to the other. It seeks an (...)
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  38.  39
    Stan Husi (2014). Against Moral Fictionalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):80-96.
    Moral nihilists need an answer: if moral discourse is fatally flawed, how are we to proceed? A popular option is fictionalism, to uphold the flawed discourse in the mode of a fiction. My thesis is that fictionalism is not the best available answer to the nihilist; a better one is revisionism, the proposal to refashion the discourse so as to cure it of all flaws. Should it be possible to revise the discredited practice, by removing what is erroneous (...)
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  39.  88
    Joel Marks (2011). Atheism, Amorality, and Animals. The New York Times.
  40.  61
    Joel Marks (2011). Confessions of an Ex-Moralist. The New York Times.
  41.  8
    Andrew Stables (2005). Multiculturalism and Moral Education: Individual Positioning, Dialogue and Cultural Practice. Journal of Moral Education 34 (2):185-197.
    Multicultural education can be seen as generally premised on two assumptions. The first is often made explicit: that children should learn not to discriminate unfairly on grounds of ethnicity or culture. To this degree, multiculturalism is clearly morally educative, encouraging children to see others in terms of their common humanity rather than their cultural differences. The second is more implicit and diffuse: that sensitivity to cultural and ethnic difference ipso facto promotes social justice and/or harmony between people(s) and thus is (...)
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  42.  57
    Joel Marks (2010). An Amoral Manifesto Part II. Philosophy Now (81):23-26.
  43. Richard Joyce, Nihilism.
    Nihilism” (from the Latin “nihil” meaning nothing) is not a well-defined term. One can be a nihilist about just about anything: A philosopher who does not believe in the existence of knowledge, for example, might be called an “epistemological nihilist”; an atheist might be called a “religious nihilist.” In the vicinity of ethics, one should take care to distinguish moral nihilism from political nihilism and from existential nihilism. These last two will be briefly discussed below, (...)
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  44.  43
    Simon Blackburn (1995). Justification, Scepticism, and Nihilism. Utilitas 7 (2):237.
    Sinnott-Armstrong's paper principally defends our inability to justify, philosophically, normal moral claims. In particular, we cannot justify them against other claims, especially the claim of moral nihilism. Moral nihilism is the doctrine that there are no moral obligations. This thesis ‘does not lie in meta-ethics. It is a universally quantified substantive moral claim’. Sinnott-Annstrong makes it clear that he does not actually believe this doctrine, but he believes that it is coherent, and that (...)
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  45.  31
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1999). Explanation and Justification in Moral Epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:117-127.
    Recent exchanges among Harman, Thomson, and their critics about moral explanations have done much to clarify this two-decades-old debate. I discuss some points in these exchanges along with five different kinds of moral explanations that have been proposed. I conclude that moral explanations cannot provide evidence within an unlimited contrast class that includes moral nihilism, but some moral explanations can still provide evidence within limited contrast classes where all competitors accept the necessary presuppositions. This (...)
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  46.  9
    Edwin E. Gantt (2001). Rationality, Irrationality, and the Ethical: On Saving Psychology From Nihilism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1-19.
    Notes that much debate in contemporary psychology has been centered on the nature and scope of rationality and rational discourse. This paper seeks to elucidate 2 philosophical approaches that have come to occupy a central position in this debate: modernism and postmodernism. It will be argued that, although proceeding from antithetical assumptions concerning the proper grounding for philosophical and psychological endeavor, both modernism and postmodernism ultimately fall prey to epistemological skepticism and moral nihilism. The work of the French (...)
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  47.  8
    J. T. Hyland (1986). Instruction, Rationality and Learning to Be Moral. Journal of Moral Education 15 (2):127-138.
    Abstract Moral education programmes which concentrate exclusively on the process of developing critical thinking skills are criticized for their one?sided and incomplete conception of the rational enterprise. Rational moral thinking calls for both criticism and conformity to standards, and critical thinking is vacuous and impotent until it is linked with the prima?facie intuitions which constitute a moral way of life. The fostering of rational moral behaviour, therefore, requires, in addition to the development of critical skills, an (...)
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  48.  29
    Lawrence Vogel (1995). Hans Jonas's Diagnosis of Nihilism: The Case of Heidegger. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):55 – 72.
    I show how Hans Jonas, one of Heidegger's most distinguished Jewish students, traces his mentor's susceptibility to Nazism to a moral nihilism at the heart of Heidegger's teaching in "Being and Time". I then demonstrate how Jonas's own "existential interpretation of the biological facts" and metaphysical grounding of "an imperative of responsibility" provide one of the most systematic and challenging rejoinders to the moral failings of Heidegger's thought.
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  49. Theodor W. Adorno (2000). Problems of Moral Philosophy. Stanford University Press.
    These seventeen lectures given in 1963 focus largely on Kant, 'a thinker in whose work the question of morality is most sharply contrasted with other spheres of existence'. After discussing a number of the Kantian categories of moral philosophy, Adorno considers other, seemingly more immediate general problems, such as the nature of moral norms, the good life, and the relation of relativism and nihilism. In the course of the lectures, Adorno addresses a wide range of topics, including: (...)
     
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  50. Jon Tresan (2010). Question Authority: In Defense of Moral Naturalism Without Clout. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):221 - 238.
    Metaethicists of all stripes should read and learn from Richard Joyce's book The Evolution of Morality. This includes moral realists, despite Joyce's own nihilism. Joyce thinks that moral obligations, prohibitions, and the like are myths. But that is just a bit of a rich, broad account of moral attitudes and practices, the bulk of which can comfortably be accepted by realists. In fact, other than nihilism itself, there's only one claim of Joyce's which realists must (...)
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