Search results for 'moral rationalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Patricia Marino (2010). Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):227-252.score: 93.0
    This paper concerns the normative status of coherence of desires, in the context of moral rationalism. I argue that 'desiderative coherence' is not tied to rationality, but is rather of pragmatic, instrumental, and sometimes moral value. This means that desire-based views cannot rely on coherence to support non-agent-relative accounts of moral reasons. For example, on Michael Smith's neo-rationalist view, you have 'normative reason' to do whatever your maximally coherent and fully informed self would want you to (...)
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  2. Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford Univ Pr.score: 75.0
  3. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.score: 75.0
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model (...)
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  4. Shaun Nichols (2002). How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism. The Monist 85 (2):285-303.score: 60.0
    Over the last 20 years, a number of central figures in moral philosophy have defended some version of moral rationalism, the idea that morality is based on reason or rationality (e.g., Gewirth 1978, Darwall 1983, Nagel 1970, 1986, Korsgaard 1986, Singer 1995; Smith 1994, 1997). According to rationalism, morality is based on reason or rationality rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasies, and this has seemed to many to be the best way of securing a kind (...)
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  5. Michael B. Gill (2007). Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 2 (1):16–30.score: 60.0
    One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists — such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and John Balguy — held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists — such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume — held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In addition to arguments, the rationalists and sentimentalists (...)
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  6. Jeanette Kennett (2006). Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):69 – 82.score: 60.0
    It is often claimed that the existence of psychopaths undermines moral rationalism. I examine a recent empirically based argument for this claim and conclude that rationalist accounts of moral judgement and moral reasoning are perfectly compatible with the evidence cited.
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  7. Shaun Nichols, Moral Rationalism and Empirical Immunity.score: 60.0
    With the rapid recent growth of naturalized metaethics, Richard Joyce’s paper sounds an appropriate cautionary note. It’s easy to be overwhelmed by sexy new data and to neglect the difficulties in using the data to draw major philosophical conclusions. One of the central views in the sights of naturalists has been moral rationalism. Jonathan Haidt (2001), Joshua Greene (this volume), Jesse Prinz (forthcoming), and I (2002, 2004b) have all used recent empirical findings to challenge moral rationalist views. (...)
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  8. Alfred Archer (2014). Moral Rationalism Without Overridingness. Ratio 27 (1):100-114.score: 60.0
    Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of Moral Rationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as Douglas Portmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept Moral Rationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. (...)
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  9. John J. Tilley (2012). Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):53-83.score: 60.0
    One of the most oft-cited parts of Francis Hutcheson's Illustrations upon the Moral Sense is his discussion of "exciting reasons."1 In that discussion he defends what has come to be called, owing to its later association with David Hume, "the Humean view of motivation." My topic in this paper is the relation of that discussion to Hutcheson's critique of moral rationalism and, more generally, to his aims in the Illustrations. By ‘moral rationalism' I mean the (...)
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  10. J. B. Schneewind (2000). Hume and the Religious Significance of Moral Rationalism. Hume Studies 26 (2):211-223.score: 60.0
    In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rationalism about morality was repeatedly used to reject strong divine command theories of ethics. Such theories were morally unacceptable to many devout Christians. But deism, rationalist through and through, seemed to make revelation unnecessary, and with it most of Christianity. William Law, an influential divine command theorist of Hume's time, argued that Christians must consequently find rationalism unacceptable. Hume's effort to destroy moral rationalism functions to force his readers into a (...)
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  11. Michael Cholbi (2011). The Moral Conversion of Rational Egoists. Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):533-556.score: 51.0
    One principal challenge to the rationalist thesis that the demands of morality are requirements of rationality has been that posed by the "rational egoist." In attempting to answer's the egoist's challenge, some rationalists have supposed that an adequate reply must take the form of a deductive argument that "converts" the egoist by showing that her position is contradictory, arbitrary, or violates some precept that defines practical rationality as such. Here I argue (a) that such rationalist replies will fail to persuade (...)
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  12. David O. Brink, Handout #2: Moral Motivation and Rationalism.score: 48.0
    We have looked at worries about expressivism and other forms of noncognitivism. The externalist solution may also seem to be a solution of last resort, because it may seem to deny the platitude that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious. For this reason, we might look seriously at rationalist theories of moral motivation, because they promise to represent moral judgments as intrinsically motivational without giving up cognitivism.
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  13. Maria Antonaccio (2001). Picturing the Soul: Moral Psychology and the Recovery of the Emotions. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):127-141.score: 48.0
    This paper draws from the resources of Iris Murdoch''s moral philosophy to analyze the ethical status of the emotions at two related levels of reflection. Methodologically, it argues that a recovery of the emotions requires a revised notion of moral theory which affirms the basic orientation of consciousness to some notion of value or the good. Such a theory challenges many of the rationalist premises which in the past have led moral theory to reject the role of (...)
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  14. Steve Clarke (2008). Sim and the City: Rationalism in Psychology and Philosophy and Haidt's Account of Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):799 – 820.score: 48.0
    Jonathan Haidt ( 2001 ) advances the 'Social Intuitionist' account of moral judgment , which he presents as an alternative to rationalist accounts of moral judgment , hitherto dominant in psychology. Here I consider Haidt's anti-rationalism and the debate that it has provoked in moral psychology , as well as some anti-rationalist philosophical claims that Haidt and others have grounded in the empirical work of Haidt and his collaborators. I will argue that although the case for (...)
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  15. Mark van Roojen (2010). Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism. Ethics 120 (3):495–525.score: 45.0
  16. James Doyle (2000). Moral Rationalism and Moral Commitment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):1-22.score: 45.0
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  17. Michael B. Gill (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 3 (2):397–400.score: 45.0
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  18. Luca Malatesti (2009). Moral Understanding in the Psychopath. Synthesis Philosophica 24 (2):337-348.score: 45.0
    A pressing and difficult practical problem concerns the general issue of the right social response to offenders classified as having antisocial personality disorder. This paper approaches this general problem by focusing, from a philosophical perspective, on the still relevant but more approachable question whether psychopathic offenders are morally responsible. In particular, I investigate whether psychopaths possess moral understanding. A plausible way to approach the last question requires a satisfactory philosophical interpretation of the empirical evidence that appears to show that (...)
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  19. Jonathan Dancy (2006). On How to Be a Moral Rationalist. Philosophical Books 47 (2):103-110.score: 45.0
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  20. Christopher Peacocke (2004). Moral Rationalism. Journal of Philosophy 101 (10):499 - 526.score: 45.0
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  21. Lawrence A. Blum (1982). Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism: A Feminist Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):287 - 302.score: 45.0
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  22. Brian K. Powell (2009). Discourse Ethics and Moral Rationalism. Dialogue 48 (02):373-.score: 45.0
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  23. Alan Donagan (1982). Moral Rationalism and Variable Social Institutions. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1):3-10.score: 45.0
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  24. Joshua Gert (2014). Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):217-224.score: 45.0
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  25. Shaun Nichols (2002). Is It Irrational to Be Amoral? How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism. The Monist 85:285-304.score: 45.0
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  26. Charles Taylor (2007). Modern Moral Rationalism. In Santiago Zabala (ed.), Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.score: 45.0
     
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  27. Gerard Delanty (1997). Habermas and Occidental Rationalism: The Politics of Identity, Social Learning, and the Cultural Limits of Moral Universalism. Sociological Theory 15 (1):30-59.score: 42.0
    While Habermas's theory of communicative action is deeply critical of all kinds of ethnocentrism, proposing a discursive concept of universal morality which transcends culture, a residual Eurocentrism still pervades it. Habermas's theory rests on a notion of modernity which is tied to Occidental rationalism, and when viewed in the global context or in the context of deeply divided societies it is problematic. The theory fails to grasp that universal morality can be articulated in more than one cultural form and (...)
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  28. Robert L. Arrington (1989). Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism: Perspectives in Contemporary Moral Epistemology. Cornell University Press.score: 42.0
  29. Hans Poser (2008). Innate Ideas as the Cornerstone of Rationalism: The Problem of Moral Principles in Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais. In. In Marcelo Dascal (ed.), Leibniz: What Kind of Rationalist? Springer. 479--493.score: 39.0
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  30. T. Horgan & M. Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism: Making Room for Moral Principles. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10:279-295.score: 39.0
     
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  31. Caj Strandberg (2013). An Internalist Dilemma—and an Externalist Solution. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):25-51.score: 36.0
    In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a strong version of internalism is able to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the notion that people who suffer from certain mental conditions need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, a weaker form of internalism avoids this difficulty, but fails to explain the mentioned conception concerning (...) language and motivation. Moreover, I argue that externalism in conjunction with a pragmatic claim which employs Grice’s concept of generalized conversational implicature is able to account for both these conceptions and that it consequently avoids the internalist dilemma. Thus, there is reason to think that this view is preferable to internalism. (shrink)
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  32. Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Oxford University Press.score: 36.0
    This is a book on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, I defend a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
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  33. Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.score: 36.0
    This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to (...)
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  34. Alan Donagan (1984). Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems. Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):291-309.score: 36.0
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  35. Stephen Cohen (1979). Gewirth's Rationalism: Who is a Moral Agent? Ethics 89 (2):179-190.score: 36.0
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  36. James Klagge (1991). Rationalism, Supervenience, and Moral Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):25-28.score: 36.0
  37. Stephen J. Sullivan (1991). Book Review:Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism: Perspectives in Contemporary Moral Epistemology. Robert L. Arrington. [REVIEW] Ethics 101 (2):406-.score: 36.0
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  38. Obed Balaban, Lawrence A. Blum & Victor Seidler (1990). Arrington, Robert L. Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989; $13.95 (Paper); 321 Pps.(Indexed). Baird, Robert M. And Stuart E. Rosenbaum (Ed). Euthanasia: The Moral Issue. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989; $11.95 (Paper); 182 Pps. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 24:335-336.score: 36.0
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  39. Marian Cehelnik (2009). Critical Rationalism as a Moral Decision. Filozofia 64 (6):545-551.score: 36.0
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  40. Gerard J. Hughes (1991). Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism: Perspectives in Contemporary Moral Epistemology. Philosophical Books 32 (2):114-116.score: 36.0
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  41. Kiichi Tachibana (1995). Moral Decision in Popper's Critical Rationalism. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 8 (5):261-266.score: 36.0
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  42. Attila Tanyi (2012). The Case for Authority. In S. Schleidgen (ed.), Should we always act morally? Essays on Overridingness. Tectum.score: 34.0
    The paper deals with a charge that is often made against consequentialist moral theories: that they are unacceptably demanding. This is called the Overdemandingness Objection. The paper first distinguishes three interpretations of the Objection as based on the three dimensions of moral demands: scope, content, and authority. It is then argued that neither the scope, nor the content-based understanding of the Objection is viable. Constraining the scope of consequentialism is neither helpful, nor justified, hence the pervasiveness of consequentialism (...)
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  43. Andrei G. Zavaliy (2012). On Rational Amoralists. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 42 (4):365-384.score: 33.0
    An influential tradition in moral philosophy attempts to explain an immoral action by reference to the defect in reasoning on the part of an immoral agent. On this view, the requirements of morality are not only sanctioned by the more general requirements of rationality, but the violations of the moral requirements would be indicative of a rational failure. In this article I argue that ascription of irrationality to amoral individuals (e.g., psychopaths) is either empirically false, or else, conceptually (...)
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  44. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Precis of Commonsense Consequentialism and Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.score: 31.0
    For a symposium on Douglas W. Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.
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  45. Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.score: 30.0
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can (...)
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  46. Logi Gunnarsson (2008). The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):305 - 326.score: 30.0
    The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalismmoral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status (...)
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  47. Patricia Sheridan (2007). The Metaphysical Morality of Francis Hutcheson: A Consideration of Hutcheson's Critique of Moral Fitness Theory. Sophia 46 (3):263-275.score: 30.0
    Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact, Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, (...)
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  48. Charles R. Pigden (2012). A 'Sensible Knave'? Hume, Jane Austen and Mr Elliot. Intellectual History Review 22 (3):465-480.score: 30.0
    This paper deals with what I take to be one woman’s literary response to a philosophical problem. The woman is Jane Austen, the problem is the rationality of Hume’s ‘sensible knave’, and Austen’s response is to deepen the problem. Despite his enthusiasm for virtue, Hume reluctantly concedes in the EPM that injustice can be a rational strategy for ‘sensible knaves’, intelligent but selfish agents who feel no aversion towards thoughts of villainy or baseness. Austen agrees, but adds that ABSENT CONSIDERATIONS (...)
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  49. P. Michael McCullough & Sam Faught (2005). Rational Moralists and Moral Rationalists Value-Based Management: Model, Criterion and Validation. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2):195 - 205.score: 30.0
    This paper considers ethical decision making by blending three streams of related research: cognitive moral development of the decision maker, rational choice theory and a subjective expected utility model. Ethical dilemmas can be defined as situations where moral certainty is compromised by rational cognition. In this paper, the authors assume that some people use a morality-first perspective and others a rationality-first perspective. Ethical scenarios were written and used to test hypotheses derived from this perspective. The instrument developed was (...)
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  50. Laura Schroeter (2004). The Rationalist Foundations of Chalmers's 2-D Semantics. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):227-255.score: 27.0
    In Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers seeks to develop a version of 2-D semantics which can vindicate the rationalist claim that there are constitutive connections between meaning, possibility and a priority. Chalmers lays out different ways of filling in his preferred epistemic approach to 2-D semantics so as to avoid controversial philosophical assumptions. In these comments, however, I argue that there are some distinctively rationalist commitments in Chalmers's epistemic approach to 2-D semantics. I start by explaining why Chalmers's approach requires (...)
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