Search results for 'moral rationalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Robert L. Arrington & Realism Rationalism (2001). Adams, David M." Objectivity, Moral Truth, and Constitutional Doctrine: A Comment on R. George Wright's' Is Natural Law Theory of Any Use in Constitutional Interpretation?'" Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 4 (1995): 489-500. Alexander, Larry, and Ken Kress." Against Legal Principles," in A. Marmor (Ed.), Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. [REVIEW] In Brian Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge University Press 4--331.
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  2.  70
    Patricia Marino (2010). Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):227-252.
    This paper concerns the normative status of coherence of desires, in the context of moral rationalism. I argue that 'desiderative coherence' is not tied to rationality, but is rather of pragmatic, instrumental, and sometimes moral value. This means that desire-based views cannot rely on coherence to support non-agent-relative accounts of moral reasons. For example, on Michael Smith's neo-rationalist view, you have 'normative reason' to do whatever your maximally coherent and fully informed self would want you to (...)
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  3. Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford Univ Pr
    IN THIS PAPER, I make a presumptive case for moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. And I argue that this view leads us to reject all traditional versions of act‐consequentialism. I begin by explaining how moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism.
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  4.  78
    Christopher Gregory Weaver (2015). Evilism, Moral Rationalism, and Reasons Internalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):3-24.
    I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue (pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law’s (Relig Stud 46(3):353–373, 2010) evil god challenge.
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  5. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist (...)
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  6. Alfred Archer (2014). Moral Rationalism Without Overridingness. Ratio 27 (1):100-114.
    Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of Moral Rationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as Douglas Portmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept Moral Rationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. (...)
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  7. Shaun Nichols (2002). How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism. The Monist 85 (2):285-303.
    Over the last 20 years, a number of central figures in moral philosophy have defended some version of moral rationalism, the idea that morality is based on reason or rationality (e.g., Gewirth 1978, Darwall 1983, Nagel 1970, 1986, Korsgaard 1986, Singer 1995; Smith 1994, 1997). According to rationalism, morality is based on reason or rationality rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasies, and this has seemed to many to be the best way of securing a kind (...)
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  8. Jeanette Kennett (2006). Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):69 – 82.
    It is often claimed that the existence of psychopaths undermines moral rationalism. I examine a recent empirically based argument for this claim and conclude that rationalist accounts of moral judgement and moral reasoning are perfectly compatible with the evidence cited.
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  9. Michael B. Gill (2007). Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 2 (1):16–30.
    One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists — such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and John Balguy — held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists — such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume — held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In addition to arguments, the rationalists and sentimentalists (...)
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  10. James Doyle (2000). Moral Rationalism and Moral Commitment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):1-22.
    Moral rationalism is identified as the view that moral constraints are rational constraints. This view seems implausible to many because it seems to involve belief in the fantastic-sounding possibility of egoist-conversion: that, in principle, an argument for moral constraints could be produced which would motivate a rational person who does not yet accept those constraints to observe them. Furthermore, the Humean want-belief model of motivation---the view that beliefs alone are incapable of motivating---seems to provide a good (...)
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  11. Shaun Nichols, Moral Rationalism and Empirical Immunity.
    With the rapid recent growth of naturalized metaethics, Richard Joyce’s paper sounds an appropriate cautionary note. It’s easy to be overwhelmed by sexy new data and to neglect the difficulties in using the data to draw major philosophical conclusions. One of the central views in the sights of naturalists has been moral rationalism. Jonathan Haidt (2001), Joshua Greene (this volume), Jesse Prinz (forthcoming), and I (2002, 2004b) have all used recent empirical findings to challenge moral rationalist views. (...)
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  12.  11
    J. B. Schneewind (2000). Hume and the Religious Significance of Moral Rationalism. Hume Studies 26 (2):211-223.
    In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rationalism about morality was repeatedly used to reject strong divine command theories of ethics. Such theories were morally unacceptable to many devout Christians. But deism, rationalist through and through, seemed to make revelation unnecessary, and with it most of Christianity. William Law, an influential divine command theorist of Hume's time, argued that Christians must consequently find rationalism unacceptable. Hume's effort to destroy moral rationalism functions to force his readers into a (...)
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  13. Mark van Roojen (2010). Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism. Ethics 120 (3):495–525.
  14. John J. Tilley (2012). Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):53-83.
    One of the most oft-cited parts of Francis Hutcheson’s Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1728) is his discussion of “exciting reasons.” In this paper I address the question: What is the function of that discussion? In particular, what is its relation to Hutcheson’s attempt to show that the rationalists’ normative thesis ultimately implies, contrary to their moral epistemology, that moral ideas spring from a sense? Despite first appearances, Hutcheson’s discussion of exciting reasons is not part of that (...)
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  15. Shaun Nichols (2002). Is It Irrational to Be Amoral? How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism. The Monist 85:285-304.
     
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  16.  6
    Brian K. Powell (2009). Discourse Ethics and Moral Rationalism. Dialogue 48 (2):373.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper, I raise the following question: can the ethical thought of Jurgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel provide us with a way of showing that morality is a rational requirement? The answer I give is that it cannot. I argue for this claim by showing that a decisive objection to Alan Gewirth’s line of thought in Reason and Morality also applies to discourse ethical arguments that try to show an inescapable commitment to a moral principle. RÉSUMÉ: La (...)
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  17.  63
    Christopher Peacocke (2004). Moral Rationalism. Journal of Philosophy 101 (10):499 - 526.
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    Lawrence A. Blum (1982). Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism: A Feminist Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):287 - 302.
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  19.  67
    Jonathan Dancy (2006). On How to Be a Moral Rationalist. Philosophical Books 47 (2):103-110.
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    Joshua Gert (2014). Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):217-224.
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  21.  58
    Michael B. Gill (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 3 (2):397–400.
  22. Chris Zarpentine (2007). Michael Smith, Rationalism, And The Moral Psychology Of Psychopathy. Florida Philosophical Review 7 (1):1-15.
    In this paper, on the basis of psychological research concerning psychopathy, I argue against one claim a moral rationalist—such as Michael Smith —might make. First, I distinguish three rationalist claims the moral rationalist might make: the rationalists' conceptual claim, the rationalists' substantial claim, and the practicality requirement. Then, I go on to discuss some of the subtle relations between these claims. I argue that, if we have reason to reject the rationalists' substantial claim, this gives us prima facie (...)
     
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  23.  15
    Alan Donagan (1982). Moral Rationalism and Variable Social Institutions. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1):3-10.
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  24. Charles Taylor (2007). Modern Moral Rationalism. In Santiago Zabala (ed.), Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo. Mcgill-Queen's University Press
     
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  25. David O. Brink, Handout #2: Moral Motivation and Rationalism.
    We have looked at worries about expressivism and other forms of noncognitivism. The externalist solution may also seem to be a solution of last resort, because it may seem to deny the platitude that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious. For this reason, we might look seriously at rationalist theories of moral motivation, because they promise to represent moral judgments as intrinsically motivational without giving up cognitivism.
     
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  26.  42
    Steve Clarke (2008). Sim and the City: Rationalism in Psychology and Philosophy and Haidt's Account of Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):799 – 820.
    Jonathan Haidt ( 2001 ) advances the 'Social Intuitionist' account of moral judgment , which he presents as an alternative to rationalist accounts of moral judgment , hitherto dominant in psychology. Here I consider Haidt's anti-rationalism and the debate that it has provoked in moral psychology , as well as some anti-rationalist philosophical claims that Haidt and others have grounded in the empirical work of Haidt and his collaborators. I will argue that although the case for (...)
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  27. Marian Cehelnik (2009). Critical Rationalism as a Moral Decision. Filozofia 64 (6):545-551.
    The paper deals with the ethical-moral dimension of Popper’s critical rationalism, which is the less analyzed aspect of his philosophy. Critical rationalism is not without assumptions. As a life attitude, it is actualized on the basis of one’s moral preferences based rather on assumptions than on critical reasonableness. Critical rationalism does not exclude logical argumentation and reasoning, but the adoption of them is predominantly the result of an individual moral decision and choice, based, paradoxically (...)
     
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  28.  25
    Robert L. Arrington (1989). Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism: Perspectives in Contemporary Moral Epistemology. Cornell University Press.
  29. T. Horgan & M. Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism: Making Room for Moral Principles. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10:279-295.
     
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  30.  51
    Gerard Delanty (1997). Habermas and Occidental Rationalism: The Politics of Identity, Social Learning, and the Cultural Limits of Moral Universalism. Sociological Theory 15 (1):30-59.
    While Habermas's theory of communicative action is deeply critical of all kinds of ethnocentrism, proposing a discursive concept of universal morality which transcends culture, a residual Eurocentrism still pervades it. Habermas's theory rests on a notion of modernity which is tied to Occidental rationalism, and when viewed in the global context or in the context of deeply divided societies it is problematic. The theory fails to grasp that universal morality can be articulated in more than one cultural form and (...)
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    Hans Poser (2008). Innate Ideas as the Cornerstone of Rationalism: The Problem of Moral Principles in Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais. In Marcelo Dascal (ed.), Leibniz: What Kind of Rationalist? Springer 479--493.
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  32. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279-295.
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    Alan Donagan (1984). Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems. Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):291-309.
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  34. Kiichi Tachibana (1995). Moral Decision in Popper's Critical Rationalism. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 8 (5):261-266.
     
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  35.  15
    Noell Birondo (2013). Rationalism in Ethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell 4329-4338.
    The word 'rationalism,' as it appears in philosophical discussions of ethics and morality, signifies at least one of a cluster of theses, each of which connects some aspect of ethical experience to reason or rationality. The most provocative rationalist thesis arises in contemporary discussions in metaethics; and it is this thesis that remains the most likely referent, in contemporary discussions, of the phrase 'moral rationalism.' The thesis is more accurately referred to, however, as metaethical rationalism, since (...)
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  36.  5
    Massimo Reichlin (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 127-144.
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  37.  24
    James Klagge (1991). Rationalism, Supervenience, and Moral Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):25-28.
  38.  2
    Gerard Delanty (1997). Habermas and Occidental Rationalism: The Politics of Identity, Social Learning, and the Cultural Limits of Moral Universalism. Sociological Theory 15 (1):30-59.
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  39.  3
    Antonella Corradini (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 145-162.
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  40.  3
    Michael Pauen (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 45-62.
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  41.  3
    Maureen Sie (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 165-192.
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  42.  30
    Stephen Cohen (1979). Gewirth's Rationalism: Who is a Moral Agent? Ethics 89 (2):179-190.
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    Obed Balaban, Lawrence A. Blum & Victor Seidler (1990). Arrington, Robert L. Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989; $13.95 (Paper); 321 Pps.(Indexed). Baird, Robert M. And Stuart E. Rosenbaum (Ed). Euthanasia: The Moral Issue. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989; $11.95 (Paper); 182 Pps. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 24:335-336.
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  44.  2
    Christoph Lumer (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 3-42.
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  45.  1
    Arnaldo Benini (2014). Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW] In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter 195-202.
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  46.  8
    Stephen J. Sullivan (1991). Book Review:Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism: Perspectives in Contemporary Moral Epistemology. Robert L. Arrington. [REVIEW] Ethics 101 (2):406-.
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  47. Mitchell Gabhart (1993). Freedom in Necessity: The Moral Psychology of Spinoza's Rationalism. Dissertation, University of Kentucky
    Traditionally, attempts at resolving the problem of accounting for the possibility of human freedom against the background of determinism have assumed that the options available are to: endorse determinism and deny human freedom, deny determinism in order to make room for human freedom, or find a compatibilist reconciliation. Commonly, the problem is addressed from an 'externalist' perspective. In the dissertation, the issue is refocused upon the positions of 'internalists' such as Frankfurt, Watson, Taylor, and Wolf. Their compatibilist approaches emphasize the (...)
     
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  48. Gerard J. Hughes (1991). Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism: Perspectives in Contemporary Moral Epistemology. Philosophical Books 32 (2):114-116.
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  49. Leon Pearl (1957). The Rationalist Moral Argument of Richard Price. Dissertation, New York University
     
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  50. Michael Cholbi (2011). The Moral Conversion of Rational Egoists. Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):533-556.
    One principal challenge to the rationalist thesis that the demands of morality are requirements of rationality has been that posed by the "rational egoist." In attempting to answer's the egoist's challenge, some rationalists have supposed that an adequate reply must take the form of a deductive argument that "converts" the egoist by showing that her position is contradictory, arbitrary, or violates some precept that defines practical rationality as such. Here I argue (a) that such rationalist replies will fail to persuade (...)
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