Search results for 'naturalistic fallacy' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Julia Tanner (2006). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 13.score: 180.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is a source of much confusion. In what follows I will explain what G. E. Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy, give modern day examples of it then mention some of the different types of views it has spawned. Finally, I will consider a few criticisms of it.
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  2. David Sloan Wilson, Eric Dietrich & Anne B. Clark (2003). On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-81.score: 180.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can be discussed constructivelywithout impeding evolutionary psychologicalresearch. A key is to show how ethicalbehaviors, in addition to unethical (...)
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  3. Jonathan Barrett (1991). Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously: An Objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):433-437.score: 180.0
    Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties (...)
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  4. William A. Rottschaefer & David Martinsen (1991). The Insufficience of Supervenient Explanations of Moral Actions: Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):439-445.score: 180.0
    In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications (...)
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  5. David Sloan-Wilson, Eric Dietrich & Anne Clark (2003). On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-681.score: 180.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is mentioned frequently by evolutionary psychologists as an erroneous way of thinking about the ethical implications of evolved behaviors. However, evolutionary psychologists are themselves confused about the naturalistic fallacy and use it inappropriately to forestall legitimate ethical discussion. We briefly review what the naturalistic fallacy is and why it is misused by evolutionary psychologists. Then we attempt to show how the ethical implications of evolved behaviors can be discussed constructively without impeding (...)
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  6. Oren Harman (2012). Is the Naturalistic Fallacy Dead (and If So, Ought It Be?). Journal of the History of Biology 45 (3):557 - 572.score: 180.0
    Much of modern moral philosophy argued that there are is's in this world, and there are oughts, but that the two are entirely independent of one another. What this meant was that morality had nothing to do with man's biological nature, and could not be derived from it. Any such attempt was considered to be a categorical mistake, and plain foolish. Most philosophers still believe this, but a growing group of neonaturalist thinkers are now challenging their assumptions. Here I consider (...)
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  7. Burton frederick Porter (1968). Deity and Morality, with Regard to the Naturalistic Fallacy. London, Allen & Unwin.score: 180.0
    ChapterI THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY AZ THE NATURE OF THE FALLACY The criticism which has since been labelled the naturalistic fallacy was first described by the eighteenth-century empircist David Hume, in a small but celebrated ...
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  8. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay, Semantic Naturalism and the New Naturalistic Fallacy.score: 120.0
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously offered an extended inference to reject what are in effect two substantially different types of ethical naturalism. Although some naturalistic doctrines targeted by that inference make semantic claims that, if true, would entail certain metaphysical claims, it is also possible that those semantic doctrines could be false and the metaphysical ones true at the same time. For if semantic naturalism is true, then moral terms and sentences are reducible, by an (...)
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  9. Kenneth E. Goodpaster (1985). Business Ethics, Ideology, and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Journal of Business Ethics 4 (4):227 - 232.score: 120.0
    This paper addresses the relationship between theoretical and applied ethics. It directs philosophical attention toward the concept of ideology, conceived as a bridge between high-level principles and decision-making practice. How are we to understand this bridge and how can we avoid the naturalistic fallacy while taking ideology seriously?It is then suggested that the challenge posed by ideology in the arena of organizational ethics is in many ways similar to the challenge posed by developmentalist accounts of moral stages in (...)
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  10. Erik Angner, Did Hayek Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?score: 120.0
    In promoting spontaneous orders – orders that evolve in a process of cultural evolution – as “efficient,” “beneficial,” and “advantageous,” Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992) has often been attributed the belief that there is something desirable about them. For this reason, he has been accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy, that is, of trying to derive an “ought” from an “is.” It appears that Hayek was..
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  11. Susana Nuccetelli, Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy?score: 120.0
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously offered his own version of nonnaturalism in opposition to what are, in effect, analytic versions of reductive naturalism in ethics. Although Moore himself did not clearly distinguish the analysis of predicates from that of properties, he plainly denied that the evaluative predicate, good , could be analyzed in terms of any purely descriptive predicate, and took this to show that the property of goodness could not be identical to any natural property (...)
     
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  12. Andrew J. Kerr (2000). The Possibility of Metaphysics: Environmental Ethics and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Environmental Ethics 22 (1):85-99.score: 120.0
    One of the most distinguishing features of environmental ethics has been the effort to develop a nonanthropocentric intrinsic value theory, that is, a definition of the good which is not dependent upon some quality particular to humanity, a definition of the good whereby properties found in the terrestrial, nonhuman world are constitutive of that definition. In this paper, I argue that major nonanthropocentric theories suffer from arbitrariness. I argue through the use of representative thinkers that much nonathropocentric theory has committed (...)
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  13. Charles Pigden (1991). Naturalism. In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell. 421-431.score: 96.0
    Survey article on Naturalism dealing with Hume's NOFI (including Prior's objections), Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy and the Barren Tautology Argument. Naturalism, as I understand it, is a form of moral realism which rejects fundamental moral facts or properties. Thus it is opposed to both non-cognitivism, and and the error theory but also to non-naturalism. General conclusion: as of 1991: naturalism as a program has not been refuted though none of the extant versions look particularly promising.
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  14. Kwok Tung Cheung (2008). On a Recent Naturalism Debate in Business Ethics – From a Philosophy Point of View. Journal of Business Ethics 82 (4):889 - 898.score: 96.0
    William C. Frederick proposes a naturalistic business ethics. Many commentators focus on the issues of naturalistic fallacy, deprivation of freedom of the will, and possibility of important and universal moral values in business ethics. I argue that an ethics being naturalistic is not a worry. The issue of deprivation of free will is irrelevant. Yet there are urgent questions regarding the possibility of important and universal moral values, which may prevent Frederick’s view from getting off the (...)
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  15. Glen-O. Allen (1970). From the "Naturalistic Fallacy" to the Ideal Observer Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30:533-549.score: 92.0
    G. E. MOORE'S PROOF THAT 'GOOD' CANNOT BE DEFINED IS THE\nANALOGUE OF HUME'S PROOF THAT THE IDEA OF CAUSE HAS NO\nEMPIRICAL CORRELATE. AS A PROOF, IT CANNOT SUSTAIN ETHICAL\nINTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM, OR THE VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS OF\nETHICAL NATURALISM WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO REST UPON IT.\nHOWEVER, IT DOES SUSTAIN THE THEORY THAT VALUES ARE CAUSES\nOF HUMAN RESPONSES, AND THAT, UNDER A METHODOLOGICAL\nINTERPRETATION OF OBJECTIVITY, VALUES HAVE OBJECTIVE\nCOGNITIVE STATUS AS CAUSES OF RESPONSES IN THE\nCONSCIOUSNESS OF A HYPOTHETICAL BEING, AN IDEAL OBSERVER.
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  16. Sinion Derpmann, Dominik Düber, Tim Rojek & Konstantin Schnieder (2013). Can Kitcher Avoid the Naturalistic Fallacy? In Marie Kaiser & Ansgar Seide (eds.), Philip Kitcher. Pragmatic Naturalism. Ontos. 61.score: 92.0
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  17. W. K. Frankena (1939). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Mind 48 (192):464-477.score: 90.0
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  18. Julian Dodd & Suzanne Stern-Gillet (1995). The Is/Ought Gap, the Fact/Value Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Dialogue 34 (04):727-.score: 90.0
  19. Samuel Schindler (2013). The Kuhnian Mode of HPS. Synthese 190 (18):4137-4154.score: 90.0
    In this article I argue that a methodological challenge to an integrated history and philosophy of science approach put forth by Ronald Giere almost forty years ago can be met by what I call the Kuhnian mode of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). Although in the Kuhnian mode of HPS norms about science are motivated by historical facts about scientific practice, the justifiers of the constructed norms are not historical facts. The Kuhnian mode of HPS therefore evades the (...) fallacy which Giere’s challenge is a version of. Against the backdrop of a discussion of Laudan’s normative naturalism I argue that the Kuhnian mode of HPS is a superior form of naturalism: it establishes contact to the practice of science without making itself dependent on its contingencies. (shrink)
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  20. Glen O. Allen (1970). From the "Naturalistic Fallacy" to the Ideal Observer Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (4):533-549.score: 90.0
  21. Mauro Dorato, THE NATURALNESS OF THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY AND THE ETHICS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY.score: 90.0
    In the first part of this paper, I try to clear the ground from frequent misconceptions about the relationship between fact and value by examining some uses of the adjective “natural” in ethical controversies. Such uses bear evidence to our “natural” tendency to regard nature (considered in a descriptive sense, as the complex of physical and biological regularities) as the source of ethical norms. I then try to account for the origin of this tendency by offering three related explanations, the (...)
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  22. Katinka Quintelier, Linda van Speybroeck & Johan Braeckman (2011). Normative Ethics Does Not Need a Foundation: It Needs More Science. Acta Biotheoretica 59 (1):29-51.score: 90.0
    The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In (...)
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  23. Hasna Begum (1979). Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):251 – 265.score: 90.0
  24. Alan Ryan (1966). Mill and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Mind 75 (299):422-425.score: 90.0
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  25. Peter Woolcock (1993). Ruse's Darwinian Meta-Ethics: A Critique. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 8 (4):423-439.score: 90.0
    Michael Ruse, in Taking Darwin Seriously seeks to establish that taking Darwin seriously requires us to treat morality as subjective and naturalistic. I argue that, if morality is not objective, then we have no good reason for being moral if we can avoid detection and punishment. As a consequence, we will only continue to behave morally as long as we remain ignorant of Ruse''s theory, that is, as long as the cat is not let out of the bag. Ruse (...)
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  26. George R. Geiger (1949). A Note on the Naturalistic Fallacy. Philosophy of Science 16 (4):336-342.score: 90.0
  27. John Lemos (2000). Darwinian Natural Right and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):119-132.score: 90.0
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  28. Aurel Kolnai (1980). The Ghost of the Naturalistic Fallacy. Philosophy 55 (211):5 - 16.score: 90.0
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  29. Francis Michael Walsh (2008). The Return of the Naturalistic Fallacy: A Dialogue on Human Flourishing. Heythrop Journal 49 (3):370-387.score: 90.0
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  30. Elmer H. Duncan (1970). Has Anyone Committed the Naturalistic Fallacy? Southern Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):49-55.score: 90.0
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  31. William A. Rottschaefer & David Martinsen (1990). Really Taking Darwin Seriously: An Alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian Metaethics. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):149-173.score: 90.0
    Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens (...)
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  32. William A. Rottschaefer (1997). Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber's the Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):369-384.score: 90.0
    In his recent The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics, Paul Farber has given a negative assessment of the last one hundred years of attempts in Anglo-American philosophy, beginning with Darwin, to develop an evolutionary ethics. Farber identifies some version of the naturalistic fallacy as one of the central sources for the failures of evolutionary ethics. For this reason, and others, Farber urges that though it has its attraction, evolutionary ethics is a temptation to be resisted. In this discussion I (...)
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  33. Darryl F. Wright (1994). Diagnosing the Naturalistic Fallacy:Principia EthicaRevisited. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):465-482.score: 90.0
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  34. James C. Anderson (1974). A Note on Searle's Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacy. Analysis 34 (4):139 - 141.score: 90.0
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  35. K. G. Ferguson (2001). Semantic and Structural Problems in Evolutionary Ethics. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):69-84.score: 90.0
    In ''''A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics'''' (1986), Robert J. Richardsendeavors to explain how moral ''oughts'' can be derived from thescience of evolutionary biology without committing the dreadednaturalistic fallacy. First, Richards assumes that ''ought'' as usedin ethical discourse bears the same meaning as ''ought'' used anywherein science, indicating merely that certain results or behaviors arepredicted based on prior structured contexts. To this extent, themoral behavior of animals, what they ''ought'' to do, could arguablybe predicted by evolutionary biology as effectively as, (...)
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  36. Bernard H. Baumrin (1968). Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy? American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (2):79 - 89.score: 90.0
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  37. David P. Gauthier (1967). Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy. American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):315 - 320.score: 90.0
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  38. G. P. Baker & P. M. Hacker (1966). Rules, Definitions, And The Naturalistic Fallacy. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (October):299-305.score: 90.0
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  39. Kai Nielsen (1974). Covert and Overt Synonymity: Brandt and Moore and the 'Naturalistic Fallacy'. Philosophical Studies 25 (1):51 - 56.score: 90.0
  40. James M. Giarelli (1976). Lawrence Kohlberg and G. E. Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy. Educational Theory 26 (4):348-354.score: 90.0
  41. Robert Richards (1986). A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics. Biology and Philosophy 1 (3):265-293.score: 90.0
    From Charles Darwin to Edward Wilson, evolutionary biologists have attempted to construct systems of evolutionary ethics. These attempts have been roundly criticized, most often for having committed the naturalistic fallacy. In this essay, I review the history of previous efforts at formulating an evolutionary ethics, focusing on the proposals of Darwin and Wilson. I then advance and defend a proposal of my own. In the last part of the essay, I try to demonstrate that my revised version of (...)
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  42. James Fieser (1993). Moore, Spencer, and the Naturalistic Fallacy. History of Philosophy Quarterly 10 (3):271 - 276.score: 90.0
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  43. Dennis Rohatyn (1982). Burying Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:173-185.score: 90.0
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  44. Philip Mulloch (1971). The Naturalistic Fallacy and Anderson's Systems OM. Philosophical Studies 22 (4):60 - 61.score: 90.0
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  45. Steven Gimbel (2002). Avoiding the Super-Naturalistic Fallacy: Practical Reasoning and the Insightful Undergraduate. Journal of Thought 37 (3).score: 90.0
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  46. Laurens Landeweerd (2004). Normative-Descriptive and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Global Bioethics 17 (1):17-23.score: 90.0
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  47. Sandra L. Schneider (2000). An Elitist Naturalistic Fallacy and the Automatic-Controlled Continuum. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):695-696.score: 90.0
    Although a focus on individual differences can help resolve issues concerning performance errors and computational complexity, the understanding/acceptance axiom is inadequate for establishing which decision norms are most appropriate. The contribution of experience to automatic and controlled processes suggests difficulties in attributing interactional intelligence to goals of evolutionary rationality and analytic intelligence to goals of instrumental rationality.
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  48. Kevin Elliott (2002). Biomedical Ethics, Public-Health Risk Assessment, and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Public Affairs Quarterly 16 (4):351-376.score: 90.0
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  49. Nr Luebke (1970). Frankena on Naturalistic Fallacy. Journal of Thought 5 (4):262-273.score: 90.0
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