Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 10, Issue 1, Page 42-52, March 2021.

We define a model for computing probabilities of right-nested conditionals in terms of graphs representing Markov chains. This is an extension of the model for simple conditionals from Wójtowicz and Wójtowicz. The model makes it possible to give a formal yet simple description of different interpretations of right-nested conditionals and to compute their probabilities in a mathematically rigorous way. In this study we focus on the problem of the probabilities of conditionals; we do not (...) discuss questions concerning logical and metalogical issues such as setting up an axiomatic framework, inference rules, defining semantics, proving completeness, soundness etc. Our theory is motivated by the possible-worlds approach ; however, our model is generally more flexible. In the paper we focus on right-nested conditionals, discussing them in detail. The graph model makes it possible to account in a unified way for both shallow and deep interpretations of right-nested conditionals. In particular, we discuss the status of the Import-Export Principle and PCCP. We briefly discuss some methodological constraints on admissible models and analyze our model with respect to them. The study also illustrates the general problem of finding formal explications of philosophically important notions and applying mathematical methods in analyzing philosophical issues. (shrink)

Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramsey’s test, which characterizes graded acceptability for conditionals in terms of hypothetical updates on the antecedent. Some results in van Fraassen may raise hope that this explicatory approach to Ramsey’s test is extendible to left-nested (...) conditionals, that is, conditionals whose antecedent is itself conditional in form. We argue that this interpretation of van Fraassen’s results is to be rejected. Specifically, we provide an argument from material inadequacy against a generalization of Adams’ thesis for left-nested conditionals. (shrink)

We employ a recently developed methodology -- called "structural refinement" -- to extract nested sequent systems for a sizable class of intuitionistic modal logics from their respective labelled sequent systems. This method can be seen as a means by which labelled sequent systems can be transformed into nested sequent systems through the introduction of propagation rules and the elimination of structural rules, followed by a notational translation. The nested systems we obtain incorporate propagation rules that are parameterized (...) with formal grammars, and which encode certain frame conditions expressible as first-order Horn formulae that correspond to a subclass of the Scott-Lemmon axioms. We show that our nested systems are sound, cut-free complete, and admit hp-admissibility of typical structural rules. (shrink)

Today, many pregnancy guides mention a nesting instinct. According to this, pregnant women would be seized by an urge to create the right environment for their child, for example to buy baby equipment or clean the apartment. The concept of the nesting instinct forms a specific configuration of knowledge: While it is widespread in the popular field, it occupies a marginal position in the scientific field. In this paper, I will investigate the historical epistemology of this form of knowledge. In (...) so doing, the following questions are addressed: How did the knowledge about a nesting instinct during pregnancy form? How was the nest as a specific natural-anthropogenic environment constructed? And to what extent do notions of gender and environment interact here? To answer these questions, the study takes the perspective of a history of knowledge in transit, in the longue durée from the nineteenth century to the present. The investigation reveals a gradual feminization of the concept of environment in the knowledge of the nesting instinct. Whereas in the nineteenth century it was often considered a male behavioral pattern and the nest was an analogy to the house, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the instinct transformed into a primarily female characteristic, with the nest representing the interior of the home. A decisive condition for this circulation of knowledge was that the nest became a ‘metaphorical thing’. As such, the nest did not simply lead to naturalization, but denoted a natural-social in-between space that increasingly became the goal of female care work. (shrink)

Since the declaration of financial crisis in 2008, and the imposition of austerity measures in 2011, Greece has become an epicentre—or a “laboratory”—of multiple, successively declared crises, including the humanitarian crisis induced by the devastating effects of neoliberal structural adjustment policies. In this paper, I approach the explosion of crisis discourse as a medium for ideological negotiations of nation-state borders in relation to a continental project of securitisation. I suggest that ‘crisis’ functions as a lexicon through which sovereignty can be (...) reasserted in relation to supranational institutional interference in ostensibly democratic governance. Specifically, I examine how the refugee crisis and the debt crisis converge in nationalised space in Greece; that is, how in state discourse, ‘crises’ serve as a conduit through which the borders of an embattled nation are redrawn and hardened against threats from a political space conceptualised as ‘outside’ the nation. My point of entry is the declaration of the Greek government by the end of the summer of 2015, that it was “experiencing a crisis within a crisis,” dually victimised by migration ‘flows’ and failed European solidarity in a context of ongoing austerity measures required by its institutional lenders. The figure of ‘a crisis within a crisis’ functioned to delineate the boundaries of national space and time and to distinguish the normative victims of what are seen as distinct, if overlapping political phenomena (debt and migration), from those who parasitically share in, or indeed by their very illicit presence cause or contribute to the suffering of the national subject. If the global economic crisis had already been made ‘ours’ by being constructed as a problem inherent in the national economy, the global war on migration became reinvented as 'Europe’s crisis,’ and then ‘Greece’s.’ The nationalisation of ‘crisis’ then, has a triple function: first, to conceal the systemic and structural underpinnings of violent processes of dispossession and displacement; second, to authorise the imposition of regimes of management and securitisation; and third, to reify borders that simultaneously fortify the agencies of state sovereignties while containing those of embodied human beings. The figure of ‘nesting crises’—‘a crisis within a crisis’—emerges through gestures of ownership or territorialisation of crisis: that is, in the conditions under which, affectively and politically a ‘crisis’ becomes ‘ours’ rather than ‘theirs’ and, indeed, constitutes the ‘we’ and the ‘they.’ ‘Nesting crises’ discourse can be read as a vocabulary through which national sovereignty is reasserted and national unity reconstituted. (shrink)

We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional (...) can be reduced to acceptance tests for unnested conditionals. Thus, iterated revision can be accomplished in a "virtual" manner, using uniterated revision. (shrink)

We prove completeness of preferential conditional logic with respect to convexity over finite sets of points in the Euclidean plane. A conditional is defined to be true in a finite set of points if all extreme points of the set interpreting the antecedent satisfy the consequent. Equivalently, a conditional is true if the antecedent is contained in the convex hull of the points that satisfy both the antecedent and consequent. Our result is then that every consistent formula without nested (...) conditionals is satisfiable in a model based on a finite set of points in the plane. The proof relies on a result by Richter and Rogers showing that every finite abstract convex geometry can be represented by convex polygons in the plane. (shrink)

We bring out syntactic and semantic similarities of two types of conditionals with fronted antecedents [normal indicative conditionals and biscuit conditionals ] and two types of left dislocation constructions in German, which mark two types of topicality. On the basis of these similarities we argue that NCs and BCs are aboutness topics and relevance topics, respectively. Our analysis extends the approach to aboutness topicality of Endriss to relevance topics to derive the semantic and pragmatic contribution of left-dislocated (...) DPs and applies it to an analysis of conditionals as pluralities of possible worlds. We show how this uniform approach to the interpretation of topicality accounts for the nominal left dislocation constructions as well as for the semantic and pragmatic effects observed in connection with the two types of conditionals. We furthermore discuss the potential of our proposal to deal with subjunctive biscuit conditionals, if-clauses modifying speech acts different from assertions, conditionals with right-dislocated if-clauses, and nested conditionals. (shrink)

According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reflect changes of beliefs: α > β is accepted in a belief state iff β is accepted in the minimal revision of it that is necessary to accommodate α. Since Gärdenfors’s seminal paper of 1986, a series of impossibility theorems (“triviality theorems”) has seemed to show that the Ramsey test is not a viable analysis of conditionals if it is combined with AGM-type belief revision models. I argue that it is possible to (...) endorse that Ramsey test for conditionals while staying true to the spirit of AGM. A main focus lies on AGM’s condition of Preservation according to which the original belief set should be fully retained after a revision by information that is consistent with it. I use concrete representations of belief states and (iterated) revisions of belief states as semantic models for (nested) conditionals. Among the four most natural qualitative models for iterated belief change, two are identified that indeed allow us to combine the Ramsey test with Preservation in the language containing only flat conditionals of the form α > β. It is shown, however, that Preservation for this simple language enforces a violation of Preservation for nested conditionals of the form α > (β > γ). In such languages, no two belief sets are ordered by strict subset inclusion. I argue that it has been wrong right from the start to expect that Preservation holds in languages containing nested conditionals. (shrink)

According to the modal account of propositional apriority, a proposition is a priori if it is possible to know it with a priori justification. Assuming that modal truths are necessarily true and that there are contingent a priori truths, this account has the undesirable consequence that a proposition can be a priori in a world in which it is false. Epistemic two-dimensionalism faces the same problem, since on its standard interpretation, it also entails that a priori propositions are necessarily a (...) priori. In response to this problem, Chalmers and Rabern propose an alternative conception of propositional apriority as well as two-dimensional truth-conditions for apriority statements. Their proposal is also supposed to avoid another problem for the modal account, namely that it entails the existence of false instances of ‘φ iff actually φ’. I discuss Chalmers and Rabern’s account and point out a number of problems with it. I then develop my own account of propositional apriority that solves the problems in question, that can be accepted by friends and foes of two-dimensionalism alike, and that is also neutral with respect to the question of how one construes the objects of propositional apriority. (shrink)

A suggestion is made for representing iterated deontic modalities in stit theory, the “seeing-to-it-that” theory of agency. The formalization is such that normative sentences are represented as agentive sentences and therefore have history dependent truth conditions. In contrast to investigations in alethic modal logic, in the construction of systems of deontic logic little attention has been paid to the iteration... of the deontic modalities.

Despite its diminished importance amongst philosophers, the deductive-nomological framework is still important to contemporary behavioral scientists. Behavioral theorists operating within this framework must be careful to distinguish between nesting and chaining. Explanations are chained when the explanandum sentence of one explanation is one of the antecedent conditions of another. They are nested when one of the antecedent conditions or the explanandum sentence of one explanation is one of the covering laws of another. Confusion between nesting and chaining leads to (...) explanation nests that cannot be nomologically entrenched. They cannot, even in principle, be logically connected to laws arising from other sciences. This hazard should be particularly important for evolutionary psychologists to avoid, since many evolutionary psychologists tend to see themselves as dedicated to both nomological entrenchment and cognitive functionalist models. The hazard can be avoided if the intentional constructs of the behavioral sciences are construed not as ineffable and inaccessible antecedent conditions, but as complex, law-like patterns in behavior. (shrink)

We provide a direct method for proving Craig interpolation for a range of modal and intuitionistic logics, including those containing a "converse" modality. We demonstrate this method for classical tense logic, its extensions with path axioms, and for bi-intuitionistic logic. These logics do not have straightforward formalisations in the traditional Gentzen-style sequent calculus, but have all been shown to have cut-free nested sequent calculi. The proof of the interpolation theorem uses these calculi and is purely syntactic, without resorting to (...) embeddings, semantic arguments, or interpreted connectives external to the underlying logical language. A novel feature of our proof includes an orthogonality condition for defining duality between interpolants. (shrink)

This doctoral dissertation investigates what influence indicative conditionals have on belief updating and how learning from conditionals may be modelled in a probabilistic framework. Because the problem is related to the interpretation of conditionals, we first assess different semantics of indicative conditionals. We propose that conditionals should be taken as primary concepts. This allows us to defend a claim that learning a conditional is equivalent to learning that the relevant conditional probability is 1. This implies (...) that learning a conditional can be modelled as learning a material conditional. We then turn to a few competing approaches to the problem of learning from a conditional -- an approach that models these situations with regards to changes in the explanatory status of the antecedent, as minimising probability distances between the prior and posterior probability distributions, and, particularly, an approach based on epistemic entrenchment. It is argued that although all approaches are important for their pioneering contributions, none of them ultimately provides a fully satisfactory solution. We then formulate a proposal according to which learning a conditional may be modelled as learning a material conditional in conjunction with other contextually inferred or observed information. We show that the view has an intuitive appeal on the grounds of pragmatics and empirical research in psychology of reasoning. We also show that the proposed approach successfully resolves all standard cases from the literature. The proposal is then extended to left-nested conditionals. To do so, we first inspect some preliminary empirical data about actual reasoning with nested conditionals and then show that the proposed approach also successfully models these cases. We then investigate how the approach may be extended to the so-called imperative conditionals. We introduce a tripartite typology of imperative conditionals and argue that although imperatives cannot be probabilistically modelled in any straight-forward way, at least some general insights of the proposed method help us understand the influence that the three different types of imperative conditionals have on listeners’ beliefs. We conclude with a summary and some open questions that should be addressed in future work (e.g. the influence of counterfactuals on belief updating). (shrink)

In this paper I look at indicative nested whether-conditionals, sentences like:If I pass the exam, I will pass whether I pray or not.The behavior of ‘if’ in these examples is to be contrasted with the behavior of ‘if’ in or-to-if conditionals:If Mary is at home or at work, then if she is not at home, she is at work.I argue that no currently available semantics for indicative conditionals can explain both the behavior of ‘if’ in (...) class='Hi'>nested whether-conditionals and the behavior of ‘if’ in or-to-ifs. We need a theory that predicts both. While no currently available theory makes the right predictions, one theory comes close—Heim’s rendition of Stalnaker’s semantics :183–221, 1992). I show how to fix Heim’s view to get the right results for all cases. In sum, the paper argues for a particular development of Stalnaker’s semantics, and shows that whether-conditionals cannot be dealt with on other approaches. (shrink)

In my paper “On the Probabilities of Conditionals,” I claimed, mistakenly, that David Lewis’s four triviality results and Alan Hájek’s proof depend on the application of the following principle to conditionals containing nested conditionals.

In my paper “On the Probabilities of Conditionals,” I claimed, mistakenly, that David Lewis’s four triviality results and Alan Hájek’s proof depend on the application of the following principle to conditionals containing nested conditionals.

Counterfactual analysis of causation between particular events, combined with standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals, cannot express the idea that the cause is sufficient for the effect. Several authors have suggested that a more complex pattern of nested counterfactual conditionals is a better candidate for expressing the idea of causal connection. The most systematic account is developed by Kadri Vihvelin. She argues that a complex pattern of causal dependence, expressed by embedded conditionals, covers all the cases of (...) causation and still yields an account of causal asymmetry. But the new account relies heavily on the use of backtracking conditionals, and no criterion is given for their evaluation. I will try to show that Vihvelin’s proposal is not superior to the standard account because it overlooks the disadvantages of a liberal theory of causal relata. (shrink)

This paper develops a trivalent semantics for the truth conditions and the probability of the natural language indicative conditional. Our framework rests on trivalent truth conditions first proposed by Cooper (1968) and Belnap (1973) and it yields two logics of conditional reasoning: (i) a logic C of certainty-preserving inference; and (ii) a logic U for uncertain reasoning that preserves the probability of the premises. We show systematic correspondences between trivalent and probabilistic representations of inferences in either framework, and we use (...) the distinction between the two systems to cast light on the validity of inferences such as Modus Ponens, Or-To-If, and Conditional Excluded Middle. Specifically, the conditional behaves monotonically in C, but non-monotonically in U; Modus Ponens is valid in C, but valid in U only for non-nested conditionals. The result is a unified account of the semantics and epistemology of indicative conditionals that can be fruitfully applied to analyzing the validity of conditional inferences. (shrink)

We show how to extend any finite probability space into another finite one which satisfies the conditional construal of conditional probability for the original propositions, given some maximal allowed degree of nesting of the conditional. This mitigates the force of the well-known triviality results.

The paper focuses on a recent challenge brought forward against the interventionist approach to the meaning of counterfactual conditionals. According to this objection, interventionism cannot account for the interpretation of right-nested counterfactuals, the problem being its strict interventionism. We will report on the results of an empirical study supporting the objection. Furthermore, we will extend the well-known logic of intervention with a new operator expressing an alternative notion of intervention that does away with strict interventionism. This new notion (...) of intervention operates on the valuation of the variables in a causal model, and not on their functional dependencies. (shrink)

In my paper “On the Probabilities of Conditionals,” I claimed, mistakenly, that David Lewis’s four triviality results and Alan Hájek’s proof depend on the application of the following principle to conditionals containing nested conditionals.

O que é posto em comum depende, em grande parte, de processos textuais específi cos que funcionam como condições de possibilidade pragmático-narratológicas da partilha dos sentidos que circulam pelo meio da linguagem. Tal implica que o simples uso corrente da linguagem, ao contrário do que é usual supor, ainda que indispensável, não seja sufi ciente para gerar essa comunidade, pois que nem todos os dispositivos linguísticos estão vocacionados para favorecer a convergência. Neste artigo, pretendemos, por conseguinte, reflectir sobre uma dessas (...) condições, a de que uma nova enunciação, para se tornar comum, tenha sempre de retomar uma versão enunciativa, já consolidada, não apenas formalmente, mas, também, no que respeita a sequências textuais específicas. Para o efeito, estendemos o conceito de retomada que, na filosofia de Eric Weil, surge no âmbito da Lógica da Filosofia, à totalidade da comunicação com pretensão a fazer sentido. Trata-se, portanto, de pensar com Weil, para lá de Weil, num exercício de (in)fidelidade e distanciação que constitui, em si mesmo, uma forma de o retomar. (shrink)

In het kader van de Leerstoel Rector Dhanis (UFSIA, Antwerpen) werd door een studiegroep bestaande uit artsen en verpleegkundigen, ethici en juristen, een interdisciplinaire studie ondernomen over 'klinische ethiek' en 'hoe recht en politiek omgaan met problemen die thuishoren in de klinische praktijk'. In deze bundel wordt het ethische denken in een aantal casussen betreffende neonatalen en dementerenden kritisch besproken. De adviezen van het Raadgevend Comite voor Bio-Ethiek over sterilisatie van mentaal gehandicapten en over klonering worden onderzocht op hun relevantie (...) voor de klinische praktijk. (shrink)

I give a semantics for a logic with two pairs of doxastic modals and an indicative conditional connective that all nest without restriction. Sentences are evaluated as accepted, rejected, or neither. Certainty is the necessity-like modality of acceptance. Inferences may proceed from premises that are certain, or merely accepted, or a mix of both. This semantic setup yields some striking results. Notably, the existence of inferences that preserve certainty but not acceptance very directly implies both failure of modus ponens for (...) the indicative conditional in the logic of acceptance and failure of the deduction theorem for the material conditional in the logic of certainty. The latter failure dissolves, in the logic of certainty, the much - discussed tension between modus ponens and the law of import-export. (shrink)

In this article, the place and the nature of an ethical dialogue that develops within Christian healthcare institutions in Flanders, Belgium is examined. More specifically, the question is asked how Christian healthcare institutions should position themselves ethically in a context of a pluralistic society. The profile developed by Caritas Catholica Flanders must take seriously not only the external pluralistic context of our society and the internal pluralistic worldviews by personnel/employees and patients, but also the inherent inspiration of a Christian healthcare (...) institution. This article concludes with ten general orientations that could shape the ethical dialogue from a Christian inspiration in a pluralistic context. (shrink)

We establish a connection between measurement-based quantum computation and the field of mathematical logic. We show that the computational power of an important class of quantum states called graph states, representing resources for measurement-based quantum computation, is reflected in the expressive power of (classical) formal logic languages defined on the underlying mathematical graphs. In particular, we show that for all graph state resources which can yield a computational speed-up with respect to classical computation, the underlying graphs—describing the quantum correlations of (...) the states—are associated with undecidable logic theories. Here undecidability is to be interpreted in a sense similar to Gödel’s incompleteness results, meaning that there exist propositions, expressible in the above classical formal logic, which cannot be proven or disproven. (shrink)

The work of scientists and doctors in advancing genetic research and its applications has been accompanied by plenty of discussion in the popular press—from Good Housekeeping and Forbes to Ms. and the Congressional Record—about such ...

In the last third of the twentieth century, humanists and social scientists argued that attention to genetics would heighten already‐existing genetic determinism, which in turn would intensify negative social outcomes, especially sexism, racism, ableism, and harshness to criminals. They assumed that laypeople are at risk of becoming genetic essentialists. I will call this the “laypeople are genetic essentialists model.” This model has not accurately predicted psychosocial impacts of findings from genetics research. I will be arguing that the failure of the (...) model can be traced to its inability to recognize the complexity of laypeople’s attitudes; its incorrect theory of how beliefs, attitudes, and discourse function; and its blindness to how academics’ own interests can override the available evidence. More specifically, I suggest that the substantial data about laypeople’s deployment of genetics supports what I will call the “laypeople are strategic essentialists model” better than the “laypeople are genetic essentialists model.” The strategic essentialists model holds that people tend to store multiple categories, including multiple causal forces, that they deploy “strategically” to serve context‐dependent goals. It will be difficult for academics to reorient ourselves to model laypeople as sophisticated strategic essentialists rather than as naïve genetic essentialists. Perhaps a little shift, however, will be of value. (shrink)

In the face of documented difficulties in the public understanding of genetics, new metaphors have been suggested. The language of information coding and processing has become deeply entrenched in the public representation of genetics, and some critics have found fault in the blueprint metaphor, a variant of the dominant theme. They have offered the language of the recipe as a preferable metaphor. The metaphors of the blueprint and the recipe are compared in respect to their deterministic implications and other associations. (...) The likelihood of the recipe metaphor framing cognition in more useful ways is called into question. (shrink)

Anorexia nervosa remains an enigma among Western cultures. Various causal explanations have been offered, encompassing biological, psychological, and sociocultural models. These explanations, however, focus on the immediate or proximal mechanisms of causation. A more thorough understanding of anorexia nervosa can be achieved by understanding the relationship between these factors and ultimate causation, the level of explanation which deals with individual reproductive fitness. This paper reviews the biological, psychological, sociocultural, and evolutionary models and indicates a necessary synthesis between proximate and ultimate (...) levels of causation in examining the anorexia nervosa puzzle. (shrink)

People respond to metaphors as much with regard to the emotions that they generate as to their referential, comparative contents. Interviews with non-geneticists about preferred metaphors for gene-environment interaction that illustrate this tendency are reported. These interviews also reveal the dynamic tendency of such emotional responses. A second set of interviews shows that lay people may preferentially use a metaphor of "virus" or "disease" for talking about genes, as opposed to the coding metaphors transmitted through the mass media and reportedly (...) preferred by geneticists. An explanation based on the differently situated emotions of these groups is proposed. It is proposed that the prominence of emotions in responding to genetics indicates the importance of incorporating analyses of emotions instead of simple principles into policy formulation about genetics. (shrink)