Search results for 'no-miracles argument' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mark Newman (2010). The No-Miracles Argument, Reliabilism, and a Methodological Version of the Generality Problem. Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.score: 540.0
    The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism. We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffers from a potentially devastating difficulty known as the Generality Problem and attempts to solve this problem require adopting both epistemic and metaphysical assumptions regarding local scientific theories. Although the externalist can happily adopt (...)
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  2. Greg Frost-Arnold (2010). The No-Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):35-58.score: 540.0
    I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no-miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans-statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using (...)
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  3. Simon Fitzpatrick (2013). Doing Away with the No Miracles Argument. In Dennis Dieks & Vassilios Karakostas (eds.), Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems. Springer.score: 400.0
    The recent debate surrounding scientific realism has largely focused on the “no miracles” argument (NMA). Indeed, it seems that most contemporary realists and anti-realists have tied the case for realism to the adequacy of this argument. I argue that it is mistake for realists to let the debate be framed in this way. Realists would be well advised to abandon the NMA altogether and pursue an alternative strategy, which I call the “local strategy”.
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  4. Jacob Busch (2008). No New Miracles, Same Old Tricks. Theoria 74 (2):102-114.score: 378.0
    Abstract: Laudan (1984) distinguishes between two senses of success for scientific theories: (i) that a particular theory is successful, and (ii) that the methods for picking out approximately true theories are successful. These two senses of success are reflected in two different ways that the no miracles argument for scientific realism (NMA) may be set out. First, I set out a (traditional) version of NMA that considers the success of particular theories. I then consider a more recent formulation of (...)
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  5. Greg Frost-Arnold, The Limits of Scientific Explanation and the No-Miracles Argument.score: 360.0
    There are certain explanations that scientists do not accept, even though such explanations do not conflict with observation, logic, or other scientific theories. I argue that a common version of the no-miracles argument (NMA) for scientific realism relies upon just such an explanation. First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans neither generates novel predictions nor unifies apparently disparate phenomena. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions, and (...)
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  6. Greg Frost‐Arnold (2010). The No‐Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):35-58.score: 360.0
    I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no‐miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans‐statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any (...)
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  7. Carl Matheson (1998). Why the No-Miracles Argument Fails. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):263 – 279.score: 360.0
    The chief argument for scientific realism is the no-miracles argument, according to which the approximate truth of our current scientific theories can be inferred from their success through time. To date, anti-realist responses to the argument have been unconvincing, largely because of their anti-realistic presuppositions. In this paper, it is shown that realists cannot pre-emptively dismiss the problem of the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and that the no-miracles argument fails because it does nothing (...)
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  8. C. Howson (2013). Exhuming the No-Miracles Argument. Analysis 73 (2):205-211.score: 360.0
    The No-Miracles Argument has a natural representation as a probabilistic argument. As such, it commits the base-rate fallacy. In this article, I argue that a recent attempt to show that there is still a serviceable version that avoids the base-rate fallacy fails, and with it all realistic hope of resuscitating the argument.
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  9. Moti Mizrahi (2012). Why the Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism Ultimately Fails. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):132-138.score: 297.0
    In this paper, I argue that the ultimate argument for Scientific Realism, also known as the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), ultimately fails as an abductive defence of Epistemic Scientific Realism (ESR), where (ESR) is the thesis that successful theories of mature sciences are approximately true. The NMA is supposed to be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that purports to explain the success of science. However, the explanation offered as the best explanation for success, namely (ESR), fails (...)
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  10. Dean Rickles (2013). Mirror Symmetry and Other Miracles in Superstring Theory. Foundations of Physics 43 (1):54-80.score: 297.0
    The dominance of string theory in the research landscape of quantum gravity physics (despite any direct experimental evidence) can, I think, be justified in a variety of ways. Here I focus on an argument from mathematical fertility, broadly similar to Hilary Putnam’s ‘no miracles argument’ that, I argue, many string theorists in fact espouse in some form or other. String theory has generated many surprising, useful, and well-confirmed mathematical ‘predictions’—here I focus on mirror symmetry and the mirror theorem. (...)
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  11. Mario Alai (2012). Levin and Ghins on the “No Miracle” Argument and Naturalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):85-110.score: 292.0
    On the basis of Levin’s claim that truth is not a scientific explanatory factor, Michel Ghins argues that the “no miracle” argument (NMA) is not scientific, therefore scientific realism is not a scientific hypothesis, and naturalism is wrong. I argue that there are genuine senses of ‘scientific’ and ‘explanation’ in which truth can yield scientific explanations. Hence, the NMA can be considered scientific in the sense that it hinges on a scientific explanation, it follows a typically scientific inferential pattern (...)
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  12. Wang-Yen Lee (forthcoming). Should the No-Miracle Argument Add to Scientific Evidence? Philosophia:1-6.score: 292.0
    Lipton contends that the no-miracle argument is illegitimate, because it fails to adduce new evidence beyond that cited by scientists for their theories. The debate on this issue between Lipton and Psillos has focussed on whether there is a construal of the no-miracle argument in relation to first-order scientific inferences that can yield new evidence. I move away from this focus without taking sides, and argue that the no-miracle argument, on its two popular interpretations, is as legitimate, (...)
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  13. Liz Stillwaggon Swan (2011). Putnam's No Miracles Argument. In Michael Bruce Steven Barbone (ed.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 273.0
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  14. Liz Stillwaggon Swan (2011). Putnam's No Miracles Argument. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 273.0
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  15. Gerhard Schurz (2011). Structural Correspondence, Indirect Reference, and Partial Truth: Phlogiston Theory and Newtonian Mechanics. Synthese 180 (2):103-120.score: 270.0
    This paper elaborates on the following correspondence theorem (which has been defended and formally proved elsewhere): if theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of applications A, but was superseded later on by a different theory T* which was likewise successful in A, then under natural conditions T contains theoretical expressions which were responsible for T’s success and correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions of T*. I illustrate this theorem at hand of the phlogiston versus oxygen theories (...)
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  16. John Worrall (2011). The No Miracles Intuition and the No Miracles Argument. In. In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. Springer. 11--21.score: 270.0
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  17. Ludwig Fahrbach (2011). How the Growth of Science Ends Theory Change. Synthese 180 (2):139 - 155.score: 238.0
    This paper outlines a defense of scientific realism against the pessimistic meta-induction which appeals to the phenomenon of the exponential growth of science. Here, scientific realism is defined as the view that our current successful scientific theories are mostly approximately true, and pessimistic meta-induction is the argument that projects the occurrence of past refutations of successful theories to the present concluding that many or most current successful scientific theories are false. The defense starts with the observation that at least (...)
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  18. Mario Alai (2014). Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument. Erkenntnis 79 (2):297-326.score: 194.7
    Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of (...)
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  19. Michael Levine (1997). Bayesian Analyses of Hume's Argument Concerning Miracles. Philosophy and Theology 10 (1):101-106.score: 189.0
    Bayesian analyses are prominent among recent and allegedly novel interpretations of Hume’s argument against the justified belief in miracles. However, since there is no consensus on just what Hume’s argument is any Bayesian analysis will beg crucial issues of interpretation. Apart from independent philosophical arguments—arguments that would undermine the relevance of a Bayesian analysis to the question of the credibility of reports of the miraculous—no such analysis can, in principle, prove that no testimony can (or cannot) establish the (...)
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  20. Duncan Macintosh (1994). Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):153-170.score: 183.0
    Scientific Realists argue that it would be a miracle if scientific theories were getting more predictive without getting closer to the truth; so they must be getting closer to the truth. Van Fraassen, Laudan et al. argue that owing to the underdetermination of theory by data (UDT) for all we know, it is a miracle, a fluke. So we should not believe in even the approximate truth of theories. I argue that there is a test for who is right: suppose (...)
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  21. John Worrall (1989). Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? Dialectica 43 (1-2):99-124.score: 174.0
    The no-miracles argument for realism and the pessimistic meta-induction for anti-realism pull in opposite directions. Structural Realism---the position that the mathematical structure of mature science reflects reality---relieves this tension.
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  22. Frederik Herzberg (forthcoming). A Note on “The No Alternatives Argument” by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-10.score: 168.0
    The defence of The No Alternatives Argument in a recent paper by R. Dawid, S. Hartmann and J. Sprenger (forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; latest version: February 2013) rests on the assumption (among others) that the number of acceptable alternatives to a scientific hypothesis is independent of the complexity of the scientific problem. This note proves a generalisation of the main theorem by Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger, where this independence assumption is no longer necessary. (...)
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  23. Zdeňka JastrZembská (forthcoming). Realistické Vysvětlení Úspěchu Vědy Aneb No Miracle Argument. Studia Philosophica.score: 146.0
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  24. Jean Goodwin (2007). Argument Has No Function. Informal Logic 27 (1):69-90.score: 144.0
    Douglas Walton has been right in calling us to attend to the pragmatics of argument. He has, however, also insisted that arguments should be understood and assessed by considering the functions they perform; and from this, I dissent. Argument has no determinable function in the sense Walton needs, and even if it did, that function would not ground norms for argumentative practice. As an alternative to a functional theory of argumentative pragmatics, I propose a design view, which draws (...)
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  25. John Worrall, Miracles, Pessimism and Scientific Realism.score: 117.0
    Worrall ([1989]) argued that structural realism provides a ‘synthesis’ of the main pro-realist argument – the ‘No Miracles Argument’, and the main anti-realist argument – the ‘Pessimistic Induction’. More recently, however, it has been claimed (Howson [2000] and Lewis [2001], respectively) that each of these arguments is an instance of the same probabilistic fallacy – sometimes called the ‘base-rate fallacy’. If correct, this clearly seems to undermine structural realism and Magnus and Callender have indeed claimed that both (...)
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  26. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). The No Guidance Argument. Theoria 79 (1):279-283.score: 112.0
    In a recent article, I criticized Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss's so-called “no guidance argument” against the truth norm for belief, for conflating the conditions under which that norm recommends belief with the psychological state one must be in to apply the norm. In response, Glüer and Wikforss have offered a new formulation of the no guidance argument, which makes it apparent that no such conflation is made. However, their new formulation of the argument presupposes a much (...)
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  27. Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger (forthcoming). The No Alternatives Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axt045.score: 112.0
    Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H (...)
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  28. Jeff Jordan (2013). The No-Minimum Argument and Satisficing: A Reply to Chris Dragos. Religious Studies:1-8.score: 112.0
    Chris Dragos has recently presented two objections to criticisms I've published against Peter van Inwagen's No-Minimum argument. He also suggests that the best way to criticize the No-Minimum argument is via the concept of divine satisficing. In this article I argue that both of Dragos's objections fail, and I question whether satisficing is relevant to the viability of the No-Minimum argument.
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  29. S. Buckle (2001). Marvels, Miracles, and Mundane Order. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):1 – 31.score: 110.0
    Hume’s critique of religion in the first ’Enquiry’ is a unified whole. ’Of Miracles’ is not a free-standing critique of religion, but the first part of a two-stage argument. Hume follows Locke in subordinating evidence for miracles to natural theological arguments for the existence of God--without such supports miraculous claims are incredible (’disproven’ in his special sense). He differs from Locke in arguing, in ’Of a particular Providence’, that no such arguments are available. The decline of natural theology after (...)
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  30. John Earman (2000). Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles. Oxford University Press.score: 108.0
    This vital study offers a new interpretation of Hume's famous "Of Miracles," which notoriously argues against the possibility of miracles. By situating Hume's popular argument in the context of the 18th century debate on miracles, Earman shows Hume's argument to be largely unoriginal and chiefly without merit where it is original. Yet Earman constructively conceives how progress can be made on the issues that Hume's essay so provocatively posed about the ability of eyewitness testimony to establish the credibility (...)
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  31. Alan Hájek (2008). Are Miracles Chimerical? In , Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 1. Oxford Univ Pr. 82-104.score: 108.0
    I analyze David Hume’s "Of Miracles". I vindicate Hume’s argument against two charges: that it (1) defines miracles out of existence; (2) appeals to a suspect principle of balancing probabilities. He argues that miracles are, in a certain sense, maximally improbable. To understand this sense, we must turn to his notion of probability as ’strength of analogy’: miracles are incredible, according to him, because they bear no analogy to anything in our past experience. This reveals as anachronistic various recent (...)
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  32. Andrew McCarthy & Ian Phillips (2006). No New Argument Against the Existence Requirement. Analysis 66 (289):39–44.score: 108.0
    Yagisawa (2005) considers two old arguments against the existence requirement. Both arguments are significantly less appealing than Yagisawa suggests. In particular, the second argument, first given by Kaplan (1989: 498), simply assumes that existence is contingent (§1). Yagisawa’s ‘new’ argument shares this weakness. It also faces a dilemma. Yagisawa must either treat ‘at @’ as a sentential operator occupying the same grammatical position as ‘∼’ or as supplying an extra argument place. In the former case, Yagisawa’s (...) faces precisely the problems he concedes that Kaplan’s argument does (§2). In the latter case, though the argument does not face these problems, it renders the sense in which things exist contingently no threat to (E) properly understood (§3). (shrink)
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  33. Joseph S. Fulda, Remarks on the Argument From Design.score: 108.0
    Gives two pared-down versions of the argument from design, which may prove more persuasive as to a Creator, discusses briefly the mathematics underpinning disbelief and nonbelief and its misuse and some proper uses, moves to why the full argument is needed anyway, viz., to demonstrate Providence, offers a theory as to how miracles (open and hidden) occur, viz. the replacement of any particular mathematics underlying a natural law (save logic) by its most appropriate nonstandard variant. -/- Note: This (...)
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  34. Richard Otte (1996). Mackie's Treatment of Miracles. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (3):151 - 158.score: 108.0
    A recent discussion of Hume’s argument concerning the rationality of accepting a belief that a miracle has occurred is given by J. L. Mackie in The Miracle of Theism. Mackie believes that Hume’s argument is essentially correct, although he attempts to clarify and strengthen it. Any version of Hume’s argument depends upon one’s conception of miracles and laws of nature; I will argue that Mackie commits a simple logical error and that given his conception of (...)
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  35. John Earman (1993). Bayes, Hume, and Miracles. Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):293-310.score: 108.0
    Recent attempts to cast Hume’s argument against miracles in a Bayesian form are examined. It is shown how the Bayesian apparatus does serve to clarify the structure and substance of Hume’s argument. But the apparatus does not underwrite Hume’s various claims, such as that no testimony serves to establish the credibility of a miracle; indeed, the Bayesian analysis reveals various conditions under which it would be reasonable to reject the more interesting of Hume’s claims.
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  36. Seahwa Kim (2009). Counterlegals and the 'Makes No Difference' Argument. Erkenntnis 70 (3):419 - 426.score: 108.0
    In his 2003 paper, “Does the Existence of Mathematical Objects Make a Difference?”, Alan Baker criticizes what he terms the ‘Makes No Difference’ (MND) argument by arguing that it does not succeed in undermining platonism. In this paper, I raise two objections. The first objection is that Baker is wrong in claiming that the premise of the MND argument lacks a truth-value. The second objection is that the theory of counterlegals which he appeals to in his argument (...)
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  37. Nicholas Everitt (1987). The Impossibility of Miracles. Religious Studies 23 (3):347 - 349.score: 108.0
    TAKING ONE STANDARD DEFINITION OF ’MIRACLES’ AS ’VIOLATIONS OF LAWS OF NATURE, BY A VOLITION OF GOD’, I ARGUE THAT NO REPORT ASSERTING THE OCCURRENCE OF A MIRACLE CAN BE TRUE. WHATEVER IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH A TRUTH MUST ITSELF BE FALSE, AND NO STATEMENT OF A GENUINE LAW OF NATURE CAN BE OTHER THAN TRUE. OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT, INCLUDING THOSE BY MACKIE AND SWINBURNE, ARE REBUTTED.
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  38. Michael P. Levine (1989). Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution. Kluwer.score: 108.0
    HUME’S ARGUMENT AGAINST JUSTIFIED BELIEF IN MIRACLES CANNOT BE PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD APART FROM HIS ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION. IT IS ARGUED THAT HUME’S POSITION HAS NEVER BEEN CORRECTLY INTERPRETED BECAUSE ITS CONNECTION WITH HIS MORE GENERAL METAPHYSICS HAS NEVER BEEN ADEQUATELY EXAMINED. TO UNDERSTAND HUME’S VIEW ON MIRACLES THE FOLLOWING QUESTION MUST BE ANSWERED: WHY DID HUME THINK THAT ONE COULD JUSTIFIABLY BELIEVE THAT AN "EXTRAORDINARY" EVENT HAD OCCURRED, BUT THAT ONE COULD "NEVER" JUSTIFIABLY BELIEVE A "MIRACLE" HAD OCCURRED? THIS (...)
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  39. Leon Pearl (1988). Miracles: The Case for Theism. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (4):331 - 337.score: 108.0
    IN THE PAPER THERE IS AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE FOLLOWING THREE PROPOSITIONS: (1) THE CONCEPT OF MIRACLE IS NOT DEFECTIVE; (2) MIRACLES ARE NOT OBSTACLES TO SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS; (3) THE BEST EXPLANATION FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF CERTAIN RADICAL ANOMALOUS EVENTS IS THAT THE AGENCY OF A SUPERNATURAL BEING WAS PART OF THEIR CAUSE. THE ARGUMENT IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVE GOD’S EXISTENCE FROM MIRACLES, BUT ONLY THAT THERE ARE NO "A PRIORI" OBSTACLES TO SUCH A PROOF. THERE COULD (...)
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  40. Robert A. Larmer (1989). Miracles and Natural Explanations: A Rejoinder. Sophia 28 (3):7 - 12.score: 108.0
    IN HIS ARTICLE "MIRACLES AND NATURAL EXPLANATION" DAVID BASINGER TAKES ISSUE WITH THE CLAIM I ADVANCED IN MY EARLIER ARTICLE "MIRACLES AND CRITERIA" THAT ONLY A DOGMATIC AND UNCRITICAL ASSUMPTION THAT NATURE IS IN FACT AN ISOLATED SYSTEM CAN EXPLAIN THE INSISTENCE OF SOME PHILOSOPHERS THAT, NO MATTER WHAT THE EVENT AND NO MATTER WHAT THE CONTEXT IN WHICH IT OCCURS, IT IS ALWAYS MORE RATIONAL TO LIVE IN THE FAITH THAT SUCH AN EVENT HAS A NATURAL EXPLANATION RATHER THAN (...)
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  41. D. Tulodziecki (2012). Principles of Reasoning in Historical Epidemiology. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):968-973.score: 97.3
  42. Sam Coleman (2011). There is No Argument That the Mind Extends. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):100-108.score: 96.0
    There is no Argument that the Mind Extends On the basis of two argumentative examples plus their 'parity principle', Clark and Chalmers argue that mental states like beliefs can extend into the environment. I raise two problems for the argument. The first problem is that it is more difficult than Clark and Chalmers think to set up the Tetris example so that application of the parity principle might render it a case of extended mind. The second problem is (...)
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  43. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). On Hume's Philosophical Case Against Miracles. In Christopher Bernard (ed.), God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion. Longman Publications.score: 96.0
    According to the Christian religion, Jesus was “crucified under Pontius Pilate; he suffered death and was buried. On the third day he rose again”. I take it that this rising again—the Resurrection of Jesus, as it’s sometimes called—is, according to the Christian religion, an historical event, just like his crucifixion, death, and burial. And I would have thought that to investigate whether the Resurrection occurred, we would need to do some historical research: we would need to assess the reliability of (...)
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  44. Catherine Legg (2001). Naturalism and Wonder: Peirce on the Logic of Hume's Argument Against Miracles. Philosophia 28 (1-4):297-318.score: 96.0
    Peirce wrote that Hume’s argument against miracles (which is generally liked by twentieth century philosophers for its antireligious conclusion) "completely misunderstood the true nature of" ’abduction’. This paper argues that if Hume’s argumentative strategy were seriously used in all situations (not just those in which we seek to "banish superstition"), it would deliver a choking epistemological conservatism. It suggests that some morals for contemporary naturalistic philosophy may be drawn from Peirce’s argument against Hume.
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  45. David Mckenzie (1999). Miracles Are Not Immoral: A Response to James Keller's Moral Argument Against Miracles. Religious Studies 35 (1):73-88.score: 96.0
    James Keller recently argued that miracles in the sense of divine intervention are immoral because in such acts God would unfairly choose to help the beneficiary of the miracle over others who may be equally in need and just as deserving. I respond generally by arguing that his analysis overlooks the possibility that those who do not receive the miraculous intervention may receive other benefits of equal or greater value and that there may be purposes for miraculous intervention which transcend (...)
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  46. Geoffrey K. Pullum & Kyle Rawlins (2007). Argument or No Argument? Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (2):277 - 287.score: 96.0
    We examine an argument for the non-context-freeness of English that has received virtually no discussion in the literature. It is based on adjuncts of the form ‘X or no X’, where X is a nominal. The construction has been held to exemplify unbounded syntactic reduplication. We argue that although the argument can be made in a mathematically valid form, its empirical basis is not claimed unbounded syntactic identity between nominals does not always hold in attested cases, and second, (...)
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  47. Alan Hájek (1995). In Defense of Hume's Balancing of Probabilities in the Miracles Argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):111-118.score: 96.0
    I vindicate Hume’s argument against belief in miracle reports against a prevalent objection. Hume has us balance the probability of a miracle’s occurrence against the probability of its being falsely attested to, and argues that the latter must inevitably be the greater; thus, reason requires us to reject any miracle report. The "flaw" in this reasoning, according to Butler and many others, is that it proves too much--it counsels us to never believe historians, newspaper reports of lottery results, and (...)
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  48. Barbra Clayton (2001). Compassion as a Matter of Fact: The Argument From No‐Self to Selflessness in Sāntideva'sSiksāsamuccaya. Contemporary Buddhism 2 (1):83-97.score: 96.0
    (2001). Compassion as a matter of fact: The argument from no‐self to selflessness in Sāntideva's Siksāsamuccaya. Contemporary Buddhism: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 83-97. doi: 10.1080/14639940108573740.
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  49. Peter Harrison (1999). Prophecy, Early Modern Apologetics, and Hume's Argument Against Miracles. Journal of the History of Ideas 60 (2):241 - 256.score: 96.0
    Hume’s "Of Miracles" concludes with the claim that prophecies, too, are miracles, and as such are susceptible to the same arguments which apply to miracles. However, both Hume and his commentators have overlooked the distinctive features of prophecy. Hume’s chief objection to miracles--that one is never justified in crediting second-hand testimony to miraculous events--does not necessarily apply to the argument from fulfilled prophecies as it was understood in the eighteenth century. Neither was prophecy necessarily thought to entail any breach (...)
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  50. Michael J. Wreen (1988). Admit No Force But Argument. Informal Logic 10 (2).score: 96.0
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