Search results for 'nominalism, resemblance, universals' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  41
    Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Clarendon Press.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  2.  80
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford University Press.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  3. D. M. Armstrong (2003). Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra's Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285 – 286.
    Book Information Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. By Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. xii + 238. £35.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  73
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism. Oxford University Press.
    Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  5.  97
    C. Dorr (2005). Review: Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Mind 114 (454):457-461.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  54
    Jessica M. Wilson (2006). Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra's Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):241--246.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  42
    Fraser MacBride (2004). Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (2).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  10
    David M. Armstrong (2003). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285-286.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2001). Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):395 – 408.
    Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10.  66
    Nathan Stemmer (2007). On Universals: An Extensionalist Alternative to Quine's Resemblance Theory. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1):75 - 90.
    The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine’s theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine’s theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Alexander Bird (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts. Analysis 63 (3):221–228.
    In his (2002) Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra provides a powerful articulation of the claim that Resemblance Nominalism provides the best answer to the so-called Problem of Universals. Resemblance Nominalism has not been popular for some time, and one influential reason for this is the widespread belief that Resemblance Nominalism cannot dispense with all universals. The realist critics appeal to what is known as Russell’s Regress (cf. Russell 1997). If properties are to be explained in terms of one object’s resembling another, (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12.  79
    James Cargile (2003). On Russell's Argument Against Resemblance Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):549 – 560.
    Russell famously argued that Resemblance Nominalism leads to a vicious infinite regress in attempting to avoid admitting universals. Saying that a number of things are white only in that they resemble a particular white thing leaves a number of resemblances to that white thing, each of them constituting the holding of the same relation to the paradigm, qualifying that resemblance relation as a universal. Trying to dismiss that new universal by appeal to resemblances between those first resemblances only leads (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  28
    D. M. Armstrong (1991). Arda Denkel's Resemblance Nominalism. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):478-482.
    Arda Denkel, in "Real Resemblances," argues for a moderate Nominalism where substances objectively have properties and relations, the latter being particulars, but dependent particulars, grouped into classes by objective relations of resemblance. This view is contrasted unfavorably with the view that properties and relations are universals instantiated by particulars. It is conceded that Denkel's scheme has much to commend it. But it is argued that the universals view has much more to be said for it than Denkel allows, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651.
    Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts: Reply to Bird. Analysis 63 (3):229–237.
    In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  78
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999). Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):965-982.
    The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  17. Stewart Duncan (forthcoming). Hobbes, Universal Names, and Nominalism. In Stefano Di Bella & Tad M. Schmaltz (eds.), Universals in Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    (Forthcoming in a volume on early modern theories of universals edited by Stefano Di Bella and Tad Schmaltz, which is under contract with Oxford University Press.) Thomas Hobbes was, rather famously, a nominalist. The core of that nominalism is the belief that the only universal things are universal names: there are no universal objects, or universal ideas. This paper looks at what Hobbes's views about universal names were, how they evolved over time, and how Hobbes argued for them. The (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  23
    Florian Boge (2014). Tropes With a Kantian Flavor. Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 41 (99-100).
    This paper discusses one of the major problems for resemblance nominalism, posed by Bertrand Russell in 1911–12, and often referred to as Russell’s regress. It is the problem that resemblance must either be a universal, thus refuting a thorough nominalism, or must itself resemble other resemblances to count as a resemblance, which ultimately leads to an infinite regress of resemblances. I am going to discuss two solutions that have been proposed to this problem. I will then attempt to show in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  27
    Byeong-uk Yi (2014). Abstract Nouns and Resemblance Nominalism. Analysis 74 (4):622-629.
    In developing resemblance nominalism, Rodriguez-Pereyra attempts to meet the challenge that truths involving abstract nouns pose to the doctrine. He holds that one can render sentences containing abstract nouns without invoking attributes and defends this view by giving nominalistic sentences that express the truthmakers of two such sentences: ‘Scarlet is a colour’ and ‘Carmine resembles vermillion more than it resembles French blue.’ This article argues that his renderings have serious problems and fall far short of meeting the challenge posed by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999). Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):965 - 982.
    The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  21.  64
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2013). Resemblance Nominalism, Conjunctions and Truthmakers. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1):21-38.
    The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of 〈Socrates is white〉 ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of 〈Socrates resembles Plato〉, and Socrates and Aristotle those of 〈Socrates resembles Aristotle〉. But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle〉 and 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle〉 have the same truthmakers, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  10
    G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015). Resemblance Nominalism and Abstract Nouns. Analysis 75 (2):223-231.
    This is a reply to Byeong-Uk Yi who argued that my _Resemblance Nominalism_ fails to account for sentences featuring abstract nouns like Carmine resembles vermillion more than it resembles French Blue and Scarlet is a colour. I accept his criticism of what I said in my book on Resemblance Nominalism about, but then I go on to show how can be accounted for. I reject his criticism of what I said in my book about. I also show how Resemblance Nominalism (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  75
    Rubenstein, Mary C. MacLeod & M. Eric, Universals.
    Universals are a class of mind independent entities, usually contrasted with individuals, postulated to ground and explain relations of qualitative identity and resemblance among individuals. Individuals are said to be similar in virtue of sharing universals. An apple and a ruby are both red, and their common redness results from sharing a universal. If they are both red at the same time, the universal, red, must be in two places at once. This makes universals quite different from (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. D. M. Armstrong (1980). Nominalism and Realism: Volume 1: Universals and Scientific Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual and potential findings of natural science. He (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  6
    Charles Landesman (1971). The Problem of Universals. New York,Basic Books.
    On the relations of universals and particulars, by B. Russell.--Universals and resemblances, by H. H. Price.--On concept and object, by G. Frege.--Frege's hidden nominalism, by G. Bergmann.--Universals, by F. P. Ramsey.--Universals and metaphysical realism, by A. Donagan.--Universals and family resemblances, by R. Bambrough.--Particular and general, by P. F. Strawson.--The nature of universals and propositions, by G. F. Stout.--Are characteristics of particular things universal or particular? By G. E. Moore and G. F. Stout.--The relation of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26.  2
    Jon Fennell (2013). Polanyi, Universals, and the Nominalism Controversy. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 27 (4):365-387.
    Among the traditional issues in philosophy that are directly affected by Michael Polanyi's revolutionary epistemology and its related ontology are nominalism and the question of universals. Polanyi's treatment of these matters is particularly fruitful, for it not only clarifies his conceptions of "tacit knowing" and "indwelling" but also illuminates his understanding of truth and reality and introduces us to his views on induction. Such inquiry will also demonstrate a deep affinity between Polanyi's position and that of Charles Sanders Peirce, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  13
    Fred Wilson (1987). Resemblance, Universals And Sorites: Comments On March On Sorting Out Sorites. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (March):175-184.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. David M. Armstrong (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism and Realism Vol. I. Cambridge University Press.
  29.  4
    Panayot Butchvarov (1968). Resemblance and Identity: An Examination of the Problem of Universals. Philosophical Review 77 (3):386-389.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30.  89
    David Manley (2002). Properties and Resemblance Classes. Noûs 36 (1):75–96.
    There are two major theories of properties that employ resemblance classes to avoid commitment to universals.1 Object-resemblance nominalism ~ORN! faces the notorious companionship and imperfect community difficulties, though some costly remedies have been proposed. Trope-resemblance nominalism ~TRN!, in contrast, is commonly supposed to avoid these difficulties altogether. My contention is that both versions of resemblance nominalism are subject to companionship and imperfect community difficulties. If I am right, ~1! trope theory loses one of its primary selling points, and ~2! (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  31.  1
    Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Hume as a Trope Nominalist. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (supl1):55-66.
    In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call “the problem of universals” would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by these tropes themselves and their resemblance. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. James Porter Moreland (2001). Universals. Routledge.
    Things are particulars and their qualities are universals, but do universals have an existence distinct from the particular things describable by those terms? And what must be their nature if they do? This book provides a careful and assured survey of the central issues of debate surrounding universals, in particular those issues that have been a crucial part of the emergence of contemporary analytic ontology. The book begins with a taxonomy of extreme nominalist, moderate nominalist, and realist (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. James Porter Moreland (2014). Universals. Routledge.
    Things are particulars and their qualities are universals, but do universals have an existence distinct from the particular things describable by those terms? And what must be their nature if they do? This book provides a careful and assured survey of the central issues of debate surrounding universals, in particular those issues that have been a crucial part of the emergence of contemporary analytic ontology. The book begins with a taxonomy of extreme nominalist, moderate nominalist, and realist (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. David Malet Armstrong (1978). Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I. Cambridge University Press.
  35. James van Cleve (1994). Predication Without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):577-590.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  36.  27
    James Van Cleve (1994). Predication Without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):577 - 590.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  37. Arthur Pap (1960). Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals--II. Philosophical Quarterly 10 (38):44-60.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  28
    Adam Pautz (1997). An Argument Against Armstrong's Analysis of the Resemblance of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):109 – 111.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  39.  44
    Arthur Pap (1959). Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals--I. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (37):330-340.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  40.  4
    A. Bird (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts. Analysis 63 (3):221-228.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  4
    G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts: Reply to Bird. Analysis 63 (3):229-237.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  5
    A. (1980). Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 33 (3):615-616.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. D. M. Armstrong (1982). Universals and Scientific Realism Volume 1: Nominalism and Realism; Volume 2: A Theory of Universals. Noûs 16 (1):133-142.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Cian Dorr (2005). Review of Resemblance Nominalism by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. Mind 114:457-461.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. D. M. Armstrong (1980). Nominalism and Realism, Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. 1. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 170 (1):59-60.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  46.  8
    J. P. Moreland (2003). Resemblance Extreme Nominalism and Infinite Regress Arguments. Modern Schoolman 80 (2):85-98.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Fraser MacBride, Review of G. Rodriguez-Pereyra's Resemblance Nominalism. [REVIEW]
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  1
    D. M. Armstrong (1980). Universals and Scientific Realism. Vol. I: Nominalism and Realism. Vol. II: A Theory of Universals. Philosophical Review 89 (3):471-473.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Herbert Hochberg (1988). Exemplification'tie'(or Several'ties'): The Nominalist Recognises Particular Quality-Instances and a Universal'similarity Tie'. Thus, While Russell's Argument is Neither Blocked nor Denied, It is Seemingly Deprived of its Sting. I Shall Argue That the Moderate Nominalist, s Argument Fails for a Number. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2).
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  12
    Richard D. Mohr (1977). Family Resemblance, Platonism, Universals. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):593 - 600.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000