Search results for 'nominalism, resemblance, universals' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford University Press.score: 603.0
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.
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  2. Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Clarendon Press.score: 603.0
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.
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  3. D. M. Armstrong (2003). Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra's Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285 – 286.score: 486.0
    Book Information Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. By Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. xii + 238. £35.
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  4. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism. Oxford University Press.score: 441.0
    Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives (...)
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  5. Fraser MacBride (2004). Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (2).score: 405.0
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  6. Jessica M. Wilson (2006). Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra's Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):241--6.score: 405.0
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  7. C. Dorr (2005). Review: Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Mind 114 (454):457-461.score: 405.0
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  8. David M. Armstrong (2003). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285-286.score: 405.0
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  9. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2001). Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):395 – 408.score: 345.0
    Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of (...)
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  10. Nathan Stemmer (2007). On Universals: An Extensionalist Alternative to Quine's Resemblance Theory. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):75 - 90.score: 279.0
    The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine’s theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine’s theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism (...)
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  11. Alexander Bird (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts. Analysis 63 (3):221–228.score: 261.0
    In his (2002) Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra provides a powerful articulation of the claim that Resemblance Nominalism provides the best answer to the so-called Problem of Universals. Resemblance Nominalism has not been popular for some time, and one influential reason for this is the widespread belief that Resemblance Nominalism cannot dispense with all universals. The realist critics appeal to what is known as Russell’s Regress (cf. Russell 1997). If properties are to be explained in terms of one object’s resembling another, (...)
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  12. James Cargile (2003). On Russell's Argument Against Resemblance Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):549 – 560.score: 261.0
    Russell famously argued that Resemblance Nominalism leads to a vicious infinite regress in attempting to avoid admitting universals. Saying that a number of things are white only in that they resemble a particular white thing leaves a number of resemblances to that white thing, each of them constituting the holding of the same relation to the paradigm, qualifying that resemblance relation as a universal. Trying to dismiss that new universal by appeal to resemblances between those first resemblances only leads (...)
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  13. D. M. Armstrong (1991). Arda Denkel's Resemblance Nominalism. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):478-482.score: 261.0
    Arda Denkel, in "Real Resemblances," argues for a moderate Nominalism where substances objectively have properties and relations, the latter being particulars, but dependent particulars, grouped into classes by objective relations of resemblance. This view is contrasted unfavorably with the view that properties and relations are universals instantiated by particulars. It is conceded that Denkel's scheme has much to commend it. But it is argued that the universals view has much more to be said for it than Denkel allows, (...)
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  14. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651.score: 198.0
    Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a (...)
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  15. Rubenstein, Mary C. MacLeod & M. Eric, Universals.score: 144.0
    Universals are a class of mind independent entities, usually contrasted with individuals, postulated to ground and explain relations of qualitative identity and resemblance among individuals. Individuals are said to be similar in virtue of sharing universals. An apple and a ruby are both red, and their common redness results from sharing a universal. If they are both red at the same time, the universal, red, must be in two places at once. This makes universals quite different from (...)
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  16. Charles Landesman (1971). The Problem of Universals. New York,Basic Books.score: 144.0
    On the relations of universals and particulars, by B. Russell.--Universals and resemblances, by H. H. Price.--On concept and object, by G. Frege.--Frege's hidden nominalism, by G. Bergmann.--Universals, by F. P. Ramsey.--Universals and metaphysical realism, by A. Donagan.--Universals and family resemblances, by R. Bambrough.--Particular and general, by P. F. Strawson.--The nature of universals and propositions, by G. F. Stout.--Are characteristics of particular things universal or particular? By G. E. Moore and G. F. Stout.--The relation of (...)
     
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  17. David Manley (2002). Properties and Resemblance Classes. Noûs 36 (1):75–96.score: 126.0
    There are two major theories of properties that employ resemblance classes to avoid commitment to universals.1 Object-resemblance nominalism ~ORN! faces the notorious companionship and imperfect community difficulties, though some costly remedies have been proposed. Trope-resemblance nominalism ~TRN!, in contrast, is commonly supposed to avoid these difficulties altogether. My contention is that both versions of resemblance nominalism are subject to companionship and imperfect community difficulties. If I am right, ~1! trope theory loses one of its primary selling points, and ~2! (...)
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  18. Marek Rosiak (1999). O niektórych kategoriach ontycznych (Z zagadnień orzekania). Filozofia Nauki 3.score: 81.0
    The problems investigated in the paper concern mainly the question: What do components of the predicative sentence „A is b” refer to? The following particular issues are considered: the Aristotelian distinction between particularity and ontic self-sufficiency; the interpretation of different kinds of predication based on that distinction; a debate on different standpoints in the controversy concerning the nature of the predicate referent, in particular a contemporary version of nominalism called The Resemblance Theory of Universals (with the related problem of (...)
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  19. Natalie Stoljar (2000). The Politics of Identity and the Metaphysics of Diversity. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:21-30.score: 54.0
    The terms “essentialism” and “antiessentialism” have rhetorical, metaphysical, and political force in feminist philosophical literature. This paper develops the relation between the metaphysics and the politics of essentialism. I argue that there are broadly two metaphysical conceptions of essentialism implicit in the literature: the idea that there is a universal womanness that all women share, and the idea that each individual woman has certain essential properties. The first conception is false because it is incompatible with the existence of “multiple identities” (...)
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  20. Lowell Friesen (2006). Natural Classes of Universals: Why Armstrong's Analysis Fails. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):285 – 296.score: 42.0
    Realists, D. M. Armstrong among them, claim, contrary to natural class nominalists, that natural classes are analysable. Natural classes of particulars, claim the realists, can be analysed in terms of particulars having universals in common. But for the realist, there are also natural classes of universals. And if the realist's claim that natural classes are analysable is a general claim about natural classes, then the realist must also provide an analysis of natural classes of universals. For Armstrong, (...)
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  21. Matteo Morganti (2011). The Partial Identity Account of Partial Similarity Revisited. Philosophia 39 (3):527-546.score: 27.0
    This paper provides a defence of the account of partial resemblances between properties according to which such resemblances are due to partial identities of constituent properties. It is argued, first of all, that the account is not only required by realists about universals à la Armstrong, but also useful (of course, in an appropriately re-formulated form) for those who prefer a nominalistic ontology for material objects. For this reason, the paper only briefly considers the problem of how to conceive (...)
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