Search results for 'non-cognitivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  47
    Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism. Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Schopenhauer has been consistently ignored by contemporary metaethics, and almost no commentators on his work address the question of whether his metaethics is realist or anti-realist. I argue, however, that Schopenhauer’s views provide a powerful and novel challenge to the widely-held metaethical view that cognitivism about moral judgments is a necessary condition for moral realism. I begin by discussing how the phrase “moral realism” has been intended to characterize the family of anti-skeptical views that goes back at least to Plato. (...)
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  2. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (2012). Nietzsche and Non-Cognitivism. In Simon Robertson & Christopher Janaway (eds.), Nietzsche, Naturalism & Normativity. Oxford University Press
    Though Nietzsche traditionally often used to be interpreted as a nihilist, a range of possible metaethical interpretations, including varieties of realism, subjectivism and fictionalism, have emerged in the secondary literature. Recently the possibility that Nietzsche is a non-cognitivist has been broached. If one sees Hume as a central non-cognitivist figure, as recent non-cognitivists such as Simon Blackburn have, then the similarities between Nietzsche and Hume can make this reading seem plausible. This paper assesses the general plausibility of interpreting Nietzsche as (...)
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  3.  57
    Charles R. Pigden (2009). If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What? In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan
    Taking my cue from Michael Smith, I try to extract a decent argument for non-cognitivism from the text of the Treatise. I argue that the premises are false and that the whole thing rests on a petitio principi. I then re-jig the argument so as to support that conclusion that Hume actually believed (namely that an action is virtuous if it would excite the approbation of a suitably qualified spectator). This argument too rests on false premises and a begged (...)
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  4.  72
    Eugen Fischer (2008). Wittgenstein's 'Non-Cognitivism' – Explained and Vindicated. Synthese 162 (1):53 - 84.
    The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result (...)
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  5.  76
    Mark Bryant Budolfson (2011). Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
    Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr's argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will (...)
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  6. Charles Pigden (2010). Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is. In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument (...)
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  7.  34
    David Alm (2007). Non-Cognitivism and Validity. Theoria 73 (2):121-147.
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  8. Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian (...)
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  9.  7
    Edmund Wall (2015). Natural Morality, Descriptivism, and Non-Cognitivism. Philosophia 43 (1):233-248.
    I attempt to identify a problem running through the foundation of R. M. Hare’s ethical prescriptivism and the more recent sentimentalism/ethical expressivism of Simon Blackburn. The non-cognitivism to which Hare and Blackburn’s approaches are committed renders them unable to establish stable contents for basic moral principles and, thus, incapable of conducting a logical analysis of moral terms or statements. I argue that objective-descriptive- natural ethical theories are in a much better position to provide a satisfying account of the logical (...)
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  10.  18
    Christopher Mole & Jiaying Zhao (forthcoming). Vision and Abstraction: An Empirical Refutation of Nico Orlandi’s Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This (...)
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  11. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):279-309.
    This paper investigates the linguistic basis for moral non-cognitivism, the view that sentences containing moral predicates do not have truth conditions. It offers a new argument against this view by pointing out that the view is incompatible with our best empirical theories about the grammatical encoding of illocutionary force potentials. Given that my arguments are based on very general assumptions about the relations between the grammar of natural languages and a sentence's illocutionary function, my arguments are broader in scope (...)
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  12. Cian Dorr (2002). Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking. Noûs 36 (1):97–103.
    Even if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclusion expresses a belief and at least one of whose premises expresses a non-cognitive attitude, it could be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises.
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  13.  11
    Christopher Macleod, Was Mill a Non-Cognitivist?
    In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical non-cognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing, and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin, in Section I, by laying out the ‘received view’ of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. There is, I claim in Sections II and III, no firm textual evidence (...)
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  14. Nick Zangwill (2009). Non-Cognitivism and Motivation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan 416--24.
    In sum, the non-cognitivist account of motivation is far from unproblematic. The non-cognitivist has trouble telling us what moral attitudes are in a way that is consistent with the phenomenon of variable motivation. Given that the cognitivist has an easy explanation of variable motivation, it seems that cognitivism is preferable to non-cognitivism on the score of motivation, which is a reversal of the way the issue is usually perceived.
     
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  15. James Harold (2012). Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Skepticism About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185.
    In recent years it has become more and more difficult to distinguish between metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. For example, proponents of the minimalist theory of truth hold that moral claims need not express beliefs in order to be (minimally) truth-apt, and yet some of these proponents still reject the traditional cognitivist analysis of moral language and thought. Thus, the dispute in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists has come to be seen as a dispute over the correct way to characterize (...)
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  16. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):279-309.
    This paper investigates the linguistic basis for moral non-cognitivism, the view that sentences containing moral predicates do not have truth conditions. It offers a new argument against this view by pointing out that the view is incompatible with our best empirical theories about the grammatical encoding of illocutionary force potentials. Given that my arguments are based on very general assumptions about the relations between the grammar of natural languages and a sentence's illocutionary function, my arguments are broader in scope (...)
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  17.  99
    Olga Ramirez (2011). Between Non-Cognitivism and Realism in Ethics: A Three Fold Model. Prolegomena (Croatia) 10 (1):101-11202.
    Abstracts The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view (...)
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  18.  30
    Catherine Wilson (2001). Prospects for Non-Cognitivism. Inquiry 44 (3):291 – 314.
    This essay offers a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules. It addresses the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing that anti-realism is compatible with moral aspiration despite the non-existence of obligations as the externalist imagines them. A moral judgment consists of separate descriptive and prescriptive components (...)
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  19.  12
    Joseph D. Markowski (2014). Buddhist Non-Cognitivism. Asian Philosophy 24 (3):227-241.
    The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, I plan to argue that in light of Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics, it would be an inherent contradiction to the Buddhist tradition as whole to defend the cognitivist view that moral knowledge is possible. Quite the contrary, this essay will demonstrate that, in light of Buddhist theories of knowledge and metaphysical philosophies of no-self and emptiness, Buddhist ethics only makes coherent sense from a standpoint of non-cognitivism. Second, from the arguments that (...)
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  20.  30
    Frans Svensson (2007). Does Non-Cognitivism Rest on a Mistake? Utilitas 19 (2):184-200.
    Philippa Foot has recently argued that non-cognitivism rests on a mistake. According to Foot, non-cognitivism cannot properly account for the role of reasons in moral thinking. Furthermore, Foot argues that moral judgements share a conceptual structure with the kind of evaluations that we make about plants and animals, which cannot be couched in non-cognitivist terms. In this article I argue that, in the form of expressivism, non-cognitivism is capable of accommodating most of what Foot says about reasons (...)
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  21.  23
    Mark van Roojen (forthcoming). Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Non-cognitivism is a variety of irrealism about ethics with a number of influential variants. Non-cognitivists agree with error theorists that there are no moral properties or moral facts. But rather than thinking that this makes moral statements false, noncognitivists claim that moral statements are not in the business of predicating properties or making statements which could be true or false in any substantial sense. Roughly put, noncognitivists think that moral statements have no truth conditions. Furthermore, according to non-cognitivists, when (...)
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  22.  18
    Henry Veatch (1966). Non-Cognitivism in Ethics: A Modest Proposal for its Diagnosis and Cure. Ethics 76 (2):102-116.
    Non-Congnitivism relies for its defense upon g e moore's open question argument for a naturalistic fallacy. But this argument is invalid as applied to real definitions, Which are not analytic truths. G e moore's own conclusions about goodness are definitions in this sense. A definition of the good is possible. A valid one will allow for the non-Cognitivist's points that goodness reflects some pro-Attitude, That goodness is supervenient, And that goodness cannot be equated with the properties of a thing. An (...)
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  23.  1
    Michael Blome‐Tillmann (2009). XIV—Moral Non‐Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):279-309.
    This paper investigates the linguistic basis for moral non‐cognitivism, the view that sentences containing moral predicates do not have truth conditions. It offers a new argument against this view by pointing out that the view is incompatible with our best empirical theories about the grammatical encoding of illocutionary force potentials. Given that my arguments are based on very general assumptions about the relations between the grammar of natural languages and a sentence's illocutionary function, my arguments are broader in scope than (...)
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  24. Hartmut Kliemt (1986). Individualism, Libertarianism and Non-Cognitivism. Analyse & Kritik 8 (2):211-228.
    This paper suggests that libertarian and contractarian ideas would be less vulnerable to certain forms of criticism if they would more carefully disentangle their legal and moral standards for the assessment of institutions from empirical, methodological, and epistemological assumptions about individualism and non-cognitivism. Holding apart several meanings of individualism different issues can be treated separately. It Will be shown that the justification of libertarian norms raises some problems which are not too easily solved within a non-cognitivist approach. No attempt (...)
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  25. Jussi Suikkanen (2007). The Argument From Intransigence For Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Writings 35 (2).
    There is a classic disagreement in moral psychology about the mental states that constitute the sincere acceptance of moral claims. Cognitivists hold that these states are beliefs aiming at a correct description of the world; whereas non-cognitivists argue that they must be some other kind of attitude. Mark Eli Kalderon has recently presented a new argument for non-cognitivism. He argues that all cognitivist inquiries include certain epistemic obligations for the participants in cases of disagreement in the inquiry. I will (...)
     
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  26. Jinhee Choi (1999). Emotion, Fiction, and Rationality: Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    The focus of this dissertation is on the rationality of emotion directed toward fiction. The launch of the cognitive theory of emotion in philosophy of mind and in psychology provides us with a way to show how emotion is not, by nature, opposed to reason and rationality. However, problems still remain with respect to emotion directed toward fiction, because we are emotionally involved with a story about people that do not exist and events that did not happen. This is called (...)
     
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  27. John McDowell (1981). Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge 141--62.
  28.  36
    Folke Tersman (1995). Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):361-372.
    This is acknowledged by moral realists and non-cognitivists alike, but, for obvious reasons, they relate differently to this resemblance. For realists, it provides arguments, and for non-cognitivists, it provides potential trouble. Realists claim that the various points of resemblance between moral and factual discourse indicate that moral discourse simply is a kind of factual discourse.1 However, in recent years a number of interesting attempts have been made in trying to show that the realist appearance of moral discourse can after all (...)
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  29.  87
    Michael Smith (2001). Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics. Ratio 14 (2):93–115.
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  30. Nick Zangwill (2011). Non-Cognitivism and Consistency. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (4):465-484.
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  31.  23
    Michael Ridge (2003). Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's 'Do so as Well'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):563 - 574.
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  32.  30
    Charles Starkey (2007). Manipulating Emotion: The Best Evidence for Non-Cognitivism in the Light of Proper Function. Analysis 67 (295):230–237.
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  33.  9
    Paul Horwich (2006). A World Without Isms: Life After Realism, Fictionalism, Non-Cognitivism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press 188.
  34. Frank Jackson (1999). Non-Cognitivism, Validity and Conditionals. In Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics. Blackwell Publishers 18--37.
     
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  35.  53
    Ralph Wedgwood (1997). Non-Cognitivism, Truth and Logic. Philosophical Studies 86 (1):73-91.
    This paper provides a new argument for a position of Crispin Wright's: given that ethical statements can be embedded within all sorts of sentential operators and are subject to definite standards of warrantedness, they must have truth conditions. Allan Gibbard's normative logic' is the only noncognitivist logic that stands a chance of avoiding Geach's Fregean objection. But what, according to Gibbard, is the point of avoiding inconsistency in one's ethical statements? He must say that it is to ensure that one's (...)
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  36.  20
    W. Fenske (1997). Non-Cognitivism: A New Defense. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (3):301-309.
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  37.  21
    P. J. E. Kail (2010). Causation, Fictionalism, and Non-Cognitivism: Berkeley and Hume. In Silvia Parigi (ed.), George Berkeley: Religion and Science in the Age of Enlightenment. Springer
  38.  16
    S. L. Hurley (1984). Frege, the Proliferation of Force, and Non-Cognitivism. Mind 93 (372):570-576.
  39. Michael Smith (2010). The Motivation Argument for Non-Cognitivism. In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan 105.
  40.  19
    F. E. McDermott (1976). A Rebuttal of Pollock's `Refutation' of Non-Cognitivism. Mind 85 (337):103-106.
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  41.  7
    Wayne Fenske (2000). The Advantage of an Empirically Minded Conception of Non-Cognitivism. Dialogue 39 (03):513-.
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  42.  25
    Antonio Marturano, Non-Cognitivism in Ethics. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  43.  6
    Michael Ridge (2013). Non‐Cognitivism. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
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  44.  7
    Teemu Toppinen (2013). Goading or Guiding? Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Practical Reasoning. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):119-141.
    Name der Zeitschrift: SATS Jahrgang: 14 Heft: 2 Seiten: 119-141.
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  45.  1
    Olga Ramírez Calle (2011). Between Non-Cognitivism and Realism in Ethics: A Three-Fold Model. Prolegomena 10 (1):101-112.
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  46.  10
    Wayne Fenske (2001). Empirically Minded Non-Cognitivism: As Serious as It Needs to Be. Dialogue 40 (03):613-.
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  47.  4
    Michael Ridge (2010). Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):563-574.
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  48.  6
    John J. Hartley (1987). Kierkegaard: A Non-Cognitivist? Dialogue 26 (02):331-.
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  49.  4
    James Lindemann Nelson (1989). Desire's Desire for Moral Realism: A Phenomenological Objection to Non-Cognitivism. Dialogue 28 (03):449-.
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  50.  2
    Jeremy Walker (1988). A Reply to Hartley's “Kierkegaard; A Non-Cognitivist?”. Dialogue 27 (3):539.
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