Search results for 'non-cognitivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (2012). Nietzsche and Non-Cognitivism. In Simon Robertson & Christopher Janaway (eds.), Nietzsche, Naturalism & Normativity. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    Though Nietzsche traditionally often used to be interpreted as a nihilist, a range of possible metaethical interpretations, including varieties of realism, subjectivism and fictionalism, have emerged in the secondary literature. Recently the possibility that Nietzsche is a non-cognitivist has been broached. If one sees Hume as a central non-cognitivist figure, as recent non-cognitivists such as Simon Blackburn have, then the similarities between Nietzsche and Hume can make this reading seem plausible. This paper assesses the general plausibility of interpreting Nietzsche as (...)
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  2. Charles Pigden (2010). Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is. In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 240.0
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument (...)
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  3. Mark Bryant Budolfson (2011). Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.score: 240.0
    Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr's argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will show that Dorr's (...)
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  4. Eugen Fischer (2008). Wittgenstein's 'Non-Cognitivism' – Explained and Vindicated. Synthese 162 (1):53 - 84.score: 240.0
    The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result (...)
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  5. Charles R. Pigden (2009). If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What? In , Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 240.0
    Taking my cue from Michael Smith, I try to extract a decent argument for non-cognitivism from the text of the Treatise. I argue that the premises are false and that the whole thing rests on a petitio principi. I then re-jig the argument so as to support that conclusion that Hume actually believed (namely that an action is virtuous if it would excite the approbation of a suitably qualified spectator). This argument too rests on false premises and a begged (...)
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  6. David Alm (2007). Non-Cognitivism and Validity. Theoria 73 (2):121-147.score: 210.0
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  7. Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29:286-309.score: 192.0
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian (...)
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  8. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):279-309.score: 180.0
    This paper investigates the linguistic basis for moral non-cognitivism, the view that sentences containing moral predicates do not have truth conditions. It offers a new argument against this view by pointing out that the view is incompatible with our best empirical theories about the grammatical encoding of illocutionary force potentials. Given that my arguments are based on very general assumptions about the relations between the grammar of natural languages and a sentence's illocutionary function, my arguments are broader in scope (...)
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  9. Cian Dorr (2002). Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking. Noûs 36 (1):97–103.score: 180.0
    Even if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclusion expresses a belief and at least one of whose premises expresses a non-cognitive attitude, it could be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises.
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  10. Nick Zangwill (2009). Non-Cognitivism and Motivation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 416--24.score: 180.0
    In sum, the non-cognitivist account of motivation is far from unproblematic. The non-cognitivist has trouble telling us what moral attitudes are in a way that is consistent with the phenomenon of variable motivation. Given that the cognitivist has an easy explanation of variable motivation, it seems that cognitivism is preferable to non-cognitivism on the score of motivation, which is a reversal of the way the issue is usually perceived.
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  11. Olga Ramirez (2011). Between Non-Cognitivism and Realism in Ethics: A Three Fold Model. Prolegomena (Croatia) 10 (1):101-11202.score: 180.0
    Abstracts The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view (...)
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  12. James Harold (2012). Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Skepticism About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185.score: 180.0
    In recent years it has become more and more difficult to distinguish between metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. For example, proponents of the minimalist theory of truth hold that moral claims need not express beliefs in order to be (minimally) truth-apt, and yet some of these proponents still reject the traditional cognitivist analysis of moral language and thought. Thus, the dispute in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists has come to be seen as a dispute over the correct way to characterize (...)
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  13. Frans Svensson (2007). Does Non-Cognitivism Rest on a Mistake? Utilitas 19 (2):184-200.score: 180.0
    Philippa Foot has recently argued that non-cognitivism rests on a mistake. According to Foot, non-cognitivism cannot properly account for the role of reasons in moral thinking. Furthermore, Foot argues that moral judgements share a conceptual structure with the kind of evaluations that we make about plants and animals, which cannot be couched in non-cognitivist terms. In this article I argue that, in the form of expressivism, non-cognitivism is capable of accommodating most of what Foot says about reasons (...)
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  14. Catherine Wilson (2001). Prospects for Non-Cognitivism. Inquiry 44 (3):291 – 314.score: 180.0
    This essay offers a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules. It addresses the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing that anti-realism is compatible with moral aspiration despite the non-existence of obligations as the externalist imagines them. A moral judgment consists of separate descriptive and prescriptive components (...)
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  15. Henry Veatch (1966). Non-Cognitivism in Ethics: A Modest Proposal for its Diagnosis and Cure. Ethics 76 (2):102-116.score: 180.0
    Non-Congnitivism relies for its defense upon g e moore's open question argument for a naturalistic fallacy. But this argument is invalid as applied to real definitions, Which are not analytic truths. G e moore's own conclusions about goodness are definitions in this sense. A definition of the good is possible. A valid one will allow for the non-Cognitivist's points that goodness reflects some pro-Attitude, That goodness is supervenient, And that goodness cannot be equated with the properties of a thing. An (...)
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  16. Mark van Roojen (forthcoming). Moral Cognitivism Vs . Non-Cognitivism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 180.0
    Non-cognitivism is a variety of irrealism about ethics with a number of influential variants. Non-cognitivists agree with error theorists that there are no moral properties or moral facts. But rather than thinking that this makes moral statements false, noncognitivists claim that moral statements are not in the business of predicating properties or making statements which could be true or false in any substantial sense. Roughly put, noncognitivists think that moral statements have no truth conditions. Furthermore, according to non-cognitivists, when (...)
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  17. Joseph D. Markowski (2014). Buddhist Non-Cognitivism. :1-15.score: 180.0
    Buddhist Non-Cognitivism. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09552367.2014.952577.
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  18. Folke Tersman (1995). Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):361-372.score: 164.0
    This is acknowledged by moral realists and non-cognitivists alike, but, for obvious reasons, they relate differently to this resemblance. For realists, it provides arguments, and for non-cognitivists, it provides potential trouble. Realists claim that the various points of resemblance between moral and factual discourse indicate that moral discourse simply is a kind of factual discourse.1 However, in recent years a number of interesting attempts have been made in trying to show that the realist appearance of moral discourse can after all (...)
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  19. Andrew Sepielli (2012). Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.score: 160.0
    Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) (...)
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  20. Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson (2014). Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem. Mind 123 (489):1-38.score: 160.0
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the (...)
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  21. John McDowell (1981). Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. 141--62.score: 150.0
  22. Michael Smith (2001). Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics. Ratio 14 (2):93–115.score: 150.0
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  23. Nick Zangwill (2011). Non-Cognitivism and Consistency. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (4):465-484.score: 150.0
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  24. Ralph Wedgwood (1997). Non-Cognitivism, Truth and Logic. Philosophical Studies 86 (1):73-91.score: 150.0
    This paper provides a new argument for a position of Crispin Wright's: given that ethical statements can be embedded within all sorts of sentential operators and are subject to definite standards of warrantedness, they must have truth conditions. Allan Gibbard's normative logic' is the only noncognitivist logic that stands a chance of avoiding Geach's Fregean objection. But what, according to Gibbard, is the point of avoiding inconsistency in one's ethical statements? He must say that it is to ensure that one's (...)
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  25. Antonio Marturano, Non-Cognitivism in Ethics. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 150.0
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  26. Charles Starkey (2007). Manipulating Emotion: The Best Evidence for Non-Cognitivism in the Light of Proper Function. Analysis 67 (295):230–237.score: 150.0
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  27. P. J. E. Kail (2010). Causation, Fictionalism, and Non-Cognitivism: Berkeley and Hume. In Silvia Parigi (ed.), George Berkeley: Religion and Science in the Age of Enlightenment. Springer.score: 150.0
  28. W. Fenske (1997). Non-Cognitivism: A New Defense. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (3):301-309.score: 150.0
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  29. S. L. Hurley (1984). Frege, the Proliferation of Force, and Non-Cognitivism. Mind 93 (372):570-576.score: 150.0
  30. Wayne Fenske (2001). Empirically Minded Non-Cognitivism: As Serious as It Needs to Be. Dialogue 40 (03):613-.score: 150.0
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  31. Michael Ridge (2003). Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's 'Do so as Well. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):563 - 574.score: 150.0
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  32. Wayne Fenske (2000). The Advantage of an Empirically Minded Conception of Non-Cognitivism. Dialogue 39 (03):513-.score: 150.0
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  33. John J. Hartley (1987). Kierkegaard: A Non-Cognitivist? Dialogue 26 (02):331-.score: 150.0
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  34. James Lindemann Nelson (1989). Desire's Desire for Moral Realism: A Phenomenological Objection to Non-Cognitivism. Dialogue 28 (03):449-.score: 150.0
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  35. Michael Ridge (2013). Non‐Cognitivism. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 150.0
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  36. Michael Ridge (2010). Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):563-574.score: 150.0
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  37. Teemu Toppinen (2013). Goading or Guiding? Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Practical Reasoning. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):119-141.score: 150.0
    Name der Zeitschrift: SATS Jahrgang: 14 Heft: 2 Seiten: 119-141.
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  38. Paul Horwich (2006). A World Without Isms: Life After Realism, Fictionalism, Non-Cognitivism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. 188.score: 150.0
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  39. F. E. McDermott (1976). A Rebuttal of Pollock's `Refutation' of Non-Cognitivism. Mind 85 (337):103-106.score: 150.0
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  40. Jeremy Walker (1988). A Reply to Hartley's “Kierkegaard; A Non-Cognitivist?”. Dialogue 27 (03):539-.score: 150.0
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  41. Mark Alfano (2011). Revivals of Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Forum 42 (3):330-331.score: 150.0
     
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  42. Frank Jackson (1999). Non-Cognitivism, Validity and Conditionals. In Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics. Blackwell Publishers. 18--37.score: 150.0
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  43. Alex Miller (2010). Non-Cognitivism. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.score: 150.0
     
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  44. Olga Ramírez Calle (2011). Between Non-Cognitivism and Realism in Ethics: A Three-Fold Model. Prolegomena 10 (1):101-112.score: 150.0
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  45. Michael Smith (2010). The Motivation Argument for Non-Cognitivism. In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan. 105.score: 150.0
     
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  46. Author unknown, Non-Cognitivism and Variable Motivation.score: 150.0
    in Constantinos Sandis (ed.) New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
     
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  47. Jack Woods (2011). Hare: A Defense of Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Forum 42 (3):329-330.score: 150.0
     
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  48. Huw Price (1996). How to Stand Up for Non-Cognitivists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292.score: 100.0
    Is non-cognitivism compatible with minimalism about truth? A contemporary argument claims not, and therefore that moral realists, for example, should take heart from the popularity of semantic minimalism. The same is said to apply to cognitivism about other topics—conditionals, for example—for the argument depends only on the fact that ordinary usage applies the notions of truth and falsity to utterances of the kind in question. Given this much, minimalism about truth is said to leave no room for the view (...)
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  49. James Dreier (1996). Accepting Agent Centred Norms: A Problem for Non-Cognitivists and a Suggestion for Solving It. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):409–422.score: 100.0
    Non-cognitivists claim to be able to represent normative judgment, and especially moral judgment, as an expression of a non-cognitive attitude. There is some reason to worry whether their treatment can incorporate agent centred theories, including much of common sense morality. In this paper I investigate the prospects for a non-cognitivist explanation of what is going on when we subscribe to agent centred theories or norms. The first section frames the issue by focusing on a particularly simple and clear agent centred (...)
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