Search results for 'non-conceptual content' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. R. Waugh & Non-Conceptual Content (1995). Putting Meaning Before Truth. In P. Pyllkkänen & P. Pyllkkö (eds.), New Directions in Cognitive Science. Finnish Society for Artificial Intelligence.score: 870.0
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  2. Katalin Balog (2009). Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content. Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.score: 720.0
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In (...)
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  3. Michael D. Barber (2008). Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-Conceptual Content. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 24 (2):79-97.score: 720.0
    John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing McDowell’s rejection of what he means by (...)
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  4. Simone Gozzano (2008). In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content. Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.score: 720.0
    In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have (...)
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  5. Bill Wringe (2011). Posidonius on Emotions and Non-Conceptual Content. Prolegomena 10 (2):185-213.score: 672.0
    In this paper I argue that the work of the unorthodox Stoic Posidonius - as reported to us by Galen - can be seen as making an interesting contribution to contemporary debates about the nature of emotion. Richard Sorabji has already argued that Posidonius' contribution highlights the weaknesses in some well-known contemporary forms of cognitivism. Here I argue that Posidonius might be seen as advocating a theory of the emotions which sees them as being, in at least some cases, two-level (...)
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  6. Dennis Schulting (2012). Kant, Non-Conceptual Content, and the 'Second Step' of the B-Deduction. Kant Studies Online:51-92.score: 558.0
    This article is a modified version in translation of the original Dutch version that appeared in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 4 (2010) / * Inspired by Kant's account of intuition and concepts, John McDowell has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against (...)
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  7. Robert Hanna (2011). Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):323 - 398.score: 558.0
    In this essay I argue that a broadly Kantian strategy for demonstrating and explaining the existence, semantic structure, and psychological function of essentially non-conceptual content can also provide an intelligible and defensible bottom-up theory of the foundations of rationality in minded animals. Otherwise put, if I am correct, then essentially non-conceptual content constitutes the semantic and psychological substructure, or matrix, out of which the categorically normative a priori superstructure of epistemic rationality and practical rationality - Sellars's (...)
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  8. Xinli Wang (2012). Alternative Conceptual Schemes and A Non-Kantian Scheme-Content Dualism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:267-275.score: 558.0
    D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian scheme-content dualism, which requires a scheme-neutral empirical content and a fixed, sharp schemecontent distinction. The dismantlement of such a Kantian scheme-content dualism, which Davidson calls “the third dogma of empiricism”, would render the notion of alternative conceptual schemes groundless. To counter Davidson’s attack on the notion of alternative conceptual schemes, I argue that alternative conceptual schemes neither entail nor presuppose the Kantian scheme-content dualism. (...)
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  9. Sean D. Kelly (2001). The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.score: 555.0
    I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke’s claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content - a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on (...)
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  10. Michael K. Shim (2005). The Duality of Non-Conceptual Content in Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.score: 555.0
    Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F.
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  11. David W. Hamlyn (1994). Perception, Sensation, and Non-Conceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53.score: 555.0
    Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly non- conceptual. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept- dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and is thereby dependent on processes involving information in the technical sense (...)
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  12. Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore (2007). Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.score: 540.0
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: (...)
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  13. Timothy Fuller (2012). Non-Conceptual Content. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):143-154.score: 540.0
    In this paper I argue that a principal argument in favor of the existence of non-conceptual content (henceforth NCC) fails. That is, I do not accept that considerations regarding the richness of our perceptual experiences support the existence of NCC. I argue instead that the existence of NCC is empirically motivated. Here is an outline of the paper. First, I set out the distinction between conceptual content and NCC as we understand it. Second, I consider the richness (...)
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  14. Dietmar H. Heidemann (ed.) (2012). Kant and Non-Conceptual Content. Routledge.score: 540.0
    Conceptualism is the view that cognizers can have mental representations of the world only if they possess the adequate concepts by means of which they can specify what they represent. By contrast, non-conceptualism is the view that mental representations of the world do not necessarily presuppose concepts by means of which the content of these representations can be specified, thus cognizers can have mental representations of the world that are non-conceptual. Consequently, if conceptualism is true then non-conceptualism must (...)
     
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  15. Tobias Schlicht (2011). Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.score: 537.0
    Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to (...)
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  16. Sean D. Kelly (2002). What Makes Perceptual Content Non-Conceptual? Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.score: 522.0
    the world. 1 Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application", the content of our perceptual experiences is, according to Evans, "non-conceptual". Because Evans takes it for granted that we are often able to entertain thoughts about an object in virtue of having perceived it, a central problem in.
     
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  17. David Forman (2006). Learning and the Necessity of Non-Conceptual Content in Sellars's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In Michael P. Wolf & Mark Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi. 115-145.score: 492.0
    For Sellars, the possibility of empirical knowledge presupposes the existence of "sense impressions" in the perceiver, i.e., non-conceptual states of perceptual consciousness. But this role for sense impressions does not implicate Sellars' account in the Myth of the Given: sense impressions do not stand in a justificatory relation to instances of perceptual knowledge; their existence is rather a condition for the possibility of the acquisition of empirical concepts. Sellars suggests that learning empirical concepts presupposes that we can remember certain (...)
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  18. Mark A. Wrathall (2005). Non-Rational Grounds and Non-Conceptual Content. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):265-278.score: 490.0
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  19. Hemdat Lerman (2010). Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.score: 471.0
    According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on (...)
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  20. Susanna Schellenberg (2006). Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual Content. In Mark Lance & Michael P. Wolf (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi. 173-196.score: 468.0
    I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars so famously (...)
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  21. Peter Poellner (2003). Non-Conceptual Content, Experience and the Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (2):32-57.score: 468.0
  22. Huang Xiang (2013). Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content? Frontiers of Philosophy in China 8 (3):485-497.score: 468.0
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  23. Arindam Chakrabarti (2003). Perception, Apperception and Non-Conceptual Content. In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.score: 468.0
  24. Annalisa Coliva (2003). The Argument From the Finer-Grained Content of Colour Experiences: A Redefinition of its Role Within the Debate Between McDowell and Non-Conceptual Theorists. Dialectica 57 (1):57-70.score: 453.0
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  25. Lucy Allais (2009). Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 383-413.score: 450.0
  26. Juan José Acero (1998). Non-Conceptual Content, Subject-Centered Information and the Naturalistic Demand. Philosophical Issues 9:359-367.score: 450.0
  27. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2012). Distinguishing Non-Conceptual Content From Non-Syntactic Propositions: Comment on Fuller. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):53-57.score: 450.0
  28. Michael Fleming (2000). Misrepresentation and Non-Conceptual Content. Dialogue 39 (03):557-.score: 450.0
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  29. Andrea Faggion (2013). Kant and Non-Conceptual Content. [REVIEW] Manuscrito 36 (2):343-354.score: 450.0
  30. John McDowell (1994). Lecture III: Non-Conceptual Content. In Mind and World. Harvard University Press.score: 450.0
     
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  31. Corijn van Mazijk (2014). Kant, Husserl, McDowell: The Non-Conceptual in Experience. Diametros 41:99-114.score: 432.0
    In this paper I compare McDowell′s conceptualism to Husserl′s later philosophy. I aim to argue against the picture provided by recent phenomenologists according to which both agree on the conceptual nature of experience. I start by discussing McDowell′s reading of Kant and some of the recent Kantian and phenomenological non-conceptualist criticisms thereof. By separating two kinds of conceptualism, I argue that these criticisms largely fail to trouble McDowell. I then move to Husserl’s later phenomenological analyses of types and of passive (...)
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  32. Costas Pagondiotis (2005). “Can Perceptual Content Be Conceptual and Non-Theory-Laden?”. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science.score: 423.0
  33. Clinton Tolley (2013). The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach. Kantian Review 18 (1):107-36.score: 364.0
    There has been considerable recent debate about whether Kant's account of intuitions implies that their content is conceptual. This debate, however, has failed to make significant progress because of the absence of discussion, let alone consensus, as to the meaning of in this context. Here I try to move things forward by focusing on the kind of content associated with Frege's notion of , understood as a mode of presentation of some object or property. I argue, first, that (...)
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  34. Dennis Schulting (2010). Kant, Non-Conceptuele Inhoud En Synthese. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 72 (4):679-715.score: 315.0
    Inspired by Kant's account of intuition and concepts, John McDowell has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view the charge that it neglects the possibility of the existence of essentially non-conceptual content that is not conceptualized or (...)
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  35. Alex Byrne (2005). Perception and Conceptual Content. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 231--250.score: 315.0
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs—that much seems obvious. As Brewer puts it, “sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs” (this volume, xx). In Mind and World McDowell argues that we can get from this apparent platitude to the controversial claim that perceptual experiences have conceptual content: [W]e can coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgement and belief, but only if we take it that spontaneity is already implicated in receptivity; that is, only if we take it that experiences (...)
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  36. Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.score: 309.0
    There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all (...)
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  37. Wayne Wu (2008). Visual Attention, Conceptual Content, and Doing It Right. Mind 117 (468):1003-1033.score: 297.0
    Reflection on the fine-grained information required for visual guidance of action has suggested that visual content is non-conceptual. I argue that in a common type of visually guided action, namely the use of manipulable artefacts, vision has conceptual content. Specifically, I show that these actions require visual attention and that concepts are involved in directing attention. In acting with artefacts, there is a way of doing it right as determined by the artefact’s conventional use. Attention must reflect (...)
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  38. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2007). Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.score: 291.0
    Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepts are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways (...)
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  39. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2009). Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.score: 291.0
    Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepls are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways (...)
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  40. Nicoletta Orlandi (2011). Ambiguous Figures and Representationalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):307-323.score: 270.0
    Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources (...)
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  41. Arthur Melnick (2013). Two Charges of Intellectualism Against Kant. Kantian Review 18 (2):197-219.score: 270.0
    The contemporary discussion of non-conceptual content inaugurated by Gareth Evans and John McDowell has generated a range of differing views as to Kant's position on the issues raised. I argue that for Kant perception is prior to thought and that it is as being prior that perception connects us to reality in outer intuition. I then argue that for Kant thought relates to perception by being the rule for perceptual procedures. This accounts for thought's extending in scope beyond (...)
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  42. María del Rosario Hernández Borges & Tamara Ojeda Arceo (2008). Emotion, self-deception and conceptual/nonconceptual content. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:223-231.score: 270.0
    First the rationalist tradition and then the cognitive revolution put limits on the philosophy and social sciences with regard to the analysis of emotion, of irrationality in mental events and actions, to the reduction of our representations to conceptual elements, and so on. This fact caused an increasing interest in these topics. In this paper, we intend to claim the significant relations among these three issues: emotion, selfdeception and non-conceptual content, with two aims: i) to analyse the relation (...)
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  43. Michael Ayers (2004). Sense Experience, Concepts and Content, Objections to Davidson and McDowell. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality - From Descartes to the Present. mentis.score: 267.0
    Philosophers debate whether all, some or none of the represcntational content of our sensory experience is conccptual, but the technical term "concept" has different uses. It is commonly linked more or less closely with the notions of judgdment and reasoning, but that leaves open the possibility that these terms share a systematic ambiguity or indeterminacy. Donald Davidson, however, holds an unequivocal and consistent, if paradoxical view that there are strictly speaking no psychological states with representational or intentional content (...)
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  44. John-Michael Kuczynski (2007). Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism. John Benjamins & Co.score: 267.0
    Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. (...)
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  45. Santiago Echeverri (2011). McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.score: 261.0
    Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could (...)
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  46. Jonathan Webber (2002). Motivated Aversion: Non-Thetic Awareness in Bad Faith. Sartre Studies International 8 (1):45-57.score: 261.0
    Sartre's concept of ‘non-thetic awareness’ must be understood as equivalent to the concept of ‘nonconceptual content’ currently discussed in anglophone epistemology and philosophy of mind, since it could not otherwise play the role in the structure of ‘bad faith’, or self-deception, that Sartre ascribes to it. This understanding of the term makes sense of some otherwise puzzling features of Sartre's early philosophy, and has implications for understanding certain areas of his thought.
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  47. P. Kügler (2013). Non-Dualism Versus Conceptual Relativism. Constructivist Foundations 8 (2):247-252.score: 261.0
    Context: Although Josef Mitterer’s non-dualism has received increasing attention in recent years, it is still underrated by philosophers. It is an ambitious and unusual treatment of epistemological problems concerning truth and reality. Problem: Is non-dualism tenable? Is conceptual relativism tenable? Method: On the basis of a pragmatic semantics, Mitterer’s arguments against conceptual relativism are shown to be unjustified. Results: Non-dualism lacks a clear conception of semantics. Given the similarities to Robert Brandom’s account of truth, as well as Mitterer’s preoccupation with (...)
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