Search results for 'non-existent' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  95
    Stephen Barker (2015). Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-Existent Without Meinongian Metaphysics. Erkenntnis 80 (S2):215-234.
    Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to the Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  20
    William J. Rapaport (1985). Non-Existent Objects and Epistemological Ontology. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:61-95.
    This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" — the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Außersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3.  63
    Peter Forrest (2012). Truths About Non-Existent Things. Metascience 21 (2):305-307.
    Truths about non-existent things Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9583-8 Authors Peter Forrest, Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  30
    Daniel Murphy (2007). Levinas and Kierkegaard on Divine Transcendence and Ethical Life: Response to Donald L. Turner and Ford Turrell's “The Non-Existent God”. [REVIEW] Philosophia 35 (3-4):383-385.
    This article is a brief commentary on Donald Turner and Ford Turrell’s “The Non-Existent God: Transcendence, Humanity, and Ethics in Emmanuel Levinas.” While I agree with Turner and Turrell’s general presentation of Levinas’s existential conception of God and ethics, I reflect primarily on the reference the authors make to Kierkegaard as an existentialist forefather of Levinas. I show certain basic similarities between Levinas and Kierkegaard as existentialist thinkers, but also note their differences, also taking into consideration the influence of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  1
    John Deely (1975). Reference to the Non-Existent. The Thomist 39 (2):253-308.
    Can we refer to objects which do not exist? Searle says that we cannot. He postulates an ‘axiom of existence’ such that, if an object does not exist, we cannot refer to it. This ‘axiom of existence’ could be taken simply as a way of defining the notion of ‘reference’; we would not count a reference to a non-existent object as a ‘reference’ in the philosophical sense; or perhaps it might count as a reference but not as a ‘successful’ (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  14
    A. M. Honoré (1971). Reference to the Non-Existent. Philosophy 46 (178):302 - 308.
    Can we refer to objects which do not exist? Searle says that we cannot. He postulates an ‘axiom of existence’ such that, if an object does not exist, we cannot refer to it. This ‘axiom of existence’ could be taken simply as a way of defining the notion of ‘reference’; we would not count a reference to a non-existent object as a ‘reference’ in the philosophical sense; or perhaps it might count as a reference but not as a ‘successful’ (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Andrew Kenneth Jorgensen (2002). Meinong's Theory of Non-Existent Objects. Dissertation, Temple University
    The argument is an investigation of the philosophy of Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong. There are three chapters. The first chapter argues that there are non-existent objects. It is argued that negative existential statements have a simple subject-predicate logical form. The conclusion follows from this premise, together with realist assumptions about truth and predication. Positive and negative existential statements have subject-predicate logical form, I argue, because; that is the grammatical form they appear to have, and the alternative analysis of their (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  5
    Michele Paolini Paoletti (2016). Who's Afraid of Non-Existent Manifestions? In Francesco F. Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter 193-206.
    I shall defend in this paper the thesis that, if there are irreducible powers such as the power to produce a certain object (generative powers), then there are objects that do not exist and they are part of the fundamental level of the universe. Thus, generative powers come together with Meinongianism. After having clarified my argument, I shall examine and criticize Armstrong (1997)’s attempt to reduce powers to other sorts of entities. Finally, I shall deal with five accounts of generative (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  5
    Diwakar Acharya (forthcoming). ‘This World, in the Beginning, Was Phenomenally Non-Existent’: Āruṇi’s Discourse on Cosmogony in Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.1–VI.7. Journal of Indian Philosophy:1-32.
    This paper critically reads and analyzes the first discourse of Āruṇi and Śvetaketu in the first half of the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. It argues that, except for a few interpolated lines in VI.2 and VI.3, the entire discourse constitutes one integrated whole with a specific indicatory knowledge at its core that indicates deeper truth underlying all realities, and its characterization and twofold elaboration with reference to macro- and microcosmos. In light of two cosmogonic accounts from the Jaiminīya (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  67
    Phillip Bricker (2004). McGinn on Non-Existent Objects and Reducing Modality. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 118 (3):439-451.
    In this discussion of Colin McGinn's book, 'Logical Properties', I comment first on the chapter "Existence", then on the chapter "Modality." With respect to existence, I argue that McGinn's view that existence is a property that some objects have and other objects lack requires the property of existence to be fundamentally unlike ordinary qualitative properties. Moreover, it opens up a challenging skeptical problem: how do I know that I exist? With respect to modality, I argue that McGinn's argument that quantificational (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  15
    Chelsea Haramia (2013). Our Responsibility to the Non-Existent. Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):249-256.
    Those who do not exist cannot be harmed. If someone is not worse off than she otherwise would have been, she is not harmed. Together, these claims entail that the individuals in non-identity cases are not harmed, because no one who exists is made worse off. While these claims might be true at the individual level, their truth does not preclude our having harm-based concerns about future persons in general. These concerns are justified when we recognize the responsibility we have (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Thomas Hofweber (2000). Quantification and Non-Existent Objects. In T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. Csli Publications
  13.  16
    Lobsang Dargyay (1990). What is Non-Existent and What is Remanent in Sūnyatā. Journal of Indian Philosophy 18 (1):81-91.
    In the various texts the phrase “something does not exist there” was interpreted in the following way: “elephants, cows, etc.” (Cūlasuññata-sutta) “the imagined, or conceptualized” (Yogācāra tradition), “the five skandhas, the elements, the sensory fields as eternal and solid entities” (Abhidharmasamuccaya), “all conventional phenomena” (Dolpo-pa), “inherent reality” (rGyal-tshab-rje), “accidental pollution with regard to the tathāgatagarbha (Gung-thang). The phrase “something that remains there does exist as a real existent” was interpreted also in different ways: “monks, palace, world, etc” (Cūlasuññata-sutta), “the perfect, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan (2012). How We Feel About Terrible, Non-Existent Mafiosi. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):277-306.
    We argue for an imaginative analog of desire from premises about imaginative engagement with fiction. There's a bit about the paradox of fiction, too.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  15.  19
    Theodore J. Everett (2005). Are There Non-Existent Entities? In Larry Lee Blackman (ed.), The Philosophy of Panayot Butchvarov: a collegial evaluation. Edwin Mellen Press 3-19.
    There are things of which it is true to say that there are no such things. How can we resolve this paradox? Panayot Butchvarov argues that there are objects of reference that are not also entities, where the former must merely be thinkable but the latter must be indefinitely re-identifiable. This paper argues that fictional and many other unreal objects are indeed indefinitely re-identifiable, so they must be counted as existing things on Butchvarov's theory. The paradox is best resolved by (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Kit Fine (1984). Critical Review of Parsons' Non-Existent Objects. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 45 (1):95-142.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  17.  75
    Alberto Voltolini (2006). Are There Non-Existent Intentionalia? Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):436-441.
    In his recent book on the philosophy of mind, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia may further (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18.  4
    Donald L. Turner & Ford J. Turrell (2013). Emmanuel Levinas's Non-Existent God. In Jeanine Diller & Asa Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. Springer 727--733.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19.  28
    Karel Lambert (1985). Non-Existent Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:439-446.
    This essay argues for the importance of developing theories of nonexistent objects. The grounds are utility and smoothness of logical theory. In the latter case a parallel with the theory of negative and imaginary numbers is exploited. The essay concludes with a counterexample to a general argument against the enterprise of developing theories of nonexistent objects, and outlining the foremost problem an adequate theory of nonexistent objects must solve.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  6
    Robert Goedecke (1961). 7. For the Best Listing of the Differences Between Aristotle's Logic and Aristotelian Logic. Or, Alternatively, for the Best Account Showing That the Differences Are Non-Existent or Minor. Review of Metaphysics 15 (2):319-321.
  21.  12
    Philip Bricker (2004). Discussion–McGinn on Non-Existent Objects and Reducing Modality. Philosophical Studies 118 (3):439-451.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  12
    Bas C. Van Fraassen (2004). Transcendence of the Ego (The Non-Existent Knight). Ratio 17 (4):453-477.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  2
    Maria Gyemant (2015). Objects or Intentional Objects?: Twardowski and Husserl on Non-Existent Entities. In Denis Seron, Sebastien Richard & Bruno Leclercq (eds.), Objects and Pseudo-Objects: Ontological Deserts and Jungles From Brentano to Carnap. De Gruyter 85-100.
  24.  7
    William H. Kane (1961). 7. For the Best Listing of the Differences Between Aristotle's Logic and Aristotelian Logic. Or, Alternatively, for the Best Account Showing That the Differences Are Non-Existent or Minor. Review of Metaphysics 15 (2):321-324.
  25.  9
    Jeong-Hyun Youn (2008). Non-Existent Existing God; Understanding of God From an East Asian Way of Thinking with Specific Reference to the Thought of Dasŏk Yoo Yŏng-Mo. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:881-905.
    This paper is an interpretation of the thought of the twentieth century Korean religious thinker, Yoo Yŏng-mo (柳永模, 1890-1981), a pioneer figure who sought to re-conceptualise a Christian understanding of the Ultimate Reality in the light of a positive openness to the plurality of Korean religions. Yoo Yŏng-mo considered that it was possible to present an overall picture of harmony and complementarity between the three traditions of Korea and Christianity, and this is endorsed by the present thesis. This essay is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  37
    Donald L. Turner & Ford Turrell (2007). The Non-Existent God: Transcendence, Humanity, and Ethics in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Philosophia 35 (3-4):375 - 382.
    This paper considers three essential gestures in Levinas’s theology, highlighting in each case how Levinas’s thinking allows him to either incorporate or sidestep some of the fiercest modern criticisms of traditional theism. First, we present Levinas’s vision of divine transcendence, outlining his ontological atheism and explaining how this obviates proving the existence of God and avoids the tangles of traditional theodicy. Second, we describe Levinas’s idea of the trace, showing how a nonexistent God still leaves its mark in the face (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  2
    James Bissett Pratt (1918). Professor Spaulding's Non-Existent Illusions. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (25):688-695.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  10
    Reinhardt Grossmann (1969). Non-Existent Objects: Recent Work on Brentano and Meinong. American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1):17 - 32.
  29.  4
    Howard Jackson & Richard E. Robinson (1985). Non-Existent Concepts. Dialogue 24 (03):473-.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Laurent Cesalli (2012). Does Loving Every Mean Loving Every Every, Even Non-Existent Ones? In Mora-Márquez Ana María, Fink Jakob Leth & Hansen Heine (eds.), Logic and Language in the Middle Ages. Brill 305--336.
  31. William Farr Church (1964). The Influence of the Enlightenment on the French Revolution: Creative, Disastrous, or Non-Existent? Boston, Heath.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Benoit de Cornulier (1974). A Non-Existent Performative Argument. Foundations of Language 11 (3):413-414.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Reinhardt Grossmann (1998). Wittgenstein and the Problem of Non-Existent States of Affairs. Acta Analytica 21:139-146.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Ivelise Perniola (2011). Dziga Vertov and Cinema as Non-Existent. Ontology of Thought and Iconoclastic Thought in Cinema. Rivista di Estetica 51 (1):123-135.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Quentin Skinner (2008). Response: Why Is Laughter Almost Non-Existent in Ancient Greek Sculpture? Cogito 8:22.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Richard Sylvan (1986). Australia's Defence Philosophy: Further Investigations of the Non-Existent. Critical Philosophy 3 (1/2):160.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Andy Egan Tyler Doggett (2012). How We Feel About Terrible, Non‐Existent Mafiosi. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):277-306.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Peter van Lith (1991). AI Technology, Non-Existent or Extinct? In P. A. Flach (ed.), Future Directions in Artificial Intelligence. New York: Elsevier Science
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Tim Crane (2012). What is the Problem of Non-Existence? Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.
    It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40.  97
    Graham Priest (2005). Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Graham Priest presents a ground-breaking account of the semantics of intentional language--verbs such as "believes," "fears," "seeks," or "imagines." Towards Non-Being proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, at worlds that may be either possible or impossible. The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy of fiction, the philosophy of mathematics, or (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   43 citations  
  41.  42
    Rivka Weinberg (2013). Existence: Who Needs It? The Non‐Identity Problem and Merely Possible People. Bioethics 27 (9):471-484.
    In formulating procreative principles, it makes sense to begin by thinking about whose interests ought to matter to us. Obviously, we care about those who exist. Less obviously, but still uncontroversially, we care about those who will exist. Ought we to care about those who might possibly, but will not actually, exist? Recently, unusual positions have been taken regarding merely possible people and the non-identity problem. David Velleman argues that what might have happened to you – an existent person – (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Erich Rast (2010). Classical Possibilism and Fictional Objects. In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Fiction in Philosophy.
    An account of non-existing objects called 'classical possibilism', according to which objects that don't actually exist do exist in various other ways, is implemented in a two-dimensional modal logic with non-traditional predication theory. This account is very similar to Priest's, but preserves bivalence and does not endorse dialethism. The power of classical possibilism is illustrated by giving some examples that makes use of a description theory of reference. However, the same effect could also be achieved in a more Millian fashion. (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Barry Smith (1986). The Substitution Theory of Art. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:533-557.
    In perceptual experience we are directed towards objects in a way which establishes a real relation between a mental act and its target. In reading works of fiction we enjoy experiences which manifest certain internal similarities to such relational acts, but which lack objects. The substitution theory of art attempts to provide a reason why we seek out such experiences and the artifacts which generate. Briefly, we seek out works of art because we enjoy the physiology and the phenomenology of, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Graham Priest (2007). Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Graham Priest presents a ground-breaking account of the semantics of intentional language - verbs such as 'believes', 'fears', 'seeks', or 'imagines'. Towards Non-Being proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, at worlds that may be either possible or impossible. The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy of fiction, the philosophy of (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  45. Gordon Knight (2013). Disjunctivism Unmotivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2):1-18.
    Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  24
    Lilian Alweiss (2013). Beyond Existence and Non-Existence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):448-469.
    When Husserl speaks of the so-called ?transcendental reduction? or ?phenomenological epoch?? many believe that he is eschewing the question of truth or existence. Two reasons are given for this: First, Husserl explicitly states that when we perform the reduction, we should no longer naively ?accept [the world] as it presents itself to me as factually existing? (Id I ?30, p. 53) and should suspend our judgement with regard to ?the positing of its actual being? (Id I ?88, p. 182). Second, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. T. Parent, Conservative Meinongianism.
    This paper defends the Meinongian thesis that “there are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects,” re: fictitious and illusory objects. I first formulate the problem of negative existentials in a novel way, and discuss why this new version is more forceful against anti-Meinongians. Additional data is then raised to vex anti-Meinongians—e.g., the truth of ‘Pegasus is imaginary’, and a reading of ‘There actually are illusory objects’ where it comes out true. The Meinongian, in contrast, (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  36
    Raamy Majeed (2014). The Objects of Thought, by Tim Crane. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):182-184.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  38
    Graham Oppy (2007). More Than One Flaw: Reply to Millican. Sophia 46 (3):295-304.
    Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004) claims to have detected ‘the one fatal flaw in Anselm’s ontological argument.’ I argue that there is more than one important flaw in the position defended in Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004). First, Millican’s reconstruction of Anselm’s argument does serious violence to the original text. Second, Millican’s generalised objection fails to diagnose any flaw in a vast range of ontological arguments. Third, there are independent reasons for thinking that Millican’s generalised objection is unpersuasive.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50.  15
    Frederick Kroon (1996). Characterizing Non-Existents. Grazer Philosophische Studien 51:163-193.
    Consider predicates like 'is a fictional character' and 'is a mythical object'. Since their ascription entails a corresponding Negative Existential claim, call these 'NE-characterizing predicates'. Objectualists such as Parsons, Sylvan, van Inwagen, and Zalta think that NE-characterizing properties are genuine properties of genuinely non-existent objects. But how, then, to make room for statements like 'Vulcan is a failed posit' and 'that little green man is a trick of the light'? The predicates involved seem equally NE-characterizing yet on the surface (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000