Search results for 'non-inferential justification' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Chris Tucker (forthcoming). Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification. In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press
    Classical acquaintance theory is any version of classical foundationalism that appeals to acquaintance in order to account for non-inferential justification. Such theories are well suited to account for a kind of infallible non-inferential justification. Why am I justified in believing that I’m in pain? An initially attractive (partial) answer is that I’m acquainted with my pain. But since I can’t be acquainted with what isn’t there, acquaintance with my pain guarantees that I’m in pain. What’s less (...)
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    Peter J. Graham (2006). Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84-95.
    Anti-Reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehending (both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. Comprehension as such, like perceptual representation, confers non-inferential justification on belief. Reductionists, on the other hand, reject this. Comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief. Beliefs based on comprehension are justified only if inferentially supported by other things the subject believes. I discuss an argument from Elizabeth Fricker from her ‘Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical (...)
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  3.  28
    Peter J. Graham (2006). Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84–95.
    Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such (...)
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  4. James Pryor, Is There Non-Inferential Justification?
    I want to talk about a certain epistemic quality that I call “justification,” and inquire whether that quality can ever be had “immediately” or “non-inferentially.” Before we get into substantive issues, we need first to agree about what epistemic quality it is we’ll be talking about, and then we need to clarify what it is to have that quality immediately or non-inferentially. When I say I call this epistemic quality “justification,” you’re liable to think, “Oh I know what (...)
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  5. J. Pryor (2005). A Defense of Immediate Non-Inferential Justification. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell
     
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  6. Jessica Brown (2004). Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity. Analysis 64 (4):339–348.
    Bergmann argues that we should accept epistemically circular reasoning since, he claims, it is a consequence of the plausible assumption that some justification is noninferential (Bergmann, M. "Epistemic Circularity, Malignant and Benign", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research forthcoming). I show that epistemically circular reasoning does not follow merely from the assumption that some justification is noninferential, but only from that view combined with the assumption of basic justification or knowledge. Thus, we have reason to endorse epistemically circular reasoning (...)
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    J. Brown (2004). Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity. Analysis 64 (4):339-348.
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    Thor Grünbaum (2011). Perception and Non-Inferential Knowledge of Action. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.
    I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her (...)
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  9. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Non‐Inferentialism About Justification – The Case of Aesthetic Judgements. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):660-682.
    In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non‐inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower‐level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non‐inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited (...)
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  10. Thomas Raleigh (forthcoming). Against an Inferentialist Dogma. Synthese:1-25.
    I consider the ‘inferentialist’ thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it is in virtue of inferential relations holding between the contents of the two states. I suggest that no good argument has yet been given for the thesis. I focus in particular on Williamson (2000) and Ginsborg (2011) and show that neither provides us with a reason to deny the plausible idea that experience can provide non-inferential justification for belief. I finish by pointing out (...)
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  11.  23
    Paul K. Moser (1989). Inferential Justification and Foley's Foundations. Analysis 49 (2):84 - 88.
    In "the theory of epistemic rationality" (harvard university press, 1987), Richard foley presents a version of subjective foundationalism designed to avoid aristotle's famous regress problem. This paper explains why foley's theory does not provide an adequate account of the foundations of inferential epistemic justification. Foley's theory neglects the epistemic significance of 'non'belief perceptual states.
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  12. Carl Ginet (2010). Self-Evidence. Logos and Episteme 54 (2):325-352.
    ABSTRACT: This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be self- evident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, (...)
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  13. Chris Tucker (2009). Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.
    As I use the term, ‘entitlement’ is any warrant one has by default—i.e. without acquiring it. Some philosophers not only affirm the existence of entitlement, but also give it a crucial role in the justification of our perceptual beliefs. These philosophers affirm the Entitlement Thesis: An essential part of what makes our perceptual beliefs justified is our entitlement to the proposition that I am not a brain-in-a-vat. Crispin Wright, Stewart Cohen, and Roger White are among those who endorse this (...)
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  14. Chris Tucker (2012). Movin' on Up: Higher-Level Requirements and Inferential Justification. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.
    Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against (...)
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  15. Andrea Guardo (2014). Semantic Dispositionalism and Non-Inferential Knowledge. Philosophia 42 (3):749-759.
    The paper discusses Saul Kripke's Normativity Argument against semantic dispositionalism: it criticizes the orthodox interpretation of the argument, defends an alternative reading and argues that, contrary to what Kripke himself seems to have been thinking, the real point of the Normativity Argument is not that meaning is normative. According to the orthodox interpretation, the argument can be summarized as follows: (1) it is constitutive of the concept of meaning that its instances imply an ought, but (2) it is not constitutive (...)
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  16.  43
    Frederik Herzberg (2014). The Dialectics of Infinitism and Coherentism: Inferential Justification Versus Holism and Coherence. Synthese 191 (4):701-723.
    This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle (...)
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  17.  47
    Luca Moretti, Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to (...)
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  18.  34
    Marie McGinn (2012). Non-Inferential Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):1-28.
    This paper looks at statements I am in a position to make ‘straight off’: observational judgements, perceptual and memory statements, statements about my posture, my intentions, and so on. These kinds of statement pose a problem: what is the nature of my entitlement to them? I focus on observational judgements and on two contrasting approaches to them. The first, which I reject, provides an account of my warrant for them; the second, which I defend, disconnects my entitlement from possession of (...)
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  19.  3
    Marie McGinn (2012). The Presidential Address: Non-Inferential Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112:1 - 28.
    This paper looks at statements I am in a position to make 'straight off': observational judgements, perceptual and memory statements, statements about my posture, my intentions, and so on. These kinds of statement pose a problem: what is the nature of my entitlement to them? I focus on observational judgements and on two contrasting approaches to them. The first, which I reject, provides an account of my warrant for them; the second, which I defend, disconnects my entitlement from possession of (...)
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  20.  48
    Ted Poston (2010). Similarity and Acquaintance: A Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):369 - 378.
    There is an interesting and instructive problem with Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory of noninferential justification. Fumerton's explicit account requires acquaintance with the truth-maker of one's belief and yet he admits that one can have noninferential justification when one is not acquainted with the truthmaker of one's belief but instead acquainted with a very similar truth-maker. On the face of it this problem calls for clarification. However, there are skeptical issues lurking in the background. This paper explores these issues (...)
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  21. Chris Tucker (forthcoming). Why Sceptical Theism Isn’T Sceptical Enough. In Trent Doughtery & Justin McBrayder (eds.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
    The most common charge against sceptical theism is that it is too sceptical, i.e. it committed to some undesirable form of scepticism or another. I contend that Michael Bergmann’s sceptical theism isn’t sceptical enough. I argue that, if true, the sceptical theses secure a genuine victory: they prevent, for some people, a prominent argument from evil from providing any justification whatsoever to doubt the existence of God. On the other hand, even if true, the sceptical theses fail to prevent (...)
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  22. David James Barnett (2016). Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief. Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
    This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so (...)
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  23.  15
    Yusef Waghid (2003). Peters' Non-Instrumental Justification of Education View Revisited: Contesting the Philosophy of Outcomes-Based Education in South Africa. Studies in Philosophy and Education 22 (3/4):245-265.
    In this article I argue that Outcomes-basedEducation is conceptually trapped in aninstrumentally justifiable view of education. Icontend that the notion of Outcomes-basedEducation is incommensurable with anon-instrumental justification of educationview as explained by RS Peters (1998). Theprocess of specifying outcomes in educationaldiscourse lends itself to manipulation andcontrol and thereby makes the idea ofOutcomes-based Education educationallyimpoverished. In this article an argument ismade for education through rational reflectionand imagination which can complement anOutcomes-based Education system for the reasonthat it finds expression in a (...)
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  24.  84
    Alexander Bird (2004). Is Evidence Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265.
    Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry.
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  25.  67
    M. Huemer (2002). Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:329--340.
    Richard Fumerton’s “Principle of Inferential Justification” holds that, in order to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, one must be justified in believing that E makes P probable. I argue that the plausibility of this principle rests upon two kinds of mistakes: first, a level confusion; and second, a fallacy of misconditionalisation. Furthermore, Fumerton’s principle leads to skepticism about inferential justification, for which reason it should be rejected. Instead, the examples Fumerton uses to motivate (...)
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  26. Elizabeth Tropman (2011). Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge. Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366.
    In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has (...)
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  27.  45
    Alan R. Rhoda (2008). Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification, Skepticism, and the Nature of Inference. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:215-234.
    I argue that Richard Fumerton’s controversial “Principle of Inferential Justification” (PIJ) can be satisfactorily defended against several charges that have been leveled against it, namely, that it leads to skepticism, that it confuses different levels of justification, and that it involves a fallacy of “misconditionalization.”The basis of my defense of PIJ is a distinction between two theories of the nature of inference—an internalist conception (IC), according to which inferring requires that the reasoner have a conscious perspective on the (...)
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  28.  43
    Richard Foley (1978). Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):311 - 316.
    It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose (...)
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  29.  57
    Bart Streumer (2007). Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that (...)
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  30. Andrew Naylor (2015). Inferentially Remembering That P. Logos and Episteme 6 (2):225-230.
    Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably (...)) memory that q. Bernecker’s account of non-inferentially remembering that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading. (shrink)
     
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  31.  8
    Katarzyna Budzynska & Maciej Witek (2014). Non-Inferential Aspects of Ad Hominem and Ad Baculum. Argumentation 28 (3):301-315.
    The aim of the paper is to explore the interrelation between persuasion tactics and properties of speech acts. We investigate two types of arguments ad: ad hominem and ad baculum. We show that with both of these tactics, the structures that play a key role are not inferential, but rather ethotic, i.e., related to the speaker’s character and trust. We use the concepts of illocutionary force and constitutive conditions related to the character or status of the speaker in order to (...)
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  32. Hamid Vahid (2008). Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):295 - 313.
    It is not difficult to make sense of the idea that beliefs may derive their justification from other beliefs. Difficulties surface when, as in certain epistemological theories, one appeals to sensory experiences to give an account of the structure of justification. This gives rise to the so-called problem of ‘nondoxastic justification’, namely, the problem of seeing how sensory experiences can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to. In this paper, I begin by criticizing a (...)
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  33.  9
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2001). Are Any of Our Beliefs About Ourselves Non-Inferential or Infallible? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):20-45.
    We are aware of truths (e.g. the truth that the shoes I'm now wearing are uncomfortably tight) and also of states of affairs (e.g. the uncomfortable tightness of said shoes). My awareness of the tightness of my shoes---not, be it emphasized, of the corresponding truth, but of the shoe-related mass-energy-distribution underlying that truth---is an instance, not of truth-awareness, but of fact-awareness or, as I prefer to put, object-awareness. The aforementioned truth-awareness corresponding to that object-awareness is the result of my conceptualizing (...)
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  34.  5
    Ian A. Apperly, Elisa Back, Dana Samson & Lisa France (2008). The Cost of Thinking About False Beliefs: Evidence From Adults’ Performance on a Non-Inferential Theory of Mind Task. Cognition 106 (3):1093-1108.
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  35.  97
    Kenneth Hobson (2008). Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification. Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.
    I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which (...)
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  36.  55
    D. Krause, The Problem of Identity and a Justification for Non-Reflexive Quantum Mechanics.
    In this paper we try to justify our way of looking for an alternative approach to quantum mechanics, which is based on a non-classical logic. We consider two specific questions related to quantum theory, namely, entanglement and the indiscernibility of quanta. We characterize individuals, and then explain in what sense entanglement is a concept which can be applied to individuals in a restricted sense only. Then, we turn to indiscernibility and, after realizing that this concept is of a fundamental importance, (...)
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  37.  3
    Daniel Tigard (2015). Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation Trial: A Philosophical Justification for Non‐Voluntary Enrollment. Bioethics 30 (4).
    In a current clinical trial for Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation, Dr. Samuel Tisherman of the University of Maryland aims to induce therapeutic hypothermia in order to ‘buy time’ for operating on victims of severe exsanguination. While recent publicity has framed this controversial procedure as ‘killing a patient to save his life’, the US Army and Acute Care Research appear to support the study on the grounds that such patients already face low chances of survival. Given that enrollment in the trial (...)
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  38. Daniel Tigard (2016). Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation Trial: A Philosophical Justification for Non‐Voluntary Enrollment. Bioethics 30 (5):344-352.
    In a current clinical trial for Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation, Dr. Samuel Tisherman of the University of Maryland aims to induce therapeutic hypothermia in order to ‘buy time’ for operating on victims of severe exsanguination. While recent publicity has framed this controversial procedure as ‘killing a patient to save his life’, the US Army and Acute Care Research appear to support the study on the grounds that such patients already face low chances of survival. Given that enrollment in the trial (...)
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  39.  19
    Christopher Hookway (2000). Scepticism and the Principle of Inferential Justification. Noûs 34 (s1):344 - 365.
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  40.  59
    George S. Pappas (1982). Non-Inferential Knowledge. Philosophia 12 (December):81-98.
  41.  23
    R. A. Fumerton (1976). Inferential Justification and Empiricism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (17):557-569.
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  42.  37
    Gilbert Harman (1976). Inferential Justification. Journal of Philosophy 73 (17):570-571.
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  43. Robert B. Brandom (2002). Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell's Empiricism. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge
     
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  44.  13
    Josep E. Corbí (2000). The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs. Philosophical Issues 10 (1):377-385.
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  45.  14
    Josep E. Corbi (2000). The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs. Noûs 34 (s1):377 - 385.
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  46. Alexander Bird (2004). Is Knowledge Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly:252-65.
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  47. Christopher Hookway (2000). Scepticism and the Principle of Inferential Justification. Philosophical Issues 10 (1):344-365.
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  48. Hamid Vahid (2008). Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification. Erkenntnis 69 (3):295-313.
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  49.  73
    Jan Almäng (2014). Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments. Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.
    It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and judgments can nevertheless have the same cognitive (...)
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  50.  12
    Jukka Varelius (2015). Is the Non-Rivalrousness of Intellectual Objects a Problem for the Moral Justification of Economic Rights to Intellectual Property? Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (4):895-906.
    It is often argued that the fact that intellectual objects—objects like ideas, inventions, concepts, and melodies—can be used by several people simultaneously makes intellectual property rights impossible or particularly difficult to morally justify. In this article, I assess the line of criticism of intellectual ownership in connection with a central category of intellectual property rights, economic rights to intellectual property. I maintain that it is unconvincing.
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