Search results for 'non-propositional attitudes' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sean Crawford (2014). Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes? Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.score: 390.0
    Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as (...)
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  2. Barbara Hannan (1990). `Non-Scientific Realism' About Propositional Attitudes as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):21-31.score: 314.0
    Two arguments are discussed which have been advanced in support of eliminative materialism: the argument from reductionism and the argument from functionalism. It is contended that neither of these arguments is effective if "non-scientific realism" is adopted with regard to commonsense propositional attitude psychology and its embedded notions. "Non-scientific realism," the position that commonsense propositional attitude psychology is an independently legitimate descriptive/explanatory framework, neither in competition with science nor vulnerable to being shown false by science, is defended.
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  3. Alex Grzankowski (2013). Non‐Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.score: 312.0
    Intentionality, or the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for things, remains central in the philosophy of mind. But the study of intentionality in the analytic tradition has been dominated by discussions of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, and visual perception. There are, however, intentional states that aren't obviously propositional attitudes. For example, Indiana Jones fears snakes, Antony loves Cleopatra, and Jane hates the monster under her bed. The present paper explores such (...)
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  4. Veikko Rantala (1982). Quantified Modal Logic: Non-Normal Worlds and Propositional Attitudes. Studia Logica 41 (1):41 - 65.score: 297.0
    One way to obtain a comprehensive semantics for various systems of modal logic is to use a general notion of non-normal world. In the present article, a general notion of modal system is considered together with a semantic framework provided by such a general notion of non-normal world. Methodologically, the main purpose of this paper is to provide a logical framework for the study of various modalities, notably prepositional attitudes. Some specific systems are studied together with semantics using non-normal (...)
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  5. Alex Grzankowski (2014). Attitudes Towards Objects. Noûs 48 (3).score: 297.0
    This paper offers a positive account of an important but under-explored class of mental states, non-propositional attitudes such as loving one’s department, liking lattice structures, fearing Freddy Krueger, and hating Sherlock Holmes. In broadest terms, the view reached (called ‘Non-propositional Intentionalism’) is a representationalist account guided by two puzzles. The proposal allows one to say in an elegant way what differentiates a propositional attitude from an attitude merely about a proposition. The proposal also allows one to offer (...)
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  6. Søren Harnow Klausen (2008). The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):445-462.score: 297.0
    Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional (...) may be transparent, just like sensations and emotions are commonly held to be: there may be no appropriate way of describing their phenomenal character apart from describing the properties and objects they represent. (shrink)
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  7. Alex Grzankowski (2012). Not All Attitudes Are Propositional. European Journal of Philosophy:n/a-n/a.score: 288.0
  8. David Landy (2005). Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.score: 285.0
    Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a (...)
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  9. Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.) (forthcoming). Non-Propositional Attitudes.score: 270.0
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  10. Diana Ackerman (1979). Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes and Non-Descriptive Connotations. Philosophical Studies 35 (1):55 - 69.score: 261.0
  11. Hanoch Ben-Yami (1997). Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.score: 219.0
    The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ‘S Vs that p’. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. A reason for the characterization relying on (...)
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  12. Sørenarnow H. Klausen (2008). The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).score: 213.0
    Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional (...) may be transparent, just like sensations and emotions are commonly held to be: there may be no appropriate way of describing their phenomenal character apart from describing the properties and objects they represent. (shrink)
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  13. Howard Burdick (1982). A Logical Form for the Propositional Attitudes. Synthese 52 (2):185 - 230.score: 179.0
    The author puts forth an approach to propositional attitude contexts based upon the view that one does not have beliefs of ordinary extensional entitiessimpliciter. Rather, one has beliefs of such entities as presented in various manners. Roughly, these are treated as beliefs of ordered pairs — the first member of which is the ordinary extensional entity and the second member of which is a predicate that it satisfies. Such an approach has no difficulties with problems involving identity, such as of (...)
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  14. J. Christopher Maloney (1990). Mental Misrepresentation. Philosophy of Science 57 (September):445-58.score: 171.0
    An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibility. Nevertheless, the proposal may suffer from two deficiencies: (1) It seems (...)
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  15. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1988). How to Be Realistic About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.score: 171.0
    Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps (...)
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  16. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.score: 168.0
    The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works.
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  17. Thomas Kelly (2002). The Rationality of Belief and Other Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.score: 168.0
    In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality of doing so. Special attention is given to various ways in which one might attempt to exert some measure of control over what one believes and the normative status of the beliefs that result from the successful execution of such projects. I argue that the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we (...)
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  18. Robert J. Matthews (2007/2010). The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution. Oxford University Press.score: 168.0
    A prospective introduction -- The received view -- Troubles with the received view -- Are propositional attitudes relations? -- Foundations of a measurement-theoretic account of the attitudes -- The basic measurement-theoretic account -- Elaboration and explication of the proposed measurement-theoretic account.
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  19. Richard H. Feldman (1986). Davidson's Theory of Propositional Attitudes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.score: 168.0
    Donald davidson has proposed an account of indirect discourse that has been the subject of a great deal of discussion. Critics have contended that the theory saddles sentences in indirect discourse with implications they do not have, That the theory rests on an unsuitably obscure primitive notion that it cannot be extended to "de re" constructions and that it cannot be extended to sentences about other propositional attitudes such as belief. In this paper, I formulate davidson's theory more precisely (...)
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  20. Michael Morreau & Sarit Kraus (1998). Syntactical Treatments of Propositional Attitudes. Artificial Intelligence 106 (1):161-177.score: 168.0
    Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes are attractive to artificial intelligence researchers. But results of Montague (1974) and Thomason (1980) seem to show that syntactical treatments are not viable. They show that if representation languages are sufficiently expressive, then axiom schemes characterizing knowledge and belief give rise to paradox. Des Rivières and Levesque (1988) characterize a class of sentences within which these schemes can safely be instantiated. These sentences do not quantify over the propositional objects of knowledge and belief. We (...)
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  21. Adam Morton (2009). From Tracking Relations to Propositional Attitudes. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):7-18.score: 168.0
    I explore the possibility that propositional attitudes are not basic in folk psychology, and that what we really ascribe to people are relations to individuals, those that the apparently propositional contents of beliefs, desires, and other states concern. In particular, the relation between a state and the individuals that it tracks shows how ascription of propositional attitudes could grow out of ascription of relations between people and objects.
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  22. Alessandro Capone (2013). The Pragmatics of Pronominal Clitics and Propositional Attitudes. Intercultural Pragmatics 10 (3):459-485.score: 168.0
    pronominal clitics, pragmatics and propositional attitudes.
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  23. William S. Robinson (2005). Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.score: 164.0
    Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think (...)
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  24. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Brentano's Simple Attitudes. In Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. OUP.score: 156.0
    According to what I will refer to as the ‘received view,’ at least some intentional states are propositional attitudes, construed as relations to propositions (§1). The received view faces some extraordinary difficulties (§2). In this paper, I propose that these difficulties may be avoided if we adopt the radically different view of intentional states developed by Franz Brentano. Brentano’s view is different from the received view in two crucial respects. First, according to Brentano every intentional state is an objectual (...)
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  25. Robert M. Gordon (2007). Ascent Routines for Propositional Attitudes. Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165.score: 153.3
    An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying our (...)
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  26. Emar Maier, Parasitic Attitudes.score: 153.0
    Karttunen observes that a presupposition triggered in an x hopes that complement, can be filtered out by a seemingly inaccessible antecedent under the scope of a preceding x believes that ascription. I show that the problem evaporates once we enrich our semantics of attitude ascriptions with some independently argued assumptions on the structure and interpre- tation of mental states. In particular, I argue that mental states consist of acquaintance-based mental files and variously labeled attitude compartments, laid out in a DRT-like (...)
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  27. Mark E. Richard (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.score: 152.0
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues (...)
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  28. Mark Richard (2013). Context and the Attitudes. Oxford University Press.score: 147.0
    The collection addresses a range of topics in philosophical semantics and philosophy of mind, and is accompanied by a new Introduction which discusses attitudes realized by dispositions and other non-linguistic cognitive structures.
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  29. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of Propositional Attitudes Capture the Agent's Conception? Noûs 36 (4):597-621.score: 146.0
    Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are.
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  30. Jerry A. Fodor (1978). Propositional Attitudes. The Monist 61 (October):501-23.score: 140.0
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  31. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concept Individuation, Possession Conditions, and Propositional Attitudes. Noûs 39 (1):140-66.score: 140.0
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  32. C. Anthony Anderson (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.score: 140.0
  33. Keith Quillen (1986). Propositional Attitudes and Psychological Explanation. Mind and Language 1 (2):133-57.score: 140.0
  34. M. F. Egan (1991). Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (September):379-88.score: 140.0
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  35. Bennett Holman (2011). Restrictive Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Philosophia 39 (1):61-70.score: 140.0
    It has been argued that naturalizing the mind will result in the elimination of the ontology of folk psychology (e.g. beliefs and desires). This paper draws from a wide range of empirical literature, including from developmental and cross-cultural psychology, in building an argument for a position dubbed restrictive materialism . The position holds that while the ontology of folk psychology is overextended, there is a restricted domain in which the application of the folk ontology remains secure. From the evidence of (...)
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  36. Donald Brownstein (1985). Individuating Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):205-212.score: 140.0
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  37. Lex Guichard (1995). The Causal Efficacy of Propositional Attitudes. In Cognitive Patterns in Science and Common Sense. Amsterdam: Rodopi.score: 140.0
     
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  38. Anders Johan Schoubye (2013). Ghosts, Murderers, and the Semantics of Descriptions. Noûs 47 (3):496-533.score: 137.0
    It is widely agreed that sentences containing a non-denoting description embedded in the scope of a propositional attitude verb have true de dicto interpretations, and Russell's (1905) analysis of definite descriptions is often praised for its simple analysis of such cases, cf. e.g. Neale (1990). However, several people, incl. Elbourne (2005, 2009), Heim (1991), and Kripke (2005), have contested this by arguing that Russell's analysis yields incorrect predictions in non-doxastic attitude contexts. Heim and Elbourne have subsequently argued that once certain (...)
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  39. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Entertaining as a Propositional Attitude: A Non-Reductive Characterization. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):1-22.score: 135.0
  40. Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson (2014). Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem. Mind 123 (489):1-38.score: 124.0
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any (...)
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  41. Jan Almäng (2014). Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments. Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.score: 124.0
    It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and judgments can nevertheless have the same cognitive (...)
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  42. Clas Weber (2012). Eternalism and Propositional Multitasking: In Defence of the Operator Argument. Synthese 189 (1):199-219.score: 114.0
    It is a widely held view in philosophy that propositions perform a plethora of different theoretical roles. Amongst other things, they are believed to be the semantic values of sentences in contexts, the objects of attitudes, the contents of illocutionary acts, and the referents of that-clauses. This assumption is often combined with the claim that propositions have their truth-values eternally. In this paper I aim to show that these two assumptions are incompatible: propositions cannot both fulfill the mentioned roles (...)
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  43. Manuel Rebuschi & Tero Tulenheimo (2011). Between de Dicto and de Re: De Objecto Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):828-838.score: 114.0
    Hintikka's second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions can be reformulated in terms of quantifier independence, but the reformulation does not extend to non-factive attitudes like belief. There, formulae with independent quantifiers serve to express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, called ‘de objecto’: in each possible world compatible with the agent's belief, there is an individual with the specified (...)
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  44. Howard Burdick (1993). Non-Essentialistic Modal Logic or Meaning and Necessity Revisited. Philosophia 22 (1-2):87-93.score: 114.0
    Using the method of ordered pairs proposed in my 'A Logical Form for the Propositional Attitudes', a non-essentialistic modal logic is possible which avoids these oddities.
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  45. Hans Johann Glock, Animal Minds: A Non-Representationalist Approach.score: 114.0
    Do animals have minds? We have known at least since Aristotle that humans constitute one species of animal. And some benighted contemporaries apart, we also know that most humans have minds. To have any bite, therefore, the question must be restricted to non-human animals, to which I shall henceforth refer simply as "animals." I shall further assume that animals are bereft of linguistic faculties. So, do some animals have minds comparable to those of humans? As regards that question, there are (...)
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  46. Hans-Johann Glock (2013). Animal Minds: A Non-Representationalist Approach. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):213-232.score: 114.0
    Do animals have minds? We have known at least since Aristotle that humans constitute one species of animal. And some benighted contemporaries apart, we also know that most humans have minds. To have any bite, therefore, the question must be restricted to non-human animals, to which I shall henceforth refer simply as "animals." I shall further assume that animals are bereft of linguistic faculties. So, do some animals have minds comparable to those of humans? As regards that question, there are (...)
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  47. Indrek Reiland (2012). Propositional Attitudes and Mental Acts. Thought 1 (3):239-245.score: 112.0
    Peter Hanks and Scott Soames have recently developed similar views of propositional attitudes on which they consist at least partly of being disposed to perform mental acts. Both think that to believe a proposition is at least partly to be disposed to perform the primitive propositional act: one the performance of which is part of the performance of any other propositional act. However, they differ over whether the primitive act is the forceless entertaining or the forceful judging. In this (...)
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  48. John Zeimbekis (2004). Propositional Attitudes in Fiction. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.score: 112.0
    Theories that seek to explain the status of psychological states experienced in fictional contexts either claim that those states are special propositional attitudes specific to fictional contexts (make-believe attitudes), or else define them as normal propositional attitudes by stretching the concept of a propositional attitude to include ‘objectless’ states that do not imply constraints such as truth or satisfaction. I argue that the first theory is either vacuous or false, and that the second, by defining the reality (...)
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  49. Jay David Atlas, Aboutness, Fiction, and Quantifying Into Intentional Contexts: A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on The..score: 112.0
    A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on the Active/Passive Mood Distinction in English, etc.
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  50. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2010). The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.score: 112.0
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and (...)
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