. Three logical squares of predication or quantification, which one can even extend to logical hexagons, will be presented and analyzed. All three squares are based on ideas of the non-traditional theory of predication developed by Sinowjew and Wessel. The authors also designed a non-traditional theory of quantification. It will be shown that this theory is superfluous, since it is based on an obscure difference between two kinds of quantification and one pays a (...) high price for differentiating in this way: losing the definability between the existence- and all-quantifier. Therefore, a combination of non-traditional predication and classical quantification is preferred here. (shrink)

The present work takes the decease of Horst Wessel as an opportunity to present and honour his work (and that of his group), which has not received the attention it deserves. The focus will be on works which might not be sufficiently well-known. Wessel was, as we aim to show, familiar with the international debate concerning logical and philosophical issues and strived to solve them by considering theories of logical consequence, a non-traditional theory of predication and the (...) theory of logical terms, all of which he developed in joint work with Alexander Sinowjew. Wessel had to significantly refine these theories in order to formulate his criticism towards alternative logics and to apply the theories to a treatment of intensional contexts. He was vehemently opposed to approaches which revised fundamental laws of classical logic. Questions concerning the history of Philosophy are addressed in Wessel’s criticism of the Kantian antinomies of pure reason, in Wessel’s contributions to the problem of universals and his analyses of fatalism, tychism and antifatalism. (shrink)

In Book 3 of 'On Abstinence from Animal Food', Porphyry is traditionally taken to be arguing in favour of the belief that animals are rational. However, elsewhere in his corpus, he endorses the opposite view, declaring that man differs from other mortal animals because he is rational and they are irrational. Jonathan Barnes offers a way of understanding Porphyry’s logical theory which is intended to make it consistent with the traditional interpretation of 'On Abstinence'. He suggests that the (...) same predicate can be related to different subjects in different ways. Porphyry’s claim that man differs from other mortal animals with respect to the predicate ‘rational’, is best understood to mean that whereas ‘rational’ is specifically predicated of man, it is non-specifically predicated of animals. This explains how they differ from man with respect to this predicate, without failing to be rational. This paper argues that there are reasons for rejecting Barnes’ interpretation. Barnes must maintain, for example, that animals possess the apparently incompatible properties of being specifically irrational and non-specifically rational simultaneously. Since Barnes fails to resolve the conflict, Porphyry’s claims that animals are irrational in his logical works pose a significant problem for the traditional interpretation of 'On Abstinence'. (shrink)

An account of non-existing objects called 'classical possibilism', according to which objects that don't actually exist do exist in various other ways, is implemented in a two-dimensional modal logic with non-traditional predication theory. This account is very similar to Priest's, but preserves bivalence and does not endorse dialethism. The power of classical possibilism is illustrated by giving some examples that makes use of a description theory of reference. However, the same effect could also be achieved in (...) a more Millian fashion. It is argued that classical possibilism is ontologically more neutral than is commonly thought, because it allows for the formulation of various forms of reductionism within the object language. (shrink)

Kathryn Parsons attempts a criticism of the traditional approach to the problem of meaning invariance of predicate expressions when a theory is replaced by a successor. I have considered three types of cases which Parsons presents as counter-examples to Fine's criterion, and find that the first two do not succeed in refuting the criterion. The third, however, does suceed; and I argue that there is no way to revise Fine's criterion in order to remove the difficulty. Hence some (...) non-traditional approach to meaning invariance is required, or subjectivity in the science must be shown to be avoidable in spite of the incommensurability of theories. (shrink)

The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory (...) validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker-than-classical K3 logic. I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to--whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non-classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities. (shrink)

Assesses the limits and possibilities of humanism for engaging with issues of pressing political and cultural concern. In his book The End of Education: Toward Posthumanism, William V. Spanos critiqued the traditional Western concept of humanism, arguing that its origins are to be found not in ancient Greece’s love of truth and wisdom, but in the Roman imperial era, when those Greek values were adapted in the service of imperialism on a deeply rooted, metaphysical level. Returning to that question (...) of humanism in the context of the United States’ war on terror in the post-9/11 era, Toward a Non-humanist Humanism points out the dehumanizing dynamics of Western modernity in which the rule of law is increasingly made flexible to defend against threats both real and potential. Spanos considers and assesses the work of thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, Jacques Rancière, and Slavoj Žižek as humanistic reformers and concludes with an effort to imagine a different kind of humanism—a non-humanist humanism—in which the old binary of friend versus foe gives way to a coming community without ethnic, cultural, or sexual divisions. William V. Spanos is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of English and Comparative Literature at Binghamton University, State University of New York. He is the author of many books, including American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam and Herman Melville and the American Calling: The Fiction after Moby-Dick, 1851–1857, both also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s notion of material inference and (...) Greg Restall’s bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates. (shrink)

Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s notion of material inference and (...) Greg Restall’s bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates. (shrink)

Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is his study of patterns of reasoning about necessity and possibility. Many scholars think the modal syllogistic is incoherent, a ‘realm of darkness’. Others think it is coherent, but devise complicated formal modellings to mimic Aristotle’s results. This volume provides a simple interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic using standard predicate logic. Rini distinguishes between red terms, such as ‘horse’, ‘plant’ or ‘man’, which name things in virtue of features those things must have, and green terms, such as (...) ‘moving’, which name things in virtue of their non-necessary features. By applying this distinction to the Prior Analytics, Rini shows how traditional interpretive puzzles about the modal syllogistic melt away and the simple structure of Aristotle’s own proofs is revealed. The result is an applied logic which provides needed links between Aristotle’s views of science and logical demonstration. The volume is particularly valuable to researchers and students of the history of logic, Aristotle’s theory of modality, and the philosophy of logic in general. (shrink)

I offer an account of truth that combines elements of deflationism and traditional correspondence theories. We need such an intermediary account, I argue, in order to adequately answer two kinds of questions: "Why do we find it obvious that 'p' is true iff p?" and "Why is it contingent that 'p' is true iff p?" If what it is for 'p' to be true is explained by simply saying that p, as the deflationist claims, it is hard to see (...) how it could be contingent that 'p' is true iff p. But if it is claimed instead that what it is for a sentence to be true is for it to correspond to a fact, we still need some explanation of why 'p's correspondence with reality insure that p, and vice versa. What we need, I claim, is to recognize a structure to truth: truth for sentences, utterances, and other non-propositional entities depends on, and is analyzable in terms of, the expression of true propositions. Propositional truth can then be treated as insubstantial, as deflationary, and truth for other entities as substantial, consisting of correspondence to a fact . ;This account of truth, which I call Weak Deflationism, anchors the dissertation. In an introductory chapter, I give a partial defense of realism about propositions and properties, later defending Platonism against attacks by David Lewis. After formulating Weak Deflationism, I examine its implications for such matters as the "absurd comparison" objection, the truthmaker project in ontology, and non-factualist theories in metaethics. In a final chapter, I provide a Kripke-inspired modification of Weak Deflationism aimed to avoid liar-like paradox. Premised on a distinction between propositions that predicatively involve truth, i.e., truth-dependent propositions, and those that do not, truth-independent propositions, I argue that truth for the latter is deflationary and that truth for the former consists in being determined by the totality of truth-independent fact. Falsity is understood as truth of the negation. Liars are then counted neither true nor false, and paradox is averted. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a complete Natural Kind Semantics for an Essentialist Theory of Kinds. The theory is formulated in two-sorted first order monadic modal logic with identity. The natural kind semantics is based on Rudolf Willes Theory of Concept Lattices. The semantics is then used to explain several consequences of the theory, including results about the specificity (species–genus) relations between kinds, the definitions of kinds in terms of genera and specific differences (...) and the existence of negative kinds. First, I show under which conditions the Hierarchy principle, which has been subjected to counterexamples in the literature, holds. I also show that a different principle about the species–genus relations between kinds, namely Kant’s Law, follows from the essentialist theory. Second, I introduce two new operations for kinds and show that they can be used to provide traditional definitions of kinds in terms of genera and specific differences. Finally, I show that these operations of specific difference induce, for each kind, a uniquely specified contrary kind and a uniquely specified subcontrary kind, which can be used as semantic values for non-classical predicate negations of kind terms. (shrink)

In so-called Kripke-type models, each sentence is assigned either to true or to false at each possible world. In this setting, every possible world has the two-valued Boolean algebra as the set of truth values. Instead, we take a collection of algebras each of which is attached to a world as the set of truth values at the world, and obtain an extended semantics based on the traditional Kripke-type semantics, which we call here the algebraic Kripke semantics. We introduce (...) algebraic Kripke sheaf semantics for super-intuitionistic and modal predicate logics, and discuss some basic properties. We can state the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski translation theorem within this semantics. Further, we show new results on super-intuitionistic predicate logics. We prove that there exists a continuum of super-intuitionistic predicate logics each of which has both of the disjunction and existence properties and moreover the same propositional fragment as the intuitionistic logic. (shrink)

In the Organon Aristotle describes some deductive schemata in which inconsistencies do not entail the trivialization of the logical theory involved. This thesis is corroborated by three different theoretical topics by him discussed, which are presented in this paper. We analyse inference schema used by Aristotle in the Protrepticus and the method of indirect demonstration for categorical syllogisms. Both methods exemplify as Aristotle employs classical reductio ad absurdum strategies. Following, we discuss valid syllogisms from opposite premises (contrary and contradictory) (...) studied by the Stagerian in the Analytica Priora (B15). According to him, the following syllogisms are valid from opposite premises, in which small Latin letters stand for terms such as subject and predicate, and capital Latin letters stand for the categorical propositions such as in the traditional notation: (i) in the second figure, Eba,Aba ` Eaa (Cesare), Aba, Eba ` Eaa (Camestres), Eba, I ba ` Oaa (Festino), and Aba,Oba ` Oaa (Baroco); (ii) in the third one, Eab,Aab ` Oaa (Felapton), Oab,Aab ` Oaa (Bocardo) and Eab, Iab ` Oaa (Ferison). Finally, we discuss the passage from the Analytica Posteriora (A11) in which Aristotle states that the Principle of Non-Contradiction is not generally presupposed in all demonstrations (scientific syllogisms), but only in those in which the conclusion must be proved from the Principle; the Stagerian states that if a syllogism of the first figure has the major term consistent, the other terms of the demonstration can be each one separately inconsistent. These results allow us to propose an interpretation of his deductive theory as a broad sense paraconsistent theory. Firstly, we proceed to a hermeneutical analysis, evaluating its logical significance and the interplay of the results with some other points of Aristotle’s philosophy. Secondly, we point to a logical interpretation of the Aristotelian syllogisms from opposite premises in the antilogisms method proposed by Christine Ladd-Franklin in 1883, and we also present a logical treatment of the Aristotelian demonstration with inconsistent material in the paraconsistent logics Cn, 1 _ n _!, introduced by da Costa in 1963. These two issues seem having not yet been analysed in detail in the literature. (shrink)

This study integrates institutional theory and social cognitive theory to describe how peripheral organizations can accidentally bring about radical change even in highly institutionalized and change-resistant fields. The empirical context is the field of banking in Ireland (1995–2001), where a peripheral bank triggered a shift away from traditionally conservative and risk-averse banking values toward aggressive values of entrepreneurial risk taking. The introduction of a new approach to banking was attributed to three factors: (1) a benevolent environment, which made (...) this innovation feasible and timely, (2) the state of the field, which had gaps that could be addressed through specialization, and (3) prior successes, which created hubris in the senior managers, thereby increasing the pace and scope of adoption of this approach. Eventually, what started as a specialized and entrepreneurial approach led to the spread of a risky approach to banking across the entire field. The study highlights the risks of hubris, in that media praise and early successes can increase the pace of adoption of innovations which offer short-term gains but are detrimental in the long term. (shrink)

. In the 18th century, Gottfried Ploucquet developed a new syllogistic logic where the categorical forms are interpreted as set-theoretical identities, or diversities, between the full extension, or a non-empty part of the extension, of the subject and the predicate. With the help of two operators ‘O’ (for “Omne”) and ‘Q’ (for “Quoddam”), the UA and PA are represented as ‘O(S) – Q(P)’ and ‘Q(S) – Q(P)’, respectively, while UN and PN take the form ‘O(S) > O(P)’ and ‘Q(S) > (...) O(P)’, where ‘>’ denotes set-theoretical disjointness. The use of the symmetric operators ‘–’ and ‘>’ gave rise to a new conception of conversion which in turn lead Ploucquet to consider also the unorthodox propositions O(S) – O(P), Q(S) – O(P), O(S) > Q(P), and Q(S) > Q(P). Although Ploucquet’s critique of the traditional theory of opposition turns out to be mistaken, his theory of the “Quantification of the Predicate” is basically sound and involves an interesting “Double Square of Opposition”. (shrink)

Tolerance is claimed not just as central to liberalism, but increasingly as the sole preserve of a liberal order. This essay opens up a critical space for examining the naturalized relationship between liberalism and tolerance by focusing on the political thought of Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, a prominent Pakistani public intellectual who is often labeled as a “liberal” Islamic thinker. Ghamidi has never identified himself as one. Using as an investigative opportunity the disjuncture between his self-identification and how his ideas are (...) labeled, and placing Ghamidi’s ideas within the wider tradition of Islamic thought, this essay elaborates on his vision of non-liberal tolerance predicated on individual responsibility infused with humility and shari’a-inspired state minimalism. Insight into the depth of nonliberal conceptions can facilitate a reconsideration of the relationship between liberalism and tolerance. (shrink)

This book covers a broad range of topics in the history of economics that have relevance to economic theories. The author believes that one of the tasks for a historian of economics is to analyze and interpret theories currently outside the mainstream of economic theory, in this case non-Walrasian economics. By doing so, he argues, new directions and new areas for research can be developed that will extend the current theories. Familiar topics covered include: the division of labor, economies (...) of scale, wages, profit, international trade, market mechanisms, and money. These are considered in the light of the well-known non-Walrasian schools of thought: the classical, Marxian, Austrian, and Cambridge schools. (shrink)

In this paper we present a study of adjectival/adverbial modification using modern type theories, i.e. type theories within the tradition of Martin-Löf. We present an account of various issues concerning adjectival/adverbial modification and argue that MTTs can be used as an adequate language for interpreting NL semantics. MTTs are not only expressive enough to deal with a range of modification phenomena, but are furthermore well-suited to perform reasoning tasks that can be easily implemented given their proof-theoretic nature. In MTT-semantics, common (...) nouns are interpreted as types rather than predicates. Therefore, in order to capture the semantics of adjectives adequately, one needs to meet the challenge of modeling CNs modified by adjectives as types. To explicate that this can be done successfully, we first look at the mainstream classification of adjectives, i.e. intersective, subsective and non-subsective adjectives. There, we show that the rich type structure available in MTTs, along with a suitable subtyping framework, offers an adequate mechanism to model these cases. In particular, this modelling naturally takes care of the characterising inferences associated with each class of adjectives. Then, more advanced issues on adjectival modification are discussed: degree adjectives, comparatives and multidimensional adjectives. There, it is shown that the use of indexed types can be usefully applied in order to deal with these cases. In the same vein, the issue of adverbial modification is discussed. We study two general typings for sentence and VP adverbs respectively. It is shown that the rich type structure in MTTs further provides useful organisational mechanisms in giving formal semantics for adverbs. In particular, we discuss the use of \-types to capture the veridicality/non-veridicality distinction and further discuss cases of intensional adverbs using the type theoretic notion of context. We also look at manner, subject and speech act adverbials and propose solutions using MTTs. Finally, we show that the current proof technology can help mechanically check the associated inferences. A number of our proposals concerning adjectival and adverbial modification have been formalised in the proof assistant Coq and many of the associated inference patterns are checked to be correctly captured. (shrink)

Leibniz's development of a "calculus universalis" stands and falls with his theory of negation. During the entire period of the elaboration of the algebra of concepts, L1, Leibniz had to struggle hard to grasp the difference between propositional and conceptual negation. Within the framework of syllogistic, this difference seems to disappear because 'Omne A non B' may be taken to be equivalent to ‘Omne A est non-B’. Within the "universal calculus", however, the informal quantifier expression 'omne' is to be (...) dropped. Accordingly, ‘A non est B' expresses only the propositional negation of ‘A est B' and is hence logically weaker than ‘A est non-B'. Besides Leibniz's cardinal error of confusing propositional and conceptual negation the following issues are dealt with in this paper: -"Aristotelian" vs. "Scholastic" Syllogistic; – Metalinguistic theory of the truth-predicate; -Individual-concepts vs. concepts in general. (shrink)

Plural definite descriptions across many languages display two well-known properties. First, they can give rise to so-called non-maximal readings, in the sense that they ‘allow for exceptions’. Second, while they tend to have a quasi-universal quantificational force in affirmative sentences, they tend to be interpreted existentially in the scope of negation. Building on previous works, we offer a theory in which sentences containing plural definite expressions trigger a family of possible interpretations, and where general principles of language use account (...) for their interpretation in various contexts and syntactic environments. Our theory solves a number of problems that these previous works encounter, and has broader empirical coverage in that it offers a precise analysis for sentences that display complex interactions between plural definites, quantifiers and bound variables, as well as for cases involving non-distributive predicates. The resulting proposal is briefly compared with an alternative proposal by Križ, which has similar coverage but is based on a very different architecture and sometimes makes subtly different predictions. (shrink)

An enlargement of a previous work by the author, this work is intended as a reference source for study in the theory of models of logical systems, and as a textbook; the latter aim is reached by including numerous problems, many of them of a high level of difficulty, at the end of each chapter. The sections deal with, respectively, the lower predicate calculus, the structure of algebraic theories, concepts from model theory, completeness of various systems, definability of (...) concepts, generalizations of algebraic concepts, the metamathematical theories of ideals and varieties, and various selected topics including non-standard analysis. Unfortunately, there are numerous misprints which mar an otherwise excellent presentation. Much of the material presented is new, or is presented in new form. Robinson's approach is mildly idiosyncratic and often at variance with more conventional presentations, and this may make for difficulty in relating it to these presentations. Nevertheless, for the reader with a working knowledge of algebra and no small perseverance, this book will be rewarding.—P. J. M. (shrink)

Among the means of valid cognition, the one which appears first in every enumeration, which was considered as being the basis of all other means of knowledge and which was considered as a legitimate method of knowledge by all schools of Indian thought is perception (pratyakṣa). With regard to perception, we can naturally expect such questions as ‘what is it to perceive’ or ‘what do we mean when we say that something is perceived’. It is generally believed that the philosophical (...) theories of perceptions are really theories about what we mean by ordinary perceptual statements. In considering our knowledge about the external world, the philosopher tends to consider the way in which perception can and does provide us with the knowledge and the nature, extent and certainty of knowledge it provides us with. It is a well acknowledged fact that perception is the fundamental source of knowledge. In Buddhist epistemology, a systematic discussion on perception is found in the writings of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya with vṛitti, who belongs to Yogācāra school of Buddhism of Mahayana tradition. An attempt has been made in this paper to explain and examine critically the first chapter of Pramāṇasamuccaya with vṛitti, i.e., perception with special reference to Non-Buddhist schools, namely Nyāyayikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṁkhyans and Mīmāṁsakas. To explain it, the paper has been divided into three sections. Section I deals with Dignāga’s theory of perception and examination of non-Buddhist school's theory of perception, section II deals with Dignāga’s examination of nature of Perception with reference to non-Buddhists schools and section III deals with conclusion. (shrink)

This article reports that some robustness of the notions of predicativity and of autonomous progression is broken down if as the given infinite total entity we choose some mathematical entities other than the traditionalω. Namely, the equivalence between normal transfinite recursion scheme and newdependent transfinite recursionscheme, which does hold in the context of subsystems of second order number theory, does not hold in the context of subsystems of second order set theory where the universeVof sets is treated as (...) the given totality. (shrink)

I use a theorem from machine learning, called the “No Free Lunch” theorem to support the claim that non-epistemic values are essential to theory choice. I argue that NFL entails that predictive accuracy is insufficient to favor a given theory over others, and that NFL challenges our ability to give a purely epistemic justification for using other traditional epistemic virtues in theory choice. In addition, I argue that the natural way to overcome NFL’s challenge is to (...) use non-epistemic values. If my argument holds, non-epistemic values are entangled in theory choice regardless of human limitations and regardless of the subject matter. Thereby, my argument overcomes objections to the main lines of argument revealing the role of values in theory choice. At the end of the paper, I argue that, contrary to common conception, the epistemic challenge arising from NFL is distinct from Hume’s problem of induction and other forms of underdetermination. (shrink)

We propose a set theory, called NRFST, in which the Cantorian axiom of infinity is negated, and a new notion of infinity is introduced via non standard methods, i. e. via adequate notions of standard and internal, two unary predicates added to the language of ZF. After some initial results on NRFST, we investigate its relative consistency with respect to ZF and Kawai's WNST.

This book addresses prominent views on the nature of the self in Indian philosophical traditions and presents Buddhist critiques of those conceptions through the translation and commentary on Śāntarakṣita's chapter in the Tattvasaṃgraha on theories of a self and Kamala-śīla's commentary on it in his Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā. The book is comprised of an introduction presenting the theories of a self in the Indian Buddhist Middle Way philosophies and in the different philosophical schools Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla study and offers a background for (...) the translation. The detailed translation that follows reveals the theories of a self that are explained in the philosophical schools in India called the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Jain, Advaita Vedanta, and Vātsīputrīya. It is complemented by a thorough commentary by the author which brings the text to light for a modern audience. A useful contribution to Indian philosophy and global philosophy, this book will be of interest to researchers in the fields of Philosophy, Religious Studies and Buddhist Studies. (shrink)

This paper shows how the universals of category theory in mathematics provide a model (in the Platonic Heaven of mathematics) for the self-predicative strand of Plato's Theory of Forms as well as for the idea of a "concrete universal" in Hegel and similar ideas of paradigmatic exemplars in ordinary thought. The paper also shows how the always-self-predicative universals of category theory provide the "opposite bookend" to the never-self-predicative universals of iterative set theory and thus that the (...) paradoxes arose from having one theory (e.g., Frege's Paradise) where universals could be either self-predicative or non-self-predicative (instead of being always one or always the other). (shrink)

In ${\mathbf{H}}$ , a set theory with the comprehension principle within Łukasiewicz infinite-valued predicate logic, we prove that a statement which can be interpreted as “there is an infinite descending sequence of initial segments of ω” is truth value 1 in any model of ${\mathbf{H}}$ , and we prove an analogy of Hájek’s theorem with a very simple procedure.

Theorists of aesthetic value since Hume have traditionally aimed to justify at least some comparative judgments of aesthetic value and to explain why we thereby have more reason to appreciate some aesthetic objects than others. I argue that three recent theories of aesthetic value—Thi Nguyen’s and Matthew Strohl’s engagement theories, Nick Riggle’s communitarian theory, and Dominic McIver Lopes’ network theory—face a challenge to carry out this explanatory task in a satisfactory way. I defend a monotonicity principle according to (...) which the strength of our aesthetic reasons to appreciate varies monotonically with aesthetic value and claim that these theories, because they do not respect the principle, are non-monotonic. If they cannot find a plausible way to preserve the link between the aesthetic goodness of an object and our aesthetic reasons to appreciate it, these non-monotonic theories should be rejected. (shrink)

Panarchy is a normative political meta-theory that advocates non-territorial states founded on actual social contracts that are explicitly negotiated and signed between states and their prospective citizens. The explicit social contract, or a constitution, sets the terms under which a state may use coercion against its citizens and the conditions under which the contract may be annulled, revised, rescinded, or otherwise exited from. Panarchy does not advocate any particular model of the state or social justice, but intends to encourage (...) political variety, innovation, experimentation, and choice. With its emphasis on explicit social contracts, Panarchy offers an interesting variation on traditional social contract theories. Today, Panarchist political thought is particularly relevant and interesting in the context of globalization, increased international migration, the weakening of national sovereignty, the rise of the internet "cloud" as a non-territorial locus of political and protopolitical social networks that are not geographic, the invention of cryptocurrencies that may replace national currencies, and the rise of urban centers where people of many different political identities live and work together. This is the first volume to bring together key philosophically and politically interesting yet often overlooked Panarchist texts. From the first published translation of de Puydt seminal 1860 article to contemporary Silicon Valley political theory, the volume includes Panarchist texts from different eras, cultures and geographical regions. The amassed wealth of theoretical insight enables readers to compare different texts in this tradition of political thought and distinguish different streams and varieties within this political tradition, in comparison with Cosmopolitanism, Contractarianism, and Anarchism. (shrink)

_Moral Theory_ sets out the basic system used to solve moral problems, the system that consequentialists deride as 'traditional morality'. The central concepts, principles and distinctions of traditional morality are explained and defended: rights; justice; the good; virtue; the intention/foresight distinction; the acts/omissions distinction; and, centrally, the fundamental value of human life.

Developing some suggestions of Ramsey (1925), elementary logic is formulated with respect to an arbitrary categorial system rather than the categorial system of Logical Atomism which is retained in standard elementary logic. Among the many types of non-standard categorial systems allowed by this formalism, it is argued that elementary logic with predicates of variable degree occupies a distinguished position, both for formal reasons and because of its potential value for application of formal logic to natural language and natural science. This (...) is illustrated by use of such a logic to construct a theory of quantity which is argued to be scientifically superior to existing theories of quantity based on standard categorial systems, since it yields real-valued scales without the need for unrealistic existence assumptions. This provides empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the categorial structure of the physical world itself is non-standard in this sense. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Theory of International Bioethics: The Negotiable and the Non-NegotiableRobert Baker (bio)AbstractThe preceding article in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal presents the argument that “moral fundamentalism,” the position that international bioethics rests on “basic” or “fundamental” moral principles that are universally accepted in all eras and cultures, collapses under a variety of multicultural and postmodern critiques. The present article looks to the contractarian tradition (...) of Hobbes and Locke—as reinterpreted by David Gauthier, Robert Nozick, and John Rawls—for an alternative justification for international bioethics. Drawing on the central themes of this tradition, it is argued that international bioethics can be rationally reconstructed as a negotiated moral order that respects culturally and individually defined areas of nonnegotiability. Further, the theory of a negotiated moral order is consistent with traditional ideals about human rights, is flexible enough to absorb the genuine insights of multiculturalism and postmodernism, and yet is strong enough to justify transcultural and transtemporal moral judgments, including the condemnation of the Nazi doctors at Nuremberg. This theory also is consistent with the history of the ethics of human subjects experimentation and offers insights into current controversies such as the controversy over changing the consent rule for experiments in emergency medicine and the controversy over exempting certain clinical trials of inexpensive treatments for preventing the perinatal transmission of AIDS from the ethical standards of the sponsoring country.The Preamble to the Council of Europe’s (1997) Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, the most recently ratified code of international bioethics, is noteworthy because it never mentions “principles,” the concept most frequently cited by the fundamentalists as basic to international bioethics. Instead it stresses rights, a concept that has been utterly ignored by the fundamentalist theorists of international bioethics. The Preamble exemplifies a conception of international [End Page 233] bioethics as an ethics of covenants and conventions grounded in human rights. In the full text of the Preamble, the term “rights” appears eight times and the expressions “convention” and “covenant” are used six times; the term “principle” does not appear at all. In this essay, I develop a theoretical framework for international bioethics based on conventions, covenants, and areas of “nonnegotiability”—a concept that serves as a functional analogue to the traditional notion of “human rights.” I also shall argue that, unlike the theory of basic principles central to moral fundamentalism, the theory of negotiated morality appears immune to the multicultural and postmodern critiques of international bioethics that were analyzed in the preceding article in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (Baker 1998).Negotiated Moral Order: A Model for International BioethicsReconsidering ContractarianismThe linkage of “conventions” and “covenants” with human rights that is evident in the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine traces back directly to the moral and political theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Such philosophers as David Gauthier (1986), Robert Nozick (1974), and John Rawls (1971, 1993) recently have reinvigorated this classic contractarian line of analysis. In this section, I shall reconsider classical contractarian theory from a perspective informed by these more recent analyses.The most riveting feature of all forms of contractarian theory is the metaphor of the contract itself, particularly the legitimating role it accords to assent. Because contractarians look to the assent of those who would be bound by a moral norm as ultimately the sole source of a norm’s legitimacy, the most important corollary of contractarian moral theory is that moral norms are illegitimate insofar as agents either in principle could not, hypothetically would not, or actually will not rationally assent to be bound by them. Contractarians also argue that because legal norms are legitimated by acceptance of the authority of those who promulgate them, the authority of such norms is bounded by the actual or hypothetical assent of the governed. These features of contractarian analysis generate the correlative concepts of human rights and civil rights.Less often remarked, but nonetheless integral to the metaphor of the social contract, is the contractarian recognition that the interests of the [End Page 234] parties who contract to form civil society are naturally in conflict (or, as Hobbes put... (shrink)

The Neuzeit is that of "modern Scholasticism", a period rich in the investigation of logical questions, but relatively neglected by historians and philosophers interested in these matters. Hickman here offers a general outline and interpretation of the major tendencies of Neuzeit theories of second intentions through the examination of several characteristic examples. The opening chapter is devoted primarily to an interpretation of modern scholastic predication theory in terms of class membership and class inclusion, following which he proceeds to (...) a discussion of the sense in which "intention" was used by various authors and schools, distinguishing several basic trends, the more detailed analysis of which occupies the greater part of the book. 1) "Psychologistic Conceptualism and Nominalism", is a series of variations on a single theme, represented here chiefly by William of Ockham for the former and John Major for the latter. Hickman notes that albeit one distinguished first and second intentions, the theory did not formally recognise higher level predicates as such, since intentions were understood as psychological entities and though a second intention was thus considered the concept of a concept or sign or a sign, it nonetheless signifies a first level existent, viz., another sign, really existing in the thinker. The tendency was carried even further, Hickman says, by John Major and his disciples, who tended to neglect in practice the distinction between intentions and words. (shrink)

This essay seeks to demonstrate that there are no compelling reasons to exclude non-Western artefacts from the domain of art. Any theory of art must therefore account for the universality of the concept of art. It cannot simply start from ‘our’ art traditions and extend these conceptions to other cultures, since this would imply cultural appropriation, nor can it resolve the matter simply by formulating separate criteria for non-Western art, since this would imply that there is no unity in (...) the concept of art. At first sight, cluster theories of art seem capable of accounting for the universality of art since they (can) start from a broad cross-cultural range of artworks and nowhere seem to extend one conception of art to other conceptions. Yet cluster theories remain unsatisfactory, because they can neither avoid misapplication of the proposed criteria, nor clarify the unity in the concept of art. (shrink)

Quantum Mechanics has imposed strain on traditional (dualist and representationalist) epistemological conceptions. An alternative was offered by Bohr and Heisenberg, according to whom natural science does not describe nature, but rather the interplay between nature and ourselves. But this was only a suggestion. In this paper, a systematic development of the Bohr-Heisenberg conception is outlined, by way of a comparison with the modern self-organizational theories of cognition. It is shown that a perfectly consistent non-representationalist (and/or relational) reading of quantum (...) mechanics can be reached thus. (shrink)

A recent challenge to Russell’s theory of definite description centers upon the divergent behavior of definites and their Russellian paraphrases in non-extensional contexts. Russellians can meet this challenge, I argue, by incorporating the familiarity theory of definiteness into Russell’s theory. The synthesis of these two seemingly incompatible theories produces a conceptually consistent and empirically powerful framework. As I show, the coalescence of Russellianism and the familiarity theory of definiteness stands as a legitimate alternative to both (...) class='Hi'>Traditional Russellianism and alternative semantic frameworks. (shrink)

This article sketches how the debate over divine predications should be informed by the medieval Islamicate tradition. We emphasize the focus not only on the metaphysics and language of divine predications by al-Ghazali, Maimonides, and others, but also on the epistemology of divine predications. In particular, we emphasize the importance of a theory that explains not only what it takes to make a divine predication true, but also whether these predications are knowable. The epistemological element is central, because (...) traditional views of theology aim to avoid theological skepticism, which is the view that, even if there are theological truths, these truths are unknowable. We pursue this point by emphasizing the role of substantives in al-Ghazalı’s theory of divine predicates, and Maimonides’s discussion of negative predications. In closing we apply these lessons to some recent discussions of theological predication. (shrink)

Recently, some scholars have sought to cast Marx and other socialists as participants in the republican tradition, expanding ideas such as non-domination and self-rule beyond what they had been typically conceived of as by many of the instigators of the revival of republican thought in recent decades. The ramifications of such an expansion, however, have not yet been fully grappled with in the area of rights. This article aims to remedy this by building a theory of social republican rights (...) by drawing on both prongs of this framework. I argue that (1) rights ought to function primarily as instruments to overcome domination and that Marxist and socialist analysis identifies novel forms of domination missed by other republicans, (2) certain liberal rights are themselves vectors of domination, (3) rights are realised through active will formation in politics and the public sphere rather than being pre-political claims against these things, (4) rights should be based on a social ontology that is relational rather than individualist and (5) rights are powers that are struggled for and operate as zones of contestation rather than trans-historical principles. (shrink)

The system of sevenfold predication of the Jainas, while an invaluable tool in expounding the Jaina doctrine of "non-onesidedness" (Anekāntavāda), has also been criticized for being unsystematic and contradictory. In particular, the fourth predication has been suggested to embrace a kind of irrationality. An analysis is provided here that makes clear the logical basis underlying the seven predications. An interpretation is also offered of the problematic fourth predication that renders the system free from contradiction, and it is (...) suggested that this interpretation best captures the positive spirit of Anekāntavāda. (shrink)

We develop a new version of the causal theory of spacetime. Whereas traditional versions of the theory seek to identify spatiotemporal relations with causal relations, the version we develop takes causal relations to be the grounds for spatiotemporal relations. Causation is thus distinct from, and more basic than, spacetime. We argue that this non-identity theory, suitably developed, avoids the challenges facing the traditional identity theory.