Search results for 'nonsense' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  66
    William Short, Alistair Welchman & Wilson Shearin (2014). Deleuze and the Enaction of Nonsense. In Tom Froese & Massimiliano Cappuccio (eds.), Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making. 238-265.
    This chapter examines the ways in which French philosopher Gilles Deleuze offers conceptual resources for an enactive account of language, in particular his extensive consideration of language in The Logic of Sense. Specifically, Deleuze’s distinction between the nonsense of Lewis Carroll’s portmanteau creations and that of Antonin Artaud’s “transla- tion” of Carroll’s Jabberwocky highlights the need for an enactive, rather than merely embodied, approach to sense-making, particularly with regard to the general category of what Jakobson and Halle (1956) call (...)
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  2.  28
    Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (2015). Logics of Nonsense and Parry Systems. Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):65-80.
    We examine the relationship between the logics of nonsense of Bochvar and Halldén and the containment logics in the neighborhood of William Parry’s A I. We detail two strategies for manufacturing containment logics from nonsense logics—taking either connexive and paraconsistent fragments of such systems—and show how systems determined by these techniques have appeared as Frederick Johnson’s R C and Carlos Oller’s A L. In particular, we prove that Johnson’s system is precisely the intersection of Bochvar’s B 3 and (...)
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  3.  42
    Herman Cappelen (2013). Nonsense and Illusions of Thought. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):22-50.
    This paper addresses four issues: 1. What is nonsense? 2. Is nonsense possible? 3. Is nonsense actual? 4. Why do the answers to (1)–(3) matter, if at all? These are my answers: 1. A sentence (or an utterance of one) is nonsense if it fails to have or express content (more on ‘express’, ‘have’, and ‘content’ below). This is a version of a view that can be found in Carnap (1959), Ayer (1936), and, maybe, the early (...)
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  4.  51
    Melissa M. Kozma & Jeanine Weekes Schroer (2014). Purposeful Nonsense, Intersectionality, and the Mission to Save Black Babies. In Namita Goswami, Maeve O'Donavan & Lisa Yount (eds.), Why Race and Gender Still Matter: An Intersectional Approach. Pickering & Chatto Ltd 101-116.
    The competing expressions of ideology flooding the contemporary political landscape have taken a turn toward the absurd. The Radiance Foundation’s recent anti-abortion campaign targeting African-American women, including a series of billboards bearing the slogan “The most dangerous place for an African-American child is in the womb”, is just one example of political "discourse" that is both infuriating and confounding. Discourse with these features – problematic intelligibility, disinterest in the truth, and inflammatory rhetoric – has become increasingly common in politics, the (...)
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  5.  27
    José L. Zalabardo (2015). Wittgenstein's Nonsense Objection to Russell's Theory of Judgment. In Michael Campbell & Michael O’Sullivan (eds.), Wittgenstein and Perception. Routledge 126-151.
    I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that Russell's theory of judgment fails to show that it's not possible to judge nonsense.
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  6.  91
    Gregor Damschen (2008). This is Nonsense. The Reasoner 2 (10):6-8.
    In his Paradoxes (1995: Cambridge University Press: 149) Mark Sainsbury presents the following pair of sentences: Line 1: The sentence written on Line 1 is nonsense. Line 2: The sentence written on Line 1 is nonsense. Sainsbury (1995: 149, 154) here makes three assertions: (1) The sentence in Line 1 is so viciously self-referential that it falls into the truth-value gap. The sentence is really nonsense. (2) The sentence in Line 2 is by contrast true. For it (...)
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  7.  29
    Lynette Reid (1998). Wittgenstein's Ladder: The Tractatus and Nonsense. Philosophical Investigations 21 (2):97–151.
    I discuss some reservations about the exegetical power of the claim that the Tractatus is “anti-metaphysical.” The “resolute” reading has the virtue of fidelity to important and neglected features of the work, both its anti-metaphysical moves and its account of the nature of the activity of philosophy and its status. However, its proponents underestimate the barriers to maintaining a consistent fidelity to these features of the text. The image of a ladder suggests a mere instrumental means to arrive at a (...)
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  8. Meredith Williams (2004). Nonsense and Cosmic Exile: The Austere Reading of the Tractatus. In Max Kölbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance. Routledge
     
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  9.  4
    J. A. McGeoch & A. W. Melton (1929). The Comparative Retention Values of Maze Habits and of Nonsense Syllables. Journal of Experimental Psychology 12 (5):392.
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  10.  6
    W. C. Biel & R. C. Force (1943). Retention of Nonsense Syllables in Intentional and Incidental Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 32 (1):52.
  11.  2
    Richard S. Fink & Roger L. Dominowski (1974). Pronounceability as an Explanation of the Difference Between Word and Nonsense Anagrams. Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (1):159.
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  12.  2
    Helen E. Peixotto (1947). Proactive Inhibition in the Recognition of Nonsense Syllables. Journal of Experimental Psychology 37 (1):81.
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  13.  3
    David W. Abbott & Louis E. Price (1964). Stimulus Generalization of the Conditioned Eyelid Response to Structurally Similar Nonsense Syllables. Journal of Experimental Psychology 68 (4):368.
  14.  4
    Barbara S. Musgrave, Albert E. Goss & Elizabeth Shrader (1963). Compound Nonsense-Syllable Stimuli Presented Without an Intervening Space. Journal of Experimental Psychology 66 (6):609.
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  15.  4
    Barry Gholson & Raymond H. Hohle (1968). Choice Reaction Times to Hues Printed in Conflicting Hue Names and Nonsense Words. Journal of Experimental Psychology 76 (3p1):413.
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  16.  4
    F. C. Davis (1930). The Relative Reliability of Words and Nonsense Syllables as Learning Material. Journal of Experimental Psychology 13 (3):221.
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  17.  2
    J. B. Stroud (1936). The Reliability of Nonsense Syllable Scores Derived by Group Method of Experimentation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 19 (5):621.
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  18.  3
    W. C. F. Krueger (1934). The Relative Difficulty of Nonsense Syllables. Journal of Experimental Psychology 17 (1):145.
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  19.  3
    E. Raskin & S. W. Cook (1937). The Strength and Direction of Associations Formed in the Learning of Nonsense Syllables. Journal of Experimental Psychology 20 (4):381.
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  20.  3
    Charles W. Eriksen & Joseph S. Lappin (1967). Selective Attention and Very Short-Term Recognition Memory for Nonsense Forms. Journal of Experimental Psychology 73 (3):358.
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  21.  1
    B. R. Philip & H. E. Peixotto (1943). Generalization in the Initial Stages of Learning Nonsense Syllables: I. Integral Responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology 33 (1):50.
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  22.  2
    J. B. Stroud, A. F. Lehman & C. McCue (1934). The Reliability of Nonsense-Syllable Scores. Journal of Experimental Psychology 17 (2):294.
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  23.  3
    D. Arnoult Malcolm (1956). Familiarity and Recognition of Nonsense Shapes. Journal of Experimental Psychology 51 (4):269.
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  24.  2
    B. R. Bugelski (1950). A Remote Association Explanation of the Relative Difficulty of Learning Nonsense Syllables in a Serial List. Journal of Experimental Psychology 40 (3):336.
  25.  2
    Benton J. Underwood (1953). Studies of Distributed Practice: XI. An Attempt to Resolve Conflicting Facts on Retention of Serial Nonsense Lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology 45 (5):355.
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  26.  2
    F. M. Sauer (1930). The Relative Variability of Nonsense Syllables and Words. Journal of Experimental Psychology 13 (3):235.
  27.  1
    Irwin Miller (1957). Perception of Nonsense Passages in Relation to Amount of Information and Speech-to-Noise Ratio. Journal of Experimental Psychology 53 (6):388.
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  28.  1
    Bonnie Webb Camp (1960). "Association" of Nonsense Syllables Following Varied Learning Conditions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 59 (1):35.
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  29.  1
    Albert Silverstein & Richard A. Dienstbier (1968). Can the Superior Learnability of Meaningful and Pleasant Words Be Transferred to Nonsense Syllables? Journal of Experimental Psychology 78 (2p1):292.
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  30.  1
    B. R. Philip & H. E. Peixotto (1943). Generalization in the Initial Stages of Learning Nonsense Syllables: II. Partial and Inadequate Responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology 33 (2):136.
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  31.  1
    J. A. McGeoch (1932). The Comparative Retention Values of a Maze Habit, of Nonsense Syllables, and of Rational Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 15 (6):662.
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  32. E. James Archer (1953). Retention of Serial Nonsense Syllables as a Function of Rest-Interval Responding Rate and Meaningfulness. Journal of Experimental Psychology 45 (4):245.
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  33. Barbara S. Musgrave (1962). The Effect of Nonsense-Syllable Compound Stimuli on Latency in a Verbal Paired Associate Task. Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (5):499.
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  34. Richard A. Steffy & Charles W. Eriksen (1965). Short-Term, Perceptual-Recognition Memory for Tachistoscopically Presented Nonsense Forms. Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (3):277.
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  35. E. Philip Trapp & Donald H. Kausler (1960). Relationship Between MAS Scores and Association Values of Nonsense Syllables. Journal of Experimental Psychology 59 (4):233.
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  36. Benton J. Underwood & Jack Richardson (1955). Studies of Distributed Practice: XIII. Interlist Interference and the Retention of Serial Nonsense Lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology 50 (1):39.
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  37. Benton J. Underwood & Jack Richardson (1958). Studies of Distributed Practice: XVIII. The Influence of Meaningfulness and Intralist Similarity of Serial Nonsense Lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology 56 (3):213.
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  38. Benton J. Underwood (1952). Studies of Distributed Practice: VII. Learning and Retention of Serial Nonsense Lists as a Function of Intralist Similarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology 44 (2):80.
  39. Benton J. Underwood (1953). Studies of Distributed Practice: VIII. Learning and Retention of Paired Nonsense Syllables as a Function of Intralist Similarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology 45 (3):133.
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  40.  69
    Carl F. Craver & Sarah K. Robins (2011). No Nonsense Neuro-Law. Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203.
    In Minds, Brains, and Norms, Pardo and Patterson deny that the activities of persons (knowledge, rule-following, interpretation) can be understood exclusively in terms of the brain, and thus conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant to the law, and to the conceptual and philosophical questions that arise in legal contexts. On their view, such appeals to neuroscience are an exercise in nonsense. We agree that understanding persons requires more than understanding brains, but we deny their pessimistic conclusion. Whether neuroscience can be (...)
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  41.  60
    A. W. Moore (2003). Ineffability and Nonsense. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):169–193.
    [A. W. Moore] There are criteria of ineffability whereby, even if the concept of ineffability can never serve to modify truth, it can sometimes (non-trivially) serve to modify other things, specifically understanding. This allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and those who adopt the new reading recently championed by Diamond, Conant, and others. By maintaining that what the nonsense in the Tractatus is supposed to convey is ineffable understanding, (...)
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  42.  41
    Hans-Johann Glock (2015). Nonsense Made Intelligible. Erkenntnis 80 (1):111-136.
    My topic is the relation between nonsense and intelligibility, and the contrast between nonsense and falsehood which played a pivotal role in the rise of analytic philosophy . I shall pursue three lines of inquiry. First I shall briefly consider the positive case, namely linguistic understanding . Secondly, I shall consider the negative case—different breakdowns of understanding and connected forms of failure to make sense . Third, I shall criticize three important misconceptions of nonsense and unintelligibility: the (...)
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  43. Leo K. C. Cheung (2008). The Disenchantment of Nonsense: Understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Philosophical Investigations 31 (3):197–226.
    This paper aims to argue against the resolute reading, and offer a correct way of reading Wittgenstein'sTractatus. According to the resolute reading, nonsense can neither say nor show anything. The Tractatus does not advance any theory of meaning, nor does it adopt the notion of using signs in contravention of logical syntax. Its sentences, except a few constituting the frame, are all nonsensical. Its aim is merely to liberate nonsense utterers from nonsense. I argue that these points (...)
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  44. Jeremy Waldron (1992). 'Nonsense Upon Stilts': Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man. Studies in Soviet Thought 43 (1):68-71.
    In _Nonsense upon Stilts¸_ first published in 1987, Waldron includes and discusses extracts from three classic critiques of the idea of natural rights embodied in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Each text is prefaced by an historical introduction and an analysis of its main themes. The collection as a whole in introduced with an essay tracing the philosophical background to the three critiques as well as the eighteenth-century idea of natural rights which they attacked. (...)
     
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  45. Edmund Dain (2006). Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):91-101.
    Central to a new, or 'resolute', reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus is the idea that Wittgenstein held there an 'austere' view of nonsense: the view, that is, that nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give words a meaning, and so that there are no logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Resolute readers tend not only to ascribe such a view to Wittgenstein, but also to subscribe to it themselves; and it is also a (...)
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  46.  72
    Peter Sullivan (2003). Ineffability and Nonsense. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):195–223.
    [A. W. Moore] There are criteria of ineffability whereby, even if the concept of ineffability can never serve to modify truth, it can sometimes (non-trivially) serve to modify other things, specifically understanding. This allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and those who adopt the new reading recently championed by Diamond, Conant, and others. By maintaining that what the nonsense in the Tractatus is supposed to convey is ineffable understanding, (...)
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  47.  78
    Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007). The Good Sense of Nonsense: A Reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus as Nonself-Repudiating. Philosophy 82 (1):147-177.
    This paper aims to return Wittgenstein's Tractatus to its original stature by showing that it is not the self-repudiating work commentators take it to be, but the consistent masterpiece its author believed it was at the time he wrote it. The Tractatus has been considered self-repudiating for two reasons: it refers to its own propositions as ‘nonsensical’, and it makes what Peter Hacker calls ‘paradoxical ineffability claims’ – that is, its remarks are themselves instances of what it says cannot be (...)
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  48.  18
    Franco V. Trivigno (2013). Childish Nonsense? The Value of Interpretation in Plato's Protagoras. Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (4):509-543.
    In the Protagoras, Plato presents us with a Puzzle regarding the value of interpretation. On the one hand, Socrates claims to find several familiar Socratic theses about morality and the human condition in his interpretation of a poem by Simonides (339e−347a). On the other hand, immediately after the interpretation, Socrates castigates the whole task of interpretation as “childish nonsense” appropriate for second-rate drinking parties (347d5−6).1 The core problem is this: taking Socrates’s interpretation of Simonides seriously requires undermining the significance (...)
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  49.  25
    Sarah Robins & Carl Craver (2011). No Nonsense Neuro-Law. Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203.
    In Minds, Brains, and Norms , Pardo and Patterson deny that the activities of persons (knowledge, rule-following, interpretation) can be understood exclusively in terms of the brain, and thus conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant to the law, and to the conceptual and philosophical questions that arise in legal contexts. On their view, such appeals to neuroscience are an exercise in nonsense. We agree that understanding persons requires more than understanding brains, but we deny their pessimistic conclusion. Whether neuroscience can (...)
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  50.  43
    John Lippitt & Daniel Hutto (1998). Making Sense of Nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (3):263–286.
    The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognising such a category of nonsense is necessary in order to understand the development of his thought. In the case of Kierkegaard, we argue against the view that the notion of the 'absolute paradox' of the Christian incarnation is intended to (...)
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