Search results for 'normative authority' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Yonatan Shemmer (2013). On the Normative Authority of Others. Philosophia:1-5.score: 90.0
    Gibbard argues that we have to accord others a certain fundamental epistemic normative authority. To avoid skepticism we must accept some of our normative principles; since the influence of others was a major factor in the process that led us to adopt them, we must accord others fundamental normative authority. The argument ought to be of interest to a wide range of philosophers, since while compatible with expressivism, it does not assume expressivism. It has rarely (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Linda Radzik (2002). A Coherentist Theory of Normative Authority. Journal of Ethics 6 (1):21-42.score: 72.0
    What makes an ``ought'''' claim authoritative? What makes aparticular norm genuinely reason-giving for an agent? This paper arguesthat normative authority can best be accounted for in terms of thejustification of norms. The main obstacle to such a theory, however, isa regress problem. The worry is that every attempt to offer ajustification for an ``ought'''' claim must appeal to another ``ought''''claim, ad infinitum. The paper argues that vicious regress canbe avoided in practical reasoning in the same way coherentists avoid (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Linda Radzik (2000). Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):633-649.score: 72.0
    What makes a norm a genuinely authoritative guide to action? For many theorists, the answer takes a foundationalist form, analogous to foundationalism in epistemology. They say that there is at least one norm that is justified in itself. On most versions, the norm is said to be incorrigibly authoritative. All other norms are justified in virtue of their connection with it. This essay argues that all such foundationalist theories of normative authority fail because they cannot give an account (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Enzo Rossi (2012). Justice, Legitimacy, and (Normative) Authority for Political Realists. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2):149-164.score: 63.0
    One of the main challenges faced by realists in political philosophy is that of offering an account of authority that is genuinely normative and yet does not consist of a moralistic application of general, abstract ethical principles to the practice of politics. Political moralists typically start by devising a conception of justice based on their pre-political moral commitments; authority would then be legitimate only if political power is exercised in accordance with justice. As an alternative to that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). The Problem of Normative Authority in Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. In Tom Bailey & João Constâncio (eds.), Nietzsche and Kantian Ethics.score: 60.0
    Kant and Hegel share a common foundational idea: they believe that the authority of normative claims can be justified only by showing that these norms are self-imposed or autonomous. Yet they develop this idea in strikingly different ways: Kant argues that we can derive specific normative claims from the formal idea of autonomy, whereas Hegel contends that we use the idea of freedom not to derive, but to assess, the specific normative claims ensconced in our social (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nicole A. Vincent (2011). Legal Responsibility Adjudication and the Normative Authority of the Mind Sciences. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):315-331.score: 60.0
    In the field of ?neurolaw?, reformists claim that recent scientific discoveries from the mind sciences have serious ramifications for how legal responsibility should be adjudicated, but conservatives deny that this is so. In contrast, I criticise both of these polar opposite positions by arguing that although scientific findings can have often-weighty normative significance, they lack the normative authority with which reformists often imbue them. After explaining why conservatives and reformists are both wrong, I then offer my own (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Wim de Muijnck (2011). Normative Authority for Empirical Science. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):263-275.score: 60.0
    In this article I explore the hypothesis of normative authority by epistemic authority. This is the idea that scientifically warranted claims in psychology, in being claims about human needs, interests, and concerns, can acquire authority on which values do or do not merit endorsement. The hypothesis is applied to attachment research: it seems that on the basis of what is now known about attachment, specific normative conclusions seem warranted. I argue that although attachment research and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Daniel Koltonski (2013). Normative Consent and Authority. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):255-275.score: 60.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Linda Radzik (1999). A Normative Regress Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1):35-47.score: 54.0
    The article argues that theorists who try to justify 'ought'-claims, i.e., who try to show that a standard of behavior has normative authority, will run into a regress problem. The problem is similar in structure to the familiar regress in the justification of belief. The point of the paper is not skeptical. Rather, the aim is to help theorists better understand the challenges associated with formulating a theory of normative authority.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David O. Brink, Handout #7: Normative Authority and Korsgaardian Rationalism.score: 48.0
    In The Sources of Normativity (1996) Christine Korsgaard provides a dialectical examination of different conceptions of the sources of normativity or reasons -- conceptions that appeal to voluntarism, realism, and reflective endorsement -- that culminates in her own Kantian or neo- Kantian conception of normativity that is grounded in autonomy. Her method is dialectical (Dialectical) inasmuch as her neo-Kantian conception is supposed to reveal the truth or grain of truth in each of the three prior conceptions. Korsgaard begins Lecture 1 (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Stephen E. Henderson & Kelly Sorensen (2013). Search, Seizure, and Immunity: Second-Order Normative Authority and Rights. Criminal Justice Ethics 32 (2):108-125.score: 48.0
    A paradigmatic aspect of a paradigmatic kind of right is that the rights holder is the only one who can alienate it. When individuals waive rights, the normative source of that waiving is normally taken to be the individual herself. This moral feature?immunity?is usually in the background of discussions about rights. We bring it into the foreground here, with specific attention to a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Kentucky v. King (2011), concerning search and seizure rights. An entailment of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Christian Coons & David Faraci (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia 38 (4):733-740.score: 45.0
    In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. David O. Brink, Handout #6: Normative Authority and Nagelian Rationalism.score: 45.0
    Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism (1970) is one of the few sustained attempts to reject instrumental and prudential conceptions of practical reason and to defend the possibility of practical reason that is impartial or altruistic. Nagel makes claims about both moral motivation and practical reason, and each claim has both negative and positive constituents.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. David O. Brink, Handout #8: Normative Authority and Metaphysical Egoism.score: 45.0
    Doubts about the adequacy of appeals to impartial practical reason give those with rationalist sympathies reason to explore the metaphysical, and not merely strategic, reconciliation of prudence and altruism contained in metaphysical egoism. Even if we recognize impartial practical reason, the supremacy of moral demands may depend upon the plausibility of metaphysical egoism. For as long as we recognize the demands of prudence, the conflict between altruism and prudence will threaten altruism's supremacy. We might consider one version of metaphysical egoism (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Robert Audi (2002). Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Humean Instrumentalism and the Normative Authority of Desire. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):235 – 263.score: 45.0
    This is an age of naturalization projects. Much epistemological work has been done toward naturalizing theoretical reason. One might view Hume as seeking to naturalize reason in both the theoretical (roughly, epistemological) and the practical realms. I suggest that whatever else underlies the vitality of Hume's instrumentalism - encapsulated in his view that 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions' - one incentive is the hope of naturalizing practical reason. This paper explores some broadly Humean (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Catriona Mackenzie (2008). Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism. Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (4):512-533.score: 45.0
  17. Andrea C. Westlund (2013). Deference as a Normative Power. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):455-474.score: 45.0
    Much of the literature on practical authority concerns the authority of the state over its subjects—authority to which we are, as G. E. M. Anscombe says, subject “willy nilly”. Yet many of our “willy” (or voluntary) relationships also seem to involve the exercise of practical authority, and this species of authority is in some ways even more puzzling than authority willy nilly. In this paper I argue that voluntary authority relies on a form (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Karl Schafer (forthcoming). Hume on Practical Reason: Against the Normative Authority of Reason. In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford University Press.score: 45.0
    In broad outlines, the first of these claims that beliefs and other cognitive states, on their own, can never motivate a new desire, intention, or action. Rather, on this view, what motivates us to desire, intend, or act is always the cooperation of some desire (or other conative state) with such cognitive states. Thus, on HTM, practical motivation is always the product of two fundamentally distinct categories of mental states operating in conjunction with one another.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jean Goodwin (2011). Accounting for the Appeal to the Authority of Experts. Argumentation 25 (3):285-296.score: 45.0
    Work in Argumentation Studies (AS) and Studies in Expertise and Experience (SEE) has been proceeding on converging trajectories, moving from resistance to expert authority to a cautious acceptance of its legitimacy. The two projects are therefore also converging on the need to account for how, in the course of complex and confused civic deliberations, nonexpert citizens can figure out which statements from purported experts deserve their trust. Both projects recognize that nonexperts cannot assess expertise directly; instead, the nonexpert must (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Jeanette Kennett (2011). Science and Normative Authority. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):229-235.score: 45.0
    Philosophical Explorations, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 229-235, September 2011.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Robert Audi (2007). 2 Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Instrumentalism and the Normative Authority of Desire. In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. 41.score: 45.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Linda Radzik (2000). Justification and the Authority of Norms. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):451-461.score: 36.0
    What features does a norm have to have such that we really ought to follow it? This paper argues that norms are authoritative when they are justified in a particular sense. However, this brand of justification is not any of those with which we are currently familiar. The authority of norms is not a matter of moral, epistemic or prudential justification. It depends instead on what I call "justification simpliciter." The concept of justification simpliciter is defined and defended in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Christy Simpson (2012). Mapping Our Practice? Some Conceptual “Bumps” for Us to Consider. HEC Forum 24 (3):219-226.score: 36.0
    There are several important conceptual issues and questions about the practice of healthcare ethics that can, and should, inform the development of any practice standards. This paper provides a relatively short overview of seven of these issues, with the invitation for further critical reflection and examination of their relevance to and implications for practice standards. The seven issues described include: diversity (from the perspective of training and experience); moral expertise and authority/influence; being an insider or outsider; flexibility and adaptability (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Joel Anderson (2003). Autonomy and the Authority of Personal Commitments: From Internal Coherence to Social Normativity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):90 – 108.score: 35.0
    It has been argued - most prominently in Harry Frankfurt's recent work - that the normative authority of personal commitments derives not from their intrinsic worth but from the way in which one's will is invested in what one cares about. In this essay, I argue that even if this approach is construed broadly and supplemented in various ways, its intrasubjective character leaves it ill-prepared to explain the normative grip of commitments in cases of purported self-betrayal. As (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. David Enoch (2012). Authority and Reason-Giving1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.score: 33.0
  26. Nicholas Southwood (2008). Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality. Ethics 119 (1):9-30.score: 27.0
    I argue that the "why be rational?" challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the “why be moral?” challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of rationality instead in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Bas van der Vossen (2011). Assessing Law's Claim to Authority. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (3):481-501.score: 27.0
    The idea that law claims authority (LCA) has recently been forcefully criticized by a number of authors. These authors present a new and intriguing objection, arguing that law cannot be said to claim authority if such a claim is not justified. That is, these authors argue that the view that law does not have authority viciously conflicts with the view that law claims authority. I will call this the normative critique of LCA. In this article, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. D. Robert MacDougall (2013). Liberalism, Authority, and Bioethics Commissions. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (6):461-477.score: 27.0
    Bioethicists working on national ethics commissions frequently think of themselves as advisors to the government, but distance themselves from any claims to actual authority. Governments however may find it beneficial to appear to defer to the authority of these commissions when designing laws and policies, and might appoint such commissions for exactly this reason. Where does the authority for setting laws and policies come from? This question is best answered from within a normative political philosophy. This (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Daniel Star & Candice Delmas (2011). Three Conceptions of Practical Authority. Jurisprudence 2 (1):143-160.score: 24.0
    Joseph Raz’s much discussed service conception of practical authority has recently come under attack from Stephen Darwall, who proposes that we instead adopt a second- personal conception of practical authority.1 We believe that the best place to start understanding practical authority is with a pared back conception of it, as simply a species of normative authority more generally, where this species is picked out merely by the fact that the normative authority in question (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Brian Bix (2006). Legal Positivism and 'Explaining' Normativity and Authority. American Philosophical Association Newsletter 5 (2 (Spring 2006)):5-9.score: 24.0
    It has become increasingly common for legal positivist theorists to claim that the primary objective of legal theory in general, and legal positivism in particular, is "explaining normativity." The phrase "explaining normativity" can be understood either ambitiously or more modestly. The more modest meaning is an analytical exploration of what is meant by legal or moral obligation, or by the authority claims of legal officials. When the term is understood ambitiously - as meaning an explanation of how conventional and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Jon Garthoff (2010). Legitimacy is Not Authority. Law and Philosophy 29 (6):669-694.score: 24.0
    The two leading traditions of theorizing about democratic legitimacy are liberalism and deliberative democracy. Liberals typically claim that legitimacy consists in the consent of the governed, while deliberative democrats typically claim that legitimacy consists in the soundness of political procedures. Despite this difference, both traditions see the need for legitimacy as arising from the coercive enforcement of law and regard legitimacy as necessary for law to have normative authority. While I endorse the broad aims of these two traditions, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Justin C. Fisher, The Authority of Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis.score: 24.0
    This paper defends Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis , a proposed empirical methodology for explicating philosophical concepts. This methodology attributes to our shared concepts whatever application conditions they would need to have in order best to continue delivering benefits in the ways they have regularly delivered benefits in the past. In the first stage of my argument I argue that Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis has what I call normative authority : we have practical and epistemic reason to adopt the explications that (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Waheed Hussain (2009). No More Lemmings, Please - Reflections on the Communal Authority Thesis. Journal of Business Ethics 88 (4):717 - 728.score: 23.0
    A key feature of ISCT is the claim that individuals are required to comply with the norms that are "accepted by a clear majority of the community as standing for an ethical principle" [Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, "The Ties that Bind" (Harvard Business School Press, Boson, MA), p. 39], so long as these norms are consistent with hypernorms. I refer to this as the communal authority thesis. Many people see the communal authority thesis as an attractive feature of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Joseph Raz, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception.score: 21.0
    The problem I have in mind is the problem of the possible justification of subjecting one's will to that of another, and of the normative standing of demands to do so. The account of authority that I offered, many years ago, under the title of the service conception of authority, addressed this issue, and assumed that all other problems regarding authority are subsumed under it. Many found the account implausible. It is thin, relying on very few (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Elizabeth Anderson (2008). An Epistemic Defense of Democracy: David Estlund's Democratic Authority. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 129-139.score: 21.0
    In Democratic Authority, David Estlund 2008 presents a major new defense of democracy, called epistemic proceduralism. The theory claims that democracy exercises legitimate authority in virtue of possessing a modest epistemic power: its decisions are the product of procedures that tend to produce just laws at a better than chance rate, and better than any other type of government that is justifiable within the terms of public reason. The balance Estlund strikes between epistemic and non-epistemic justifications of democracy (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Peter Railton (1999). Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, but Not Hume Versus Kant. Ratio 12 (4):320–353.score: 21.0
    Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect, it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by definition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experience as a convincing (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Philippe Mongin (2006). A Concept of Progress for Normative Economics. Economics and Philosophy 22 (1):19-54.score: 21.0
    The paper discusses the sense in which the changes undergone by normative economics in the twentieth century can be said to be progressive. A simple criterion is proposed to decide whether a sequence of normative theories is progressive. This criterion is put to use on the historical transition from the new welfare economics to social choice theory. The paper reconstructs this classic case, and eventually concludes that the latter theory was progressive compared with the former. It also briefly (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. William A. Edmundson (2010). Political Authority, Moral Powers and the Intrinsic Value of Obedience. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (1):179-191.score: 21.0
    Three concepts—authority, obedience and obligation—are central to understanding law and political institutions. The three are also involved in the legitimation of the state: an apology for the state has to make a normative case for the state’s authority, for its right to command obedience, and for the citizen’s obligation to obey the state’s commands. Recent discussions manifest a cumulative scepticism about the apologist’s task. Getting clear about the three concepts is, of..
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Andrés Rosler (2005). Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    It is commonly held that Aristotle's views on politics have little relevance to the preoccupations of modern political theory with authority and obligation. Andres Rosler's original study argues that, on the contrary, Aristotle does examine the question of political obligation and its limits, and that contemporary political theorists have much to learn from him. Rosler takes his exploration further, considering the ethical underpinning of Aristotle's political thought, the normativity of his ethical and political theory, and the concepts of political (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Andrea C. Westlund (2011). Autonomy, Authority, and Answerability. Jurisprudence 2 (1):161-179.score: 21.0
    Autonomy seems to require that we engage in practical deliberation and come to our own decisions regarding how we will act. Deference to authority, by contrast, seems to require that we suspend deliberation and do what the authority commands precisely because he or she commands it. How, then, could autonomy be compatible with deference to authority? In his critique of Razian instrumentalism, Stephen Darwall lays the groundwork for a distinctively contractualist answer to this question: the normative (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jens Timmermann (2007). Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in Kant's Moral Philosophy. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2):167-182.score: 21.0
    What is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice . Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. (...) theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge. Key Words: Christian Garve • ethical theory and practice • Immanuel Kant • moral psychology • theory of value. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Enzo Rossi, Liberal Legitimacy : A Study of the Normative Foundations of Liberalism.score: 21.0
    This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Carla Bagnoli (2007). The Authority of Reflection. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.score: 21.0
    This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Jean Hampton (1998). The Authority of Reason. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    This challenging and provocative book argues against much contemporary orthodoxy in philosophy and the social sciences by showing why objectivity in the domain of ethics is really no different from the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Many philosophers and social scientists have challenged the idea that we act for objectively authoritative reasons. Jean Hampton takes up the challenge by undermining two central assumptions of this contemporary orthodoxy: that one can understand instrumental reasons without appeal to objective authority, and that the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. B. Saunders (2010). Normative Consent and Opt-Out Organ Donation. Journal of Medical Ethics 36 (2):84-87.score: 21.0
    One way of increasing the supply of organs available for transplant would be to switch to an opt-out system of donor registration. This is typically assumed to operate on the basis of presumed consent, but this faces the objection that not all of those who fail to opt out would actually consent to the use of their cadaveric organs. This paper defuses this objection, arguing that people's actual, explicit or implicit, consent to use their organs is not needed. It borrows (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. A. Conti, P. Delbon, L. Laffranchi, C. Paganelli & F. De Ferrari (2012). HIV-Positive Status and Preservation of Privacy: A Recent Decision From the Italian Data Protection Authority on the Procedure of Gathering Personal Patient Data in the Dental Office. Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (6):386-388.score: 21.0
    The processing of sensitive information in the health field is subject to rigorous standards that guarantee the protection of information confidentiality. Recently, the Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali) stated their formal opinion on a standard procedure in dental offices involving the submission of a questionnaire that includes the patient's health status. HIV infection status is included on the form. The Authority has stated that all health data collection must be in accordance with (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. C. Heidemann (2000). The Creation of Normative Facts. Law and Philosophy 19 (2):263-281.score: 21.0
    In Kelsen's formalist and reductionist theory of law, the concepts of `authority' and `competence' may be explained exclusively in terms of those norms on which the validity of other legal norms or of legal acts is dependent. Kelsen describes the nature of these norms in different ways; at least three different conceptions can be distinguished. A rational reconstruction of the most plausible of these conceptions will understand sentences expressing such `norms of competence' either to state truth conditions for (...) sentences of a lower level or to state criteria for an act to be a legal act. In both functions, norms of competence regulate the creation of normative facts. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Anthony Reeves (2010). The Moral Authority of International Law. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law 10 (1):13-18.score: 21.0
    How should international law figure into the practical reasoning of agents who fall under its jurisdiction? How should the existence of an international legal norm regulating some activity affect a subject’s decision-making about that activity? This is a question concerning the general moral authority of international law. It concerns not simply the kind of authority international law claims, but the character of the authority it actually has. An authority, as I will use the term, is moral (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Fengkui Ju & Fenrong Liu (2011). Prioritized Imperatives and Normative Conflicts. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (2):35-58.score: 21.0
    Imperatives occur ubiquitously in natural languages. They produce forces which change the addressee’s cognitive state and regulate her actions accordingly. In real life we often receive conflicting orders, typically, issued by various authorities with different ranks. A new update semantics is proposed in this paper to formalize this idea. The general properties of this semantics, as well as its background ideas are discussed extensively. In addition, we compare our framework with other approaches of deontic logics in the context of (...) conflicts. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Camillia Kong (2012). The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):661-690.score: 21.0
    Abstract This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard?s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative ? namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard?s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant?s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant?s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000