Search results for 'normative reason' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). The Idea of a Normative Reason. In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 41--65.
    Recent work in English speaking moral philosophy has seen the rise to prominence of the idea of a normative reason1. By ‘normative reasons’ I mean the reasons agents appeal to in making rational claims on each other. Normative reasons are good reasons on which agents ought to act, even if they are not actually motivated accordingly2. To this extent, normative reasons are distinguishable from the motivating reasons agents appeal to in reason explanations. Even agents who (...)
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  2.  15
    J. R. Lucas, Chapter 2 the Development of Normative Reason.
    x2.1 Non-contradiction One can think wrong. The fact that after much thought one has reached a conclusion is no guarantee that the conclusion reached is right. Only a very opinionated man would refuse to concede the possibility of error, and once the admission of fallibility is made, the problem of justifying one's beliefs becomes acute. So we formulate our reasons as best we can. But even when formulated, they may fail to convince. Only if people are willing to be reasonable (...)
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  3.  1
    H. Allvard Lilleh Ammer (2003). Recent Work in English Speaking Moral Philosophy has Seen the Rise to Prominence of the Idea of a Normative Reason (See Eg Darwall). In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 41.
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  4.  5
    David Spurrett (2011). Reason is Normative, and Should Be Studied Accordingly. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):267-268.
    Reason aims at truth, so normative considerations are a proper part of the study of reasoning. Excluding them means neglecting some of what we know or can discover about reasoning. Also, the normativist position we are asked to reject by Elqayam & Evans (E&E) is defined in attenuated and self-contradictory ways.
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    Javier Roberto Suárez (2013). Dialectic of Enlightenment and the Proposal of a "Normative Horizon" of Reason [Spanish]. Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 18:148-177.
    Horkheimerian’s critique of the Enlightenment, shows the process whereby the demystification of the world is triggered by way of an “an act of sovereignty” of reason. There the man lost for reason his possibility of self-criticism, causing it to be in instrumental reason. Since its inception, the Enlightenment, as myth, mutilated reason, over the pursuit of truth –theoretical truth and moral truth–, there was a renounce to sense. The dream of Enlightenment rationality was reduced to the (...)
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  6. Neil C. Manson, Reason Explanation:A First-Order Normative Account.
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to why questions that assuage agents puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered (...)
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  7. Howard Nye (2009). Ethics, Fitting Attitudes, and Practical Reason: A Theory of Normative Facts. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    I present and defend (1) an account of ethical judgments as judgments about our reasons to feel specific motivationally laden attitudes, (2) an account of what an agent should do in terms of what would achieve ends that she has reason to be motivated to pursue, and (3) an account of an agent’s reasons for motivation (and thus action) in terms of the prescriptions of the most fundamental principles that guide her deliberations. Using these accounts, I explain the connection (...)
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  8.  6
    Triantafyllos Gkouvas (2011). The Practicality of Pure Reason. A Normative Defence of Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation. Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 14:152-191.
    El propósito de este trabajo es defender la opinión que Kant ha propuesto sobre la teoría internalista de la motivación moral. En particular, argumentaré que la adopción de Kant de internalismo se evidencia en su afirmación de que la relación de la razón pura de la voluntad se basa en una práctica una proposición sintética a priori. Lo que se pretende demostrar es que Kant trata la sinteticidad práctica como un concepto fundamental para su relato de lo que significa ser (...)
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  9.  3
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Reason's Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will. OUP Usa.
    To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. In this book, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort - "objective reasons" - to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act.
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  10.  77
    Robert Audi (2002). Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Humean Instrumentalism and the Normative Authority of Desire. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):235 – 263.
    This is an age of naturalization projects. Much epistemological work has been done toward naturalizing theoretical reason. One might view Hume as seeking to naturalize reason in both the theoretical (roughly, epistemological) and the practical realms. I suggest that whatever else underlies the vitality of Hume's instrumentalism - encapsulated in his view that 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions' - one incentive is the hope of naturalizing practical reason. This paper (...)
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  11.  20
    Jan-Reinard Sieckmann (1992). Legal System and Practical Reason. On the Structure of a Normative Theory of Law. Ratio Juris 5 (3):288-307.
    It will be argued, firstly, that there is a link between the legal validity of a norm and the rational justifiability of a requirement that judges should apply this norm, based on a normative conception of legal validity and the postulate that judges should act as rational persons; secondly, that rational justifiability of legal norms requires the construction of a legal system in a model of principles that differs from theories, e.g., of Kelsen, Hart, Dworkin and Alexy, which are (...)
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  12.  7
    Daniel Whistler (2012). Purely Practical Reason: Normative Epistemology From Leibniz to Maimon. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (2):395-419.
    In this paper, I contend that a crucial historical precedent for contemporary interest in virtue epistemology is to be found in Leibniz-Wolffian rationalism. For philosophers from Wolff to Lessing, epistemology was thoroughly normative; that is, the task of epistemology was not to describe knowledge, but set rules for the amelioration of knowledge. Such a normative stance was transferred into cognate disciplines, such as aesthetics, as well. I further argue that after Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy in 1781 strands (...)
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  13.  40
    Susanne Mantel (2014). No Reason for Identity: On the Relation Between Motivating and Normative Reasons. Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):49-62.
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  14.  27
    Karl Schafer (forthcoming). Hume on Practical Reason: Against the Normative Authority of Reason. In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford University Press
    In broad outlines, the first of these claims that beliefs and other cognitive states, on their own, can never motivate a new desire, intention, or action. Rather, on this view, what motivates us to desire, intend, or act is always the cooperation of some desire (or other conative state) with such cognitive states. Thus, on HTM, practical motivation is always the product of two fundamentally distinct categories of mental states operating in conjunction with one another.
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  15.  3
    Christel Fricke (2015). Nature, Culture, Gods, and Reason: Exploring Evaluative and Normative Constraints on Right Action in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (4):503-515.
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  16.  6
    Vincent C. Punzo (1980). Natural Law and the Normative Function of Reason. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54:197-206.
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  17.  10
    Jim Slagle (2014). Reason's Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):142-144.
  18.  20
    Stefan Bird-Pollan (2011). Some Normative Implications of Korsgaard's Theory of the Intersubjectivity of Reason. Metaphilosophy 42 (4):376-380.
    Abstract: This article argues that Christine Korsgaard's conception of self-constitution can be historicized by considering the impact of actual humans on our reflective activity. Because Korsgaard bases her argument on a philosophy of action rather than of intention (as Kant does), and our actions must always be concrete, the article argues that the principles for action which we develop in reflection are likewise responses to concrete human demands. It further interprets the types of demands humans make on each other as (...)
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  19.  8
    Paul Nnodim (2004). Public Reason as a Form of Normative and Political Justification: A Study on Rawls's Idea of Public Reason and Kant's Notion of the Use of Public Reason in What is Enlightenment? South African Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):148-157.
  20.  4
    William Simkulet (2013). Ishtiyaque Haji , Reason's Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (5):381-383.
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  21.  7
    Vincent C. Punzo (1980). The Normative Function of Reason as Reflectivity: An Alternative to Hare's Prescriptivism. Review of Metaphysics 33 (3):593 - 613.
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  22.  2
    Christopher Evan Franklin (2013). Haji, Ishtiyaque.Reason’s Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 270. $65.00. [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (3):563-567.
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  23.  1
    Daniel Haas (2013). Reason's Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will Ishtiyaque Haji Oxford University Press, 2012; Ix + 259 Pp. $65.00 (Hardback). [REVIEW] Dialogue 52 (2):415-416.
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  24. Robert Audi (2007). 2 Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Instrumentalism and the Normative Authority of Desire. In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. 41.
     
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  25.  83
    Chrisoula Andreou (2005). The Voices of Reason. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):33 - 45.
    It is widely held that instrumental reasoning to a practical conclusion is parasitic on non-instrumental practical reasoning. This conclusion is based on the claim that when there is no reason to adopt a certain end, there is no reason to take the means (qua means) to that end. But, as will be argued, while there is a sense of reason according to which the previous statement is true, there is another sense according to which it is false. (...)
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  26.  23
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2013). Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.
    Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the (...)
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  27.  68
    David Enoch, Giving Someone a Reason to Φ.
    I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don't have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. What exactly happened here? Your having the reason to read my draft – indeed, the very fact (...)
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  28.  85
    Hallvard Lillehammer (1999). Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2):117-133.
    The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed (...)
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  29.  15
    Roberto Frega (2012). A Pragmatist Critique of Liberal Epistemology: Towards a Practice-Based Account of Public Reason. Critical Horizons 12 (3):293 - 316.
    This paper tackles with the issue of the place of comprehensive beliefs within the public space. It tries to strike a middle path between the liberal ban on comprehensive beliefs and the anti-liberal claim that comprehensive beliefs should be given full pride of place in public deliberations. The article relies on arguments that are inspired by the pragmatist tradition. It starts locating the main cause of failures at articulating comprehensive beliefs and public reason in a central feature of liberal (...)
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  30.  55
    Jennie Louise (2009). Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):345 - 364.
    The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, (...)
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  31.  58
    Susanne Mantel (2013). Acting for Reasons, Apt Action, and Knowledge. Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888.
    I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of (...)
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  32. Andrew Reisner (2015). Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity. In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome. OUP
    This paper considers the relation between the sources of normativity, reasons, and normative conflicts. It argues that common views about how normative reasons relate to their sources have important consequences for how we can understand putative normative conflicts.
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  33.  20
    Patrick Fleming (2015). The Normativity Objection to Normative Reduction. Acta Analytica 30 (4):419-427.
    Non-naturalists claim that the nature of normativity precludes the possibility of normative naturalism. In particular, they think that normative reduction amounts to normative elimination. This is because it always leaves out the normative. In this paper, I examine the force that the normativity objection has against Humean reductionism. I argue that the normativity objection has no argumentative force against reductionism. When it is presented as a bare intuition, it begs the question against reduction. A more interesting (...)
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  34. H. Lillehammer (2000). Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason. Journal of Ethics 4 (3):173-190.
    This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.
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  35.  2
    Neil C. Manson (forthcoming). Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    There is an ongoing debate about the “ontology” of consent. Some argue that it is a mental act, some that it is a “hybrid” of a mental act plus behaviour that signifies that act; others argue that consent is a performative, akin to promising or commanding. Here it is argued that all these views are mistaken—though some more so than others. We begin with the question whether a normatively efficacious act of consent can be completed in the mind alone. Standard (...)
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  36.  21
    Chrisoula Andreou (2007). Non-Relative Reasons and Humean Thought: If What is a Reason for You is a Reason for Me, Where Does That Leave the Humean? Metaphilosophy 38 (5):654-668.
    A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent’s reasons for action are provided by the agent’s current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non-relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason- giving consideration and show that the non-relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason-giving considerations (...)
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  37. Sergio Tenenbaum (2015). Moral Faith and Moral Reason. In Sophie-Grace Chappell (ed.), Intuition, Theory, Anti-Theory in Ethics. 76-103.
    Robert Adams argues that often our moral commitment outstrips what we are epistemically entitled to believe; in these cases, the virtuous agent doxastic states are instances of “moral faith”. I argue against Adams’ views on the need for moral faith; at least in some cases, our moral “intuitions” provide us with certain moral knowledge. The appearance that there can be no certainty here is the result of dubious views about second-order or indirect doubts. Nonetheless, discussing the phenomena that lead Adams (...)
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  38. David Enoch (2014). Authority and Reason‐Giving1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.
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  39.  90
    David Enoch (2011). Giving Practical Reasons. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (4).
    I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don't have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. By my asking, I managed to give you the reason to read the draft. What does such (...)
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  40.  18
    Alex Gregory (forthcoming). Normative Reasons as Good Bases. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases, according to which a normative reason to φ is something that is a good basis for φing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify (...)
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  41. Andrew Reisner (2011). Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press
    An important advance in normativity research over the last decade is an increased understanding of the distinction, and difference, between normativity and rationality. Normativity concerns or picks out a broad set of concepts that have in common that they are, put loosely, guiding. For example, consider two commonly used normative concepts: that of a normative reason and that of ought. To have a normative reason to perform some action is for there to be something that (...)
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  42. Matthew S. Bedke (2008). Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85 - 111.
    There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of (...)
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  43. Christian Coons & David Faraci (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia 38 (4):733-740.
    In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. (...)
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  44.  85
    R. Jay Wallace (ed.) (2006). Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
    Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments (...)
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  45. Nicholas Rescher (1988). Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason. Oxford University Press.
    Contending that only a normative theory of rationality can be adequate to the complexities of the subject, this book explains and defends the view that rationality consists of the intelligent pursuit of appropriate objectives. Rescher considers the mechanics, rationale, and rewards of reason, and argues that social scientists who want to present a theory of rationality while avoiding the vexing complexities of normative deliberations must amend their perspective of the rational enterprise.
     
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  46.  3
    Mette Ebbesen & Birthe D. Pedersen (2007). Using Empirical Research to Formulate Normative Ethical Principles in Biomedicine. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (1):33-48.
    Bioethical research has tended to focus on theoretical discussion of the principles on which the analysis of ethical issues in biomedicine should be based. But this discussion often seems remote from biomedical practice where researchers and physicians confront ethical problems. On the other hand, published empirical research on the ethical reasoning of health care professionals offer only descriptions of how physicians and nurses actually reason ethically. The question remains whether these descriptions have any normative implications for nurses and (...)
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  47. Andrew Sepielli (2012). Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
    Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (...)
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  48. Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.
    In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates in meta-ethics (...)
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  49.  10
    Radosław Zyzik (2011). Normativity and Moral Psychology : The Social Intuitionist Model and a World Without Normative Moral Rules? In Jerzy Stelmach & Bartosz Brożek (eds.), The Normativity of Law. Copernicus Center Press
    The paper pores over the recent conceptions of normative judgement developed against the background of advances in psychology and neuroscience. It begins by analyzing what normative claim of morality and law consists of before presenting and criticizing the Social Intuitionist Model of normative judgement developed by Jonathan Haidt. The model poses serious challenges for well-established normative concepts, and the concept of normativity as objective reason for action in particular. A question is asked of what the (...)
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  50. Stefano Bertea (2009). The Normative Claim of Law. Hart Pub..
    Meaning and status -- Generality and moral quality -- Content-dependence and discursive character -- Why grounds are needed -- Grounding the normativity of practical reason -- Grounding the normative claim and force of law.
     
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