Search results for 'objective truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.score: 174.0
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at (...)
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  2. David A. Cleveland (2001). Is Plant Breeding Science Objective Truth or Social Construction? The Case of Yield Stability. Agriculture and Human Values 18 (3):251-270.score: 120.0
    This article presents a holistic framework for understanding the scienceof plant breeding, as an alternative to the common objectivist andconstructivist approaches in studies of science. It applies thisapproach to understanding disagreements about how to deal with yieldstability. Two contrasting definitions of yield stability are described,and concomitant differences in the understanding and roles ofsustainability and of selection, test, and target environments areexplored. Critical questions about plant breeding theory and practiceare posed, and answers from the viewpoint of the two contrastingdefinitions of yield (...)
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  3. Brian Hebblethwaite (1988). The Ocean of Truth: A Defence of Objective Theism. Cambridge University Press.score: 114.0
    This short book offers an alternative reading of the impact of modernity on Christian faith to that advanced by Don Cupitt in his television series and book, The Sea of Faith. Hebblethwaite gives a spirited defense of belief in the objective reality of God and in life after death, as opposed to Cupitt's radically interiorized and expressivist view of religion. As attractive as many may find a denial of the traditional church doctrines in favor of an anti-metaphysical, non-dogmatic expressivist (...)
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  4. Alphonso Lingis (2011). Truth in Reconciliation. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (3):239-243.score: 96.0
    To what extent is truth required for reconciliation of peoples in conflict? What kind of truth? Objective truth, subjective truth? Maybe reconciliation require that the pursuit of truth be limited? The trial of the former “Khmer Rouge” leaders in Cambodia for crimes against humanity provides a case where these issues are examined.
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  5. J. Donald Walters (2006). The Oneness of Objective Reality and Spiritual Truth. World Futures 62 (1 & 2):28 – 30.score: 96.0
    Spirituality and science discover that they are both motivated by the desire to know, and realize that mere sensory perception does not guarantee the truth of knowledge. The concepts that emerge in the new sciences show a striking similarity to the ideas that come to the mind of spiritually intuitive persons, giving rise to the hope that with the recognition that at the bottom objective reality and spiritual truth are one, the historic opposition (or feud) between science (...)
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  6. Michael Gorr & Mark Timmons (1989). Subjective Truth, Objective Truth, and Moral Indifference. Philosophical Studies 55 (1):111 - 116.score: 90.0
  7. Carl Wellman (1975). Ethical Disagreement and Objective Truth. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (3):211 - 221.score: 90.0
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  8. Deborah C. Smith (1999). Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth: Is Metaphysical Antirealism Self-Refuting? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):293-313.score: 90.0
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  9. I. Ping (1969). Formal Logic and Objective Truth — on the Correctness of Thought Form and the Truthfulness of Thought Content. Contemporary Chinese Thought 1 (1):89-98.score: 90.0
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  10. Anguel S. Stefanov (1984). Formal Truth and Objective Truth. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 13 (3):154-160.score: 90.0
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  11. Adam Schaff (1967). On Objective Truth in Sociology. Russian Studies in Philosophy 6 (2):33-38.score: 90.0
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  12. Danielle Macbeth (2007). Pragmatism and Objective Truth. In C. J. Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press. 169.score: 90.0
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  13. V. Ia Pakhomov (1970). Contemporary Physics and Lenin's Conception of Objective Truth. Russian Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):60-80.score: 90.0
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  14. Deborah C. Smith (2012). Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):293-313.score: 90.0
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  15. Artur Rojszczak & Barry Smith (2003). Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth. In Jaako Hintikka (ed.), Philosophy and Logic: In Search of the Polish Tradition. Kluwer.score: 78.0
    The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski’s “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn (...)
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  16. Pirmin Stekeler Weithofer (2005). Formal Truth and Objective Reference in an Inferentialist Setting. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):7-38.score: 78.0
    The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-representationalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege's and Wittgenstein's original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theories (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), conventionalism (D. Lewis), (...)
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  17. Scott Forschler (2009). Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical: Further Support for Subjective Consequentialism. Utilitas 21 (3):337-346.score: 72.0
    Two meanings of "subjective consequentialism" are distinguished: conscious deliberation with the aim of producing maximally-good consequences, versus acting in ways that, given one's evidence set and reasoning capabilities, is subjectively most likely to maximize expected consequences. The latter is opposed to "objective consequentialism," which demands that we act in ways that actually produce the best total consequences. Peter Railton's arguments for a version of objective consequentialism confuse the two subjective forms, and are only effective against the first. After (...)
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  18. Margaret Holmgren (1987). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Objective Moral Truth. Metaphilosophy 18 (2):108–124.score: 72.0
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  19. David Wiggins (1995). Objective and Subjective in Ethics, with Two Postscripts About Truth. Ratio 8 (3):243-258.score: 72.0
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  20. R. Parks, P. M. Warren, K. M. Boyd, H. Cameron, A. Cumming & G. Lloyd-Jones (2006). The Objective Structured Clinical Examination and Student Collusion: Marks Do Not Tell the Whole Truth. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (12):734-738.score: 72.0
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  21. K. Ludwig (2007). Review: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective * Review: Problems of Rationality * Review: Truth, Language, and History. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):405-416.score: 72.0
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  22. Eugene Webb (1995). Objective and Existential Truth in Politics. Public Affairs Quarterly 9 (2):193-199.score: 72.0
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  23. Chris Meyers (2005). A Non-Realist Theory of Objective Moral Truth. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):69-75.score: 72.0
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  24. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer (2005). Formal Truth and Objective Reference in an Inferentialist Setting. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):7-37.score: 72.0
  25. Michael Walschots (2010). Dworkin and the Possibility of Objective Moral Truth. Gnosis 11 (1).score: 72.0
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  26. Robert M. Ellis (2011). Truth on the Edge: A Brief Western Philosophy of the Middle Way. Lulu.com.score: 70.0
    This book is a briefer and updated account of the Middle Way Philosophy developed in 'A Theory of Moral Objectivity'. Its starting point is the argument that we are not justified in making any claims about truth, whether moral or scientific, but the idea of truth is still meaningful. Instead of making or denying metaphysical claims about truth, we need to think in terms of incrementally objective justification within experience. This standpoint is related to an account (...)
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  27. D. Grover (2001). Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity. Philosophical Review 110 (1):98-100.score: 66.0
    Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically na{ï}ve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues that (...)
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  28. J. L. Gorman (1974). Objectivity and Truth in History. Inquiry 17 (1-4):373 – 397.score: 60.0
    Examples of historical writing are analysed in detail, and it is demonstrated that, with respect to the statements which appear in historical accounts, their truth and value-freedom are neither necessary nor sufficient for the relative acceptability of historical accounts. What is both necessary and sufficient is the acceptability of the selection of statements involved, and it is shown that history can be objective only if the acceptability of selection can be made on the basis of a rational criterion (...)
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  29. Genia Schönbaumsfeld, 'Objectively There is No Truth' - Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard on Religious Belief.score: 60.0
    Kierkegaard’s influence on Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief was profound, but this hasn’t so far been given the attention it deserves . Although Wittgenstein wrote comparatively little on the subject, while the whole of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre has a religious theme, both philosophers have become notorious for refusing to construe religious belief in either of the two traditional ways: as a ‘propositional attitude’ on the one hand or as a mere ‘emotional response’ with no reference to the ‘real world’ on the (...)
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  30. William S. Hamrick (1971). Heidegger and the Objectivity of Aesthetic Truth. Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (2):120-130.score: 60.0
    Heidegger's totally objective view of aesthetic truth, That the meaning of aesthetic experience is revealed only in and through the art-Object, Fails to appreciate the contributions of subjectivity to that meaningfulness. This is shown by pointing out that interpretation of an artwork can be relevant for our aesthetic appreciation and that sometimes subjective factors such as the artist's intentions, And the viewer's personal, Cultural background, Are relevant to interpretation.
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  31. Ashok K. Vijh (1996). Some Remarks on Scientific Positivism and Constructivist Epistemology in Science. Science and Engineering Ethics 2 (1):5-8.score: 60.0
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  32. James O. Young (2009). Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.score: 54.0
    The central claim of this essay is that many deflationary theories of truth are variants of the correspondence theory of truth. Essential to the correspondence theory of truth is the proposal that objective features of the world are the truthmakers of statements. Many advocates of deflationary theories (including F. P. Ramsay, P. F. Strawson and Paul Horwich) remain committed to this proposal. Although T-sentences (statements of the form “ s is true iff p ”) are presented (...)
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  33. Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) (2006). Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
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  34. Susan Haack (2008). Of Truth, in Science and in Law. Brooklyn Law Review 73 (2).score: 54.0
    Abstract: This paper responds to the question posed in the announcement of the conference at Brooklyn Law School at which it was presented: if and how [the inquiry into the reliability of proffered scientific testimony mandated by Daubert] relates to 'truth,' and whose view of the truth should prevail. The first step is to sketch the legal history leading up to Daubert, and to explore some of the difficulties Daubert brought in its wake; the next, to develop an (...)
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  35. Robert Albin (2012). BEYOND MODES OF OBJECTIVITY. Logos and Episteme (3):361-371.score: 54.0
    ABSTRACT: Frege, and others who followed him, stressed the role of fallibility as a means to defining ‘objectivity.’ By defining objective judgments as fallible, these philosophers contributed to the consolidation of a theory of objectivity which suggested interpreting epistemological, as well as other judgements, as being objective. An important philosophical implication of this theory lies in its disclosure of the interrelations between truth and objectivity. In light of this insight, and based on an analysis of instances of (...)
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  36. Markus Pantsar (2009). Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments: A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics. Dissertation, University of Helsinkiscore: 54.0
    One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established (...)
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  37. Shane Mackinlay (2010). Heidegger's Temple: How Truth Happens When Nothing is Portrayed. Sophia 49 (4):499-507.score: 54.0
    In his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Martin Heidegger discusses three examples of artworks: a painting by Van Gogh of peasant shoes, a poem about a Roman fountain, and a Greek temple. The new entry on Heidegger’s aesthetics in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, written by Iain Thomson, focuses on this essay, and Van Gogh’s painting in particular. It argues that Heidegger uses Van Gogh’s painting to set art, as the happening of truth, in relation to (...)
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  38. Robert S. Summers (1999). Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial Fact-Finding -- Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):497 - 511.score: 54.0
    Truth is a fundamental objective of adjudicative processes; ideally, substantive as distinct from formal legal truth. But problems of evidence, for example, may frustrate finding of substantive truth; other values may lead to exclusions of probative evidence, e.g., for the sake of fairness. Jury nullification and jury equity. Limits of time, and definitiveness of decision, require allocation of burden of proof. Degree of truth-formality is variable within a system and across systems.
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  39. Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Truth-Aptness. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.score: 54.0
    Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items (...)
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  40. Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2011). Bolzanian Knowing: Infallibility, Virtue and Foundational Truth. Synthese 183 (1):27 - 45.score: 54.0
    The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano's epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano's notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one's assertions and to do (...)
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  41. Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2011). Bolzanian Knowing: Infallibility, Virtue and Foundational Truth. Synthese 183 (1):27-45.score: 54.0
    The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do (...)
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  42. Katrina Mitcheson (2013). Truth, Autobiography and Documentary: Perspectivism in Nietzsche and Herzog. Film-Philosophy 17 (1):348-366.score: 54.0
    The presence of interpretation according to different perspectives in art forms in which we expect the 'truth' about the subject matter, provides an opportunity to understand what truth means in the context of perspectivism, the view that there is no objective standard of truth free from any perspective against which we can measure the veracity of an account. In this article, I explore perspectival truth through Nietzsche's philosophical autobiography, Ecce Homo , and Herzog's films, particularly (...)
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  43. Tomas Rudzkis & Artūras Panomariovas (2011). Aspiration of the Criminal Procedure – the Truth. Jurisprudence 18 (2):739-754.score: 54.0
    The article investigates the problem of the truth as the purpose of the criminal procedure, the problem of its cognition. Individuals carrying out criminal procedure activities (including the court) are servants of the procedural form and, at the same time, its hostages, therefore they are unable to approach the objective, absolute truth and should be content with the formal (legal) truth. This position falls under criticism. Attempts to artificial segmentation of the truth to its separate (...)
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  44. MarkA Smeltzer (1996). Lying and Intersubjective Truth: A Communication Based Approach to Understanding Lying. [REVIEW] Argumentation 10 (3):361-373.score: 54.0
    This project was undertaken as a response to a perceived deficiency regarding the role of communication in a large block of the phenomenological discourse on lying. The arguments presented here attempt to make the communication process an explicit, rather than an implicit component of this discussion. First, a ‘lie’ is explained as a communicative act that is identified by making a simple comparison between two contradictory realities, the reality presented by the lie, and some sort of ‘true’ reality. Existing discussions (...)
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  45. Richard Rorty (1991). Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge University Press.score: 52.0
    In this volume Rorty offers a Deweyan account of objectivity as intersubjectivity, one that drops claims about universal validity and instead focuses on utility for the purposes of a community. The sense in which the natural sciences are exemplary for inquiry is explicated in terms of the moral virtues of scientific communities rather than in terms of a special scientific method. The volume concludes with reflections on the relation of social democratic politics to philosophy.
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  46. B. D. Ellis (1990). Truth and Objectivity. Basil Blackwell.score: 50.0
  47. David Dwan (2010). Truth and Freedom in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four. Philosophy and Literature 34 (2):381-393.score: 48.0
    The hero of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four defends a seemingly modest claim: "There was truth and there was untruth."1 It may be incoherent to deny this, but, as the novel shows, those who set no store in truth will not be browbeaten by contradictions. Orwell's last novel reflects his conviction that a commitment to "objective truth" was fast disappearing from the world—a prospect that troubled him more than bombs.2 Truth meant little in this "age of (...)
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  48. Glen Hoffmann (2007). The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field's Incompleteness Objection. Philosophia 35 (2):161-170.score: 48.0
    According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue that, within (...)
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  49. Alberto Vanzo (2008). A Correspondence Theory of Objects? On Kant's Notions of Truth, Object, and Actuality. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):259-275.score: 48.0
    Ernst Cassirer claimed that Kant's notion of actual object presupposes the notion of truth. Therefore, Kant cannot define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object. In this paper, I discuss the relations between Kant's notions of truth, object, and actuality. I argue that's notion of actual object does not presuppose the notion of truth. I conclude that Kant can define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object.
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  50. Kyle Swan (2002). Emotivism and Deflationary Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281.score: 48.0
    The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non-cognitivist theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non-cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self-defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is (...)
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