Search results for 'objective truth' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  2.  50
    Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2016). Objective Truth in Matters of Taste. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1755-1777.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  16
    David A. Cleveland (2001). Is Plant Breeding Science Objective Truth or Social Construction? The Case of Yield Stability. Agriculture and Human Values 18 (3):251-270.
    This article presents a holistic framework for understanding the scienceof plant breeding, as an alternative to the common objectivist andconstructivist approaches in studies of science. It applies thisapproach to understanding disagreements about how to deal with yieldstability. Two contrasting definitions of yield stability are described,and concomitant differences in the understanding and roles ofsustainability and of selection, test, and target environments areexplored. Critical questions about plant breeding theory and practiceare posed, and answers from the viewpoint of the two contrastingdefinitions of yield (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4.  6
    I. Ping (1969). Formal Logic and Objective Truth — on the Correctness of Thought Form and the Truthfulness of Thought Content. Contemporary Chinese Thought 1 (1):89-98.
    As we all know, metaphysics and objective truth are basically antagonistic, while dialectical materialism and objective truth are uniform. This is the common sense of Marxist philosophy and needs no argument. What, then, is the relationship between formal logic as a science and objective truth? This involves the problem of the correctness of thought form and the truthfulness of thought content. As shown, this problem is still an unsettled dispute in philosophy and logic circles. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  8
    Brian Hebblethwaite (1988). The Ocean of Truth: A Defence of Objective Theism. Cambridge University Press.
    This short book offers an alternative reading of the impact of modernity on Christian faith to that advanced by Don Cupitt in his television series and book, The Sea of Faith. Hebblethwaite gives a spirited defense of belief in the objective reality of God and in life after death, as opposed to Cupitt's radically interiorized and expressivist view of religion. As attractive as many may find a denial of the traditional church doctrines in favor of an anti-metaphysical, non-dogmatic expressivist (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  15
    Anguel S. Stefanov (1984). Formal Truth and Objective Truth. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 13 (3):154-160.
    How can we ever judge about the truth of a scientific theory? Ostensibly it seems to be no problems concerning such a judgement. Each scientific theory is expressed by a set of statements, formulated in a definite language; and we know, in principle, to ascertain whether a sentence is true or false, If we take any formula, say in the first order predicate calculus, no matter how complex, and if we know its interpretation, i.e. the appropriate finite domain of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  2
    V. Ia Pakhomov (1970). Contemporary Physics and Lenin's Conception of Objective Truth. Russian Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):60-80.
    Central among the complex philosophical problems created by the development of contemporary physics is the problem of the objectivity of physical knowledge, the problem of the reflection of objective reality in our knowledge.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  3
    Adam Schaff (1967). On Objective Truth in Sociology. Russian Studies in Philosophy 6 (2):33-38.
    "I do not doubt that if the truth that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles were in conflict with someone's right to power or the interests of those who already hold power, then, to the degree that this would be in the power of those whose interests are affected by this truth, the teaching of geometry would be challenged or driven out by the burning of all books on geometry.".
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  22
    Carl Wellman (1975). Ethical Disagreement and Objective Truth. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (3):211 - 221.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  10. Danielle Macbeth (2007). Pragmatism and Objective Truth. In C. J. Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press 169.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  65
    Michael Gorr & Mark Timmons (1989). Subjective Truth, Objective Truth, and Moral Indifference. Philosophical Studies 55 (1):111 - 116.
  12.  21
    Deborah C. Smith (1999). Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth: Is Metaphysical Antirealism Self-Refuting? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):293-313.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. Michael Walschots (2010). Dworkin and the Possibility of Objective Moral Truth. Gnosis 11 (1):1-16.
    Ronald Dworkin’s ‘right answer thesis’ states that there are objectively right answers to most legal cases, even in hard cases where there is deep and intractable disagreement over what the law requires. Dworkin also believes that when deciding cases in law judges and lawyers must necessarily take moral considerations into account. This is problematic, however, for if moral considerations come into play when legal decisions are made, then there can only be a single right answer as a matter of law (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  2
    Deborah C. Smith (2012). Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):293-313.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. James O'shea (2011). Objective Truth and the Practice Relativity of Justification in the Pragmatic Turn. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3:216-222.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  36
    J. Donald Walters (2006). The Oneness of Objective Reality and Spiritual Truth. World Futures 62 (1 & 2):28 – 30.
    Spirituality and science discover that they are both motivated by the desire to know, and realize that mere sensory perception does not guarantee the truth of knowledge. The concepts that emerge in the new sciences show a striking similarity to the ideas that come to the mind of spiritually intuitive persons, giving rise to the hope that with the recognition that at the bottom objective reality and spiritual truth are one, the historic opposition (or feud) between science (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Pirmin Stekeler Weithofer (2005). Formal Truth and Objective Reference in an Inferentialist Setting. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):7-38.
    The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-representationalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege's and Wittgenstein's original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theories (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), conventionalism (D. Lewis), (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  6
    Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer (2005). Formal Truth and Objective Reference in an Inferentialist Setting. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):7-37.
    The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-repre­sen­ta­tio­nalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege's and Witt­genstein's original idea of inferential semantics in later developments like formal axiomatic theo­ries , regularist behaviorism , mental regulism and interpretationism , social behaviorism , intentionalism , con­ventionalism , justificational theories and, finally, Brandom's normative pragmatics.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  5
    R. Parks, P. M. Warren, K. M. Boyd, H. Cameron, A. Cumming & G. Lloyd-Jones (2006). The Objective Structured Clinical Examination and Student Collusion: Marks Do Not Tell the Whole Truth. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (12):734-738.
    Objective: To determine whether the marks in the third year Objective Structured Clinical Examination were affected by the collusion reported by the students themselves on an electronic discussion board.Design: A review of the student discussion, examiners’ feedback and a comparison of the marks obtained on the 2 days of the OSCE.Participants: 255 third year medical students.Setting: An OSCE consisting of 15 stations, administered on three sites over 2 days at a UK medical school.Results: 40 students contributed to the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  90
    Margaret Holmgren (1987). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Objective Moral Truth. Metaphilosophy 18 (2):108–124.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  21.  63
    David Wiggins (1995). Objective and Subjective in Ethics, with Two Postscripts About Truth. Ratio 8 (3):243-258.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  22.  1
    Lambert Zuidervaart (2016). Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity: The Contemporary Significance of Early Husserl's Conception of Truth. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2).
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  10
    Chris Meyers (2005). A Non-Realist Theory of Objective Moral Truth. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):69-75.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  16
    Eugene Webb (1995). Objective and Existential Truth in Politics. Public Affairs Quarterly 9 (2):193-199.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  8
    K. Ludwig (2007). Review: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective * Review: Problems of Rationality * Review: Truth, Language, and History. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):405-416.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  24
    Alphonso Lingis (2011). Truth in Reconciliation. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (3):239-243.
    To what extent is truth required for reconciliation of peoples in conflict? What kind of truth? Objective truth, subjective truth? Maybe reconciliation require that the pursuit of truth be limited? The trial of the former “Khmer Rouge” leaders in Cambodia for crimes against humanity provides a case where these issues are examined.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  27. Scott Forschler (2009). Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical: Further Support for Subjective Consequentialism. Utilitas 21 (3):337-346.
    Two meanings of "subjective consequentialism" are distinguished: conscious deliberation with the aim of producing maximally-good consequences, versus acting in ways that, given one's evidence set and reasoning capabilities, is subjectively most likely to maximize expected consequences. The latter is opposed to "objective consequentialism," which demands that we act in ways that actually produce the best total consequences. Peter Railton's arguments for a version of objective consequentialism confuse the two subjective forms, and are only effective against the first. After (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Arnold Zuboff (2015). Theories That Refute Themselves. Philosophy Now (106).
    Many philosophical positions wholly undermine themselves because to possess the truth that they claim for themselves they would have to be false. These are the theories that in one way or another reject the meaningfulness or attainability of objective truth.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  38
    Max Kölbel (2002). Truth Without Objectivity. Routledge.
    The mainstream view in the philosophy of language holds that every meaningful sentence has a truth-condition. This view, however, runs into difficulties with non-objective sentences such as sentences on matters of taste or value: these do not appear to be either true or false, but are generally taken to be meaningful. How can this conflict be resolved? -/- Truth Without Objectivity examines various ways of resolving this fundamental problem, before developing and defending its own original solution, a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   68 citations  
  30.  30
    Artur Rojszczak & Barry Smith (2003). Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth. In Jaako Hintikka (ed.), Philosophy and Logic: In Search of the Polish Tradition. Kluwer
    The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski’s “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  7
    Theo W. A. De Wit (forthcoming). Between Indifference and the Regimes of Truth. An Essay on Fundamentalism, Tolerance and Hypocrisy. Philosophia:1-15.
    There are two basic positions where tolerance as political strategy and moral viewpoint is rejected or made redundant. We are hostile to tolerance when we hold that we are defending an objective truth—religious or secular—which should also be defended and maintained by means of political and legal power. And tolerance become superfluous also when the affirmation of plurality becomes total, and tolerance identical to a vive la difference. As recent developments in my own country—the Netherlands—have demonstrated, the political (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  9
    Daniel Watts (forthcoming). Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many? Mind.
    This paper reexamines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [Fordoblelse], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  91
    Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) (2006). Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  34.  8
    Grant Gillett (2015). Culture, Truth, and Science After Lacan. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 12 (4):633-644.
    Truth and knowledge are conceptually related and there is a way of construing both that implies that they cannot be solely derived from a description that restricts itself to a set of scientific facts. In the first section of this essay, I analyse truth as a relation between a praxis, ways of knowing, and the world. In the second section, I invoke the third thing—the objective reality on which we triangulate as knowing subjects for the purpose of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. Adam Morton (2002). Emotional Truth: Emotional Accuracy: Adam Morton. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):265–275.
    This is a reply to de Sousa's 'Emotional Truth', in which he argues that emotions can be objective, as propositional truths are. I say that it is better to distinguish between truth and accuracy, and agree with de Sousa to the extent of arguing that emotions can be more or less accurate, that is, based on the facts as they are.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  36.  69
    Susan Haack (2008). Of Truth, in Science and in Law. Brooklyn Law Review 73 (2).
    Abstract: This paper responds to the question posed in the announcement of the conference at Brooklyn Law School at which it was presented: if and how [the inquiry into the reliability of proffered scientific testimony mandated by Daubert] relates to 'truth,' and whose view of the truth should prevail. The first step is to sketch the legal history leading up to Daubert, and to explore some of the difficulties Daubert brought in its wake; the next, to develop an (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37. James O. Young (2009). Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.
    The central claim of this essay is that many deflationary theories of truth are variants of the correspondence theory of truth. Essential to the correspondence theory of truth is the proposal that objective features of the world are the truthmakers of statements. Many advocates of deflationary theories (including F. P. Ramsay, P. F. Strawson and Paul Horwich) remain committed to this proposal. Although T-sentences (statements of the form “ s is true iff p ”) are presented (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38. Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Truth-Aptness. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
    Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  92
    A. J. Ayer (1935). The Criterion of Truth. Analysis 3 (1/2):28-31.
    The criterion of truth is the measure of the truthfulness and reliability of our knowledge. It is also the basis for determining the correctness of our concepts and how much our perceptions, ideas, and concepts accord with objective reality. Idealism holds to the idea that the criterion of truth does not involve the integration between theory as created by human intelligence and objective reality, but rather that the criterion of truth involves the "clarity and correctness" (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  40.  76
    Konzelmann Ziv Anita (2011). Bolzanian Knowing: Infallibility, Virtue and Foundational Truth. Synthese 183 (1):27-45.
    The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  53
    Shane Mackinlay (2010). Heidegger's Temple: How Truth Happens When Nothing is Portrayed. Sophia 49 (4):499-507.
    In his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Martin Heidegger discusses three examples of artworks: a painting by Van Gogh of peasant shoes, a poem about a Roman fountain, and a Greek temple. The new entry on Heidegger’s aesthetics in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, written by Iain Thomson, focuses on this essay, and Van Gogh’s painting in particular. It argues that Heidegger uses Van Gogh’s painting to set art, as the happening of truth, in relation to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  9
    MarkA Smeltzer (1996). Lying and Intersubjective Truth: A Communication Based Approach to Understanding Lying. [REVIEW] Argumentation 10 (3):361-373.
    This project was undertaken as a response to a perceived deficiency regarding the role of communication in a large block of the phenomenological discourse on lying. The arguments presented here attempt to make the communication process an explicit, rather than an implicit component of this discussion. First, a ‘lie’ is explained as a communicative act that is identified by making a simple comparison between two contradictory realities, the reality presented by the lie, and some sort of ‘true’ reality. Existing discussions (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43.  57
    Robert S. Summers (1999). Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial Fact-Finding -- Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):497 - 511.
    Truth is a fundamental objective of adjudicative processes; ideally, substantive as distinct from formal legal truth. But problems of evidence, for example, may frustrate finding of substantive truth; other values may lead to exclusions of probative evidence, e.g., for the sake of fairness. Jury nullification and jury equity. Limits of time, and definitiveness of decision, require allocation of burden of proof. Degree of truth-formality is variable within a system and across systems.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  9
    Katrina Mitcheson (2013). Truth, Autobiography and Documentary: Perspectivism in Nietzsche and Herzog. Film-Philosophy 17 (1):348-366.
    The presence of interpretation according to different perspectives in art forms in which we expect the 'truth' about the subject matter, provides an opportunity to understand what truth means in the context of perspectivism, the view that there is no objective standard of truth free from any perspective against which we can measure the veracity of an account. In this article, I explore perspectival truth through Nietzsche's philosophical autobiography, Ecce Homo , and Herzog's films, particularly (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  3
    Curt John Ducasse (1969). Truth, Knowledge and Causation. New York, Humanities P..
    Originally published in 1969. This book examines the fundamental concepts of metaphysics and of theory of knowledge. Topics treated include the nature of substance and of causation; their relation to natural laws, dispositions, and attributes; the nature of consciousness and purposiveness; of symbols, signs, and signals, and their relation to interpretation and objective reference; and the nature and criteria of truth. The author holds that philosophy is by intent a science and that its becoming so requires precise and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46.  5
    Tomas Rudzkis & Artūras Panomariovas (2011). Aspiration of the Criminal Procedure – the Truth. Jurisprudence 18 (2):739-754.
    The article investigates the problem of the truth as the purpose of the criminal procedure, the problem of its cognition. Individuals carrying out criminal procedure activities (including the court) are servants of the procedural form and, at the same time, its hostages, therefore they are unable to approach the objective, absolute truth and should be content with the formal (legal) truth. This position falls under criticism. Attempts to artificial segmentation of the truth to its separate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Predrag Cicovacki (2002). Between Truth and Illusion: Kant at the Crossroads of Modernity. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Truth, Cicovacki says, presupposes neither a dominance of subject or object, but their dynamic and reciprocal interactive relation. The absence of proper interactions leads to various forms of self-projections or illusions. Truth, by contract, exists in a harmonious interaction between its subjective and objective elements. Cicovacki thus locates the value of truth between traditional absolutist claims and contemporary relativism.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  33
    Robert M. Ellis (2011). Truth on the Edge: A Brief Western Philosophy of the Middle Way. Lulu.Com.
    This book is a briefer and updated account of the Middle Way Philosophy developed in 'A Theory of Moral Objectivity'. Its starting point is the argument that we are not justified in making any claims about truth, whether moral or scientific, but the idea of truth is still meaningful. Instead of making or denying metaphysical claims about truth, we need to think in terms of incrementally objective justification within experience. This standpoint is related to an account (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Markus Pantsar (2009). Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments: A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics. Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  8
    Michael P. Lynch (2001). Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity. A Bradford Book.
    A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In (...) in Context, Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about truth. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, Lynch develops an original version of metaphysical pluralism, which he calls relativistic Kantianism. He argues that one can take facts and propositions as relative without implying that our ordinary concept of truth is a relative, epistemic, or "soft" concept. The truths may be relative, but our concept of truth need not be. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000