Search results for 'ought implies can' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Charles R. Pigden (1990). Ought-Implies-Can: Erasmus Luther and R.M. Hare. Sophia 29 (1):2-30.score: 720.0
    l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Free Will) that this violates (...)-Implies-Can which he supported with Hare-style ordinary language arguments. 4. Luther a) pointed out the antinomy and b) resolved it by undermining the prescriptivist arguments for Ought-Implies-Can. 5. We can reinforce Luther's argument with an example due to David Lewis. 6. Whatever its merits as a moral principle, Ought-Implies-Can is not a logical truth and should not be included in deontic logics. Most deontic logics, and maybe the discipline itself, should therefore be abandoned. 7. Could it be that Ought-Conversationally-Implies-Can? Yes - in some contexts. But a) even if these contexts are central to the evolution of Ought, the implication is not built into the semantics of the word; b) nor is the parallel implication built into the semantics of orders; and c) in some cases Ought conversationally implies Can, only because Ought-Implies-Can is a background moral belief. d) Points a) and b) suggest a criticism of prescriptivism - that Oughts do not entail imperatives but that the relation is one of conversational implicature. 8. If Ought-Implies-Can is treated as a moral principle, Erasmus' argument for Free Will can be revived (given his Christian assumptions). But it does not 'prove' Pelagianism as Luther supposed. A semi-Pelagian alternative is available. (shrink)
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  2. Elinor Mason (2003). Consequentialism and the "Ought Implies Can" Principle. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):319 - 331.score: 720.0
    It seems that the debate between objective and subjective consequentialists might be resolved by appealing to the ought implies can principle. Howard-Snyder has suggested that if one does not know how to do something, cannot do it, and thus one cannot have an obligation to do it. I argue that this depends on an overly rich conception of ability, and that we need to look beyond the ought implies can principle to answer the question. Once we (...)
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  3. Guglielmo Feis (2012). The “OughtImplies “Can” Principle: A Challenge to Collective Intentionality. Phenomenology and Mind 2:114-121.score: 720.0
    I investigate collective intentionality (CI) through the “Oughtimplies “Can” (OIC) principle. My leading question is does OIC impose any further requirement on CI? In answering the challenge inside a Searlean framework, I realize that we need to clarify what CI's structure is and what kind of role the agents joining a CI-act have. In the last part of the paper, I put forward an (inverted) Hartian framework to allow the Searlean CI theory to be agent sensitive and (...)
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  4. Shyam Ranganathan (2010). Does Kant Hold That Ought Implies Can? In J. Sharma A. Raguramaraju (ed.), Grounding Morality. Routledge. 60.score: 720.0
    Undergraduate students of philosophy are often told that Kant is famous for teaching us that “ought implies can,” and furthermore that this principle implies that it makes no sense to tell someone that they ought to do something if they do not have the ability to execute the action in question. It is thus surprising to find that the words “ought implies can” do not appear conspicuously in popular English translations of Kant’s main moral (...)
     
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  5. Jonny Anomaly (2008). Internal Reasons and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle. Philosophical Forum 39 (4):469-483.score: 630.0
  6. Moti Mizrahi (2012). Does 'Ought' Imply 'Can' From an Epistemic Point of View? Philosophia 40 (4):829-840.score: 560.0
    In this paper, I argue that the “Ought Implies Can” (OIC) principle, as it is employed in epistemology, particularly in the literature on epistemic norms, is open to counterexamples. I present a counterexample to OIC and discuss several objections to it. If this counterexample works, then it shows that it is possible that S ought to believe that p, even though S cannot believe that p. If this is correct, then OIC, considered from an epistemic point of (...)
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  7. John Kekes (1984). `Ought Implies Can' and Two Kinds of Morality. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):459-467.score: 540.0
    The principle, Ought implies can, Has two versions. The strong version expresses a necessary condition for the appropriateness of moral judgments; the weak version expresses a possible ground for excusing wrongdoing. The strong version is presupposed by choice-Morality, While the weak one is presupposed by character-Morality. It is argues that the strong version and choice-Morality are mistaken and that the weak version and character-Morality give a much more plausible account of our moral experience. The general conclusion is that (...)
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  8. Dale Jacquette (1991). Moral Dilemmas, Disjunctive Obligations, and Kant's Principle That 'Ought' Implies 'Can'. Synthese 88 (1):43 - 55.score: 540.0
    In moral dilemmas, where circumstances prevent two or more equally justified prima facie ethical requirements from being fulfilled, it is often maintained that, since the agent cannot do both, conjoint obligation is overridden by Kant's principle that ought implies can, but that the agent nevertheless has a disjunctive obligation to perform one of the otherwise obligatory actions or the other. Against this commonly received view, it is demonstrated that although Kant's ought-can principle may avoid logical inconsistency, the (...)
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  9. Matthew H. Kramer (2005). Moral Rights and the Limits of the Ought-Implies-Can Principle: Why Impeccable Precautions Are No Excuse. Inquiry 48 (4):307 – 355.score: 540.0
    This essay argues against the commonly held view that "ought" implies "can" in the domain of morality. More specifically, I contest the notion that nobody should ever be held morally responsible for failing to avoid the infliction of any harm that he or she has not been able to avoid through all reasonably feasible precautions in the carrying out of some worthwhile activity. The article explicates the concept of a moral right in order to show why violations of (...)
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  10. Gregory Mellema (2001). Praise, Blame, and the Ought Implies Can Principle. Philosophia 28 (1-4):425-436.score: 540.0
    Recently David Widerker argued that from the widely accepted ought implies can principle one can deduce the controversial and much discussed principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Actually, he argues that this result is true only of the part of PAP which deals with moral blame. Because there are acts of supererogation, he maintains that it does not apply to the part which deals with moral praise. What Widerker says about supererogation seems true, and I develop and expand upon (...)
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  11. Peter A. Graham (2011). Fischer on Blameworthiness and “OughtImplies “Can”. Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):63-80.score: 540.0
    I argue that Fischer’s attempts to undermine the “OughtImplies “Can” principle (OIC) fail. I argue both against his construal of the natural motivation for OIC and against his argument for the falsity of OIC. I also consider some attempts to salvage Fischer’s arguments and argue that they can work only if the true moral theory is motive determinative--i.e., it is such that, necessarily, any action performed from a motive which renders one of the blame emotions appropriate is (...)
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  12. Terrance McConnell (1989). “'Ought' Implies 'Can'” and the Scope of Moral Requirements. Philosophia 19 (4):437-454.score: 540.0
    This paper examines two contexts in ethical theory that some have thought support the claim that attempts, rather than actions, are what are morally required of agents. In each context there is an appeal to the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. I begin by explaining how I think appeals to this principle typically work. I conclude that not only do the contexts in question not demonstrate that moral requirements range over attempts, but also that any argument in support (...)
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  13. Jennifer Moore (1989). Drug Testing and Corporate Responsibility: The “Ought Implies Can” Argument. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 8 (4):279 - 287.score: 540.0
    Most of the debate about drug testing in the workplace has focused on the right to privacy. Proponents of testing have had to tackle difficult questions concerning the nature, extent, and weight of the privacy rights of employees. This paper examines a different kind of argument — the claim that because corporations are responsible for harms committed by employees while under the influence of drugs, they are entitled to test for drug use. This argument has considerable intuitive appeal, because it (...)
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  14. John R. Danley (1988). OughtImplies “Can”, or, the Moral Relevance of a Theory of the Firm. Journal of Business Ethics 7 (1-2):23 - 28.score: 540.0
    Since ought implies can, i.e., one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do, the question of corporate responsibility cannot be discussed intelligibly without an inquiry into the range of corporate or managerial discretion. Hence, the moral relevance of a theory of the firm. Within classical or neo-classical economic theory, for instance, firms which act other than to maximize profit are eliminated. They cannot do otherwise, and thus either have no obligations at all or only the duty (...)
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  15. Ralph Wedgwood (2013). Rational 'Ought' Implies 'Can'. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.score: 537.0
    Every kind of ‘oughtimplies some kind of ‘can’ – but there are many kinds of ‘ought’ and even more kinds of ‘can’. In this essay, I shall focus on a particular kind of ‘ought’ – specifically, on what I shall call the “rational ‘ought’”. On every occasion of use, this kind of ‘ought’ is focused on the situation of a particular agent at a particular time; but this kind of ‘ought’ is concerned, (...)
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  16. Moti Mizrahi (2009). Ought’ Does Not Imply ‘Can’. Philosophical Frontiers 4 (1):19-35.score: 535.0
    According to the Ought-Implies-Can principle (OIC), an agent ought to perform a certain action only if the agent can perform that action. Proponents of OIC interpret this supposed implication in several ways. Some argue that the implication in question is a logical one, namely, entailment. Some think that the relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ is a relation of presupposition. Still others argue that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. Opponents of OIC offer a variety of counterexamples in (...)
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  17. Nicholas Southwood (2013). “The Thing To Do” Implies “Can”. Noûs 47 (3).score: 480.0
    A familiar complaint against the principle that “oughtimplies “can” is that it seems that agents can intentionally make it the case that they cannot perform acts that they nonetheless ought to perform. I propose a related principle that I call the principle that “the thing to do” implies “can.” I argue that the principle that “the thing to do” implies “can” is implied by important but underappreciated truths about practical reason, and that it is (...)
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  18. Matthew Talbert (forthcoming). Symmetry, Rational Abilities, and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-14.score: 459.0
    In Making Sense of Free Will and Moral Responsibility Dana Nelkin defends the “rational abilities view.” According to this view, agents are responsible for their behavior if and only if they act with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. It follows that agents who act well are open to praise regardless of whether they could have acted differently, but agents who act badly are open to blame only if they could have acted on the moral reasons that (...)
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  19. David Copp (2008). 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Analysis 68 (297):67–75.score: 450.0
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  20. Norman O. Dahl (1974). Ought Implies Can and Deontic Logic. Philosophia 4 (4):485-511.score: 450.0
  21. Gideon Yaffe (1999). 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Analysis 59 (3):218-222.score: 450.0
  22. John Martin Fischer (2003). Ought-Implies-Can’, Causal Determinism and Moral Responsibility. Analysis 63 (279):244–250.score: 450.0
  23. Ira M. Schnall (2001). The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and ‘OughtImplies ‘Can’. Analysis 61 (272):335–340.score: 450.0
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  24. Frederick E. Brouwer (1969). A Difficulty with 'Ought Implies Can'. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):45-50.score: 450.0
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  25. David Widerker (1991). Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities. Analysis 51 (4):222 - 224.score: 450.0
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  26. G. P. Henderson (1966). Ought" Implies "Can. Philosophy 41 (156):101 - 112.score: 450.0
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  27. Russell Jacobs (1985). Is “Ought Implies Can” a Moral Principle? Southwest Philosophy Review 2:43-54.score: 450.0
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  28. Lawrence L. Heintz (1975). Excuses and '"Ought" Implies "Can"'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):449 - 462.score: 450.0
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  29. Robert Kane (2000). Deontic Acts, Frankfurt-Style Examples, and "'Ought' Implies 'Can'" (Comments on Ishtiyaque Haji's Presentation). Journal of Ethics 4 (4):357 - 360.score: 450.0
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  30. Rita C. Manning (1981). Ought Implies Can” and the Price of Duty. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):117-121.score: 450.0
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  31. L. J. Russell (1935). Ought Implies Can. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 36:151 - 186.score: 450.0
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  32. Jeffrey Reiman (1991). What Ought "'Ought'Implies 'Can'" Imply? Comments on James Sterba's How to Make People Just. Journal of Social Philosophy 22 (3):73-80.score: 450.0
  33. Matthias Fritsch (2008). Deconstructing Ought Implies Can. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:109-115.score: 450.0
    The present paper aims to view three ways of thinking time by Emmanuel Levinas. We distinguish existential, historical, and eschatological time demonstrating how they are connected with his central notion of responsibility toward the Other. The following analysis reorders and interprets what Levinas has said in response of Martin Heidegger’s and Hegel’s position. The text does not make any other claims but aims to offer a possible reading and exegesis of Levinas’s philosophy and open a further discussion on these topics.
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  34. D. G. Collingridge (1977). 'Ought-Implies-Can' and Hume's Rule. Philosophy 52 (201):348 - 351.score: 450.0
  35. James Griffin, Ought Implies 'Can'.score: 450.0
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  36. Doreen Bretherton (1962). 'Ought' Implies 'Can Say'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:145 - 166.score: 450.0
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  37. Don Fawkes (1990). Regarding Rich's “Compatibilism Argument” and the 'Ought- Implies-'Can' Argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 6 (2):123-124.score: 450.0
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  38. Frances Howard‐Snyder (2013). Ought Implies Can. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 450.0
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  39. Gregory Rich (1989). Compatibilism and the 'Ought'-Implies-'Can' Argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 5 (2):9-16.score: 450.0
  40. Guglielmo Feis (2014). The OIC/PAP Dispute: Two Ways of Interpreting the '€˜Ought' Implies '€˜Can'€™. In Sofia Bonicalzi, Leonardo Caffo & Mattia Sorgon (eds.), Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics. Cambridge Scholars. 172--181.score: 450.0
  41. Manfred Moritz (1968). On Second Order Norms. An Interpretation of €˜'Ought Implies Can' and 'is Commanded Implies is Permitted'. Ratio 10:101-115.score: 450.0
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  42. M. Moritz (1966). 'Sollen'soil'konrien'implizieren" Und RM Hare's Interpretation von" Ought Implies Can. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 3.score: 450.0
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  43. Knut Erik Tranøy (1975). 'Ought' Implies 'Can': A Bridge From Fact to Norm (Part 2)? Ratio 17:147-175.score: 450.0
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  44. Knut Erik Tranøy (1972). OughtImplies ‘Can’: A Bridge Form Fact to Norm? Part 1. Ratio 14:116-130.score: 450.0
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  45. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1984). `Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can'. Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.score: 435.0
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  46. Michael Stocker (1971). 'Ought' and 'Can'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):303 – 316.score: 390.0
  47. Robert Stern (2004). Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does? Utilitas 16 (1):42-61.score: 380.0
    The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has happened in the way it has been taken up in some of the current literature. Second, Kant's understanding of the principle is considered. Here it is argued that these problematic conceptions put the principle to work in a way that Kant does not, so (...)
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  48. Clayton Littlejohn (2012). Does 'Ought' Still Imply 'Can'? Philosophia 40 (4):821-828.score: 355.0
    According to ‘oughtimplies ‘can’ (OIC), your obligation can never be to do what you cannot do. In a recent attack on OIC, Graham has argued that intuitions about justified intervention can help us determine whether the agent whose actions we use force to prevent would have acted permissibly or not. These intuitions, he suggests, cause trouble for the idea that you can be obligated to refrain from doing what you can refrain from doing. I offer a defense (...)
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  49. Paul Saka (2000). Ought Does Not Imply Can. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2):93 - 105.score: 355.0
    Moral philosophers widely believe that it is a part of the MEANING of 'ought' statements that they imply 'can' statements. To this thesis I offer three challenges, and then I conclude on a broader methodological note. (1) Epistemological Modal Argument: for all we know, determinism is true; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore we don’t know that 'ought' implies 'can'. (2) Metaphysical Modal Argument: determinism is conceptually possible; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore (...)
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