Search results for 'panpsychism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  23
    Galen Strawson (forthcoming). Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism. In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press 000-00.
    I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft ≈ being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden ≈ being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein ≈ being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein ≈ being is mind. [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the (...)
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  2.  33
    Jean-Luc Solère (forthcoming). Bayle and Panpsychism. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 2017 (2).
    Pierre Bayle shows that, in order to avoid devastating objections, materialism should postulate that the property of thinking does not emerge from certain material combinations but is present in matter from the start and everywhere—a hypothesis recently revived and labelled “panpsychism”. There are reasons for entertaining the idea that Bayle actually considers this enhanced materialism to be tenable, as it might use the same line of defence that Bayle outlined for Stratonism. However, this would lead to a view similar (...)
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  3.  85
    David Skrbina (2005). Panpsychism in the West. MIT Press.
    Skrbina argues that panpsychism is long overdue for detailed treatment, and with this book he proposes to add impetus to the discussion of panpsychism in...
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  4. Sam Coleman (2013). The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence. Erkenntnis (1):1-26.
    Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to (...)
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  5.  33
    Miguel Ángel Sebastián (2015). What Panpsychists Should Reject: On the Incompatibility of Panpsychism and Organizational Invariantism. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846.
    Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the (...)
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  6. David Papineau (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson: Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):100-109.
    Galen Strawson (2006) thinks it is 'obviously' false that 'the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience' (p. 4). He also describes this view as 'crazy' (p. 7). I think that he has been carried away by first impressions. It is certainly true that 'physicSalism', as he dubs this view, is strongly counterintuitive. But at the same time there are compelling arguments in its favour. I think that these arguments are sound and that the contrary (...)
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  7. Shan Gao (2013). A Quantum Physical Argument for Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1 - 2.
    It has been widely thought that consciousness has no causal efficacy in the physical world. However, this may be not the case. In this paper, we show that a conscious being can distinguish definite perceptions and their quantum superpositions, while a physical measuring system without consciousness cannot distinguish such nonorthogonal quantum states. The possible existence of this distinct quantum physical effect of consciousness may have interesting implications for the science of consciousness. In particular, it suggests that consciousness is not emergent (...)
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  8. David Skrbina (2003). Panpsychism as an Underlying Theme in Western Philosophy: A Survey Paper. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (3):4-46.
    Panpsychism is the view that all things have a mind, or a mind-like quality. Contrary to the common view that panpsychism is a fringe or 'absurd' theory of mind, it in fact has a long and noble tradition within western philosophy. In the forms of animism and polytheism, panpsychism was the dominant view for most if not all of the pre-historical era. In the early years of western thought it was widely accepted though not often explicitly argued (...)
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  9. Gregory Nixon (2009). Skrbina's *Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):116-121.
    Is the great god Pan reborn? For a while there, it seemed every intellectual movement began with the prefix ‘post’, implying non-totality, but now there are indications that ‘pan’ (all) is returning to provide another answer to one of the most basic of ontological questions: What is the relationship of mind to matter? In this important book with 17 different authors, panpsychism is given its due.
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  10. David S. Clarke (2002). Panpsychism and the Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (3):151-166.
    This article summarizes the principal arguments for panpsychism given by Charles Hartshorne by separating it from Whitehead's event metaphysics and Hartshorne's natural theology. It sorts out the plausible reasons for panpsychism given by Hartshorne from those less plausible. Among the plausible reasons are those based on analogical reasoning and the impossibility of explaining how mentality originated. Among the implausible ones are those that postulate a type of psychic causation between wholes and parts. The conclusion is that the plausible (...)
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  11.  29
    Liam P. Dempsey (2013). The Side Left Untouched: Panpsychism, Embodiment, and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
    This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have (...)
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  12.  91
    Roy Wood Sellars (1960). Panpsychism or Evolutionary Materialism. Philosophy of Science 27 (October):329-49.
    I shall be concerned in this paper with the consideration of panpsychism and of materialism in new forms as alternatives. Extended reference will be made to C. S. Peirce's view of perception as realistic in intention and yet not quite clear as to its mechanism and how it attains objective import. I shall say little about Whitehead as a representative of panpsychism as I have just finished a detailed criticism of his epistemological framework. I shall, however, make comments (...)
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  13.  50
    D. S. Clarke (2003). Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude. State University of New York Press.
    In this bold, challenging book, D. S. Clarke outlines reasons for accepting panpsychism and defends the doctrine against its critics.
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  14.  21
    Raamy Majeed (2013). A Representationalist Argument Against Contemporary Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):105-123.
    Consider (i) the humility thesis that we only know the causal natures of the external world and (ii) the thesis we are directly acquainted with the intrinsic natures of our phenomenal experiences. The conjunction of these two theses has motivated a version of panpsychism, which states that the intrinsic nature of all matter is phenomenal. Contemporary panpsychists, such as Lockwood (1991, 1993), Rosenberg (1999, 2004) and Maxwell (2002), have taken it upon themselves to flesh out a plausible story of (...)
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  15.  15
    Karl R. Popper (1977). Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 31 (1‐2):177-86.
    Many writers, both scientists and philosophers, when discussing the mind‐body problem, adopt what might be called the physicalist principle of the closedness of the physical world. They reject the possibility that the physical world is causally open to a realm of conscious experience that is not part of it.Among the upholders of such a view are those who may be called radical materialists or radical physicalists, who deny that there exists a realm of conscious experience. Also, there are the proponents (...)
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  16. Warren G. Frisina (1997). Minds, Bodies, Experience, Nature: Is Panpsychism Really Dead? In Donald A. Crosby & Charley D. Hardwick (eds.), Pragmatism, Neo-Pragmatism, and Religion: Conversations with Richard Rorty. Peter Lang
    In a paper titled "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin," Richard Rorty argued that while it is appropriate to describe John Dewey as a radical empiricist and panpsychist, it would be better if we allowed those aspects of his thought to atrophy and eventually disappear. This paper challenges that claim, arguing that properly understood, radical empiricism and panpsychism continue to have a role in a world newly fascinated by the way bodies, minds, experience and nature are all interwoven into a (...)
     
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  17. David Skrbina (ed.) (2009). Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. John Benjamins Pub..
    other distinct subjects is famously difficult (see James 1890: 1.160-161; Goff 2006) but I cannot avoid the difficulty in the way Coleman can (2006:48—50), ...
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  18. Peter Carruthers & Elizabeth Schechter (2006). Can Panpsychism Bridge the Explanatory Gap? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):32-39.
  19.  93
    Susan Stuart (2012). David Skrbina (Ed.): Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 22 (3):271-275.
    David Skrbina opens this timely and intriguing text with a suitably puzzling line from the Diamond Sutra: ‘‘Mind that abides nowhere must come forth.’’, and he urges us to ‘‘de-emphasise the quest for the specifically human embodiment of mind’’ and follow Empedocles, progressing ‘‘with good will and unclouded attention’’ into the text which he has drawn together as editor. If we do, we are assured that it will ‘‘yield great things’’ (p. xi). This, I am pleased to say, is not (...)
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  20. Shan Gao (2003). A Possible Quantum Basis of Panpsychism. Neuroquantology 1 (1):4-9.
    We show that consciousness may violate the basic quantum principle, according to which the nonorthogonal quantum states can't be distinguished. This implies that the physical world is not causally closed without consciousness, and consciousness is a fundamental property of matter.
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  21.  46
    Michael Blamauer (2013). Panpsychism Without Subjectivity? A Brief Commentary on Sam Coleman's 'Mental Chemistry' and 'The Real Combination Problem'. Panpsychism Without Subjectivity? A Brief Commentary on Sam Coleman’s ‘Mental Chemistry’ and ‘the Real Combination Problem’ (Online First).
    Blamauer, Michael_Panpsychism without Subjectivity (Online First).
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  22. Frank Jackson (2006). Galen Strawson on Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):62-64.
    We make powerful motor cars by suitably assembling items that are not themselves powerful, but we do not do this by 'adding in the power' at the very end of the assembly line; nor, if it comes to that, do we add portions of power along the way. Powerful motor cars are nothing over and above complex arrangements or aggregations of items that are not themselves powerful. The example illustrates the way aggregations can have interesting properties that the items aggregated (...)
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  23.  60
    Leemon B. McHenry (1995). Whitehead's Panpsychism as the Subjectivity of Prehension. Process Studies 24:1-14.
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  24. Daniel Stoljar (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson - 'Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):170-176.
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  25. Christian Nimtz & M. Schutte (2003). On Physicalism, Physical Properties, and Panpsychism. Dialectica 57 (4):413-22.
     
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  26.  7
    Lewis S. Ford (1995). Panpsychism and the Early History of Prehension. Process Studies 24:15-33.
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  27.  20
    Clark W. Butler (1978). Panpsychism: A Restatement of the Genetic Argument. Idealist Studies 8 (January):33-39.
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  28.  14
    Andrew G. Bjelland (1982). Popper's Critique of Panpsychism and Process Proto-Mentalism. Modern Schoolman 59 (May):233-43.
  29. John Mark Bishop (2003). Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press
  30. Anthony Freeman (2006). Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? Exeter: Imprint Academic.
     
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  31. Georges Rey (2006). Better to Study Human Than World Psychology - Commentary on Galen Strawson's Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):110-116.
     
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  32.  83
    Michael Blamauer (2013). The Role of Subjectivity in the Continuity-Argument for Panpsychism. Polish Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):7-18.
    The Principle of Continuity is a major premise in what can be called the “Continuity-Argument for Panpsychism” : If we, as complex conscious organisms, are the evolutionary products of originally inorganic components and processes, and consciousness is a metaphysically irreducible feature, thenconsciousness must have already been a feature of these fundamental components, assuming there is continuity between the inorganic and the organic. This argument faces one serious objection, based on the possible vagueness of consciousness: If consciousness is a feature (...)
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  33. Philip Goff (2009). Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness. Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.
    This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
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  34. William Seager (2010). Panpsychism, Aggregation and Combinatorial Infusion. Mind and Matter 8 (2):167-184.
    Deferential Monadic Panpsychism is a view that accepts that physical science is capable of discovering the basic structure of reality. However, it denies that reality is fully and exhaustively de- scribed purely in terms of physical science. Consciousness is missing from the physical description and cannot be reduced to it. DMP explores the idea that the physically fundamental features of the world possess some intrinsic mental aspect. It thereby faces a se- vere problem of understanding how more complex mental (...)
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  35.  29
    William E. Seager (1995). Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):272-88.
    The generation problem is to explain how material configurations or processes can produce conscious experience. David Chalmers urges that this is what makes the problem of consciousness really difficult. He proposes to side-step the generation problem by proposing that consciousness is an absolutely fundamental feature of the world. I am inclined to agree that the generation problem is real and believe that taking consciousness to be fundamental is promising. But I take issue with Chalmers about what it is to be (...)
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  36. William E. Seager (2006). The 'Intrinsic Nature' Argument for Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145.
    Strawson’s case in favor of panpsychism is at heart an updated version of a venerable form of argument I’ll call the ‘intrinsic nature’ argument. It is an extremely interesting argument which deploys all sorts of high caliber metaphysical weaponry (despite the ‘down home’ appeals to common sense which Strawson frequently makes). The argument is also subtle and intricate. So let’s spend some time trying to articulate its general form.
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  37. Emmett Holman (2008). Panpsychism, Physicalism, Neutral Monism and the Russellian Theory of Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.
    As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a (...)
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  38.  13
    Michael Blamauer (2011). Is the Panpsychist Better Off as an Idealist? Some Leibnizian Remarks on Consciousness and Composition. Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 15:48-75.
    Some philosophers of mind have argued for considering consciousness as a further fundamental feature of reality in addition to its physical properties. Hence most of them are property dualists. But some of them are panpsychists. In the present paper it will be argued that being a real property dualist essentially entails being a panpsychist. Even if panpsychism deals rather elegantly with certain problems of the puzzle of consciousness, there’s no way around the composition problem. Adhering to the fundamentality claim (...)
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  39.  66
    Itay Shani (2010). Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind-Stuff Theory Does Not Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (4):413-434.
    There is a famous passage in chapter six of James’ Principles of Psychology whose import, many believe, deals a devastating blow to the explanatory aspirations of panpsychism. In the present paper I take a close look at James’ argument, as well as at the claim that it underlies a powerful critique of panpsychism. Apart from the fact that the argument was never aimed at panpsychism as such, I show that it rests on highly problematic assumptions which, if (...)
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  40.  32
    Sami Pihlström (2007). Panpsychism—a Neglected Jamesian Alternative? Journal of Philosophical Research 32:319-347.
    This essay examines the speculative metaphysical doctrine of panpsychism, which some (though only a few) philosophers regard as a plausible solution to the problem of explaining the possibility of conscious experience. After a survey of some of the main arguments for and against panpsychism, the metaphysically realist background assumption of the doctrine is uncovered and questioned. A pragmatic reinterpretation of panpsychism, drawn from the work of William James,is then proposed. In order to be treated truly pragmatically, (...)—like any other metaphysical position—ought to be subjected to Jamesian pragmatic pluralism. Something like “panculturalism” follows as a result: both panpsychism and its metaphysical rivals are, in the end, cultural posits arising fromhuman practices of engaging with reality. (shrink)
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  41.  95
    Pierfrancesco Basile (2010). It Must Be True – But How Can It Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):93-112.
    Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least good prima facie reasons for taking it seriously. In a second (...)
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  42. P. Goff (2009). Can the Panpsychist Get Around the Combination Problem?(Chapter 6). In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. John Benjamins Pub. 129--135.
     
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  43. D. S. Clarke (ed.) (2004). Panpsychism: Past and Recent Selected Readings. State University of New York Press.
    An anthology of readings in panpsychism, spanning two millennia.
     
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  44.  5
    Nathaniel F. Barrett (2010). The Perspectivity of Feeling: Process Panpsychism and the Explanatory Gap. Chromatikon: Annales de la Philosophie En Procès / Yearbook of Philosophy in Process 6 (2):63-77.
    For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibilityof special, “experiential” properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary (...)
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  45.  25
    Jonathan Beever & Vernon Cisney (2013). All Things in Mind: Panpsychist Elements in Spinoza, Deleuze, and Peirce. [REVIEW] Biosemiotics 6 (3):351-365.
    Benedict de Spinoza, C.S. Peirce, and Gilles Deleuze delineate a trajectory through the history of ideas in the dialogue about the potentials and limitations of panpsychism, the view that world is fundamentally made up of mind. As a parallel trajectory to the panpsychism debate in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology, this approach can inform and enrich the discussion of the role and scope of mind in the natural world. The philosophies of mind developed by Deleuze and (...)
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  46.  52
    John Protevi, Mind in Life, Mind in Process: Toward a New Transcendental Aesthetic and a New Question of Panpsychism.
    The essay examines the idea of ―biological space and time‖ found in Evan Thompson‘s Mind in Life and Gilles Deleuze‘s Difference and Repetition. Tracking down this ―new Transcendental Aesthetic‖ intersects new work done on panpsychism. Both Deleuze and Thompson can be fairly said to be biological panpsychists. That‘s what ―Mind in Life‖ means: mind and life are coextensive; life is a sufficient condition for mind. Deleuze is not just a biological panpsychist, however, so we‘ll have to confront full-fledged (...). At the end of the essay we‘ll be able to pose the question whether or not we can supplement Thompson‘s ―Mind in Life‖ position with a ―Mind in Process‖ position and if so, what that supplement means both for his work and for panpsychism. (shrink)
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  47.  49
    David S. Clarke (2002). Panpsychism and the Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (3):151-166.
    This article summarizes the principal arguments for panpsychism given by Charles Hartshorne by separating it from Whitehead's event metaphysics and Hartshorne's natural theology. It sorts out the plausible reasons for panpsychism given by Hartshorne from those less plausible. Among the plausible reasons are those based on analogical reasoning and the impossibility of explaining how mentality originated. Among the implausible ones are those that postulate a type of psychic causation between wholes and parts. The conclusion is that the plausible (...)
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  48.  15
    William Seager (2012). Emergentist Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):9-10.
    There are many possible forms of panpsychism. In this paper, I discuss a type of panpsychism in which the complex mental states of higher-level entities emerge from a system, or organization, of fundamental entities which possess extremely simple forms of mentality. I argue that this sort of panpsychism is surprisingly plausible, especially in light of the notorious difficulties raised by consciousness. Emergentist panpsychism faces a distinctive challenge, however. In so far as panpsychism embraces emergentism of (...)
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  49.  8
    Clark Butler (2010). Panpsychism and the Dissolution of Dispositional Properties. Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (2):87-108.
    The article explains my third argument for panpsychism, based on disolving all properties, including dispositional physical properties like mass, energy, and force, into phenomenal properties. I thus reject a dual-property version of panpsychism. I seek to show, contrary to Paul Churchland, that the general panpsychist hypothesis has some explanatory value, and makes a cosmology consisting in comparative psychology possible. The mental life even of so-called physical particles in physics is hypothesized to help explain their behavior.
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  50.  50
    Georg Franck (2008). Presence and Reality: An Option to Specify Panpsychism ? Mind and Matter 6 (1):123-140.
    Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world existing throughout the universe. One problem with panpsychism is that it is a purely theoretical concept so far. For progress towards an operationalization of the idea, this paper suggests to make use of an ontological difference involved in the mind-matter distinction. The mode in which mental phenomena exist is called presence. The mode in which matter and radiation exist is called reality Physical theory disregards presence (...)
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