Phenomenology gives rise to certain ontological considerations that have far-reaching implications for standard conceptions of patient autonomy in medical ethics, and, as a result, the obligations of and to patients in clinical decision-making contexts. One such consideration is the phenomenological reduction in classical phenomenology, a core feature of which is the characterisation of our primary experiences as immediately and inherently meaningful. This paper builds on and extends the analyses of the phenomenological reduction in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, (...) and Merleau-Ponty in order to identify and explain its implications for our current understanding of the principle of respect for patient autonomy and the norms of clinical decision making. (shrink)

The principle of patient autonomy dominates the contemporary debate over medical ethics. In this examination of the doctor-patient relationship, physician and philosopher Alfred Tauber argues that the idea of patient autonomy -- which was inspired by other rights-based movements of the 1960s -- was an extrapolation from political and social philosophy that fails to ground medicine's moral philosophy. He proposes instead a reconfiguration of personal autonomy and a renewed commitment to an ethics of care. (...) In this formulation, physician beneficence and responsibility become powerful means for supporting the autonomy and dignity of patients. Beneficence, Tauber argues, should not be confused with the medical paternalism that fueled the patient rights movement. Rather, beneficence and responsibility are moral principles that not only are compatible with patient autonomy but strengthen it. Coordinating the rights of patients with the responsibilities of their caregivers will result in a more humane and robust medicine.Tauber examines the historical and philosophical competition between facts and values in medicine. He analyzes the shifting conceptions of personhood underlying the doctor-patient relationship, offers a "topology" of autonomy, from Locke and Kant to Hume and Mill, and explores both philosophical and practical strategies for reconfiguring trust and autonomy. Framing the practicalities of the clinical encounter with moral reflections, Tauber calls for an ethical medicine in which facts and values are integrated and humane values are deliberately included in the program of care. (shrink)

Therapeutic misconception involves the failure of subjects either to understand or to incorporate into their own expectations the distinctions in nature and purpose of personally responsive therapeutic care, and the generic relationship between subject and investigator which is constrained by research protocols. Researchers cannot disregard this phenomenon if they are to ensure that subjects engage in research on the basis of genuine informed consent. However, our presumption of patient autonomy must be sustained unless we have compelling evidence of (...) serious misunderstanding. This article argues that the mere expression of aspects of therapeutic misconception should not necessarily displace the presumption of subject autonomy or undermine ethical inclusion in research for at least three reasons. First, some interpretations of the empirical data do not suggest misunderstanding. Second, assessment of misestimation and optimism are delicate and value-laden, and turn quickly from questions of autonomy to questions of judgment. Third, incomplete understanding may yet be sufficient to allow a subject to engage in a substantially autonomous decision-making process. Our point is not to dismiss the possibility of genuine therapeutic misconception, but to question its frequency and fatality to the consent process. (shrink)

Background Older patients in emergency care often have complex needs and may have limited ability to make their voices heard. Hence, there are ethical challenges for healthcare professionals in establishing a trustful relationship to determine the patient’s preferences and then decide and act based on these preferences. With this comes further challenges regarding how the patient’s autonomy can be protected and promoted. Aim To describe nurses’ experiences of dealing with older patients’ autonomy when cared for in (...) emergency departments (EDs). Research design This study adopted reflective lifeworld theory and a phenomenological design. Participants and research context A total of 13 open-ended interviews were performed with nurses working at two EDs in Sweden. Ethical considerations The study was reviewed by the Ethical Advisory Board in South East Sweden and conducted according to the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave consent. Findings Nurses’ experiences of dealing with older patients’ autonomy in EDs are characterized by moving in a conflicting uphill struggle, indicating obscure thoughts on how patient autonomy can be protected in an ethically challenging context. The phenomenon is further described with its meaning constituents: ‘Being hampered by prioritization under stress’, ‘Balancing paternalism and patient autonomy’, ‘Making decisions without consent in the patient’s best interests’ and ‘Being trapped by notions of legitimate care needs’. Conclusion Stressful work conditions and lacking organizational strategies in EDs contribute to nurses maintaining unjustified paternalistic care, regardless of the patient’s ability and medical condition, and questioning who has legitimacy for participating in decisions about care. The nurses’ protection and promotion of older patients’ autonomy is dependent on the opportunity, ability and willingness to create a patient relationship where the patient’s voice and preferences are valued as important. Consequently, strategies are needed to improve patient autonomy in EDs based on the idea of ‘relational autonomy’. (shrink)

The clinical application of the concept of patient autonomy has centered on the ability to deliberate and make treatment decisions (decisional autonomy) to the virtual exclusion of the capacity to execute the treatment plan (executive autonomy). However, the one-component concept of autonomy is problematic in the context of multiple chronic conditions. Adherence to complex treatments commonly breaks down when patients have functional, educational, and cognitive barriers that impair their capacity to plan, sequence, and carry out (...) tasks associated with chronic care. The purpose of this article is to call for a two-component re-conceptualization of autonomy and to argue that the clinical assessment of capacity for patients with chronic conditions should be expanded to include both autonomous decision-making and autonomous execution of the agreed-upon treatment plan. We explain how the concept of autonomy should be expanded to include both decisional and executive autonomy, describe the biopsychosocial correlates of the two-component concept of autonomy, and recommend diagnostic and treatment strategies to support patients with deficits in executive autonomy. (shrink)

A number of bioethicists have been critical of the power of the family to “veto” a patient’s decision to posthumously donate her organs within opt-in systems of organ procurement. One major objection directed at the family veto is that when families veto the decision of their deceased family member, they do something wrong by violating or failing to respect the autonomy of that deceased family member. The goal of this paper is to make progress on answering this objection. (...) I do this in two stages. First, I argue that the most plausible interpretation of what happens when a person registers as an organ donor in an opt-in system is that she gives her consent to the state to posthumously remove her organs for transplantation purposes. Call this the Authorization Account. Second, given the Authorization Account, I argue by analogy that when families veto an individual’s decision to donate and the individual’s organs are not in the end removed, neither the doctors nor the family violate the individual’s autonomy in any morally objectionable sense. Call this the Nonremoval Thesis. I argue that since the Nonremoval Thesis is true, we do not violate or fail to respect the autonomy of registered donors when we fail to remove their organs because their family has objected. (shrink)

This paper aims to critique the phenomenon of advanced patient autonomy and choice in healthcare within the specific context of self-testing devices. A growing number of self-testing medical devices are currently available for home use. The premise underpinning many of these devices is that they assist individuals to be more autonomous in the assessment and management of their health. Increased patient autonomy is assumed to be a good thing. We take issue with this assumption and argue (...) that self-testing provides a specific example how increased patient autonomy and choice within healthcare might not best serve the patient population. We propose that current interpretations of autonomy in healthcare are based on negative accounts of liberty to the detriment of a more relational understanding. We also propose that Kantian philosophy is often applied to the healthcare arena in an inappropriate manner. We draw on the philosophical literature and examples from the self-testing process to support these claims. We conclude by offering an alternative account of autonomy based on the interrelated concepts of relationality, care and responsibility. (shrink)

Disclosure in clinical practice is aimed at promoting patient autonomy, usually culminating in patient choice (e.g., to consent to an operation or not, or between different medications). In medical ethics, there is an implicit background assumption that knowing more about (X) automatically translates to greater, or more genuine, autonomy with respect to one's choices involving (X). I challenge this assumption by arguing that in rare cases, withholding information can promote a patient's autonomy (understood as (...) the capacity for rational choice in alignment with one's values and goals). (shrink)

In contemporary liberal ethics patient autonomy is often interpreted as the right to self-determination: when it comes to treatment decisions, the patient is given the right to give or withhold informed consent. This paper joins in the philosophical and ethical criticism of the liberal interpretation as it does not regard patient autonomy as a right, rule or principle, but rather as a practice. Patient autonomy, or so I will argue, is realised in the (...) concrete activities of day-to-day health care, in the material and technological context of care, in arrangements of health care institutions, in the physical training of people with disabilities, as well as in the concrete activities of care-giving. This move from conversations in the consultation room to other sites and situations in the practice of care takes seriously the empirical reality of medical care and intends to show that patient autonomy is practically realised in a much richer and more creative way than most ethical theory seems to assume. (shrink)

Background: Over the last decade, new healthcare policies are transforming healthcare practices towards independent living and self-care of older people and people with a chronic disease or disability within the community. For professional caregivers in home care, such as nurses, this requires a shift from a caring attitude towards the promotion of patient autonomy. Aim: To explore how nurses in home care deal with the transformation towards fostering patient autonomy and self-care. Research design and context: A (...) case study was conducted in a professional development course for home care nurses, including participant observations and focus groups. The theoretical notion of ‘relational agency’ and the moral concept of ‘practices of responsibility’ were used to conduct a narrative analysis on the nurses’ stories about autonomy. Participants: Eight nurses, two coaches and two university lecturers who participated in the learning circle. Ethical considerations: Informed consent was sought at the start of the course and again, at specific moments during the course of the learning circle. Findings: Three main themes were found that expressed the moral demands experienced and negotiated by the nurses: adapting to the person, activating patients’ strengths and collaboration with patients and informal caregivers. Discussion: On a policy and organisational level, the moral discourse on patient autonomy gets intertwined with the instrumental discourse on healthcare budget savings. This is manifested in the ambiguities the nurses face in fostering patient autonomy in their daily home care practice. To support nurses, critical thinking, moral sensitivity and trans-professional working should be part of their professional development. Conclusion: The turn towards autonomy in healthcare raises moral questions about responsibilities for care. Promoting patient autonomy should be a collaborative endeavour and deliberation of patients, professional and informal caregivers together. (shrink)

The practice of medicine—and especially the patient-doctor relationship—has seen exceptional shifts in ethical standards of care over the past few years, which by and large originate in occidental countries and are then extrapolated worldwide. However, this phenomenon is blind to the fact that an ethical practice of medicine remains hugely dependent on prevailing cultural and societal expectations of the community in which it serves. One model aiming to conceptualise the dichotomous efforts for global standardisation of medical care against differing (...) sociocultural expectations is the individualism-collectivism model, with the ‘West’ being seen as individualistic and the ‘East’ being seen as collectivistic. This has been used by many academics to explain differences in approach towards ethical practice on key concepts such as informed consent and patient autonomy. However, I argue that this characterisation is incomplete and lacks nuance into the complexities surrounding cross-cultural ethics in practice, and I propose an alternative model based on the ethics of clinical care in Hong Kong, China. Core ethical principles need not be culture-bound—indeed, their very existence mandates for them to be universal and non-derogable—but instead cultural alignment occurs in the particular implementation of these principles, insofar as they respect the general spirit of contemporary ethical standards. (shrink)

Theoretical models for patient-physician communication in clinical practice are frequently described in the literature. Respecting patient autonomy is an ethical problem the physician faces in a medical emergency situation. No theoretical physician-patient model seems to be ideal for solving the communication problem in clinical practice. Theoretical models can at best give guidance to behavior and judgement in emergency situations. In this article the premises of autonomous treatment decisions are discussed. Based on a case-report we discuss different (...) genuine efforts the physician can do to uncover treatment refusal and respect patient autonomy in an emergency situation. Autonomy requires competence and in emergency medicine time does not allow intimate exploration of patient competence and reasons for treatment refusal. We find that the physician must base her decision on a firm theoretical base combined with a practical and realistic view of the patient's situation on a case to case basis. (shrink)

Telemedicine is a complex field including various applications and target groups. Especially telehealthcare is seen by many as a means to revolutionize medicine. It gives patients the opportunity to take charge of their own health by using self-tracking devices and allows health professionals to treat patients from a distance. To some, this means an empowerment of patient autonomy as well as an improvement in the quality of care. Others state the dangers of depersonalization of medicine and the pathologization (...) of daily life. This paper examines the ethical implications of telehealthcare, focusing on patient autonomy and quality of care by analyzing metareviews, randomized controlled trials and narrative ethical analyses on the topic. As a result, we conclude that the technically enhanced encounter between patients and health professionals may mean an empowerment of patient autonomy when it goes along with a personal relationship based on trust, assistance and support. When it comes to the quality of care, telehealthcare may lead to an improvement as long it is adopted to the patient’s individual needs. (shrink)

Since patient autonomy became a prominent theme in medical ethics in the 1970s and 1980s, it has had a troubled reputation among many physicians, to whom claims for its importance in medical decision making seem unrealistic and even undesirable. Of course the discussion has moved on since the early days in which informative or interpretive models of medical decision-making—in which physicians provided information and helped patients clarify and express preferences that then determined decisions—were contrasted with usual medical practice (...) characterized as paternalism: physicians telling patients what to do and patients acquiescing in physician direction. The... (shrink)

With widespread advances in the diffusion and application of medical technologies, the phenomena of misuse and overuse have become pervasive. These phenomena not only increase the cost of health care systems and deplete the accessibility and availability of health care services, they also jeopardize patient autonomy. From a literature review on this aspect of medical technology, an impact on patient autonomy is found in almost all cases, with the exception of philosophical or ethical writings, in which (...) there is not much practical application for health policy and law. In this article, the major finding is that in the area of patient autonomy, it does not matter much whether the “physician decides” or the “patient decides” in the current “disease care” health system, where most of the doctors focus only on disease treatment using aggressive medical technologies. It is also our “disease care” system that ensures that the patients, the health care professionals, or the health care management cannot safeguard their autonomy. Only when the genuine health care system is restored will patient autonomy be protected. (shrink)

In this paper, I address some of the shortcomings of established clinical ethics centring on personal autonomy and consent and what I label the Doctrine of Respecting Personal Autonomy in Healthcare. I discuss two implications of this doctrine: 1) the practice for treating patients who are considered to have borderline decision-making competence and 2) the practice of surrogate decision-making in general. I argue that none of these practices are currently aligned with respectful treatment of vulnerable individuals. Because of (...) ‘structural arbitrariness’ in the whole process of how we assess decision-making competence, this area is open to disrespectful treatment of people. The practice of surrogate decision- making on the basis of a single person's judgment is arguably not consistent with ethical and political requirements derived from the doctrine itself. In response to the inadequacies of the doctrine, I suggest a framework for reasonableness in surrogate decision-making which might allow practice to avoid the problems above. I conclude by suggesting an extended concept of Patient Autonomy which integrates both personal autonomy and the regulative idea of morality that is required by reasonableness in deciding for non-competent others. (shrink)

: Bioethicists have articulated an ideal of shared decision making between physician and patient, but in doing so the role of clinical uncertainty has not been adequately confronted. In the face of uncertainty about the patient's prognosis and the best course of treatment, many physicians revert to a model of nondisclosure and nondiscussion, thus closing off opportunities for shared decision making. Empirical studies suggest that physicians find it more difficult to adhere to norms of disclosure in situations where (...) there is substantial uncertainty. They may be concerned that acknowledging their own uncertainty will undermine patient trust and create additional confusion and anxiety for the patient. We argue, in contrast, that effective disclosure will protect patient trust in the long run and that patients can manage information about uncertainty. In situations where there is substantial uncertainty, extra vigilance is required to ensure that patients are given the tools and information they need to participate in cooperative decision making about their care. (shrink)

The concerns regarding patient autonomy presented in August A. Culbert et al.’s “Navigating Informed Consent and Patient Safety in Surgery: Lessons for Medical Students and Junior Trainees” fall just short of addressing the main issue. Patient autonomy is not something that just one member of a team should consider, and it should not be something that any protocol should have the power to subvert, particularly in an environment as tenuous as the operating room. This article (...) will take the concerns regarding the ethics of removing a patient’s hearing aid prior to entering the operating room presented in the aforementioned article and show the necessity for a new standard operating procedure. (shrink)

A 16 year old Hodgkin lymphoma patient refuses to have his blood specimen drawn, thus canceling his scheduled oncologic treatment. As a 16 year old, he has no legal standing as an adult. His parents are split over his decision. One supports his right to choose; the other wishes the specimen to be drawn and the chemotherapy reinstated. The physicians at the hospital are seeking legal redress to have the court order the blood specimens to be taken.

ABSTRACT In this paper, I address some of the shortcomings of established clinical ethics centring on personal autonomy and consent and what I label the Doctrine of Respecting Personal Autonomy in Healthcare. I discuss two implications of this doctrine: 1) the practice for treating patients who are considered to have borderline decision‐making competence and 2) the practice of surrogate decision‐making in general. I argue that none of these practices are currently aligned with respectful treatment of vulnerable individuals. Because (...) of ‘structural arbitrariness’ in the whole process of how we assess decision‐making competence, this area is open to disrespectful treatment of people. The practice of surrogate decision‐ making on the basis of a single person's judgment is arguably not consistent with ethical and political requirements derived from the doctrine itself. In response to the inadequacies of the doctrine, I suggest a framework for reasonableness in surrogate decision‐making which might allow practice to avoid the problems above. I conclude by suggesting an extended concept of Patient Autonomy which integrates both personal autonomy and the regulative idea of morality that is required by reasonableness in deciding for non‐competent others. (shrink)

In contemporary bioethics, the autonomy of the patient has assumed considerable importance. Progressing from a more limited notion of informed consent, shared decision making calls upon patients to voice the desires and preferences of their authentic self, engaging in choice among alternatives as a way to exercise deeply held values. One influential opinion in Jewish bioethics holds that Jewish law, in contradistinction to secular bioethics, limits the patient's exercise of autonomy only in those instances in which (...) treatment choices are sensitive to preferences. Here, we analyze a discussion in the Mishna, a foundational text of rabbinic Judaism, regarding patient autonomy in the setting of religiously mandated fasting, and commentaries in the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds, finding both a more expansive notion of such autonomy and a potential metaphysical grounding for it in the importance of patient self-knowledge. (shrink)

Nurses are increasingly faced with situations in practice regarding the prolongation of life and withdrawal of treatment. They play a central role in the care of dying people, yet they may find themselves disempowered by medical paternalism or ill-equipped in the decision-making process in end-of-life situations. This article is concerned with the ethical relationships between patient autonomy and medical paternalism in end-of-life care for an advanced cancer patient. The nurse’s role as the patient’s advocate is explored, (...) as are the differences between nursing and medicine when confronted with the notion of patient autonomy. The impetus for this discussion stems from a clinical encounter described in the following scenario. (shrink)

In patient-centred care, shared decision-making is advocated as the preferred form of medical decision-making. Shared decision-making is supported with reference to patient autonomy without abandoning the patient or giving up the possibility of influencing how the patient is benefited. It is, however, not transparent how shared decision-making is related to autonomy and, in effect, what support autonomy can give shared decision-making. In the article, different forms of shared decision-making are analysed in relation to (...) five different aspects of autonomy: (1) self-realisation; (2) preference satisfaction; (3) self-direction; (4) binary autonomy of the person; (5) gradual autonomy of the person. It is argued that both individually and jointly these aspects will support the models called shared rational deliberative patient choice and joint decision as the preferred versions from an autonomy perspective. Acknowledging that both of these models may fail, the professionally driven best interest compromise model is held out as a satisfactory second-best choice. (shrink)

Health care is not merely a matter of individual encounters between patients and physicians or other health care personnel. For patients and those who provide health care come to these encounters already possessed of learned habits of perception and judgment, valuation and action, which define their roles in relation to one another and affect every aspect of their encounter. So the presuppositions of these encounters must be examined if our understanding of patients' autonomy is to be complete. In this (...) paper I sketch three models of what is presupposed in the relationship between the health care professional and the lay patient; and I discuss the ways in which patients' autonomy is preserved and/or compromised under each of the three models. The models discussed are the Guild Model, the Commercial Model, and the Interactive Model. (shrink)

The pinnacle of the physician's clinical skills is his ability to develop the autonomy of his patients in the management of their health affairs. To do this requires the forging of a relationship in which patients' attitudes toward their health and illness are products of the doctor-patient relationship rather than unilateral behavior by either one. Modern medicine is beset with problems that make it difficult for physicians to develop and exercise the skills that lead to patient (...) class='Hi'>autonomy. An erosion of public confidence in physicians is being caused by several mojar forces that include: (1) the power of science over life; (2) medical technology's dehumanizing effect; (3) legalization of medical ethics; and (4) industrialization and commercialization of medical care. To restore the kind of confidence that makes the physician an effective proponent of his patient's autonomy will require a major emphasis upon all aspects of medical ethics in the medical curriculum and in medical practice. Clinical investigation of this subject is highly appropriate. Clinical faculties should be developed in greater numbers who are authorities in the humanities as well as in science. Our medical schools need also to develop and to utilize models of health care in which relations with patients are personalized, continuous, and comprehensive so that ethical ideals such as patient autonomy can be demonstrated by precept and example, and can also be researched. (shrink)

In this thoughtful article analyzing a UK court decision upholding a patient’s refusal of dialysis, the authors make the provocative but ultimately unpersuasive argument tha...

This paper concerns itself with the concept of diminished competence with particular regard to the problems and options that mentally compromised patients raise for medical management. It proceeds through three general stages: (1) a restatement of the sense and grounds of the new patients' rights ethos which the existence of such patients calls into question; (2) a consideration of what expanded responsibilities and tactics physicians should embrace to protect and enhance such patients' autonomy; and (3) the standards, criteria, and (...) mechanisms by which paternalistic interventions might be justified in cases when the diminishment remains too substantial to merit acceptance of the patients' directives. (shrink)

A commentary on “What's Not Being Shared in Shared Decision‐Making?” from the July‐August 2013.

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is increasingly seen as driving a paradigm shift in mental health law, particularly in relation to the understanding that it requires a shift from substituted to supported decisions. This article identifies two competing moral commitments implied by this shift, both of which appeal to the notion of autonomy. It is argued that because of these commitments the Convention is in tension with more general calls in the medical ethics literature for (...) preserving patient autonomy through support. The competing commitments within the Convention also present a particular challenge in putting the support it requires into practice. A discursive control account of freedom is used to develop some practical guidelines for navigating this new moral territory. (shrink)

In this paper, an attempt is made to give patient autonomy added conceptual clarity. A concept of patient autonomy grounded in both negative and positive freedoms is defended. Amartya Sen's capabilities approach is used as a conceptual framework in which patient autonomy and fairness are defined compatibly. It is argued that in a socially fair healthcare system, everyone should have at least the degree of patient autonomy that affords access to those healthcare (...) services necessary for survival and a minimally adequate level of quality of life, consistent with each person's naturally endowed health characteristics. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungOnora O’Neill hat 1984 den Zusammenhang zwischen grundsätzlichen Bedenken gegenüber dem ethischen Autonomiebegriff und der Kritik an der paternalistisch geprägten medizinethischen Praxis hergestellt, nicht die tatsächliche Einwilligung des konkreten Patienten zu berücksichtigen, sondern die angenommene, hypothetische Einwilligung, die ein idealisierter, völlig rationaler Patient geben würde. Im Anschluss an experimentalpsychologische Studien zur subliminalen Wahrnehmung, zu Volition und Handlungskontrolle erfahren kompatibilistische Theorien menschlicher Freiheit innerhalb der theoretischen Philosophie neue Popularität. Eine Handlung ist demnach frei, wenn sie das Resultat bestimmter Fähigkeiten einer (...) Person ist. Der Artikel setzt sich mit zwei dieser Theorien, Henrik Walters Konzept „natürlicher Freiheit“ und Michael Pauens „Minimalkonzeption personaler Freiheit“ näher auseinander—und zwar vorderhand im Hinblick auf den Entwurf eines nichtidealisierten ethischen Autonomiekonzeptes. Als solches ist es an der aktualen bzw. faktischen Fähigkeit einer Person ausgerichtet, rekurrierend auf die spezifische Determiniertheit autonomer Entscheidungen und Handlungen sowie auf ein relativiertes Konzept menschlicher Vernunft. (shrink)

In this issue of the Report, Daniel Groll suggests new ways to understand old tensions between autonomy and paternalism. He categorizes disagreements between doctors and patients in four ways. Some are about the ends or goals of medical treatment. For these, he claims, patient choices are based upon patient values, and physicians should neither challenge nor assess them. More common are disagreements about the appropriate means to achieve an agreed-upon goal. These subdivide into two distinct categories—those in (...) which the relative efficacy of possible means is “medically assessable” and those in which it is not. When disagreements are medically assessable, Groll argues, doctors can legitimately challenge patient .. (shrink)

The autonomy of chronic patients in Iranian hospitals is challenged by impaired functioning resulting from chronic illness, a negative image in society, and effects related to hospitalization. Comprehensive interviews and observations of 34 patients, nurses, and physicians were performed to assess the autonomy of chronic patients in Iran. Conceptualization, constant comparison, and the combination of data resulted in the identification of 5 main categories related to autonomy: welcoming paternalism, self-expression, self-proof, shared decision making, and self-determination. Authority scrambling (...) was a central category describing chronic patients’ perceptions of their autonomy during hospitalization. These patients sought to maintain their independence despite serious threats to their autonomy. (shrink)

BACKGROUND: Little is known about how hospitalized patients share decisions with physicians. METHODS: We conducted an observational study of patient-doctor communication on an inpatient medicine service among 18 hospitalized patients and 9 physicians. A research assistant (RA) approached newly hospitalized patients and their physicians before morning rounds and obtained consent. The RA audio recorded morning rounds, and then separately interviewed both patient and physician. Coding was done using integrated analysis. RESULTS: Most patients were white (61%) and half were (...) female. Most physicians were male (66%) and of Southeast Asian descent (66%). All physicians explained the plan of care to the patients; most believed that their patient understood. However, many patients did not. Physicians rarely asked the patient for their opinion. In all those cases, the decision had been made previously by the doctors. No decisions were made with the patient. Patients sometimes disagreed. CONCLUSIONS: Shared decision-making may not be the norm in hospital care. Although physicians do explain treatment plans, many hospitalized patients do not understand enough to share in decisions. When patients do assert their opinion, it can result in conflict. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: Some hospitalized patients are interested in discussing treatment. Improving hospital communication can foster patient autonomy. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 9, Page 6-7, September 2012.

In a qualitative study, 22 stroke patients undergoing rehabilitation in three nursing homes were interviewed about constraints on and improvements in their autonomy and about approaches of health professionals regarding autonomy. The data were analysed using grounded theory, with a particular focus on the process of regaining autonomy. An approach by the health professionals that was responsive to changes in the patients’ autonomy was found to be helpful for restoration of their autonomy. Two patterns in (...) health professionals’ approach appeared to be facilitatory: (1) from full support on admission through moderate support and supervision, to reduced supervision at discharge; and (2) from paternalism on admission through partial paternalism (regarding treatment) to shared decision making at discharge. The approach experienced by the patients did not always match their desires regarding their autonomy. Support and supervision were reduced over time, but paternalism was often continued too long. Additionally, the patients experienced a lack of information. Tailoring interventions to patients’ progress in autonomy would stimulate their active participation in rehabilitation and in decision making, and would improve patients’ preparation for autonomous living after discharge. (shrink)

Green bioethics is an area of research and scholarship that examines the impact of healthcare practices and policies on the environment and emphasises environmental values, such as ecological sustainability and stewardship. Some green bioethicists have argued that healthcare providers should inform patients about the environmental impacts of treatments and advocate for options that minimise adverse impacts. While disclosure of information pertaining to the environmental impacts of treatments could facilitate autonomous decision-making and strengthen the patient–provider relationship in situations where patients (...) have clearly expressed environmental concerns, it may have the opposite effect in other situations if makes patients feel like they are being judged or manipulated. We argue, therefore, that there is not a generalisable duty to disclose environmental impact information to all patients during the consent process. Providers who practice green bioethics should focus on advocating for system-level changes in healthcare financing, organisation and delivery and use discretion when bringing up environmental concerns in their encounters with patients. (shrink)

Objectives: Evidence based patient choice seems based on a strong liberal individualist interpretation of patient autonomy; however, not all patients are in favour of such an interpretation. The authors wished to assess whether ideals of autonomy in clinical practice are more in accordance with alternative concepts of autonomy from the ethics literature. This paper describes the development of a questionnaire to assess such concepts of autonomy.Methods: A questionnaire, based on six moral concepts from the (...) ethics literature, was sent to aneurysm patients and their surgeons. The structure of the questionnaire was assessed by factor analysis, and item reduction was based on reliability.Results: Ninety six patients and 58 surgeons participated. The questionnaire consisted of four scales. Two of the scales reflected the paternalistic and consumerist poles of the liberal individualist model, one scale reflected concepts of Socratic autonomy and of procedural independence, and the fourth scale reflected ideals of risk disclosure.Discussion: The Ideal Patient Autonomy Scale is a 14 item normative instrument. It is clearly distinct from the generally used psychological preference questionnaires that assess preferences for physician-patient roles. (shrink)

When new drugs are approved by the Food and Drug Administration, the default assumption is that they will be available by prescription only, safe for use exclusively under clinical supervision. The paternalism underlying this default must be interrogated in order to ensure appropriate respect for patient autonomy. Upon closer inspection, prescription requirements are justified when nonprescription status would risk harm to third parties and when a large segment of the population would struggle to exercise their autonomy in (...) using a drug safely and effectively on their own. Although these justifications can support prescription status for many drugs, we propose that reversing the FDA's current default to instead begin with a presumption in favor of over‐the‐counter status is the best way to avoid interference with valid claims of patient autonomy. Under this approach, a range of drug products could be considered for an OTC switch, including oral contraceptives, statins, and HIV‐prevention drugs. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In contemporary American medical practice, certain physicians are critical and wary of the current emphasis on patient autonomy in medicine, questioning whether it really serves the complex needs of severely ill patients. Physicians such as Eric Cassell and Thomas Duffy argue that the duty of beneficence should override the duty to respect autonomy when conflicts arise in clinical situations. After evaluating their claim that severe illness robs patients of their autonomy, I will argue that this (...) perceived conflict between beneficence and autonomy is ill‐conceived, resting on misperceptions about both the capacity for autonomy and the meaning of hope. Considering insights on hope from phenomenologist Gabriel Marcel and theologian William Lynch, as well as drawing upon a case study involving a bone marrow patient, I claim that respecting and nurturing patients’ capacity for autonomy is a necessary condition for acting beneficently and fostering authentic hope. (shrink)