Search results for 'perceptual consciousness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ned Block (2011). Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed (...)
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  2.  17
    Naomi Eilan (forthcoming). Perceptual Objectivity and Consciousness: A Relational Response to Burge’s Challenge. Topoi:1-12.
    My question is: does phenomenal consciousness have a critical role in explaining the way conscious perceptions achieve objective import? I approach it through developing a dilemma I label ‘Burge’s Challenge’, which is implicit in his approach to perceptual objectivity. It says, crudely: either endorse the general structure of his account of how objective perceptual import is achieved, and give up on a role for consciousness. Or, relinquish Caused Representation, and possibly defend a role for consciousness. (...)
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    Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum (forthcoming). Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge From Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes. Mind and Language.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling’s classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics’ in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of (...)
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  4.  10
    Erik Myin & J. Kevin O'Regan (2002). Perceptual Consciousness, Access to Modality and Skill Theories: A Way to Naturalize Phenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.
    We address the thesis recently proposed by Andy Clark, that skill-mediated access to modality implies phenomenal feel. We agree that a skill theory of perception does indeed offer the possibility of a satisfactory account of the feel of perception, but we claim that this is not only through explanation of access to modality but also because skill actually provides access to perceptual property in general. We illustrate and substantiate our claims by reference to the recently proposed 'sensorimotor contingency' theory (...)
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  5. Robert Eamon Briscoe (2016). Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part I. Philosophy Compass 11 (2):121-133.
    Multisensory processing encompasses all of the various ways in which the presence of information in one sensory modality can adaptively influence the processing of information in a different modality. In Part I of this survey article, I begin by presenting a cartography of some of the more extensively investigated forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus on two distinct types of multisensory integration. I briefly discuss the conditions under which these different forms of multisensory processing occur as well as (...)
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  6.  24
    Mohan Matthen (2014). Review of Thomas Natsoulas, Consciousness and Perceptual Experience. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
    A review of Thomas Natsoulas's "Consciousness and Perceptual Experience.".
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  7. Austen Clark (2007). Sensory and Perceptual Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell
    Asked on the Dick Cavett show about her former Stalinist comrade Lillian Hellman, Mary McCarthy replied, "Every word she says is a lie, including 'and' and 'the'." The language used to describe sensory and perceptual consciousness is worthy of about the same level of trust. One must adapt oneself to the fact that every ordinary word used to describe this domain is ambiguous; that different theoreticians use the same words in very different ways; and that every speaker naturally (...)
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  8. Thomas Natsoulas (1997). The Presence of Environmental Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: An Integrative, Ecological and Phenomenological Approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (4):371-390.
    This article is the promised sequel to a recently published article in this journal , in which I sought to make more available to psychologists Edmund Husserl’s attempted explanation of how perceptual mental acts succeed in presenting to consciousness their external, environmental objects themselves, as opposed to some kind of representation of them. Here, I continue my exposition of Husserl’s effort and, as well, I begin a project of seeking to bridge the gap between his phenomenological account of (...)
     
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  9. Susanna Siegel (2006). Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):378-410.
    In The Problem of Perception, A.D. Smith’s central aim is to defend the view that we can directly perceive ordinary objects, such as cups, keys and the like.1 The book is organized around the two arguments that Smith considers to be serious threats to the possibility of direct perception: the argument from illusion, and the argument from hallucination. The argument from illusion threatens this possibility because it concludes that indirect realism is true. Indirect realism is the view that we perceive (...)
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  10.  67
    David Forman (2010). Second Nature and Spirit: Hegel on the Role of Habit in the Appearance of Perceptual Consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):325-352.
    Hegel's discussion of the concept of “habit” appears at a crucial point in his Encyclopedia system, namely, in the transition from the topic of “nature” to the topic of “spirit” (Geist): it is through habit that the subject both distinguishes itself from its various sensory states as an absolute unity (the I) and, at the same time, preserves those sensory states as the content of sensory consciousness. By calling habit a “second nature,” Hegel highlights the fact that incipient (...)
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  11.  75
    Naomi M. Eilan (2006). On the Role of Perceptual Consciousness in Explaining the Goals and Mechanisms of Vision: A Convergence on Attention? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):67-88.
    The strong sensorimotor account of perception gives self-induced movements two constitutive roles in explaining visual consciousness. The first says that self-induced movements are vehicles of visual awareness, and for this reason consciousness ‘does not happen in the brain only’. The second says that the phenomenal nature of visual experiences is consists in the action-directing content of vision. In response I suggest, first, that the sense in which visual awareness is active should be explained by appeal to the role (...)
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  12. T. Natsoulas (1996). The Presence of Environmental Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: Consideration of the Problem with Special Reference to Husserl's Phenomenological Account. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (2):161-184.
    In the succession of states of consciousness that constitute James’s stream of consciousness, there occur, among others, states of consciousness that are themselves, or that include, perceptual mental acts. It is assumed some of the latter states of consciousness are purely perceptual, lacking both imaginal and signitive contents. According to Husserl, purely perceptual acts present to consciousness, uniquely, their environmental objects in themselves, in person. They do not present, as imaginal mental acts (...)
     
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  13. John W. Yolton (1969). Perceptual Consciousness: John W. Yolton. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 3:34-50.
    In his contribution to Human Senses and Perception , R. J. Hirst has made a number of important suggestions about perceptual consciousness, He has emphasised the need to describe ‘what the percipient is or may be conscious of’ from the percipient's own point of view . This mode of description is contrasted with stimulus or neurological description. Perceptual consciousness of one object is distinguished from perceptual consciousness of another object ‘only by or on the (...)
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  14. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). The Experiential Presence of Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: Wilfrid Sellars, Sense Impressions, and Perceptual Takings. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):293-316.
    Discussion of W. Sellars's rediscovery of experiential presence continues with special reference to J. McDowell's and J.F. Rosenberg's recent articles on Sellars's understanding of perception, and a later effort by Sellars to cast light on the intimate relation between sensing and perceptual taking. Five main sections respectively summarize my earlier discussion of Sellars's account of experiential presence, draw on Rosenberg's explication of two Sellarsian modes of responding to sense impressions, consider McDowell's claim that Sellars's perceptual takings are shapings (...)
     
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  15. Paul Coates (2004). Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness, and Theory of Attention. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-25.
    The problem of the richness of visual experience is that of finding principled grounds for claims about how much of the world a person actually sees at any given moment. It is argued that there are suggestive parallels between the two-component analysis of experience defended by Wilfrid Sellars, and certain recently advanced information processing accounts of visual perception. Sellars' later account of experience is examined in detail, and it is argued that there are good reasons in support of the claim (...)
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  16.  28
    Rolf Reber & Norbert Schwarz (2001). The Hot Fringes of Consciousness: Perceptual Fluency and Affect. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):223-231.
    High figure-ground contrast usually results in more positive evaluations of visual stimuli. This may either reflect that high figure-ground contrast per se is a desirable attribute or that this attribute facilitates fluent processing. In the latter case, the influence of high figure-ground contrast should be most pronounced under short exposure times, that is, under conditions where the facilitative influence on perceptual fluency is most pronounced. Supporting this hypothesis, ratings of the prettiness of visual stimuli increased with figure-ground contrast under (...)
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  17.  27
    Ralph Baergen (1992). Perceptual Consciousness and Perceptual Evidence. Philosophical Papers 21 (2):107-119.
  18.  44
    Massimo Grassia (2004). Consciousness and Perceptual Attention: A Methodological Argument. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-23.
    Our perception of external features comprises, among others, functional and phenomenological levels. At the functional level, the perceiver’s mind processes external features according to its own causal- functional organization. At the phenomenological level, the perceiver has consciousness of external features. The question of this paper is: How do the functional and the phenomenological levels of perception relate to each other? The answer I propose is that functional states of specifically perceptual attention constitute the necessary basis for the arising (...)
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  19.  2
    Gordon Globus & Stephen Franklin (1980). Prospects for the Scientific Observer of Perceptual Consciousness. In J. M. Davidson & Richard J. Davidson (eds.), The Psychobiology of Consciousness. Plenum 465--481.
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  20.  1
    Toomas Kirt & Talis Bachmann (2013). Perceptual Retouch Theory Derived Modeling of Interactions in the Processing of Successive Visual Objects for Consciousness: Two-Stage Synchronization of Neuronal Oscillators. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):330-347.
    We introduce a new version of the perceptual retouch model. This model was used for explaining properties of temporal interaction of successive objects in reaching conscious representation. The new model incorporates two interactive binding operations – binding features for objects and binding the bound feature-objects with a large scale oscillatory system that corresponds to perceptual consciousness. Here, the typical result of masking experiments – second object advantage in conscious perception – is achieved by applying the effects of (...)
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  21. Christopher S. Hill (2006). Perceptual Consciousness: How It Opens Directly Onto the World, Preferring the World to Itself. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press 249--272.
  22. Paul Coates (2009). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism. Routledge.
    This book is an important study in the philosophy of the mind; drawing on the work of philosopher Wilfrid Sellars and the theory of critical realism to develop a novel argument for understanding perception and metaphysics.
     
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  23. Paul Coates (2007). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism. Routledge.
    This book is an important study in the philosophy of the mind; drawing on the work of philosopher Wilfrid Sellars and the theory of critical realism to develop a novel argument for understanding perception and metaphysics.
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  24.  35
    W. Fish (2010). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism, by Paul Coates. Mind 119 (473):206-210.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  25.  73
    H. Logue (2011). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism * by Paul Coates. Analysis 71 (4):780-783.
  26.  7
    Wilfrid Sellars (1978). Some Reflections on Perceptual Consciousness. In Ronald Bruzina & Bruce W. Wilshire (eds.), Crosscurrents in Phenomenology. Martinus Nijhoff 169--185.
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  27. Petra Stoerig & Alan Cowey (1993). Blindsight and Perceptual Consciousness: Neuropsychological Aspects of Striate Cortical Function. In B. Gulyas, D. Ottoson & P. Rol (eds.), Functional Organization of the Human Visual Cortex. Pergamon Press
  28.  12
    Elizabeth Schier (2009). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):689-690.
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  29.  12
    Thomas Natsoulas (1983). What Are the Objects of Perceptual Consciousness? American Journal of Psychology 96:435-67.
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  30.  3
    John W. Yolton (1969). Perceptual Consciousness. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 3:34-50.
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  31.  2
    Arthur Collins (1973). The Objects of Perceptual Consciousness in Philosophical Thought. Social Research 40.
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  32.  1
    J. N. Mohanty (1978). Remarks on Wilfrid Sellars' Paper on Perceptual Consciousness. In Ronald Bruzina & Bruce W. Wilshire (eds.), Crosscurrents in Phenomenology. Martinus Nijhoff 186--198.
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  33. Jacob Berger (2013). Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer 137-145.
    In his (2011) paper “There It Is” and his (2014) précis “There It Was,” Benj Hellie develops a sophisticated semantics for perceptual justification according to which perceptions in good cases can be explained by intentional psychology and can justify beliefs, whereas bad cases of perception are defective and so cannot justify beliefs. Importantly, Hellie also affords consciousness a central role in rationality insofar as only those good cases of perception within consciousness can play a justificatory function. In (...)
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  34. Fern (1999). Perceptual Consciousness and the Reflexive Character of Attention. In Jos Falguera (ed.), La Filosof. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U.
     
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  35. Robert Innis (1992). Tacit Knowing, Gestalt Theory, and the Model of Perceptual Consciousness. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 27.
     
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  36. Olga Prat Fernández (1999). Perceptual Consciousness and the Reflexive Character of Attention. In La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U
     
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  37.  25
    Rolf Reber, P. Wurtz & Thomas E. Zimmermann (2004). Exploring "Fringe" Consciousness: The Subjective Experience of Perceptual Fluency and its Objective Bases. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):47-60.
    Perceptual fluency is the subjective experience of ease with which an incoming stimulus is processed. Although perceptual fluency is assessed by speed of processing, it remains unclear how objective speed is related to subjective experiences of fluency. We present evidence that speed at different stages of the perceptual process contributes to perceptual fluency. In an experiment, figure-ground contrast influenced detection of briefly presented words, but not their identification at longer exposure durations. Conversely, font in which the (...)
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  38.  11
    J. Eriksson, A. Larsson, K. Alstrom & Lars Nyberg (2004). Visual Consciousness: Dissociating the Neural Correlates of Perceptual Transitions From Sustained Perception with fMRI. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):61-72.
    To investigate the possible dichotomy between the neurophysiological bases of perceptual transitions versus sustaining a particular percept over time, an fMRI study was conducted with subjects viewing fragmented pictures. Unlike most other perceptually unstable stimuli, fragmented pictures give rise to only one perceptual transition and a continuous period of sustained perception. Earlier research is inconclusive on the subject of which anatomical regions should be attributed to what temporal aspect of perception, and the aim of the present study was (...)
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  39.  50
    Naomi M. Eilan (1998). Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press 181-202.
    of presence cannot be explained by appeal to the notion of non-representational of experience. world see John Campbell, 'The Role of Physical Objects in Thinking', in Representation: Problems Perceptual Intentionality, and.
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  40.  39
    Ted Honderich (2003). Perceptual, Reflective, and Affective Consciousness as Existence. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 1-24.
    This is a further improved version of a paper previously called `Reflective and Affective Consciousness'. It is better now -- more or less comprehensible if still imperfect. It is the fourth in a series of papers, and continues the idea that consciousness needs to be analysed not in any of the boring ways: by way of the plain or 17th Century materialism that is still with us in new packages, or immaterialism, or dualistic identity theory, or functionalism and (...)
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  41.  7
    Hillel D. Braude (2012). Conciliating Cognition and Consciousness: The Perceptual Foundations of Clinical Reasoning. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):945-950.
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  42.  20
    Rolf Reber, Pascal Wurtz & Thomas D. Zimmermann (2004). Exploring “Fringe” Consciousness: The Subjective Experience of Perceptual Fluency and its Objective Bases. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):47-60.
    Perceptual fluency is the subjective experience of ease with which an incoming stimulus is processed. Although perceptual fluency is assessed by speed of processing, it remains unclear how objective speed is related to subjective experiences of fluency. We present evidence that speed at different stages of the perceptual process contributes to perceptual fluency. In an experiment, figure-ground contrast influenced detection of briefly presented words, but not their identification at longer exposure durations. Conversely, font in which the (...)
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  43. Thomas Natsoulas (1985). An Introduction to the Perceptual Kind of Conception of Direct Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6 (3):333-356.
     
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  44.  10
    Jan Sleutels (1998). Phenomenal Consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, Naturalism and Perceptual Plasticity. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 31 (1):21-55.
  45.  13
    Bernard J. Baars (1995). Surprisingly Small Subcortical Structures Are Needed for the State of Waking Consciousness, While Cortical Projection Areas Seem to Provide Perceptual Contents of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (2):159-62.
  46.  26
    Stan Franklin, Sidney D'Mello, Bernard J. Baars & Uma Ramamurthy (2009). Evolutionary Pressures for Perceptual Stability and Self as Guides to Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):99-110.
  47. Anne Treisman (2003). Consciousness and Perceptual Binding. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press 95--113.
  48.  2
    Johan Eriksson, Anne Larsson, Katrine Riklund Åhlström & Lars Nyberg (2004). Visual Consciousness: Dissociating the Neural Correlates of Perceptual Transitions From Sustained Perception with fMRI. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):61-72.
  49.  3
    Tara W. Lumpkin (2001). Perceptual Diversity: Is Polyphasic Consciousness Necessary for Global Survival? Anthropology of Consciousness 12 (1):37-70.
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  50. Jesse J. Prinz (2007). All Consciousness is Perceptual. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
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