Search results for 'perceptual system' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Rainer Mausfeld (2010). The Perception of Material Qualities and the Internal Semantics of the Perceptual System. In Albertazzi Liliana, Tonder Gert & Vishwanath Dhanraj (eds.), Perception beyond Inference. The Information Content of Visual Processes. MIT Press
    The chapter outlines an abstract theoretical framework that is currently (re-)emerging in the course of a theoretical convergence of several disciplines. In the first section, the fundamental problem of perception theory is formulated, namely, the generation, by the perceptual system, of meaningful categories from physicogeometric energy patterns. In the second section, it deals with basic intuitions and assumptions underlying what can be regarded as the current Standard Model of Perceptual Psychology and points out why this model is (...)
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  2. Rainer Mausfeld (2010). Color Within an Internalist Framework : The Role of Color in the Structure of the Perceptual System. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press
    Colour is, according to prevailing orthodoxy in perceptual psychology, a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the type of ‘perceptual object’ to which it pertains and that‘colour per se’ constitutes a natural attribute in the functional architecture of the perceptual system. It is regarded as autonomous by assuming that it can be studied in isolation of other (...) attributes. These assumptions also provide the pillars for the technical field of colorimetry, and have proved very fruitful for neurophysiological investigations into peripheral colour coding. They also have become, in a technology-driven cultural process of abstraction, part of our common-sense conception of colour. With respect to perception theory, however, both assumptions are grossly inadequate, on both empirical and theoretical grounds. All the same, the idea of an internal homogeneous and autonomous attribute of ‘colour per se’, mostly taken not as an empirical hypothesis but as a kind of truism, became a guiding idea in perceptual psychology. Here, it has impeded the identification of relevant theoretical issues and consequently has become detrimental for the development of explanatory frameworks for the role of ‘colour’ within the structure of our perceptual system. The chapter argues that enquiries into colour perception cannot be divorced from general enquiries into the structure of the conceptual forms underlying perception. (shrink)
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  3. Rainer Mausfeld (2011). Intrinsic Multiperspectivity: Conceptual Forms and the Functional Architecture of the Perceptual System. In Welsch Wolfgang, Singer Wolf & Wunder Andre (eds.), Interdisciplinary Anthropology. Springer 19--54.
    It is a characteristic feature of our mental make-up that the same perceptual input situation can simultaneously elicit conflicting mental perspectives. This ability pervades our perceptual and cognitive domains. Striking examples are the dual character of pictures in picture perception, pretend play, or the ability to employ metaphors and allegories. I argue that traditional approaches, beyond being inadequate on principle grounds, are theoretically ill equipped to deal with these achievements. I then outline a theoretical perspective that has emerged (...)
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  4.  10
    Jeffrey S. Bowers (1999). The Visual Categories for Letters and Words Reside Outside Any Informationally Encapsulated Perceptual System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):368-369.
    According to Pylyshyn, the early visual system is able to categorize perceptual inputs into shape classes based on visual similarity criteria; it is also suggested that written words may be categorized within early vision. This speculation is contradicted by the fact that visually unrelated exemplars of a given letter (e.g., a/A) or word (e.g., read/READ) map onto common visual categories.
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  5. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1993). The Perceptual System: A Philosophical and Psychological Perspective. New York: Lang.
     
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  6.  7
    Slobodan Markovic (2003). The Soap Bubble: Phenomenal State or Perceptual System Dynamics? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):420-421.
    The Gestalt Bubble model describes a subjective phenomenal experience (what is seen) without taking into account the extraphenomenal constraints of perceptual experience (why it is seen as it is). If it intends to be an explanatory model, then it has to include either stimulus or neural constraints, or both.
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  7.  11
    John K. Tsotsos (1997). Limited Capacity of Any Realizable Perceptual System Is a Sufficient Reason for Attentive Behavior. Consciousness and Cognition 6 (2-3):429-436.
  8.  9
    Jack H. Ornstein (1995). The Perceptual System. Review of Metaphysics 49 (1):122-123.
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  9.  6
    Alan Millar (1996). The Perceptual System—A Philosophical and Psychological Perspective. History of European Ideas 22 (2):121-122.
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  10. Ross Cogan (1994). Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, The Perceptual System: A Philosophical and Psychological Perspective Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (5):308-310.
     
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  11. James R. Levenick (1989). A Self-Organizing Perceptual System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):409.
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  12.  7
    Joseph A. Hedger (2016). Perceptual Access Reasoning: Developmental Stage or System 1 Heuristic? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):207-226.
    In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be (...)
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  13.  4
    Manuel Perea & Manuel Carreiras (2012). Perceptual Uncertainty is a Property of the Cognitive System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (5):298-299.
    We qualify Frost's proposals regarding letter-position coding in visual word recognition and the universal model of reading. First, we show that perceptual uncertainty regarding letter position is not tied to European languages – instead it is a general property of the cognitive system. Second, we argue that a universal model of reading should incorporate a developmental view of the reading process.
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  14.  12
    Lawrence W. Barsalou (1993). Flexibility, Structure, and Linguistic Vagary in Concepts: Manifestations of a Compositional System of Perceptual Symbols. In A. Collins, S. Gathercole, Martin A. Conway & P. E. Morris (eds.), Theories of Memory. Lawrence Erlbaum 1.
  15.  1
    K. Roubik & J. Dusek (2004). Evaluation of the Perceptual Image Quality of Compressed Images with a Model of the Human Visual System. In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing 33--179.
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  16. J. M. Lindholm (1991). Perceptual Consequences of the Filtering Characteristics of the Pursuit System. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (6):477-477.
     
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  17. Ariel S. Cecchi (2014). Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity. Dialectica 68 (1):63-95.
    Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system. The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system which I call ‘architectural’. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content of the perceptual experience. I scrutinize a study (...)
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  18.  74
    Edoardo Zamuner, “Perception of Other People’s Emotions”. ASCS09.
    In this paper I argue that one of the functions of the perceptual system is to detect other people’s emotions when they are expressed in the face. I support this view by developing two separate but interdependent accounts. The first says that facial expressions of emotions carry information about the emotions that produced them, and about some of their properties. The second says that the visual system functions to extract the information that expressions carry about emotions.
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  19. Ayoob Shahmoradi (2016). Why Do We Need Perceptual Content? Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    Most representationalists argue that <span class='Hi'>perceptual</span> experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis (2004) argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that <span class='Hi'>perceptual</span> experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
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  20. Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Learning. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Oxford University Press
    When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptual learning, that is, ‘relatively long-lasting changes to an organism’s perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment’ (Goldstone 1998: 585). In this paper, I explore ways in which the extensive literature on perceptual learning can be applied to help improve sensory substitution devices. I then use these findings to answer a philosophical question. Much of the philosophical (...)
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  21.  45
    Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese (2015). Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations From the Enactive Theory of Agency. In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer International Publishing 219-236.
    Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To (...)
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  22.  27
    Anna Ivanova (2015). Coherentist Justification and Perceptual Beliefs. Balkan Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):107-114.
    A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a system of knowledge, perceptual beliefs seem to bear more importance than other members of the coherent set do. They are more stable in the face of confronting evidence, and may be preserved despite their degrading effect on the coherence properties of the system. This appears to be inconsistent with coherentism, according to which beliefs cannot possess independent credibility. In order to abide (...)
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  23.  15
    Jon Altschul, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford (2014). Vahid, Burge, and Perceptual Entitlement. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):325-330.
    Hamid Vahid criticizes Tyler Burge's account of perceptual entitlement. Vahid argues that Burge's account fails to satisfy a criterion of adequacy that any correct account of perceptual warrant must satisfy. According to Vahid, a correct account of perceptual warrant must allow for perceptual beliefs which are produced by a properly functioning perceptual system yet which lack warrant. The present article argues that Vahid's critique of Burge fails. It presents numerous examples of such beliefs that (...)
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  24.  4
    Heiko Lex, Christoph Schütz, Andreas Knoblauch & Thomas Schack (2015). Cognitive Representation of a Complex Motor Action Executed by Different Motor Systems. Minds and Machines 25 (1):1-15.
    The present study evaluates the cognitive representation of a kicking movement performed by a human and a humanoid robot, and how they are represented in experts and novices of soccer and robotics, respectively. To learn about the expertise-dependent development of memory structures, we compared the representation structures of soccer experts and robot experts concerning a human and humanoid robot kicking movement. We found different cognitive representation structures for both expertise groups under two different motor performance conditions . In general, the (...)
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  25. Lawrence W. Barsalou (1999). Perceptual Symbol Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
    Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, (...)
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  26. Edoardo Zamuner (2011). A Theory of Affect Perception. Mind and Language 26 (4):436-451.
    What do we see when we look at someone's expression of fear? I argue that one of the things that we see is fear itself. I support this view by developing a theory of affect perception. The theory involves two claims. One is that expressions are patterns of facial changes that carry information about affects. The other is that the visual system extracts and processes such information. In particular, I argue that the visual system functions to detect the (...)
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  27. Neil Van Leeuwen (2011). Review of Sleights of Mind: What the Neuroscience of Magic Reveals About Our Brains. [REVIEW] Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 16 (5):473-478.
    The book I review, _Sleights of Mind_, aims to illuminate properties of perceptual systems by discussing human susceptibility to magical illusions. I describe how the authors use psychological principles to explain two tricks, spoon bending and the Miser's Dream. I also argue that the book is congenial to the following view of illusions: susceptibility to illusion is the result of evolutionary trade-offs; perceptual systems must make assumptions in order to function at all, but susceptibility to illusion is the (...)
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  28.  16
    István Aranyosi (2013). The Peripheral Mind: Philosophy of Mind and the Peripheral Nervous System. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers of mind, both in the conceptual analysis tradition and in the empirical informed school, have been implicitly neglecting the potential conceptual role of the Peripheral Nervous System (PNS) in understanding sensory and perceptual states. Instead, the philosophical as well as the neuroscientific literature has been assuming that it is the Central Nervous System (CNS) alone, and more exactly the brain, that should prima facie be taken as conceptually and empirically crucial for a philosophical analysis of such (...)
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  29.  13
    Farid Masrour, Gregory Nirshberg, Michael Schon, Jason Leardi & Emily Barrett (2015). Revisiting the Empirical Case Against Perceptual Modularity. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Some theorists hold that the human perceptual system has a component that receives input only from units lower in the perceptual hierarchy. This thesis, that we shall here refer to as the encapsulation thesis, has been at the center of a continuing debate for the past few decades. Those who deny the encapsulation thesis often rely on the large body of psychological findings that allegedly suggest that perception is influenced by factors such as the beliefs, desires, goals, (...)
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  30. Carolyn Dicey Jennings (2015). Attention and Perceptual Organization. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1265-1278.
    How does attention contribute to perceptual experience? Within cognitive science, attention is known to contribute to the organization of sensory features into perceptual objects, or “object-based organization.” The current paper tackles a different type of organization and thus suggests a different role for attention in conscious perception. Within every perceptual experience we find that more subjectively interesting percepts stand out in the foreground, whereas less subjectively interesting percepts are relegated to the background. The sight of a sycamore (...)
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  31. Niklas Luhmann (2000). Art as a Social System. Stanford University Press.
    Germany's leading contemporary social theorist provides a definitive analysis of art as a social and perceptual system which not only represents an important intellectual step in discussions of art but also an important advance in systems theory. Luhmann insists on the radical incommensurability between psychic systems (perception) and social systems (communication). Art is a special kind of communication that operates at the boundary between the social system and consciousness in ways that profoundly irritate communication while remaining strictly (...)
     
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  32.  10
    Valtteri Arstila (forthcoming). Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly penetrate perceptual experiences. This paper concerns the plausibility of two prominent cases. The first one originates from Susanna Siegel’s claim that perceptual experiences can represent natural kind properties. If this is true, then the concepts we (...)
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  33.  34
    Damon Crockett (2014). Surface Colour is Not a Perceptual Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):303-318.
    In this paper, I consider a view that explains colour experience by the independent representation of surface and illumination. This view implies that surface colour is a phenomenal perceptual content. I argue from facts of colour phenomenology to the conclusion that surface colour is not a phenomenal perceptual content. I then argue from results of surface-matching experiments to the conclusion that surface colour is neither a perceptual content of any kind nor any sort of computational output of (...)
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  34.  17
    S. Peri (1977). The Problem of Universals and its Perceptual Correlates. Synthese 35 (4):447 - 456.
    This paper deals with the philosophical questions which gave rise to the traditional realist theories of universals. The main thesis is that these same questions may also be interpreted as scientific-empirical questions. The study of these problems has begun only very recently and the relevance of the results for the traditional problem of intensional entities has only been remarked by few workers aware of the philosophical problem. The approach adopted here is that of regarding man as a perceptual (...) situated in an environment and showing certain capacities like perception of universals. The possible ways of access to these entities is discussed on the basis of some recent empirical findings related to perception. One conclusion is that in order to answer the basic philosophical question of how properties, particulars and propositions are perceived may be answered within the domains of science, accepting only the usual presuppositions used in it. Basically, such an approach sees the root of the problem in the great complexity of information processing involved in the actual perception of properties, particulars and propositions. (shrink)
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  35. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1981). Perception as a Cognitive System. Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    In this work I reject the contention that there is a perceptual stage which is devoid of contributions from the agent's cognitive framework. This contention is expressed in two different noncognitive views of perception. The traditional sensory core view which has prevailed since the seventeenth century; it claims that there is a stage of pure sensory core which precedes the interpretive percepts . The recent ecological approach whose main representative is J. J. Gibson; it claims that not only a (...)
     
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  36. R. Mausfeld (2003). 'Colour'as Part of the Format of Different Perceptual Primitives: The Dual Coding of Colour. In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press 381--430.
    The chapter argues from an ethology-inspired internalist perspective that ‘colour’ is not a homogeneous and autonomous attribute, but rather plays different roles in different conceptual forms underlying perception. It discusses empirical and theoretical evidence that indicates that core assumptions underlying orthodox conceptions are grossly inadequate. The assumptions pertain to the idea that colour is a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the (...)
     
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  37. Thomas Natsoulas (1997). The Presence of Environmental Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: An Integrative, Ecological and Phenomenological Approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (4):371-390.
    This article is the promised sequel to a recently published article in this journal , in which I sought to make more available to psychologists Edmund Husserl’s attempted explanation of how perceptual mental acts succeed in presenting to consciousness their external, environmental objects themselves, as opposed to some kind of representation of them. Here, I continue my exposition of Husserl’s effort and, as well, I begin a project of seeking to bridge the gap between his phenomenological account of (...) presence to consciousness and James J. Gibson’s ecological conception of direct perception. I am concerned, with what happens at the juncture of the perceptual system’s resonance to the stimulus energy flux and the perceiver’s awareness of those environmental objects, events, properties, and relations which are specified by the informational variables that the picked-up stimulus flux instantiates. I believe that simultaneously considering the environment’s phenomenological perceptual presence from both sides of the great epistemic divide – from the ecological outside and from the phenomenological inside – is worth a serious try. In the case of both these perspectives, we fortunately can draw upon a lifetime of intensive work by a major theorist operating at the highest level, work directly relevant to the general phenomenon of special interest here. (shrink)
     
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  38. James J. Gibson (1968). The Senses Considered As Perceptual Systems. Allen & Unwin.
  39.  24
    Merav Ahissar & Shaul Hochstein (2004). The Reverse Hierarchy Theory of Visual Perceptual Learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (10):457-464.
    Perceptual learning can be defined as practice-induced improvement in the ability to perform specific perceptual tasks. We previously proposed the Reverse Hierarchy Theory as a unifying concept that links behavioral findings of visual learning with physiological and anatomical data. Essentially, it asserts that learning is a top-down guided process, which begins at high-level areas of the visual system, and when these do not suffice, progresses backwards to the input levels, which have a better signal-to-noise ratio. This simple (...)
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  40.  43
    F. de Vignemont & P. Fourneret (2004). The Sense of Agency: A Philosophical and Empirical Review of the "Who" System. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is disrupted in (...)
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  41.  10
    Thorsten Albrecht, Susan Klapötke & Uwe Mattler (2010). Individual Differences in Metacontrast Masking Are Enhanced by Perceptual Learning. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):656-666.
    In vision research metacontrast masking is a widely used technique to reduce the visibility of a stimulus. Typically, studies attempt to reveal general principles that apply to a large majority of participants and tend to omit possible individual differences. The neural plasticity of the visual system, however, entails the potential capability for individual differences in the way observers perform perceptual tasks. We report a case of perceptual learning in a metacontrast masking task that leads to the enhancement (...)
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  42.  71
    David Forman (2010). Second Nature and Spirit: Hegel on the Role of Habit in the Appearance of Perceptual Consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):325-352.
    Hegel's discussion of the concept of “habit” appears at a crucial point in his Encyclopedia system, namely, in the transition from the topic of “nature” to the topic of “spirit” (Geist): it is through habit that the subject both distinguishes itself from its various sensory states as an absolute unity (the I) and, at the same time, preserves those sensory states as the content of sensory consciousness. By calling habit a “second nature,” Hegel highlights the fact that incipient spirit (...)
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  43.  3
    D. Dotov (2016). Perception-Action Mutuality Does Not Obviate Emergence or the Animal’s Active Role in the Perceptual Act. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):308-309.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The main goal of this commentary is to make more discriminative the comparison between enactive and ecological theories of perception. Emergence at the level of the animal-environment system might be playing the role attributed to mental construction in basic perceptual processes. If correct, this would render some forms of enactivism compatible with the theoretical tenets of the target (...)
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  44.  23
    Sebastian Watzl (2014). Perceptual Guidance. Ratio 27 (4):414-438.
    Proponents of an intentionalist theory of perceptual experience have taken for granted that perceptual experience is an informing form of intentionality. Hence they often speak of the way an experience represents the environment to be, or what there is. In this respect perceptual experience is thus assumed to resemble a speech act like assertion or a mental state like belief. There is another important form of intentionality though that concerns not what there is, but what to do. (...)
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  45. John Dilworth (2007). Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their (...)
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  46.  4
    Juan C. González González, Steven J. Haase & Paul Bach-Y.-Rita (2005). Perceptual Recalibration in Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Modification. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (3):481-500.
    This paper analyzes the process of perceptual recalibration (PR) in light of two cases of technologically-mediated cognition: sensory substitution and perceptual modification. We hold that PR is a very useful concept - perhaps necessary - for explaining the adaptive capacity that natural perceptive systems display as they respond to functional demands from the environment. We also survey critically related issues, such as the role of learning, training, and nervous system plasticity in the recalibrating process. Attention is given (...)
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  47.  9
    Urszula Żegleń (2008). Perceptual Identification - Representational or Not? Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):117-136.
    The paper is focused on the problem of identification in perception. I attempt to inquire on what ground the cognitive system is able to identify an object of perception (I restrict my analysis to visual perception). Although this is an empirical question for cognitive science, I consider it using a philosophical method of analysis. But my considerations in great part are heuristic, I ask questions and rather search for the answers than give a ready solution. The questions I ask (...)
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  48.  9
    Petra Stoerig & Stephan Brandt (1993). The Visual System and Levels of Perception: Properties of Neuromental Organization. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).
    To see whether the mental and the neural have common attributes that could resolve some of the traditional dichotomies, we review neuroscientific data on the visual system. The results show that neuronal and perceptual function share a parallel and hierarchical architecture which is manifest not only in the anatomy and physiology of the visual system, but also in normal perception and in the deficits caused by lesions in different parts of the system. Based on the description (...)
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  49.  21
    Keith Lau, Perceptual Invariance of Nonlinear Focus+Context Transformations.
    Focus+Context techniques are commonly used in visualization systems to simultaneously provide both the details and the context of a particular dataset. This paper proposes a new methodology to empirically investigate the effect of various Focus+Context transformations on human perception. This methodology is based on the shaker paradigm, which tests performance for a visual task on an image that is rapidly alternated with a transformed version of itself. An important aspect of this technique is that it can determine two different kinds (...)
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    Clinton Cooper & Claire F. Michaels (2001). Perception, Learning, and Judgment in Ecological Psychology: Who Needs a Constructivist Ventral System? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):101-102.
    Norman's identification of a ventral system embodying a constructivist theory of perception is rejected in favor of an ecological theory of perception and perceptual learning. We summarize research showing that a key motivation for the ventral-constructivist connection, percept-percept coupling, confuses perceptual and post-perceptual processes.
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