Search results for 'perdurantism' (try it on Scholar)

113 found
Order:
  1. Mauro Dorato (2012). Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: Why the Unsubstantiality of the First Debate Implies That of the Second. Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):25-41.
    The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  2.  54
    Achille C. Varzi (2003). Perdurantism, Universalism, and Quantifiers. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):208-215.
    I argue that the conjunction of perdurantism (the view that objects are temporally extended) and universalism (the thesis that any old class of things has a mereological fusion) gives rise to undesired complications when combined with certain plausible assumptions concerning the semantics of tensed statements.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  3. Maureen Donnelly (2011). Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):27 - 51.
    In this paper, I focus on three issues intertwined in current debates between endurantists and perdurantists—(i) the dimension of persisting objects, (ii) whether persisting objects have timeless, or only time-relative, parts, and (iii) whether persisting objects have proper temporal parts. I argue that one standard endurantist position on the first issue is compatible with standard perdurantist positions on parthood and temporal parts. I further argue that different accounts of persistence depend on the claims about objects' dimensions and not on the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4.  71
    Jiri Benovsky (2013). New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism. Acta Analytica 28 (2):223-227.
    In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  12
    Ofra Magidor (2016). Endurantism Vs. Perdurantism?: A Debate Reconsidered. Noûs 50 (3):509-532.
    One of the central debates in contemporary metaphysics has been the debate between endurantism and perdurantism about persistence. In this paper I argue that much of this debate has been misconstrued: most of the arguments in the debate crucially rely on theses which are strictly orthogonal to the endurantism/perdurantism debate. To show this, I note that the arguments in the endurantism/perdurantism debate typically take the following form: one presents a challenge that endurantists allegedly have some trouble addressing, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  23
    Ofra Magidor (2015). Why Neither Diachronic Universalism nor the Argument From Vagueness Establishes Perdurantism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):113-126.
    One of the most influential arguments in favour of perdurantism is the Argument from Vagueness. The argument proceeds in three stages: The first aims to establish atemporal universalism. The second presents a parallel argument in favour of universalism in the context of temporalized parthood. The third argues that diachronic universalism entails perdurantism. I offer a novel objection to the argument. I show that on the correct way of formulating diachronic universalism the principle does not entail perdurantism. On (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7.  68
    Ofra Magidor (2016). Endurantism Vs. Perdurantism?: A Debate Reconsidered. Noûs 50 (3):509-532.
    One of the central debates in contemporary metaphysics has been the debate between endurantism and perdurantism about persistence. In this paper I argue that much of this debate has been misconstrued: most of the arguments in the debate crucially rely on theses which are strictly orthogonal to the endurantism/perdurantism debate. To show this, I note that the arguments in the endurantism/perdurantism debate typically take the following form: one presents a challenge that endurantists allegedly have some trouble addressing, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  96
    Steven D. Hales & Timothy A. Johnson (2003). Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):524–539.
    There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time: endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and only partly exist at each moment of their existence. In this paper we argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by Special Relativity, and can accommodate a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  9.  24
    Ofra Magidor (2015). Why Neither Diachronic Universalism nor the Argument From Vagueness Establishes Perdurantism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):113-126.
    One of the most influential arguments in favour of perdurantism is the Argument from Vagueness. The argument proceeds in three stages: The first aims to establish atemporal universalism. The second presents a parallel argument in favour of universalism in the context of temporalized parthood. The third argues that diachronic universalism entails perdurantism. I offer a novel objection to the argument. I show that on the correct way of formulating diachronic universalism the principle does not entail perdurantism. On (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  21
    Donald Smith (2010). Chisholm's Phenomenal Argument Revisited: A Dilemma for Perdurantism. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):31.
    According to perdurantism, objects persist by being spread out over time, just as composite three-dimensional objects are spread out over space. Just as a composite three-dimensional object is spread out over space by having spatial parts, objects persist, according to perdurantism, by having temporal parts. Perdurantism can be stated more precisely by saying what exactly a temporal part is. In the sequel, Theodore Sider's definition of "instantaneous temporal part" shall be assumed: x is an instantaneous temporal part (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Nikk Effingham, The Inelegance of Perdurantist Universalism.
    Universalism (the thesis that for any ys, those ys compose a further object) is an answer to the Special Composition Question. In the literature there are three arguments (the arguments from elegance) that are often relied upon, but rarely examined in-depth. I argue that these motivations cannot be had by the perdurantist, for to avoid a commitment to badly behaved superluminal objects perdurantists must answer the Proper Continuant Question. Any answer to that question necessarily ensures that there is a restricted (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Ben Caplan & Carl Matheson (2006). Defending Musical Perdurantism. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (1):59-69.
    If musical works are abstract objects, which cannot enter into causal relations, then how can we refer to musical works or know anything about them? Worse, how can any of our musical experiences be experiences of musical works? It would be nice to be able to sidestep these questions altogether. One way to do that would be to take musical works to be concrete objects. In this paper, we defend a theory according to which musical works are concrete objects. In (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  13. Ben Caplan & Carl Matheson (2008). Defending 'Defending Musical Perdurantism'. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (1):80-85.
    British Journal of Aesthetics (forthcoming Jan. 2008).
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Nikk Effingham (2012). Endurantism and Perdurantism. In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. 170.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15.  43
    Frank Hofmann (2009). An Alternative to Endurantism and Perdurantism: Doing Without Occupants. In Ludger Honnefelder, Benedikt Schick & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter Inc 134.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  23
    Jiri Benovksy (2007). On Presentist Perdurantism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):79-88.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  34
    Jrg Williams, Perdurantist Framework.
    Conc 2: Charitable reconstructions are available. Conc 3: But these lead to worrying results. (POM) Conc 4: Further weakening prevents it from playing the “survival is intrinsic” role in fission arguments.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  4
    Jiri Benovksy (2007). On Presentist Perdurantism. SATS 8 (2).
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Juraj Odorcak (2012). Realism, Perdurantism and Its Practical Consequences. Filozofia 67 (5):375-386.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  96
    Ryan Wasserman (2016). Theories of Persistence. Philosophical Studies 173 (1):243-250.
    The debate over persistence is often cast as a disagreement between two rival theories—the perdurantist theory that objects persist through time by having different temporal parts at different times, and the endurantist theory that objects persist through time by being wholly present at different times. This way of framing the debate over persistence involves both an important insight and an important error. Unfortunately, the error is often embraced and the insight is often ignored. This paper aims to correct both of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21.  68
    André Bazzoni (2016). Names and Individuals. In P. Stalmaszczyk & L. F. Moreno (eds.), Philosophical approaches to proper names. Peter Lang GmbH 123-146.
    The fact that names refer to individuals is a basic assumption of referentialist theories of proper names, but the notion of individual is systematically taken for granted in those theories. The present paper follows that basic assumption, but proposes to analyze the notion of individual prior to the development of any semantic theory of proper names. It will be argued that a particular perdurantist conception of individual should be adopted, which distinguishes the notions of individual occurrence, and individual simpliciter. A (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  24
    Kristie Miller (2005). Blocking the Path From Vagueness to Four Dimensionalism. Ratio 18 (3):317–331.
    There is a general form of an argument which I call the ‘argument from vagueness’ which attempts to show that objects persist by perduring, via the claim that vagueness is never ontological in nature and thus that composition is unrestricted. I argue that even if we grant that vagueness is always the result of semantic indeterminacy rather than ontological vagueness, and thus also grant that composition is unrestricted, it does not follow that objects persist by perduring. Unrestricted mereological composition lacks (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  23. Jiri Benovsky (2009). Eternalist Theories of Persistence Through Time: Where the Differences Really Lie. Axiomathes 19 (1):51-71.
    The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view , and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism . Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and the endurantist theories—are (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  24. Jiri Benovsky (2011). Endurance, Perdurance, and Metaontology. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy (2):159-177.
    The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  5
    Mario Alai (forthcoming). Lewis, Change and Temporary Intrinsics. Axiomathes:1-21.
    This is an attempt to sort out what is it that makes many of us uncomfortable with the perdurantist solution to the problem of change. Lewis argues that only perdurantism can reconcile change with persistence over time, while neither presentism nor endurantism can. So, first, I defend the endurantist solution to the problem of change, by arguing that what is relative to time are not properties, but their possession. Second, I explore the anti-perdurantist strategy of arguing that Lewis cannot (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. William Bynoe, Temporal Scattering.
    I show that the Eternalist faces a trilemma. Given their theory of time, three claims are each very plausible, yet together form an inconsistent triad. Denying any one of these claims will have significant consequences for how they can conceive of the material realm. I urge that the best strategy is to deny the first claim, and show that this would have a significant consequence: Perdurantism is false.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  44
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499-534.
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  28.  86
    Thomas A. C. Reydon (2008). Species in Three and Four Dimensions. Synthese 164 (2):161-184.
    There is an interesting parallel between two debates in different domains of contemporary analytic philosophy. One is the endurantism– perdurantism, or three-dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism, debate in analytic metaphysics. The other is the debate on the species problem in philosophy of biology. In this paper I attempt to cross-fertilize these debates with the aim of exploiting some of the potential that the two debates have to advance each other. I address two issues. First, I explore what the case of species (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Jiri Benovsky (2006). Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30.  82
    Pablo Rychter (2011). How Coincidence Bears on Persistence. Philosophia 39 (4):759-770.
    The ‘paradoxes of coincidence’ are generally taken as an important factor for deciding between rival views on persistence through time. In particular, the ability to deal with apparent cases of temporary coincidence is usually regarded as a good reason for favouring perdurantism (or ‘four-dimensionalism’) over endurantism (or ‘three-dimensionalism’). However, the recent work of Gilmore ( 2007 ) and McGrath ( 2007 ) challenges this standard view. For different reasons, both Gilmore and McGrath conclude that perdurantism does not really (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  89
    Katherine Hawley (2008). Persistence and Determination. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):197-212.
    Roughly speaking, perdurantism is the view that ordinary objects persist through time by having temporal parts, whilst endurantism is the view that they persist by being wholly present at different times. (Speaking less roughly will be important later.) It is often thought that perdurantists have an advantage over endurantists when dealing with objects which appear to coincide temporarily: lumps, statues, cats, tail-complements, bisected brains, repaired ships, and the like. Some cases – personal fission, for example – seem to involve (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  7
    Jiri Benovsky (2011). Endurance, Perdurance and Metaontology. SATS 12 (2).
    The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  7
    Florian Fischer (2012). On the Asymmetry of Endurantistic and Perdurantistic Coexistence in Special Relativity. Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):43-61.
    The paper reviews Balashov’s Asymmetry Thesis concerning co-existing (point-sized) enduring objects, on the one hand, and perduring ones, on the other. In this regard, it becomes crucial to investigate whether, at a given spacetime point p, it is located only the respective temporal part of a perdur- ing whole, or that whole as well. Two alternatives ought to be distinguished and, then, I will argue as follows: If the perduring whole is located where its parts are, the original asymmetry- thesis (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (2015). Time and Time Perception. Topoi 34 (1):257-263.
    There is little doubt that we perceive the world as tensed—that is, as consisting of a past, present and future each with a different ontological status—and transient—that is, as involving a passage of time. We also have the ability to execute precisely timed behaviors that appear to depend upon making correct temporal judgments about which changes are truly present and which are not. A common claim made by scientists and philosophers is that our experiences of entities enduring through transient changes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. Matteo Morganti (2009). Are the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory Really Twin Brothers? Axiomathes 19 (1):73--85.
    In a recent paper, Jiri Benovsky argues that the bundle theory and the substratum theory, traditionally regarded as ‘deadly enemies’ in the metaphysics literature, are in fact ‘twin brothers’. That is, they turn out to be ‘equivalent for all theoretical purposes’ upon analysis. The only exception, according to Benovsky, is a particular version of the bundle theory whose distinguishing features render unappealing. In the present reply article, I critically analyse these undoubtedly relevant claims, and reject them.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  17
    Katherine Hawley, Temporal Parts. Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
    Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  37.  63
    Emanuel Viebahn (2013). Counting Stages. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):311-324.
    This paper defends stage theory against the argument from diachronic counting. It argues that stage theorists can appeal to quantifier domain restriction in order to accommodate intuitions about diachronic counting sentences. Two approaches involving domain restriction are discussed. According to the first, domains of counting are usually restricted to stages at the time of utterance. This approach explains intuitions in many cases, but is theoretically costly and delivers wrong counts if diachronic counting is combined with fission or fusion. On the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38.  82
    Pablo Rychter (2012). Stage Theory and Proper Names. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):367-379.
    In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and persist by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ‘Socrates’ or ‘London’. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. Jiri Benovsky (2009). On (Not) Being in Two Places at the Same Time: An Argument Against Endurantism. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):239 - 248.
    Is there an entity such that it can be in two places at the same time ? According to one traditional view, properties can, since they are immanent universals. But what about objects such as a person or a table ? Common sense seems to say that, unlike properties, objects are not multiply locatable. In this paper, I will argue first of all that endurantism entails a consequence that is quite bizarre, namely, that objects are universals, while properties are particulars. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  96
    Jiri Benovsky (2006). A Modal Bundle Theory. Metaphysica 7 (2).
    If ordinary particulars are bundles of properties, and if properties are said to be universals, then three well-known objections arise : no particular can change, all particulars have all of their properties essentially (even the most insignificant ones), and there cannot be two numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible particulars. In this paper, I try to make a little headway on these issues and see how the objections can be met, if one accepts a certain view about persistence through time and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41.  43
    Achille C. Varzi (2000). Foreword to ''Temporal Parts''. The Monist 83 (3):319-320.
    A brief introductory note to the Monist issue on "Temporal Parts", setting the background for the eight papers included in the rest of the issue (by Y. Balashov, B. Brogaard, K. Fine, M. Heller, R. LePoidevin, J. Parsons, P. M. Simons, and P. van Inwagen).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  83
    Greg Janzen (2011). On Three Arguments Against Endurantism. Metaphysica 12 (2):101-115.
    Judith Thomson, David Lewis, and Ted Sider have each formulated different arguments that apparently pose problems for our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness, i.e., claims in which we assert that familiar, concrete objects survive (or persist) through time by enduring as numerically the same entity despite minor changes in their intrinsic or relational properties. In this paper, I show that all three arguments fail in a rather obvious way--they beg the question--and so even though there may be arguments that provide (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  23
    Jiri Benovsky (2011). Endurance and Time Travel. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):65-72.
    Suppose that you travel back in time to talk to your younger self in order to tell her that she (you) should have done some things in her (your) life differently. Of course, you will not be able to make this plan work, we know that from the many versions of 'the grandfather paradox' that populate the philosophical literature about time travel. What will be my centre of interest in this paper is the conversation between you and ... you – (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  32
    Robert Francescotti (2008). Endurance and Discernibility. Metaphysica 9 (2):193-204.
    How can an object remain the same, numerically identical, while undergoing change? This is a worry for endurantists, who hold that for any stages, x and y, of a persisting object, x is numerically identical with y. Endurantists might try to avoid the problem of change by insisting that all properties are temporally anchored. It is argued here that while this strategy helps in many cases, it does not help in all. A type of case is presented in which a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Cody Gilmore, Damiano Costa & Claudio Calosi (2016). Relativity and Three Four‐Dimensionalisms. Philosophy Compass 11 (2):102-120.
    Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality’. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is ‘spacetime unitism’, according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things as points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A second is the B-theory of time, according to which the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  46. Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Persistence, Vagueness, and Location. Journal of Philosophy.
    This article discusses two arguments in favor of perdurance. The first is Sider’s argument from vagueness, “one of the most powerful” in favor of perdurantism. I make the observation that endurantists have principled grounds to claim that the argument is unsound, at least if endurance is formulated in locative rather than mereological terms. Having made this observation, I use it to emphasize a somewhat neglected difference between endurantists and perdurantists with respect to their views on material objects. These views, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Alessandro Giordani & Damiano Costa (2013). From Times to Worlds and Back Again: A Transcendentist Theory of Persistence. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):210-220.
    Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism has been subject to a more in-depth analysis, and different versions of it, corresponding to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  48. Josh Parsons (2000). Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts? The Monist 83 (3):399-418.
    The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if it is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   35 citations  
  49. Yuri Balashov (2000). Persistence and Space-Time. The Monist 83 (3):321-340.
    Although considerations based on contemporary space-time theories, such as special and general relativity, seem highly relevant to the debate about persistence, their significance has not been duly appreciated. My goal in this paper is twofold: (1) to reformulate the rival positions in the debate (i.e., endurantism [three-dimensionalism] and perdurantism [four-dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts]) in the framework of special relativistic space-time; and (2) to argue that, when so reformulated, perdurantism exhibits explanatory advantages over endurantism. The argument builds (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  50. Antony Eagle (2010). Location and Perdurance. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 5. Oxford Univerity Press 53-94.
    Recently, Cody Gilmore has deployed an ingenious case involving backwards time travel to highlight an apparent conflict between the theory that objects persist by perduring, and the thesis that wholly coincident objects are impossible. However, careful attention to the concepts of location and parthood that Gilmore’s cases involve shows that the perdurantist faces no genuine objection from these cases, and that the perdurantist has a number of plausible and dialectically appropriate ways to avoid the supposed conflict.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 113