Search results for 'person-affecting' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christopher J. G. Meacham (2012). Person-Affecting Views and Saturating Counterpart Relations. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):257-287.score: 90.0
    In Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes (...)
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  2. Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.score: 90.0
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be (...)
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  3. Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). The Person-Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People. Ethical Perspectives 10 (3):185-195.score: 60.0
    Traditional ethical theories have paradoxical implications in regards to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future people. It has been suggested that the crux of the problem resides in an all too ‘impersonal’ axiology and that the problems of population axiology can be solved by adopting a ‘Person Affecting Restriction’ which in its slogan form states that an outcome can only be better than another if it is better for people. This move has been especially popular in the (...)
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  4. Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777-784.score: 60.0
    In "Intrzmsitivity and thc Person-Affecting Principlc,"‘ (IPAP) Alastair Norcross attacks several key claims of my "Intransitivity and thc Merc Addition Paradox" (IMAP).2 This article suggests that N0rcross’s arguments despite: their appca1——lcavc IMAP’s claims mostly intact. Bcforc assessing N0rcross’s arguments, lct mc characterize two key notions distinguished in IMAP: an essentially comparative view of moral ideals and an intrinsic aspect view. On an essentially comparative view (ECU, different factors might bc relevant for comparing diffcrcnt alternatives regarding a given idcal. On (...)
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  5. Alastair Norcross (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):769-776.score: 60.0
    Philosophy journals and conferences have recently seen several attempts to argue that 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey strict transitivity. This paper focuses on Larry Temkin's argument in "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox." Although his argument is not aimed just at utilitarians or even consequentialists in general, it is of prticular significance to consequentialists. If 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey transitivity, there may be choice situations in which there is no optimal choice, which would seem to open the (...)
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  6. Melinda A. Roberts (2003). Is the Person-Affecting Intuition Paradoxical? Theory and Decision 55 (1):1-44.score: 60.0
    This article critically examines some of the inconsistency objections that have been put forward by John Broome, Larry Temkin and others against the so-called "person-affecting," or "person-based," restriction in normative ethics, including "extra people" problems and a version of the nonidentity problem from Kavka and Parfit. Certain Pareto principles and a version of the "mere addition paradox" are discussed along the way. The inconsistencies at issue can be avoided, it is argued, by situating the person-affecting intuition within a (...)
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  7. Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2007). Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd..score: 60.0
    Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...)
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  8. Robert Huseby (2010). Person-Affecting Moral Theory, Non-Identity and Future People. Environmental Values 19 (2):193 - 210.score: 60.0
    Many of our actions will affect the welfare of future people. For instance, continued emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) may lead to future environmental degradation, which will negatively affect people's lives. If we continue GHG-emissions, are we harming future people? In light of the non-identity problem, apparently, we are not. This article assesses three recent attempts (by Carter, Page and Kumar) at grounding concern for future generations in person-affecting moral theory. Although these attempts are promising, the conclusion is that (...)
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  9. Gustaf Arrhenius (2009). Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?. In. In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. 289--314.score: 46.0
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  10. Joseph Raz (2009). On the Value of Distributional Equality. In Stephen De Wijze, Matthew H. Kramer & Ian Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges. Routledge.score: 45.0
    The paper returns to the question whether equality in distribution is valuable in itself, or, if you like, whether it is intrinsically valuable. Its bulk is an examination of two familiar arguments against the intrinsic value of distributional equality: the levelling down objection and the objection that equality violates some person-affecting condition, in that its realisation does not improve the lot of people.
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  11. Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowitz (2010). Better to Be Than Not to Be? In Hans Joas (ed.), The Benefit of Broad Horizons: Intellectual and Institutional Preconditions for a Global Social Science: Festschrift for Bjorn Wittrock on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday. Brill. 65 - 85.score: 45.0
    Can it be better or worse for a person to be than not to be, that is, can it be better or worse to exist than not to exist at all? This old 'existential question' has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy. There are roughly two reasons for this renewed interest. Firstly, traditional so-called “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counter-intuitive implications in regard to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future, not yet existing people. Secondly, (...)
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  12. Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777 - 784.score: 45.0
  13. Clark Wolf (1996). Social Choice and Normative Population Theory: A Person Affecting Solution to Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):263 - 282.score: 45.0
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  14. Alex Voorhoeve & Marc Fleurbaey (forthcoming). On the Social and Personal Value of Existence. In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome. Oxford University Press.score: 36.0
    If a potential person would have a good life if he were to come into existence, can we coherently regard his coming into existence as better for him than his never coming into existence? And can we regard the situation in which he never comes into existence as worse for him? In this paper, we argue that both questions should be answered affirmatively. We also explain where prominent arguments to differing conclusions go wrong. Finally, we explore the relevance of our (...)
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  15. Kai Vogeley Bojana Kuzmanovic, Anneli Jefferson, Gary Bente (2013). Affective and Motivational Influences in Person Perception. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 36.0
    Interpersonal impression formation is highly consequential for social interactions in private and public domains. These perceptions of others rely on different sources of information and processing mechanisms, all of which have been investigated in independent research fields. In social psychology, inferences about states and traits of others as well as activations of semantic categories and corresponding stereotypes have attracted great interest. On the other hand, research on emotion and reward demonstrated affective and motivational influences of social cues on the observer, (...)
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  16. Mark H. Bickhard (1992). How Does the Environment Affect the Person? In L. T. Winegar & Jaan Valsiner (eds.), Children's Development Within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Erlbaum.score: 24.0
    How Does the Environment Affect the Person? Mark H. Bickhard invited chapter in Children's Development within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Erlbaum. edited by L. T. Winegar, J. Valsiner, in press.
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  17. Elizabeth Goldenberg & Catherine M. Sandhofer (2013). Who is She? Changes in the Person Context Affect Categorization. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 24.0
    Changes between the learning and testing contexts affect learning, memory, and generalization. We examined whether a change (between learning and testing) in the person children were interacting with affects generalization. Three, 4-, and 5-year-old children were trained on eight novel noun categories by one experimenter. Children were tested for their ability to generalize the label to a new category member by either the same experimenter who trained them or by a novel experimenter. Three-year-old children’s performance was not affected by who (...)
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  18. Florian Ph S. Fischmeister Johanna Alexopoulos, Daniela M. Pfabigan, Claus Lamm, Herbert Bauer (2012). Do We Care About the Powerless Third? An ERP Study of the Three-Person Ultimatum Game. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 21.0
    Recent years have provided increasing insights into the factors affecting economic decision making. Little is known about how these factors influence decisions that also bear consequences for other people. We examined whether decisions that also affected a third, passive player modulate the behavioral and neural responses to monetary offers in a modified version of the three-person ultimatum game. We aimed to elucidate to what extent social preferences affect early neuronal processing when subjects were evaluating offers that were fair or unfair (...)
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  19. Adam Morton (1990). Why There is No Concept of a Person. In Christopher Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    (written years later) I argue that the schematic concept of a person as found in discussions of personal identity could not be used by real humans of themselves, and is not much of a guide for imagining possible beings. Issues of demonstrative self-knowledge play a large role in the argument.
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  20. W. Wong, D. Watkins & N. Wong (2006). Cognitive and Affective Outcomes of Person–Environment Fit to a Critical Constructivist Learning Environment: A Hong Kong Investigation. Constructivist Foundations 1 (3):124-130.score: 21.0
    Purpose: The aim of this research was to test whether Hong Kong science students would prefer a learning environment based on critical constructivism and whether a closer preferred-actual fit to such an environment would be associated with better learning outcomes. Method: The participants were 149 Hong Kong secondary school Chemistry students aged 16--19 years. They completed actual and preferred forms of a Chinese version of the Constructivist Learning Environment Survey and measures of self-efficacy and intrinsic value of their Chemistry course. (...)
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  21. Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.score: 18.0
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" (...)
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  22. Claire Petitmengin (2006). Describing One's Subjective Experience in the Second Person: An Interview Method for the Science of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):229-269.score: 18.0
    This article presents an interview method which enables us to bring a person, who may not even have been trained, to become aware of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great precision. It is focused on the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective experience and describing it, and on the processes used by this interview technique to overcome each of these difficulties. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria governing the validity of the descriptions (...)
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  23. Friederike Moltmann (2010). Relative Truth and the First Person. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..score: 18.0
    In recent work on context­dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. Thus, (...)
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  24. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007). Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty. In , Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 18.0
    As is well known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the first, unlike the latter, involve observation or a claim to knowledge and are constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry and Wittgenstein's own affirmation of the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological statements, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately did too. I first show that, on his view, most of our third-person psychological statements are noncognitive; they stem from a subjective certainty: a (...)
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  25. Philip Clayton (1999). Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press. 613-652.score: 18.0
  26. Krista Lawlor (2003). Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.score: 18.0
    Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, (...)
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  27. Gualtiero Piccinini (2009). First-Person Data, Publicity and Self-Measurement. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (9):1-16.score: 18.0
    First-person data have been both condemned and hailed because of their alleged privacy. Critics argue that science must be based on public evidence: since first-person data are private, they should be banned from science. Apologists reply that first-person data are necessary for understanding the mind: since first-person data are private, scientists must be allowed to use private evidence. I argue that both views rest on a false premise. In psychology and neuroscience, the subjects issuing first-person reports and other sources of (...)
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  28. Neil Campbell Manson (2002). What Does Language Tell Us About Consciousness? First-Person Mental Discourse and Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238.score: 18.0
    The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal's argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for "p" and "I think that p" differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars "I think" from playing one of its (expressive) roles and thus is not a good test for (...)
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  29. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2008). First-Person Thought and the Use of 'I'. Synthese 163 (2):145 - 156.score: 18.0
    The traditional account (TA) of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of ‘I’ conflict with its conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person thought cannot be maintained.
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  30. N. Georgalis (2006). Representation and the First-Person Perspective. Synthese 150 (2):281-325.score: 18.0
    The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call.
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  31. John Barresi (1999). On Becoming a Person. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.score: 18.0
    How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through (...)
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  32. Friederike Moltmann (2012). Two Kinds of First-Person-Oriented Content. Synthese 184 (2):157 - 177.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I will argue that two kinds of first-person-oriented content are distinguished in more ways than usually thought and I propose an account that will shed new light on the distinction. The first kind consists of contents of attitudes de se (in a broad sense); the second kind consists of contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will present new data concerning the two kinds of first-person-oriented content, together with a novel account of propositional content (...)
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  33. Carl Ginsburg (2005). First-Person Experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):22-42.score: 18.0
    The question asked in this paper is: How can we investigate our phenomenal experience in ways that are accurate, in principle repeatable, and produce experiences that help clarify what we understand about the processes of sensing, perceiving, moving, and being in the world? This sounds like an impossible task, given that introspection has so often in scientific circles been considered to be unreliable, and that first-person accounts are often coloured by mistaken ideas about what and how we are experiencing. The (...)
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  34. Lynne Rudder Baker (1998). The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.score: 18.0
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we (and other organisms) have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by (...)
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  35. M. A. Roberts (2009). What is the Wrong of Wrongful Disability? From Chance to Choice to Harms to Persons. Law and Philosophy 28 (1):1 - 57.score: 18.0
    The issue of wrongful disability arises when parents face the choice whether to produce a child whose life will be unavoidably flawed by a serious disease or disorder (Down syndrome, for example, or Huntington’s disease) yet clearly worth living. The authors of From Chance to Choice claim, with certain restrictions, that the choice to produce such a child is morally wrong. They then argue that an intuitive moral approach––a “person-affecting” approach that pins wrongdoing to the harming of some existing (...)
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  36. Monika Dullstein (2012). The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):231-248.score: 18.0
    It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory of mind debate, they understand some (...)
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  37. Bert Gordijn (1999). The Troublesome Concept of the Person. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20 (4):347-359.score: 18.0
    In today'sbioethical debates, the concept of the person plays a major role. However, it does not hold this role justly. The purpose of this paper is to argue that the concept of the person is unsuited to be a central concept in bioethical debates, because its use is connected with serious problems. First, the concept is superfluous. Secondly, it is a confusing concept and it lacks pragmatic use. Thirdly, its use leads to simplifications. Finally, the concept can easily be used (...)
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  38. F. M. Kamm (2005). Moral Status and Personal Identity: Clones, Embryos, and Future Generations. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):283-307.score: 18.0
    In the first part of this article, I argue that even those entities that in their own right and for their own sake give us reason not to destroy them and to help them are sometimes substitutable for the good of other entities. In so arguing, I consider the idea of being valuable as an end in virtue of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I also conclude that entities that have claims to things and against others are especially nonsubstitutable. In the (...)
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  39. Anthony Wrigley (2012). Harm to Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):175-190.score: 18.0
    Non-Identity arguments have a pervasive but sometimes counter-intuitive grip on certain key areas in ethics. As a result, there has been limited success in supporting the alternative view that our choices concerning future generations can be considered harmful on any sort of person-affecting principle. However, as the Non-Identity Problem relies overtly on certain metaphysical assumptions, plausible alternatives to these foundations can substantially undermine the Non-Identity argument itself. In this paper, I show how the pervasive force and nature of Non-Identity (...)
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  40. Catherine Green (2009). A Comprehensive Theory of the Human Person From Philosophy and Nursing. Nursing Philosophy 10 (4):263-274.score: 18.0
    This article explores a problem of the articulation of an adequate account of the human person in both philosophical and nursing theory. It follows the lead of philosopher Norris Clarke in suggesting that there has been a significant division in the way philosophers have looked at the human person and goes on to suggest that this division is paralleled in prominent nursing theories. The paper reviews and argues for the synthesis of two contemporary philosophic theories of the person that arise (...)
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  41. Karim Dharamsi (2011). Re-Enacting in the Second Person. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):163-178.score: 18.0
    R. G. Collingwood's theory of re-enactment has long been understood as an important contribution to the philosophy of history. It has also been challenging to understand how re-enactment is operationalized in the practice of understanding past actors or, indeed, other minds occupying less remote regions of our experiences. Sebastian Rödl has recently articulated a compelling defence of second person ascription, arguing that it is, in form, analogous to first person understanding. By Rödl's lights, second person understanding follows the same order (...)
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  42. Elena Pribytkova (2009). Personality, Person, Subject in Russian Legal Philosophy at the Turn of the Twentieth Century. Studies in East European Thought 61 (2/3):209 - 220.score: 18.0
    The problem of the legal person is a central issue in legal philosophy and the theory of law. In this article I examine the semantic meaning of the concept of the person in Russian philosophy at the turn of the twentieth century, considered to be the "Golden Age" of Russian legal thought. This provides an overview of the conception of the personality in the context of different legal approaches (theory of natural law, legal positivism, the psychological legal doctrine, and the (...)
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  43. Sean Valentine, Lynn Godkin & Margaret Lucero (2002). Ethical Context, Organizational Commitment, and Person-Organization Fit. Journal of Business Ethics 41 (4):349 - 360.score: 18.0
    The purpose of this study was to assess the relationships among ethical context, organizational commitment, and person-organization fit using a sample of 304 young working adults. Results indicated that corporate ethical values signifying different cultural aspects of an ethical context were positively related to both organizational commitment and person-organization fit. Organizational commitment was also positively related to person-organization fit. The findings suggest that the development and promotion of an ethical context might enhance employees' workplace experiences, and companies should consider adopting (...)
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  44. Giovanni Stanghellini (2009). The Person in Between Moods and Affects. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (3):251-266.score: 18.0
  45. Josep Corbí (2011). Observation, Character, and A Purely First-Person Point of View. Acta Analytica 26 (4):311-328.score: 18.0
    In Values and the Reflective Point of View (2006), Robert Dunn defends a certain expressivist view about evaluative beliefs from which some implications about self-knowledge are explicitly derived. He thus distinguishes between an observational and a deliberative attitude towards oneself, so that the latter involves a purely first-person point of view that gives rise to an especially authoritative, but wholly non-observational, kind of self-knowledge. Even though I sympathize with many aspects of Dunn's approach to evaluative beliefs and also with his (...)
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  46. Roger Melin (2011). Animalism and Person as a Basic Sort. ARGUMENT 1 (1):69-85.score: 18.0
    In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism it will be argued (...)
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  47. Emma Cohen, Emily Burdett, Nicola Knight & Justin Barrett (2011). Cross-Cultural Similarities and Differences in Person-Body Reasoning: Experimental Evidence From the United Kingdom and Brazilian Amazon. Cognitive Science 35 (7):1282-1304.score: 18.0
    We report the results of a cross-cultural investigation of person-body reasoning in the United Kingdom and northern Brazilian Amazon (Marajó Island). The study provides evidence that directly bears upon divergent theoretical claims in cognitive psychology and anthropology, respectively, on the cognitive origins and cross-cultural incidence of mind-body dualism. In a novel reasoning task, we found that participants across the two sample populations parsed a wide range of capacities similarly in terms of the capacities’ perceived anchoring to bodily function. Patterns of (...)
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  48. J. P. M. A. Maes & A. R. Van Gool (2008). Misattribution of Agency in Schizophrenia: An Exploration of Historical First-Person Accounts. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):191-202.score: 18.0
    This paper provides a concise description and discussion of bottom–up and top–down approaches to misattribution of agency in schizophrenia. It explores if first-person accounts of passivity phenomena can provide support for one of these approaches. The focus is on excerpts in which the writers specifically examine their experiences of external influence. None of the accounts provides arguments that fit easily with only one of the possible approaches, which is in line with current attempts to theoretical integration.
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  49. Lloyd Sandelands (2009). The Business of Business is the Human Person: Lessons From the Catholic Social Tradition. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 85 (1):93 - 101.score: 18.0
    I describe an ethic for business administration based on the social tradition of the Catholic Church. I find that much current thinking about business falters for its conceit of truth. Abstractions such as the shareholder-value model contain truth - namely, that business is an economic enterprise to manage for the wealth of its owners. But, as in all abstractions, this truth comes at the expense of falsehood -namely, that persons are assets to deploy on behalf of owners. This last is (...)
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  50. Mathew L. Sheep (2006). Nurturing the Whole Person: The Ethics of Workplace Spirituality in a Society of Organizations. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 66 (4):357 - 375.score: 18.0
    In a world which can be increasingly described as a “society of organizations,” it is incumbent upon organizational researchers to account for the role of organizations in determining the well-being of societies and the individuals that comprise them. Workplace spirituality is a young area of inquiry with potentially strong relevance to the well-being of individuals, organizations, and societies. Previous literature has not examined ethical dilemmas related to workplace spirituality that organizations might expect based upon the co-existence of multiple ethical work (...)
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