Search results for 'person-affecting' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christopher J. G. Meacham (2012). Person-Affecting Views and Saturating Counterpart Relations. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):257-287.
    In Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes (...)
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  2.  67
    Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be (...)
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  3. Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777-784.
    In "Intrzmsitivity and thc Person-Affecting Principlc,"‘ (IPAP) Alastair Norcross attacks several key claims of my "Intransitivity and thc Merc Addition Paradox" (IMAP).2 This article suggests that N0rcross’s arguments despite: their appca1——lcavc IMAP’s claims mostly intact. Bcforc assessing N0rcross’s arguments, lct mc characterize two key notions distinguished in IMAP: an essentially comparative view of moral ideals and an intrinsic aspect view. On an essentially comparative view (ECU, different factors might bc relevant for comparing diffcrcnt alternatives regarding a given idcal. On (...)
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  4.  44
    Melinda A. Roberts (2003). Is the Person-Affecting Intuition Paradoxical? Theory and Decision 55 (1):1-44.
    This article critically examines some of the inconsistency objections that have been put forward by John Broome, Larry Temkin and others against the so-called "person-affecting," or "person-based," restriction in normative ethics, including "extra people" problems and a version of the nonidentity problem from Kavka and Parfit. Certain Pareto principles and a version of the "mere addition paradox" are discussed along the way. The inconsistencies at issue can be avoided, it is argued, by situating the person-affecting intuition within a (...)
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  5.  57
    Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). The Person-Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People. Ethical Perspectives 10 (3):185-195.
    Traditional ethical theories have paradoxical implications in regards to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future people. It has been suggested that the crux of the problem resides in an all too ‘impersonal’ axiology and that the problems of population axiology can be solved by adopting a ‘Person Affecting Restriction’ which in its slogan form states that an outcome can only be better than another if it is better for people. This move has been especially popular in the (...)
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  6.  9
    Oscar Horta, In Defense of the Internal Aspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and Inconsistent Intuitions.
    According to the Internal Aspects View, the value of different outcomesdepends solely on the internal features possessed by each outcome and theinternal relations between them. This paper defends the Internal AspectsView against Larry Temkin’s defence of the Essentially Comparative View,according to which the value of different outcomes depends on what isthe alternative outcome they are compared with. The paper discusses bothperson-affecting arguments and Spectrum Arguments. The paper doesnot defend a person-affecting view over an impersonal one, but it arguesthat although (...)
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  7.  66
    Alastair Norcross (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):769-776.
    Philosophy journals and conferences have recently seen several attempts to argue that 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey strict transitivity. This paper focuses on Larry Temkin's argument in "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox." Although his argument is not aimed just at utilitarians or even consequentialists in general, it is of prticular significance to consequentialists. If 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey transitivity, there may be choice situations in which there is no optimal choice, which would seem to open the (...)
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  8.  14
    Robert Huseby (2010). Person-Affecting Moral Theory, Non-Identity and Future People. Environmental Values 19 (2):193 - 210.
    Many of our actions will affect the welfare of future people. For instance, continued emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) may lead to future environmental degradation, which will negatively affect people's lives. If we continue GHG-emissions, are we harming future people? In light of the non-identity problem, apparently, we are not. This article assesses three recent attempts (by Carter, Page and Kumar) at grounding concern for future generations in person-affecting moral theory. Although these attempts are promising, the conclusion is that (...)
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  9. Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2007). Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd.
    Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...)
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  10. Gustaf Arrhenius (2009). Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics? In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag 289--314.
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  11.  26
    Jacob Ross (2015). Rethinking the Person-Affecting Principle. Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (4):428-461.
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  12.  42
    Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777 - 784.
  13.  21
    Clark Wolf (1996). Social Choice and Normative Population Theory: A Person Affecting Solution to Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):263 - 282.
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  14. Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowitz (2010). Better to Be Than Not to Be? In Hans Joas (ed.), The Benefit of Broad Horizons: Intellectual and Institutional Preconditions for a Global Social Science: Festschrift for Bjorn Wittrock on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday. Brill 65 - 85.
    Can it be better or worse for a person to be than not to be, that is, can it be better or worse to exist than not to exist at all? This old 'existential question' has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy. There are roughly two reasons for this renewed interest. Firstly, traditional so-called “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counter-intuitive implications in regard to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future, not yet existing people. Secondly, (...)
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  15.  7
    Ben Saunders (2015). Why Procreative Preferences May Be Moral – And Why It May Not Matter If They Aren't. Bioethics 29 (7):499-506.
    There has been much argument over whether procreative selection is obligatory or wrong. Rebecca Bennett has recently challenged the assumption that procreative choices are properly moral choices, arguing that these views express mere preferences. This article challenges Bennett's view on two fronts. First, I argue that the Non-Identity Problem does not show that there cannot be harmless wrongs – though this would require us to abandon the intuitively attractive ‘person-affecting principle’, that may be a lesser cost than abandoning some (...)
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  16. Joseph Raz (2009). On the Value of Distributional Equality. In Stephen De Wijze, Matthew H. Kramer & Ian Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges. Routledge
    The paper returns to the question whether equality in distribution is valuable in itself, or, if you like, whether it is intrinsically valuable. Its bulk is an examination of two familiar arguments against the intrinsic value of distributional equality: the levelling down objection and the objection that equality violates some person-affecting condition, in that its realisation does not improve the lot of people.
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  17. Marc Fleurbaey & Alex Voorhoeve (2015). On the Social and Personal Value of Existence. In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome. Oxford University Press 95-109.
    If a potential person would have a good life if he were to come into existence, can we regard his coming into existence as better for him than his never coming into existence? And can we regard the situation in which he never comes into existence as worse for him? In this paper, we argue that both questions should be answered affirmatively.
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  18. Per Algander (2013). Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity. Dissertation, Uppsala University
    This thesis in an invistigation into the concept of "harm" and its moral relevance. A common view is that an analysis of harm should include a counterfactual condition: an act harms a person iff it makes that person worse off. A common objection to the moral relevance of harm, thus understood, is the non-identity problem. -/- This thesis criticises the counterfactual condition, argues for an alternative analysis and that harm plays two important normative roles. -/- The main ground for rejecting (...)
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  19. Per Algander (2013). Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity. Dissertation, Uppsala University
    This thesis in an invistigation into the concept of "harm" and its moral relevance. A common view is that an analysis of harm should include a counterfactual condition: an act harms a person iff it makes that person worse off. A common objection to the moral relevance of harm, thus understood, is the non-identity problem. -/- This thesis criticises the counterfactual condition, argues for an alternative analysis and that harm plays two important normative roles. -/- The main ground for rejecting (...)
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  20. Per Algander (2013). Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity. Dissertation, Uppsala University
    This thesis in an invistigation into the concept of "harm" and its moral relevance. A common view is that an analysis of harm should include a counterfactual condition: an act harms a person iff it makes that person worse off. A common objection to the moral relevance of harm, thus understood, is the non-identity problem. -/- This thesis criticises the counterfactual condition, argues for an alternative analysis and that harm plays two important normative roles. -/- The main ground for rejecting (...)
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  21.  6
    Kalle Grill (forthcoming). Asymmetric Population Axiology: Deliberative Neutrality Delivered. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Two related asymmetries have been discussed in relation to the ethics of creating new lives: First, we seem to have strong moral reason to avoid creating lives that are not worth living, but no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Second, we seem to have strong moral reason to improve the wellbeing of existing lives, but, again, no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Both asymmetries have proven very difficult to account for in any (...)
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  22.  6
    Eze Paez (2014). Six Ways Something Can Be Valuable. Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 19 (1-2):61-74.
    En este artículo argumento sobre cuatro categorías diferentes de razones prácticas y las posibles combinaciones que admiten. Se explican apelando a las cuatro formas diferentes en las que la obtención de un estado de cosas puede ser valiosa. En primer lugar, explico la diferencia entre valores agencialmente-neutrales y agencialmente-relativos. En segundo lugar, distingo entre valores relativos-a-la-persona e impersonales. La combinación de estas categorías produce seis maneras posibles en las que la obtención de un estado de cosas puede ser valiosa -cuatro (...)
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  23.  4
    Eze Paez (2014). Seis Formas En Las Que Algo Puede Ser Valioso. Télos 19 (1-2):61-74.
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  24. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007). Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty. In Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan
    As is well known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the first, unlike the latter, involve observation or a claim to knowledge and are constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry and Wittgenstein's own affirmation of the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological statements, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately did too. I first show that, on his view, most of our third-person psychological statements are noncognitive; they stem from a subjective certainty: a (...)
     
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  25.  18
    Susan Corrine Aaron (2002). A Technologically Mediated Phenomenon Affecting Human Dynamics. World Futures 58 (1):81 – 99.
    This paper will suggest a mapping for human dynamics to see where emerging digital technology currently and could further affect the dynamics of the human, technological and natural, and the cultural forms that define them. Emerging technology will be seen to reveal and surpass the limitations of human measures built on human abilities and perception. and the social structures that are derived from them. The formation of this conceptual mapping is based on the premise that digital technology has the ability (...)
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  26. Larry S. Temkin (2003). Egalitarianism Defended. Ethics 113 (4):764-782.
    In "Equality, Priority, and Compassion," Roger Crisp rejects both egalitarianism and prioritarianism. Crisp contends that our concern for those who are badly off is best accounted for by appealing to "a sufficiency principle" based -- indirectly, via the notion of an impartial spectator -- on compassion for those who are badly off" (p. 745). A key example of Crisp's is the Beverly Hills case (discussed below). This example is directed against prioritarianism, but it also threatens egalitarianism. In this article, I (...)
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  27.  24
    Peter N. Herissone-Kelly, Wrongs, Preferences and the Selection of Children: A Critique of Rebecca Bennett's Argument Against the Principle of Procreative Benefience.
    Rebecca Bennett, in a recent paper dismissing Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence, advances both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis holds that the principle's theoretical foundation--the notion of impersonal harm or non-person-affecting wrong--is indefensible. Therefore, there can be no obligations of the sort that the principle asserts. The positive thesis, on the other hand, attempts to plug an explanatory gap that arises once the principle has been rejected. That is, it holds that the intuitions of (...)
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  28. Dan W. Brock (1995). The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms – the Case of Wrongful Handicaps. Bioethics 9 (3):269–275.
    The Human Genome Project will produce information permitting increasing opportunities to prevent genetically transmitted harms, most of which will be compatible with a life worth living, through avoiding conception or terminating a pregnancy. Failure to prevent these harms when it is possible for parents to do so without substantial burdens or costs to themselves or others are what J call “wrongful handicaps”. Derek Parfit has developed a systematic difficulty for any such cases being wrongs — when the harm could be (...)
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  29.  3
    Melinda A. Roberts (1998). Child Versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Child Versus Childmaker investigates a "person-affecting" approach to ethical choice. A form of consequentialism, this approach is intended to capture the idea that agents ought both do the most good that they can and respect each person as distinct from each other. Focusing on cases in which a conflict of interest arises between "childmakers"—parents, infertility specialists, embryologists, and others engaged in the task of bringing new people into existence—and the children they aim to create, the author considers what we (...)
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  30.  60
    Fiona Woollard (2012). Have We Solved the Non-Identity Problem? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):677-690.
    Our pollution of the environment seems set to lead to widespread problems in the future, including disease, scarcity of resources, and bloody conflicts. It is natural to think that we are required to stop polluting because polluting harms the future individuals who will be faced with these problems. This natural thought faces Derek Parfit’s famous Non-Identity Problem ( 1984 , pp. 361–364). The people who live on the polluted earth would not have existed if we had not polluted. Our polluting (...)
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  31. Peter Herissone-Kelly (2011). Wrongs, Preferences, and the Selection of Children: A Critique of Rebecca Bennett's Argument Against the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. Bioethics 26 (8):447-454.
    Rebecca Bennett, in a recent paper dismissing Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence, advances both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis holds that the principle's theoretical foundation – the notion of impersonal harm or non-person-affecting wrong – is indefensible. Therefore, there can be no obligations of the sort that the principle asserts. The positive thesis, on the other hand, attempts to plug an explanatory gap that arises once the principle has been rejected. That is, it holds (...)
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  32.  68
    Anthony Wrigley (2012). Harm to Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):175-190.
    Non-Identity arguments have a pervasive but sometimes counter-intuitive grip on certain key areas in ethics. As a result, there has been limited success in supporting the alternative view that our choices concerning future generations can be considered harmful on any sort of person-affecting principle. However, as the Non-Identity Problem relies overtly on certain metaphysical assumptions, plausible alternatives to these foundations can substantially undermine the Non-Identity argument itself. In this paper, I show how the pervasive force and nature of Non-Identity (...)
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  33.  15
    Larry Temkin, Rethinking the Good – A Small Taste.
    This article aims to convey a few of the key claims and arguments ofmy book, Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of PracticalReasoning. The article gives an example of a Spectrum Argument, andillustrates that such arguments put pressure on the Axiom of Transitivity,which holds that for any three possible outcomes or alternatives, A, B, andC, if, all things considered, A is better than B, and B is better than C, then Ais better than C. The article distinguishes between (...)
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  34. Rivka Weinberg (2008). Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):3 - 18.
    Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against (...)
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  35.  59
    M. A. Roberts (2009). What is the Wrong of Wrongful Disability? From Chance to Choice to Harms to Persons. Law and Philosophy 28 (1):1 - 57.
    The issue of wrongful disability arises when parents face the choice whether to produce a child whose life will be unavoidably flawed by a serious disease or disorder (Down syndrome, for example, or Huntington’s disease) yet clearly worth living. The authors of From Chance to Choice claim, with certain restrictions, that the choice to produce such a child is morally wrong. They then argue that an intuitive moral approach––a “person-affecting” approach that pins wrongdoing to the harming of some existing (...)
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  36.  58
    Frances Howard-Snyder (2008). Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don't! Philosophia 36 (1):1-15.
    This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of (...)
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  37.  13
    Larry Temkin, Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism.
    This article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the InternalAspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments andInconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreementwith Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and pointout that this will be so on an Essentially Comparative View as well as on anInternal Aspects View. I also agree that there are various possible Person-Affecting Principles, other than the one my book focuses on, that peoplemight find plausible, and (...)
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  38. Josh Parsons (2003). Why the Handicapped Child Case is Hard. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):147 - 162.
    This paper discusses the handicapped child case and some other variants of Derek Parfit's non-identityproblem (Parfit, 1984) The case is widely held to show that there is harmless wrongdoing, and that amoral system which tries to reduce wrongdoing directly to harm (``person-affecting morality'')is inadequate.I show that the argument for this does not depend (as some have implied it does) on Kripkean necessity of origin. I distinguish the case from other variants (``wrongful life cases'') of the non-identityproblem which do not (...)
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  39.  83
    Guy Kahane (2009). Non-Identity, Self-Defeat, and Attitudes to Future Children. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):193 - 214.
    Although most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit’s non-identity problem. I argue that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued that, in certain circumstances, such choices would be self-defeating even if morally permissible. I argue that although the scope of Glover’s argument is too limited, it nevertheless directs attention to a moral defect in (...)
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  40.  19
    Marta Guivernau & Joan L. Duda (2002). Moral Atmosphere and Athletic Aggressive Tendencies in Young Soccer Players. Journal of Moral Education 31 (1):67-85.
    The major purpose of this study was to examine the relationship of the moral atmosphere of athletic teams to athletes' self-described likelihood to aggress (SLA). Two additional purposes were: first, to determine whether there was a predominant figure most influential to athletes' SLA and, secondly, to examine potential gender differences in athletes' perceived team moral atmosphere, their SLA and the most influential person affecting their SLA. Participants were 194 male and female soccer players 13-19 years of age. Athletes' perceptions of (...)
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  41. Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2007). Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd
    Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...)
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  42.  29
    Shlomi Segall (2016). What is the Point of Sufficiency? Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):36-52.
    Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it is shown that sufficientarianism cannot be grounded in a personal (...)
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  43.  1
    Jonathan Dancy (2005). Essentially Comparative Concepts. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2).
    This paper examines Larry Temkin’s notion of an ‘essentially comparative’ concept and the uses to which he puts it. It is suggested that this notion is a conflation of two distinct notions which need not go together. This leads to a critical examination of Temkin’s arguments that certain central ethical concepts are essentially comparative. These arguments are often found wanting, as is Temkin’s treatment of the Person Affecting View.
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  44.  39
    Helga Kuhse (2001). Should Cloning Be Banned for the Sake of the Child? Poiesis and Praxis 1 (1):17-33.
    It is widely believed that reproductive human cloning is morally wrong and should be prohibited because it infringes on human uniqueness, individuality, freedom and personal identity. The philosophical and ethical discussion has, however, shown that it is far more difficult than might initially be supposed to sustain arguments against cloning on these and related grounds. More recently, a potentially viable argument, initially put forward by Hans Jonas, has regained new prominence. The argument holds that cloning is wrong because it denies (...)
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  45.  77
    F. M. Kamm (2005). Moral Status and Personal Identity: Clones, Embryos, and Future Generations. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):283-307.
    In the first part of this article, I argue that even those entities that in their own right and for their own sake give us reason not to destroy them and to help them are sometimes substitutable for the good of other entities. In so arguing, I consider the idea of being valuable as an end in virtue of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I also conclude that entities that have claims to things and against others are especially nonsubstitutable. In the (...)
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  46.  26
    Patrick Tomlin (2014). Retributivists! The Harm Principle Is Not for You! Ethics 124 (2):272-298.
    Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, while retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. In fact, retributivists should reject all attempts to see the criminal law only through (other) person-affecting concepts or “grievance” morality, since they should (...)
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  47.  52
    Brett Doran (2001). Reconsidering the Levelling-Down Objection Against Egalitarianism. Utilitas 13 (1):65.
    The levelling-down objection rejects the egalitarian view that it is intrinsically good to eliminate the inequality of an outcome by lowering the relevant good of those better off to the level of those worse off. Larry Temkin suggests that the position underlying this objection is an exclusionary version of the person-affecting view, in which an outcome can be better or worse only if persons are affected for better or worse. Temkin then defends egalitarianism by rejecting this position. In this (...)
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  48.  8
    William Grey (1996). Possible Persons and the Problems of Posterity. Environmental Values 5 (2):161 - 179.
    The moral status of future persons is problematic. It is often claimed that we should take the interests of the indefinite unborn very seriously, because they have a right to a decent life. It is also claimed (often by the same people) that we should allow unrestricted access to abortion, because the indefinite unborn have no rights. In this paper I argue that these intuitions are not in fact inconsistent. The aim is to provide an account of trans-temporal concern which (...)
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  49.  59
    Marc Ramsay (2005). Teleological Egalitarianism Vs. The Slogan. Utilitas 17 (1):93-116.
    The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible moral principle, one (...)
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  50.  17
    David Heyd (2014). Parfit on the Non-Identity Problem, Again. Law and Ethics of Human Rights 8 (1):1-20.
    In his recent work, Parfit returns to the examination of the non-identity problem, but this time not in the context of a theory of value but as part of a Scanlonian theory of reasons for action. His project is to find a middle ground between pure impersonalism and the narrow person-affecting view so as to do justice to some of our fundamental intuitions regarding procreative choices. The aim of this article is to show that despite the sophisticated and challenging (...)
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