Search results for 'person-affecting' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christopher J. G. Meacham (2012). Person-Affecting Views and Saturating Counterpart Relations. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):257-287.score: 180.0
    In Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes (...)
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  2. Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.score: 180.0
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be (...)
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  3. Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). The Person-Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People. Ethical Perspectives 10 (3):185-195.score: 120.0
    Traditional ethical theories have paradoxical implications in regards to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future people. It has been suggested that the crux of the problem resides in an all too ‘impersonal’ axiology and that the problems of population axiology can be solved by adopting a ‘Person Affecting Restriction’ which in its slogan form states that an outcome can only be better than another if it is better for people. This move has been especially popular in the (...)
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  4. Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777-784.score: 120.0
    In "Intrzmsitivity and thc Person-Affecting Principlc,"‘ (IPAP) Alastair Norcross attacks several key claims of my "Intransitivity and thc Merc Addition Paradox" (IMAP).2 This article suggests that N0rcross’s arguments despite: their appca1——lcavc IMAP’s claims mostly intact. Bcforc assessing N0rcross’s arguments, lct mc characterize two key notions distinguished in IMAP: an essentially comparative view of moral ideals and an intrinsic aspect view. On an essentially comparative view (ECU, different factors might bc relevant for comparing diffcrcnt alternatives regarding a given idcal. On (...)
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  5. Alastair Norcross (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):769-776.score: 120.0
    Philosophy journals and conferences have recently seen several attempts to argue that 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey strict transitivity. This paper focuses on Larry Temkin's argument in "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox." Although his argument is not aimed just at utilitarians or even consequentialists in general, it is of prticular significance to consequentialists. If 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey transitivity, there may be choice situations in which there is no optimal choice, which would seem to open the (...)
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  6. Melinda A. Roberts (2003). Is the Person-Affecting Intuition Paradoxical? Theory and Decision 55 (1):1-44.score: 120.0
    This article critically examines some of the inconsistency objections that have been put forward by John Broome, Larry Temkin and others against the so-called "person-affecting," or "person-based," restriction in normative ethics, including "extra people" problems and a version of the nonidentity problem from Kavka and Parfit. Certain Pareto principles and a version of the "mere addition paradox" are discussed along the way. The inconsistencies at issue can be avoided, it is argued, by situating the person-affecting intuition within a (...)
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  7. Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2007). Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd..score: 120.0
    Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...)
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  8. Robert Huseby (2010). Person-Affecting Moral Theory, Non-Identity and Future People. Environmental Values 19 (2):193 - 210.score: 120.0
    Many of our actions will affect the welfare of future people. For instance, continued emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) may lead to future environmental degradation, which will negatively affect people's lives. If we continue GHG-emissions, are we harming future people? In light of the non-identity problem, apparently, we are not. This article assesses three recent attempts (by Carter, Page and Kumar) at grounding concern for future generations in person-affecting moral theory. Although these attempts are promising, the conclusion is that (...)
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  9. Gustaf Arrhenius (2009). Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?. In. In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. 289--314.score: 92.0
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  10. Joseph Raz (2009). On the Value of Distributional Equality. In Stephen De Wijze, Matthew H. Kramer & Ian Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges. Routledge.score: 90.0
    The paper returns to the question whether equality in distribution is valuable in itself, or, if you like, whether it is intrinsically valuable. Its bulk is an examination of two familiar arguments against the intrinsic value of distributional equality: the levelling down objection and the objection that equality violates some person-affecting condition, in that its realisation does not improve the lot of people.
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  11. Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowitz (2010). Better to Be Than Not to Be? In Hans Joas (ed.), The Benefit of Broad Horizons: Intellectual and Institutional Preconditions for a Global Social Science: Festschrift for Bjorn Wittrock on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday. Brill. 65 - 85.score: 90.0
    Can it be better or worse for a person to be than not to be, that is, can it be better or worse to exist than not to exist at all? This old 'existential question' has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy. There are roughly two reasons for this renewed interest. Firstly, traditional so-called “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counter-intuitive implications in regard to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future, not yet existing people. Secondly, (...)
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  12. Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777 - 784.score: 90.0
  13. Clark Wolf (1996). Social Choice and Normative Population Theory: A Person Affecting Solution to Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):263 - 282.score: 90.0
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  14. Alex Voorhoeve & Marc Fleurbaey (forthcoming). On the Social and Personal Value of Existence. In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome. Oxford University Press.score: 72.0
    If a potential person would have a good life if he were to come into existence, can we coherently regard his coming into existence as better for him than his never coming into existence? And can we regard the situation in which he never comes into existence as worse for him? In this paper, we argue that both questions should be answered affirmatively. We also explain where prominent arguments to differing conclusions go wrong. Finally, we explore the relevance of our (...)
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  15. Kai Vogeley Bojana Kuzmanovic, Anneli Jefferson, Gary Bente (2013). Affective and Motivational Influences in Person Perception. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 60.0
    Interpersonal impression formation is highly consequential for social interactions in private and public domains. These perceptions of others rely on different sources of information and processing mechanisms, all of which have been investigated in independent research fields. In social psychology, inferences about states and traits of others as well as activations of semantic categories and corresponding stereotypes have attracted great interest. On the other hand, research on emotion and reward demonstrated affective and motivational influences of social cues on the observer, (...)
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  16. Florian Ph S. Fischmeister Johanna Alexopoulos, Daniela M. Pfabigan, Claus Lamm, Herbert Bauer (2012). Do We Care About the Powerless Third? An ERP Study of the Three-Person Ultimatum Game. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 42.0
    Recent years have provided increasing insights into the factors affecting economic decision making. Little is known about how these factors influence decisions that also bear consequences for other people. We examined whether decisions that also affected a third, passive player modulate the behavioral and neural responses to monetary offers in a modified version of the three-person ultimatum game. We aimed to elucidate to what extent social preferences affect early neuronal processing when subjects were evaluating offers that were fair or unfair (...)
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  17. Mark H. Bickhard (1992). How Does the Environment Affect the Person? In L. T. Winegar & Jaan Valsiner (eds.), Children's Development Within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Erlbaum.score: 40.0
    How Does the Environment Affect the Person? Mark H. Bickhard invited chapter in Children's Development within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Erlbaum. edited by L. T. Winegar, J. Valsiner, in press.
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  18. Elizabeth Goldenberg & Catherine M. Sandhofer (2013). Who is She? Changes in the Person Context Affect Categorization. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 40.0
    Changes between the learning and testing contexts affect learning, memory, and generalization. We examined whether a change (between learning and testing) in the person children were interacting with affects generalization. Three, 4-, and 5-year-old children were trained on eight novel noun categories by one experimenter. Children were tested for their ability to generalize the label to a new category member by either the same experimenter who trained them or by a novel experimenter. Three-year-old children’s performance was not affected by who (...)
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  19. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007). Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty. In , Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 36.0
    As is well known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the first, unlike the latter, involve observation or a claim to knowledge and are constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry and Wittgenstein's own affirmation of the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological statements, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately did too. I first show that, on his view, most of our third-person psychological statements are noncognitive; they stem from a subjective certainty: a (...)
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  20. M. A. Roberts (2009). What is the Wrong of Wrongful Disability? From Chance to Choice to Harms to Persons. Law and Philosophy 28 (1):1 - 57.score: 36.0
    The issue of wrongful disability arises when parents face the choice whether to produce a child whose life will be unavoidably flawed by a serious disease or disorder (Down syndrome, for example, or Huntington’s disease) yet clearly worth living. The authors of From Chance to Choice claim, with certain restrictions, that the choice to produce such a child is morally wrong. They then argue that an intuitive moral approach––a “person-affecting” approach that pins wrongdoing to the harming of some existing (...)
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  21. F. M. Kamm (2005). Moral Status and Personal Identity: Clones, Embryos, and Future Generations. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):283-307.score: 36.0
    In the first part of this article, I argue that even those entities that in their own right and for their own sake give us reason not to destroy them and to help them are sometimes substitutable for the good of other entities. In so arguing, I consider the idea of being valuable as an end in virtue of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I also conclude that entities that have claims to things and against others are especially nonsubstitutable. In the (...)
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  22. Anthony Wrigley (2012). Harm to Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):175-190.score: 36.0
    Non-Identity arguments have a pervasive but sometimes counter-intuitive grip on certain key areas in ethics. As a result, there has been limited success in supporting the alternative view that our choices concerning future generations can be considered harmful on any sort of person-affecting principle. However, as the Non-Identity Problem relies overtly on certain metaphysical assumptions, plausible alternatives to these foundations can substantially undermine the Non-Identity argument itself. In this paper, I show how the pervasive force and nature of Non-Identity (...)
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  23. Peter Vallentyne (2000). Critical Notice of Child Versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law. Noûs 34 (4):634–647.score: 36.0
    In Child versus Childmaker Melinda Roberts provides an enlightening analysis and a cogent defense of a version of the person-affecting restriction in ethics. The rough idea of this restriction is that an action, state of affairs, or world, cannot be wrong, or bad, unless it would wrong, or be bad for, someone. I shall focus solely on Roberts’s core principles, and thus shall not address her interesting chapter-length discussions of wrongful life cases and of human cloning cases. The (...) intuition can be spelled out in a deontic and in an axiological form: -/- Deontic Person-Affecting Restriction: An action, state of affairs, or world is wrong only if it would wrong someone. Axiological Person-Affecting Restriction: An action, state of affairs, or world is worse than another only if it is worse for someone. -/- Roberts develops and defends the deontic version of the person-affecting restriction. Indeed, as her discussion (and those of others) makes clear, it is quite unlikely that there is a coherent version of the axiological form of the intuition (e.g., because of problems of transitivity). Roberts rightly rejects any appeal to impersonal ranking of worlds, and appeals only to the (many) personal rankings of worlds of the individuals involved. Roberts defends the view that worlds in which a person does not exist can be ranked in terms of that person’s well-being (how good that world would be for him/her) along with the worlds in which he/she does exist. Worlds in which the person has a life worth living are ranked more highly for that person than worlds in which he/she doesn’t exist (along with some worlds with indifferent existence), and the latter worlds are ranked more highly than worlds in which the person exists but doesn’t have a life worth living. Although this is somewhat controversial (some would deny that we can assess how good a world is for a person who doesn’t exist in it), it seems exactly right to me. Throughout I shall assume, as does Roberts, that non-existence has a value of zero (and thus that lives worth living have positive values, and that lives not worth living have negative values). In what follows I shall formulate Roberts’s theory as a theory of the permissibility of actions. In most of the book, Roberts formulates her theory as one of the permissibility of worlds, but, as I shall argue below, such assessments have little normative relevance, since they ignore the probabilities of realization (which depend on what actions are performed). The core of Roberts’s theory is just as plausible, and in some ways more powerful, when (as is sometimes the case in the book) it takes actions to be the objects of assessment. To start with, however, I shall make a highly restrictive assumption (not made by Roberts) that will effectively eliminate the difference between assessing actions and assessing worlds within the sort of welfaristic consequentialist framework that Roberts presupposes. I shall assume that if a given action were performed, then a specific world would be realized. We shall assume, that is, that there are no uncertainties involved. Everything is completely determined by which of the feasible actions is performed. Later in this paper, I will address the problems that arise once this simplifying assumption is dropped. (shrink)
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  24. Nicola Jane Williams (2013). Possible Persons and the Problem of Prenatal Harm. Journal of Ethics 17 (4):355-385.score: 36.0
    When attempting to determine which of our acts affect future generations and which affect the identities of those who make up such generations, accounts of personal identity that privilege psychological features and person affecting accounts of morality, whilst highly useful when discussing the rights and wrongs of acts relating to extant persons, seem to come up short. On such approaches it is often held that the intuition that future persons can be harmed by decisions made prior to their existence is (...)
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  25. William Grey (1996). Possible Persons and the Problems of Posterity. Environmental Values 5 (2):161 - 179.score: 36.0
    The moral status of future persons is problematic. It is often claimed that we should take the interests of the indefinite unborn very seriously, because they have a right to a decent life. It is also claimed (often by the same people) that we should allow unrestricted access to abortion, because the indefinite unborn have no rights. In this paper I argue that these intuitions are not in fact inconsistent. The aim is to provide an account of trans-temporal concern which (...)
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  26. Monika Fleischhauer, Sören Enge, Robert Miller, Alexander Strobel & Anja Strobel (2013). Neuroticism Explains Unwanted Variance in Implicit Association Tests of Personality: Possible Evidence for an Affective Valence Confound. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 36.0
    Meta-analytic data highlight the value of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) as an indirect measure of personality. Based on evidence suggesting that confounding factors such as cognitive abilities contribute to the IAT effect, this study provides a first investigation of whether basic personality traits explain unwanted variance in the IAT. In a gender-balanced sample of 204 volunteers, the Big-Five dimensions were assessed via self-report, peer-report, and IAT. By means of structural equation modeling, latent Big-Five personality factors (based on self- and (...)
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  27. Leigh C. Gayle, Diana E. Gal & Paul D. Kieffaber (2012). Measuring Affective Reactivity in Individuals with Autism Spectrum Personality Traits Using the Visual Mismatch Negativity Event-Related Brain Potential. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6:334-334.score: 36.0
    The primary aim of this research was to determine how modulation of the visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) by emotionally laden faces is related to autism spectrum personality traits. Emotionally neutral faces served as the standard stimuli and happy and sad expressions served as vMMN-eliciting deviants. Consistent with prior research, it was anticipated that the amplitude of the vMMN would be increased for emotionally salient stimuli. Extending this finding, it was expected that this emotion-based amplitude sensitivity of the vMMN would be (...)
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  28. Mark Greene (2013). Saving a Life but Losing the Patient. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (6):479-498.score: 34.0
    Gregor Samsa awakes to find himself transformed into a gigantic bug. The creature’s inchoate flailing leads Gregor’s sister to conclude that Gregor is no more, having been replaced by a brute beast lacking any vestige of human understanding. Sadly, real cases of brain injury and disease can lead to psychological metamorphoses so profound that we cannot easily think that the survivor is the person we knew. I argue that there can be cases in which statements like, “It’s just not Gregor (...)
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  29. Edita Gruodytė, Julija Kiršienė & Paulius Astromskis (2010). The Problem of Bankruptcy of Natural Persons: Legal Aspects (text only in Lithuanian). Jurisprudence 121 (3):213-232.score: 34.0
    The modern doctrine of the “fresh start” reflects the differences between the past paradigm of punishment of the insolvent person and the current focus on the economic effectiveness and activeness. Global practice in the field of insolvency shows that the “limited liability rule” is eminently effective in the economic and social perspective. The appending threat of abuse and misapplication of the system might be neutralized through the legal regulation of prevention and rehabilitation means, which are analyzed in this article. The (...)
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  30. W. Wong, D. Watkins & N. Wong (2006). Cognitive and Affective Outcomes of Person–Environment Fit to a Critical Constructivist Learning Environment: A Hong Kong Investigation. Constructivist Foundations 1 (3):124-130.score: 34.0
    Purpose: The aim of this research was to test whether Hong Kong science students would prefer a learning environment based on critical constructivism and whether a closer preferred-actual fit to such an environment would be associated with better learning outcomes. Method: The participants were 149 Hong Kong secondary school Chemistry students aged 16--19 years. They completed actual and preferred forms of a Chinese version of the Constructivist Learning Environment Survey and measures of self-efficacy and intrinsic value of their Chemistry course. (...)
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  31. Doris McIlwain (2006). Already Filtered: Affective Immersion and Personality Differences in Accessing Present and Past. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):381 – 399.score: 32.0
    Schemas contribute to adaptation, filtering novelty though knowledge-expectancy structures, the residue of past contingencies and their consequences. Adaptation requires a balance between flexible, dynamic context-sensitivity and the cognitive efficiency that schemas afford in promoting persistent goal pursuit despite distraction. Affects can form and disrupt schemas. Transient affective experiences systematically alter selectivity of attentiveness to the directly experienced present environment, the internal environment, and to the stored experiences of memory. Enduring personal stylistic predispositions, like implicit motives and affective schemas, influence how (...)
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  32. Asad Nazir, Sibylle Enz, Mei Yii Lim, Ruth Aylett & Alison Cawsey (2009). Culture–Personality Based Affective Model. AI and Society 24 (3):281-293.score: 32.0
    Bringing culture and personality in a combination with emotions requires bringing three different theories together. In this paper, we discuss an approach for combining Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, BIG five personality parameters and PSI theory of emotions to come up with an emergent affective character model.
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  33. Rivka Weinberg (2008). Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):3 - 18.score: 30.0
    Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against (...)
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  34. Josh Parsons (2003). Why the Handicapped Child Case is Hard. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):147 - 162.score: 30.0
    This paper discusses the handicapped child case and some other variants of Derek Parfit's non-identityproblem (Parfit, 1984) The case is widely held to show that there is harmless wrongdoing, and that amoral system which tries to reduce wrongdoing directly to harm (``person-affecting morality'')is inadequate.I show that the argument for this does not depend (as some have implied it does) on Kripkean necessity of origin. I distinguish the case from other variants (``wrongful life cases'') of the non-identityproblem which do not (...)
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  35. Guy Kahane (2009). Non-Identity, Self-Defeat, and Attitudes to Future Children. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):193 - 214.score: 30.0
    Although most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit’s non-identity problem. I argue that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued that, in certain circumstances, such choices would be self-defeating even if morally permissible. I argue that although the scope of Glover’s argument is too limited, it nevertheless directs attention to a moral defect in (...)
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  36. Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2007). Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd.score: 30.0
    Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...)
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  37. Marc Ramsay (2005). Teleological Egalitarianism Vs. The Slogan. Utilitas 17 (1):93-116.score: 30.0
    The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible moral principle, one (...)
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  38. Frances Howard-Snyder (2008). Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don't! Philosophia 36 (1):1-15.score: 30.0
    This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of (...)
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  39. Giovanni Stanghellini (2009). The Person in Between Moods and Affects. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (3):251-266.score: 30.0
  40. Fiona Woollard (2012). Have We Solved the Non-Identity Problem? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):677-690.score: 30.0
    Our pollution of the environment seems set to lead to widespread problems in the future, including disease, scarcity of resources, and bloody conflicts. It is natural to think that we are required to stop polluting because polluting harms the future individuals who will be faced with these problems. This natural thought faces Derek Parfit’s famous Non-Identity Problem ( 1984 , pp. 361–364). The people who live on the polluted earth would not have existed if we had not polluted. Our polluting (...)
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  41. Peter Herissone-Kelly (2011). Wrongs, Preferences, and the Selection of Children: A Critique of Rebecca Bennett's Argument Against the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. Bioethics 26 (8):447-454.score: 30.0
    Rebecca Bennett, in a recent paper dismissing Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence, advances both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis holds that the principle's theoretical foundation – the notion of impersonal harm or non-person-affecting wrong – is indefensible. Therefore, there can be no obligations of the sort that the principle asserts. The positive thesis, on the other hand, attempts to plug an explanatory gap that arises once the principle has been rejected. That is, it holds (...)
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  42. Helga Kuhse (2001). Should Cloning Be Banned for the Sake of the Child? Poiesis and Praxis 1 (1):17-33.score: 30.0
    It is widely believed that reproductive human cloning is morally wrong and should be prohibited because it infringes on human uniqueness, individuality, freedom and personal identity. The philosophical and ethical discussion has, however, shown that it is far more difficult than might initially be supposed to sustain arguments against cloning on these and related grounds. More recently, a potentially viable argument, initially put forward by Hans Jonas, has regained new prominence. The argument holds that cloning is wrong because it denies (...)
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  43. Mianna Lotz (2011). Rethinking Procreation: Why It Matters Why We Have Children. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2):105-121.score: 30.0
    Attempts to explain the intuitive wrongfulness in alleged ‘wrongful life’ cases commonly do so by attributing harmful wrongdoing to the procreators in question. Such an approach identifies the resulting child as having been, in some sense, culpably harmed by their coming into existence. By contrast, and enlarging on work elsewhere, this paper explores the relevance of procreative motivation, rather than harm, for determining the morality of procreative conduct. I begin by reviewing the main objection to the harm-based approach, which arises (...)
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  44. Brett Doran (2001). Reconsidering the Levelling-Down Objection Against Egalitarianism. Utilitas 13 (01):65-.score: 30.0
    The levelling-down objection rejects the egalitarian view that it is intrinsically good to eliminate the inequality of an outcome by lowering the relevant good of those better off to the level of those worse off. Larry Temkin suggests that the position underlying this objection is an exclusionary version of the person-affecting view, in which an outcome can be better or worse only if persons are affected for better or worse. Temkin then defends egalitarianism by rejecting this position. In this (...)
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  45. Marta Guivernau & Joan L. Duda (2002). Moral Atmosphere and Athletic Aggressive Tendencies in Young Soccer Players. Journal of Moral Education 31 (1):67-85.score: 30.0
    The major purpose of this study was to examine the relationship of the moral atmosphere of athletic teams to athletes' self-described likelihood to aggress (SLA). Two additional purposes were: first, to determine whether there was a predominant figure most influential to athletes' SLA and, secondly, to examine potential gender differences in athletes' perceived team moral atmosphere, their SLA and the most influential person affecting their SLA. Participants were 194 male and female soccer players 13-19 years of age. Athletes' perceptions of (...)
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  46. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2003). The Size of Inequality and Its Badness Some Reflections Around Temkin's Inequality. Theoria 69 (1-2):60-84.score: 30.0
    This paper puts forward the following claims: (i) The size of inequality in welfare should be distinguished from its badness. (ii) The size of a pairwise inequality between two individuals can be measured by the absolute or the relative welfare distance between their welfare levels, but it does not depend on the welfare levels of other individuals. (iii) The size of inequality in a social state may be understood either as the degree of pairwise inequality or as its amount. (iv) (...)
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  47. Nicholas Vrousalis (2013). Smuggled Into Existence: Nonconsequentialism, Procreation, and Wrongful Disability. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):589-604.score: 30.0
    The wrongful disability problem arises whenever a disability-causing, and therefore (presumptively) wrongful, procreative act is a necessary condition for the existence of a person whose life is otherwise worth living. It is a problem because it seems to involve no harm, and therefore no wrongful treatment, vis-à-vis that person. This essay defends the nonconsequentialist, rights-based, account of the wrong-making features of wrongful disability. It distinguishes between the person-affecting restriction, roughly the idea that wrongdoing is always the wronging of some (...)
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  48. Patrick Tomlin (2014). Retributivists! The Harm Principle Is Not for You! Ethics 124 (2):272-298.score: 30.0
    Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, while retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. In fact, retributivists should reject all attempts to see the criminal law only through (other) person-affecting concepts or “grievance” morality, since they should (...)
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  49. Susan Corrine Aaron (2002). A Technologically Mediated Phenomenon Affecting Human Dynamics. World Futures 58 (1):81 – 99.score: 30.0
    This paper will suggest a mapping for human dynamics to see where emerging digital technology currently and could further affect the dynamics of the human, technological and natural, and the cultural forms that define them. Emerging technology will be seen to reveal and surpass the limitations of human measures built on human abilities and perception. and the social structures that are derived from them. The formation of this conceptual mapping is based on the premise that digital technology has the ability (...)
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  50. Markus Quirin, Martin Beckenkamp & Julius Kuhl (2008). Giving or Taking: The Role of Dispositional Power Motivation and Positive Affect in Profit Maximization. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 8 (1):109-126.score: 30.0
    Socio-economic decisions are commonly explained by rational cost versus benefit considerations, whereas person variables have not much been considered. The present study aimed at investigating the degree to which dispositional power motivation and affective states predict socio-economic decisions. The power motive was assessed both indirectly and directly using a TAT-like picture test and a power motive self-report, respectively. After 9 months, 62 students completed an affect rating and performed on a money allocation task (social values questionnaire). We hypothesized and confirmed (...)
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